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J.S. Mill and market harms: a response to Endörfer

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2023

Ben Saunders Open the ORCID record for Ben Saunders [Opens in a new window]
Ben Saunders*
Affiliation:
Politics and International Relations (B58), University of Southampton, Highfield Campus, Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK
*
Email: b.m.saunders@soton.ac.uk
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Abstract

Endörfer has recently argued that proponents of the harm principle are wrong to exempt market harms as potential justifications for state interference. I argue that – contrary to suggestions in Endörfer’s article – John Stuart Mill did not exempt market harms from his harm principle. On Mill’s view, the state can (as a matter of principle) legitimately interfere with free markets to prevent market harms where they occur but, on the whole, it is better policy not to interfere. Mill’s general preference for free trade rests on utilitarian considerations and not on his harm principle, which does not exclude market harms.

Keywords

EndörferharmJ.S. Millmarkets
Type
Reply
Information
Economics & Philosophy , First View , pp. 1 - 6
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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