Abstract
George Bealer has provided an elaborate defense of the practice of appealing to intuition in philosophy. In the present paper, I argue that his defense fails. First, I argue that Bealer’s theory of determinate concept possession, even if true, would not establish the “autonomy” of philosophy. That is, even if he is correct about what determinate concept possession consists in, it would not follow that it is possible to answer the central questions of philosophy by critical reflection on our intuitions. Furthermore, I argue that Bealer’s account of determinate concept possession in fact faces serious problems. Accordingly, I conclude that Bealer does not succeed in vindicating the appeal to intuition in philosophy.
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References
Bealer G. (1996) A priori knowledge and the scope of philosophy. Philosophical Studies 81: 121–142. doi:10.1007/BF00372777
Bealer, G. (1998). Intuition and the autonomy of philosophy. In M. R. DePaul & W. Ramsey (Eds.), Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry (pp. 201–239). Rowman and Littlefield.
Bealer G. (1999) A theory of the a priori. Philosophical Perspectives 13: 29–55
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Sarch, A. Bealer and the autonomy of philosophy. Synthese 172, 451–474 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9402-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9402-y