Abstract
I formulate and defend two sceptical theses on specific parts of our modal knowledge (unqualified and absolute modalities). My main point is that unqualified modal sentences are defective in that they fail to belong unambiguously to specific modal kinds and thus cannot be evaluated; hence, we must be sceptical of beliefs involving them.
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Notes
See Van Inwagen (1998). I believe that some of the arguments advanced in, for example, Geirsson (2005) and Hawke (2011) do not directly apply to my version of SUM. Contrary to what Van Inwagen claims in his paper, I do not identify philosophically relevant modal beliefs with unqualified modal propositions.
Van Inwagen (1998: 72).
Van Inwagen (1998: 72).
Van Inwagen (1998: 82, note 9).
Van Inwagen (1998: 76).
Hawke (2011: 2).
Even if modal premises in philosophical arguments are not qualified each time they are used, this does not mean that they cannot be qualified. A certain amount of investigation may well yield the requisite qualification. I am thus sympathetic towards recent proposals that suggest that modalities that are involved in philosophical discussions can be justified or warranted. See, for instance, Geirsson (2005), Williamson (2007), Biggs (2011), Hawke (2011).
Divers (2002: 8).
See Divers (2002: 4).
If, in a Stalnakerian fashion, we take the ‘common ground’ of a conversation to be what determines the presuppositions of the linguistic exchange, then we can say that the relevant modal kind K for a speaker S is determined by what S believes is accepted and that it is common belief among the members of the conversation that K is accepted (as the relevant modal kind). See Stalnaker (2002) for more details on the notion of presupposition.
SUM does not entail that qualified modal claims within a specific context that are derived from such unqualified modal claims are not evaluable: precisifications of unqualified modal claims, like vague predicates, can be evaluated (and beliefs about them eventually warranted). See Williamson (1994) and Keefe (2000) for the notion of precisification in the context of theories of vagueness.
Divers (2002: 245).
Grim (1997: 150). Unless explicitly stated, I follow Grim’s version of the argument.
See Jubien (2001) for a related concern directed at George Bealer’s account of propositions. According to Bealer, propositions are primitive abstract entities, not reducible to sets of possible worlds or functions from possible worlds to truth-values. The crucial part of Bealer’s theory of interest here is his anti-existentialism about propositions, that is, the claim that it is not necessary for a proposition to exist that its constituents (whatever these are) exist as well. Now, Jubien argues that this does not square well with the requirement that propositions should represent. More specifically, one proposition is true (and thus, it should correctly represent) in case what this proposition is actually about is the case or does occur. It does not seem to be an accident that a proposition has certain representational features, even if only because it would have a different truth value. Jubien argues that a proposition cannot possess representational properties as a result of something external, for then these same features would not be essential to the proposition itself. According to Jubien, the general point is that it makes little sense to attribute representational properties to propositions intended as abstract primitives. Obviously, there’s more to say about this issue. See Bealer (1998) and Hanks (2009) for relevant discussion.
See Hale (1996).
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to the anonymous reviewers of the journal. This work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund of 2011.
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Sauchelli, A. Modal Scepticism, Unqualified Modality, and Modal Kinds. Philosophia 40, 403–409 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9335-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9335-4