Abstract
Section 1 discerns ambiguity in the word “truth”, observing that the term is used most naturally in reference to truth-bearers rather than truth-makers. Focusing on truths-as-truth-bearers, then, it would appear that alethic realism conflicts with metaphysical realism as naturalistically construed. Section 2 discerns ambiguity in the purporting of truth (as in assertion), conjecturing that all expressions, not just those found in traditionally recognized opaque contexts, can be read intensionally (as well, perhaps, as extensionally). For instance, we would not generally want to say that “The Matterhorn is 4,500 m high” expresses the same truth as “The Matterhorn is 14763.7795276 feet high” (or that it is true in the same range of utterance contexts), even though the two are extensionally equivalent. The reason is that they express different intensions.
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Notes
When I speak of extensional equivalences and apparent truth-conditions, I speak of the sorts of appearances that are widespread in the population of analytic philosophers. For an explanation as to why linguistic extensions and truth-conditions are not apparent to everyone, see Saka (2007).
It may be objected that “awake to” is implicitly an attitude predicate, so in line (2) “the morning star” does not appear in a genuine transparent context. For (2) to evoke or imply someone’s attitude, however, does not mean that (2) denotes or expresses any attitude; the literal semantics of “awake to” does not qualify it, under orthodox theory, as an opaque context. What’s more, other examples can be found that take us even further from attitude predicates (e.g. Jennifer Saul’s “Superman left the phone booth” versus “Clark Kent left the phone booth”).
“It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision,” says Aristotle, “just so far as the nature of the subject admits” (Nicomachean Ethics I.3).
Terminological diagnoses and stipulations are more than intellectual masturbation. If intensionalism is correct, and possibly even if it isn’t, language influences our perceived reality and helps to frame issues. In that case, it’s worth inquiring into the terminology we have and deliberating over reforms.
This paper benefitted from contributions by Amy Copland, Steven Crowell, Tim Huber, and Bert Koegler, and to them I am grateful.
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“The truth,” says Oscar Wilde, “is rarely pure and never simple” (The Importance of Being Earnest).
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Saka, P. Rarely Pure and Never Simple: Tensions in the Theory of Truth. Topoi 29, 125–135 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-009-9072-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-009-9072-5