Epistemic relativism and the problem of the criterion
Highlights
► This paper highlights parallels between contemporary epistemic relativism and the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. ► The paper provides an overview of the problem of the criterion in the work of Sextus Empiricus. ► Treatment of relativism in history and philosophy of science draws on the problem of the criterion. ► A particularist response to the problem of the criterion may meet the challenge of relativism.
Introduction
What is the relationship between scepticism and epistemic relativism?
Though the distinction is not always clearly drawn, scepticism and epistemic relativism reflect opposing philosophical tendencies. The sceptic casts doubt on the existence of knowledge and justified belief. This leads either to outright rejection of knowledge and justified belief or to suspension of judgement with respect to their existence. By comparison with the sceptic, the relativist is a model of tolerance. All cultures and practices have equal status. In the epistemic sphere, the relativist takes knowledge and justified belief to depend upon the epistemic norms employed in a given culture or local context. The norms of epistemic justification and knowledge vary with the context in which beliefs or knowledge-claims are formed. What is rejected as incorrect belief in one context may legitimately constitute knowledge or justified belief in another.
In this paper, I highlight a parallel between a classic argument for scepticism and recent treatments of epistemic relativism in the history and philosophy of science. I seek to show that influential treatments of epistemic relativism by relativist and non-relativist authors alike turn in vital ways on an argumentative strategy inherited from Pyrrhonian scepticism. The strategy is sometimes known as the diallelus, though it is more widely known under the name of the problem of the criterion. In addition, a more general form of the strategy is also sometimes known as Agrippa’s trilemma. The strategy presents a fundamental challenge to the justification of beliefs on the basis of epistemic norms. The challenge arises by confronting the proponent of an epistemic norm with the threat of an infinite regress of justification or a circular defence of the norm in which the norm is employed to justify itself.
Despite the distinction between scepticism and relativism, the dependence of epistemic relativism upon a sceptical form of argument has implications for how the threat of relativism is to be met. Philosophers often respond to the threat by appeal to universal epistemic norms or by providing an account of the objective warrant of such norms. But the connection between epistemic relativism and the problem of the criterion suggests that an alternative route lies open before us. For if there is a way to respond to the sceptical argument, then this response may likewise be employed to address the issue of relativism. At the end of this paper, I will suggest that the epistemological particularist response to the sceptic proposed by Roderick Chisholm offers significant promise as the basis of a response to epistemic relativism.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I present the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion after noting further relativistic themes in Pyrrhonism. In Section 3, I illustrate the use of patterns of reasoning analogous to the problem of the criterion in the work of significant figures in recent history and philosophy of science. In Section 4, I offer general remarks by way of conclusion, and briefly indicate how appeal to Chisholm-style particularism may defuse the threat of epistemic relativism.
Section snippets
Pyrrhonian scepticism and the problem of the criterion
While there is disagreement among scholars on points of detail, it is customary to distinguish between two forms of scepticism found in Greek antiquity, Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism. Academic scepticism, the form of scepticism that came to be associated with Plato’s Academy in the centuries after his death, is typically understood to deny the possibility of knowledge. For this reason, Academic scepticism was sometimes described as “negative dogmatism”, since it seemed to be committed to
Relativism and the problem of the criterion
In the previous section, we explored the ancient sceptical problem of the criterion. While scepticism and epistemic relativism pull in opposing directions, I wish to show that there is a connection between the sceptical problem of the criterion and recent treatments of epistemic relativism. In this section, I will document this connection in the work of key figures in the recent history and philosophy of science.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have explored the connection between an ancient sceptical argumentative strategy and treatments of epistemic relativism in recent history and philosophy of science. In this final section, I will offer some general remarks by way of conclusion. I will also briefly situate the issue within the context of the approach to epistemic relativism that I favour, and for which I have argued elsewhere.
I have sought to show that some significant treatments of epistemic relativism in the
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2012, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part ACitation Excerpt :This, in summary form, is the problem of the criterion. I have discussed the problem at greater length in Sankey (2011), and will not repeat that discussion here. It is an argument of this form which, in my view, constitutes the foundation for contemporary epistemic relativism.