

CORRIGENDA

Hugh J. McCann

Paralysis and the Spring of Action

PHILOSOPHIA Vol. 23 Nos. 1-4 (1994) 193-205.

On page 194, line 28, and on page 196, line 13,

replace “necrologic” by “neurologic”;

on page 196, line 12, replace “usual” by “unusual”;

on page 198, line 11, replace “baste” by “basic”;

on page 200, line 4, replace “t” by “it”;

on line 6, replace “Timex” by “time”, and on line 18,

replace “Caren” by “Green”;

on Page 205, list of references, add the following:

McCann, Hugh (1972). “Is Raising One’s Arm a Basic Action?”,

Journal of Philosophy 89, pp. 235-249.

McCann, Hugh (1974). “Volition and Basic Action”,

Philosophical Review 83, pp. 451-473.

Howard Sankey

The Semantic Stance of Scientific Entity Realism

PHILOSOPHIA Vol. 24 Nos. 1-2 (1994) 405-415.

Add Notes:

- ¹ The label ‘scientific entity realism’ appears to be due to Ellis [1979, p. 45, fn. 15].
- ² I follow Devitt in describing a version of scientific realism cast in terms of truth as semantic. Devitt [1984, p. 34] appears to take any construal of realism which makes use of the notions of truth or reference to be a semantic thesis, and elsewhere explains that a doctrine is semantic if it is “part of a theory of meaning” [1991, p. 46]. Thus, While the notion of truth is of most present relevance, a version of scientific realism is semantic if any semantic notion occurs in its formulation.
- ³ For the distinction between causal process theories, which are ontologically committed to the entities they employ, and theories whose employment of ideal entities engenders no such commitment, see Ellis [1990].

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- ⁴ This is to reject the claim made by some redundancy theories of truth that “‘P’ is true” means the same thing as ‘P’, a claim which is difficult to sustain given that the former is about a sentence while the latter is not. For the point that the redundancy theory denies that “‘P’ is true” is a statement about ‘P’, see Horowich [1990, p. 39].
- ⁵ Of course, given the logical equivalence of ER and ER*, the truth of ER entails the truth of a semantic thesis, namely, ER*. But to say that the truth of ER entails that of ER* is not to say that once can be derived from the other without further non-logical assumptions.
- ⁶ To spell the point out more fully: take the sentence ‘Protons exist.’ Given the T-scheme, the sentence ‘Protons exist’ if and only if protons exist. But if to be true is to cohere with a system of beliefs, ‘Protons exist’ if and only if ‘Protons exist’ coheres with a system of beliefs. Substituting the latter for the former, we get: ‘Protons exist’ coheres with a system of beliefs if and only if protons exist. But this makes the existence of protons conditional on the coherence of set of beliefs. Note that similar reasoning applies to other truth-theories which make truth a matter of epistemic evaluation, such as verificationism and pragmatism.
- ⁷ There is, in general, no conflict between the mind-independence aspect of entity realism and deflationary theories of truth, such as disquotationalism, the redundancy theory, and Horowich’s minimalism.

Robert Dunn

Attitudes, Agency and First-Personality
PHILOSOPHIA Vol. 24, Nos. 3-4 (1995) 295-319.

Replace all occurrences of ($\$x$) and ($\p) by the corresponding existential quantifiers, ($\exists x$) and ($\exists p$) respectively.