Biotechnology, the Limits of Norton's Convergence Hypothesis, and Implications for an Inclusive Concept of Health

Abstract

Bryan Norton proposes a “convergence hypothesis” stating that anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists can arrive at common environmental policy goals if certain constraints are applied. Within his theory he does not, however, address the consideration of nonconsequentualist issues, and, therefore, does not provide an argument for the convergence between consequentualist and nonconsequentualist ethical positions. In the case of biotechnology, nonconsequentualist issues can dominate the debate in both the fields of environmental ethics and bioethics. I argue that, the convergence hypothesis must be rejected when tested against the case of biotechnology, and this limitation of convergence applies to any theory of reconciliation within the “health” concept because the achievement and preservation of “health” emphasizes a consequentualist outlook. I conclude that an inclusive ethics for ecosystem and human health should be explicit about this limitation.

Introduction

The aim of this article is to comment on the feasibility of the development of an inclusive concept of health. Such a concept is to be both derived from our understanding of human and ecosystem health and based on the consideration of bioethics and environmental ethics. This project requires us to overcome at least the following two problems:

• Environmental ethics cannot be represented by a single theory. Arguably, the most important disagreement within environmental ethics exists between anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric (ecocentric) ethical positions.¹ This disagreement is fundamentally important to the project of finding an inclusive concept of health because the promotion of human health and ecosystem health have affinities with anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric ethical positions, respectively.

• Finding an inclusive concept of health requires an understanding of the meanings of the concepts human health and ecosystem health. This is challenging not only because these concepts are still under rapid development but also because they can be analysed from both descriptive and normative viewpoints.

In this article I focus my attention on the first problem: the prospect of reconciling anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric positions. I show that this analysis also informs the discussion of the second problem: the understanding of the meaning of the concept ecosystem health from a normative viewpoint.

At least two authors, Bryan Norton and James Sterba, address the prospects of the reconciliation of anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric environmental ethics.² Norton 1986, Norton 1991, Norton 1997a addresses the prospects of reconciliation between anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric positions with his convergence hypothesis vis-à-vis environmentalists. He specifies tight constraints on the outlook of anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists that are required for convergence to occur. His proposal is modest in the sense that Norton restricts it to the policy level—he does not claim that the metaethical debate can be resolved easily; instead he doubts the importance of resolving this debate in the context of practical environmental issues. Nevertheless, the unity among environmentalist that Norton envisages as the product of this type of convergence would be a first step toward the unification of human and ecosystem health goals.

Sterba (1994) contrasts his theory with Norton's convergence hypothesis in that he not only seeks convergence at the policy level but also at the theoretical level (Sterba 1994, 241 fn3). The adoption of his Principle of Disproportionality would, however, require a significant change in the way we live our lives. Consequently, from a policy perspective, it can be considered to be more ambitious relative to Norton's convergence hypothesis.³

I focus on Norton's convergence hypothesis because the ecosystem health concept appears to be more prominent in the environmental policy arena than in the academic field of environmental ethics. Norton recently stated that “the convergence hypothesis … could be falsified, but so far it has not been” (Norton 1997a, 99). I test Norton's convergence hypothesis against the case of modern biotechnology as an environmental ethics issue and as a concrete policy problem.

I argue that Norton's convergence hypothesis must be rejected when tested against the case of the deliberate environmental release of genetically engineered organisms. In other words, anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists are unlikely to endorse a common policy over the environmental use of modern biotechnology even if the constraints specified by Norton are applied. I base my argument on the observation that Norton's convergence hypothesis emphasizes a consequentualist outlook while the ethics debate over modern biotechnology can be dominated by nonconsequentualist ethical issues. I illustrate this debate from both theoretical and empirical viewpoints. This limitation of Norton's convergence hypothesis applies to any theory of reconciliation within the health concept because the achievement and preservation of health also emphasizes (although it cannot necessarily be reduced to) a consequentualist outlook. I conclude that an inclusive ethics for ecosystem and human health needs to be explicit about this limitation.