Abstract
This is a precis of my book Causation and Free Will. I go over the main features of my compatibilist account of free will, which is based on the actual causes of our behavior.
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References
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Sartorio, C. Précis of Causation and free will. Philos Stud 175, 1513–1516 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1056-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1056-0