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Virtue and Contingent History: Possibilities for Feminist Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2020

Abstract

Some feminist epistemologists make the radical claim that there are varieties of epistemically valid warrant that agents access only through having lived particular types of contingent history, varieties of epistemic warrant to which, moreover, the confirmation-theoretic accounts of warrant favored by some traditional epistemologists are inapplicable. I offer Aristotelian virtue as a model for warrant of this sort, and use loosely Aristotelian vocabulary to express, and begin to evaluate, a range of feminist epistemological positions.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 by Hypatia, Inc.

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