Journal of the History of Philosophy

Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.3 (2002) 402-404

Book Review

Berkeley et Les Philosophes du XVII^e Siècle:
Perception et Scepticisme

Richard Glauser. Berkeley et Les Philosophes du XVII^e Siècle: Perception et Scepticisme. Sprimont: Mardaga, 1999. Pp. 352. Paper, NP.

One of the central criticisms Berkeley makes of his materialist opponents is that they are inevitably committed to skepticism concerning both the existence and nature of physical objects. This accusation is all the more striking for its uncompromising universality. Berkeley maintains that by virtue of their distinguishing between sensible ideas and the sensible qualities they represent, all materialist philosophers of the seventeenth century are either implicitly or explicitly committed to skepticism. No less striking is the solution put forward by Berkeley as the only possible remedy: the rejection of material substance and identification [End Page 402] of sensible qualities (and the sensible objects they compose) with mind-dependent ideas of sense.

In this excellent study of the historical context of Berkeley's philosophy, Glauser examines these two contentions, arguing that they are united by a common thread: the epistemological role of ideas in early modern theories of perception. Specifically, Glauser argues that during the seventeenth century there is a transformation of ideas from representational acts into mental objects that are numerically distinct from the mind's perceptions of them. According to Glauser, this partial reification of ideas makes possible Berkeley's allegation that all materialist theories of perception are inherently skeptical, since it leaves them open to the charge that the only genuine objects of perception are ideas. Second it paves the way for Berkeley's idealist response to skepticism—a response that consists in part in completing the process of reification of ideas by attributing to them certain features, such as a real distinctness from the perceiving mind, that his predecessors had reserved for sensible qualities.

Glauser poses two questions that set the agenda for his study. First, what specifically is the role of ideas in the perceptual theories of Berkeley's predecessors, and to what extent is Berkeley justified in characterizing their theories as irremediably skeptical? Second, what is the relation between the "partially reified" ideas of later representational realists such as Malebranche and Berkeley's idealism?

In response to the first question, Glauser undertakes a careful and thorough analysis of the epistemological role of ideas in the theories of perception of Berkeley's major predecessors. It is here that Glauser's book is especially compelling. Glauser provides a subtle and nuanced account of sense perception and the possibility of perceptual knowledge in Descartes, Arnauld, and Malebranche. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Glauser finds that Berkeley's accusations of skepticism are largely unfounded. But this in turn raises the question of how Berkeley could have seriously misread the main figures of the previous century. Glauser argues persuasively that Berkeley's blanket condemnation is more comprehensible if viewed in the context of seventeenth-century debates concerning the nature of ideas. In the case of ontological skepticism Glauser examines the legacy of Descartes's failed attempt to provide a rational foundation for our knowledge of the existence of the material world in the Sixth Meditation and of Malebranche's insistence that belief in its existence can be justified only by appeal to divine revelation. With respect to epistemological skepticism, Glauser gives special attention to Arnauld's charge that in Malebranche's system the material world is imperceptible, as well as to similar arguments in Locke's Examination. If a good deal of this material has been discussed elsewhere, Glauser's readings of these debates is careful and almost always convincing. It is also comprehensive. Indeed, it is no small virtue of Glauser's book that he emphasizes the important influence of lesser-known figures such as Foucher and Bayle, who were instrumental in transforming specific criticisms of Malebranche into sweeping condemnations of representative realism in modern philosophy.

However, one relative weakness of Glauser's discussion is that while he acknowledges the obvious influence of Locke, almost all of the detailed exegesis is...