Abstract
Using Coffa's paper as a point of departure, this brief note is designed to show that Hempel's inductive-statistical model of explanation implicitly construes explanations of that type as defective deductive-nomological explanations, with the consequence that there is no such thing as genuine inductive-statistical explanation according to Hempel's account. This result suggests a possible implicit commitment to determinism behind Hempel's theory of scientific explanation.
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Salmon, W.C. Comments on ‘Hempel's ambiguity’ by J. Alberto Coffa. Synthese 28, 165–169 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485233
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485233