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A metarepresentational theory of intentional identity

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Abstract

Geach points out that some pairs of beliefs have a common focus despite there being, apparently, no object at that focus. For example, two or more beliefs can be directed at Vulcan even though there is no such planet. Geach introduced the label ‘intentional identity’ to pick out the relation that holds between attitudes in these cases; Geach says that ’[w]e have intentional identity when a number of people, or one person on different occasions, have attitudes with a common focus, whether or not there actually is something at that focus’ (Geach in J Philos 64(20):627–632, 1967). In this paper, I propose a novel theory of intentional identity, the triangulation theory, and argue that it has considerable advantages over its principal rivals. My approach centers on agents’ metarepresentational beliefs about what it takes for intentional attitudes to be about particular objects.

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Notes

  1. The beliefs in question have more than one putative target. Hob’s belief is directed at a witch and Bob’s mare and Nob’s belief is targeted at a witch and Cob’s sow. This is a feature of Geach’s example that we can harmlessly sidestep. When I talk of the target of the beliefs, I should be understood as meaning the relevant target. In scenarios like (a) the relevant target is the witch.

  2. I will only be concerned with cases involving beliefs, but a good theory of intentional identity ought to be adaptable to cases involving other intentional attitudes. The account offered in this paper can easily be generalized to desires, fears, etc.

  3. See, for instance, King (1993), Cumming (2014) and Lanier (2014).

  4. Another relevant approach to the intentionality of beliefs and to attitude ascription sentences comes out of discourse representation theory (DRT). See, for instance, Kamp (2013). There are interesting connections between this approach and intentional identity though, for reasons of space, exploration of these must be left to one side for the present.

  5. The account of intentional identity I propose below might be taken as a way of developing a counterpart theoretic account like that of Glick and van Rooy. One might take my theory as an account of the relevant counterpart relations.

  6. As I mention below, I do not think that the difference in the truth conditions of sentences like (1) and (3) are the only evidence for the sort of phenomenon to which Edelberg brings attention.

  7. An agent’s conception of a putative target can change over time, so the triangulation conditions they lay out for that putative target may also change. The index that makes the g-relation relative to an agent’s triangulation conditions in the schema (T), discussed below, should be understood as relativizing the g-relation to an agent at a time. The cases I consider here do not involve a change in the triangulation conditions an agent lays out, so the g-relation being relative to a time will not make a difference.

  8. This schema is adapted to handle beliefs with only one relevant putative target. If the triangulation theory is to handle beliefs with more than one relevant target, there will be an even more general variant on (T) which will be relativized to a particular target of A.

  9. If the triangulation theorist thinks, contra Geach, that (1) also commits its utterer to a witch in some sense, then they should claim that (1) says two things in the same way that (8) does. They should also claim that in both cases the g-relation should be understood triangulation theoretically while a distinct story should be told about the commitment to a witch.

  10. I have in mind a pretense theory of fictional reference roughly in line with the views developed and defended by Walton (1990), Kroon (1994, 2003), and others.

  11. This move is analogous to moving from a purely causal theory of reference to a causal descriptivist theory of reference of the sort defended by, for instance, Lewis (1984, 1997), Kroon (1987, 2009), and Jackson (1998, 2010).

  12. Even if I am wrong about how different agents’ triangulation conditions are invoked in language, the triangulation theory will still have this advantage. Since there are many g-relations, the theory leaves room for some sort of shift between the g-relations invoked by (1) and (3). Unlike some of its rivals, the triangulation theory allows for shiftiness, and this would be true even if I am wrong about the details of how things shift.

  13. Again, I am led to consider whether Glick’s view is really a rival of mine. Glick also allows for a kind of shiftiness and is, for this reason, able to handle Edelberg cases in a somewhat similar way. For the purposes of this paper, I am open to the possibility that triangulation conditions laid out by agents could be taken as determining the appropriate counterpart relations to which Glick appeals.

  14. Thanks to Daniel Nolan, Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Alan Hájek, David Braddon-Mitchell, Philip Pettit, David Ripley, Tim Crane, Laurie Paul, R. A. Briggs, Edward Elliott, Jessica Isserow, Clare Due, Lachlan Umbers, two anonymous referees for Synthese, and audiences at the University of St Andrews, the Australian National University, Macquarie University, the University of Minho, and the University of Cambridge for helpful feedback and discussion on the material in this paper.

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  1. School of Philosophy, Australian National University, H.C. Coombs Building, Canberra, 2600, Australia

    Alexander Sandgren

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Sandgren, A. A metarepresentational theory of intentional identity. Synthese 196, 3677–3695 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1609-3

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