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WHAT IS SAID AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY; GRICE'S
PROJECT AND RELEVANCE THEORISTS' CRITICISMS

One of the most important aspects of Grice's theory of conversation is the drawing of a borderline between what is said and what is implicated. Grice's views concerning this borderline have been strongly and influentially criticised by relevance theorists. In particular, it has become increasingly widely accepted that Grice's notion of what is said is too limited, and that pragmatics has a far larger role to play in determining what is said than Grice would have allowed. (See for example Bezuidenhout 1996; Blakemore 1987; Carston 1991; Recanati 1991, 1993, 2001; Sperber and Wilson 1986; Wilson and Sperber 1981.) In this paper, I argue that the rejection of Grice has moved too swiftly, as a key line of objection which has led to this rejection is flawed. The flaw, we will see, is that relevance theorists rely on a misunderstanding of Grice's project in his theory of conversation. I am not arguing that Grice's versions of saying and implicating are right in all details, but simply that certain widespread reasons for rejecting his theory are based on misconceptions.¹

Relevance theorists, I will suggest, systematically misunderstand Grice by taking him to be engaged in the same project that they are: making sense of the psychological processes by which we interpret utterances. Notions involved with this project will need to be ones that are relevant to the psychology of utterance interpretation. Thus, it is only reasonable that relevance theorists will require that what is said and what is implicated should be psychologically real to the audience. (We will see that this requirement plays a crucial role in their arguments against Grice.) Grice, I will argue, was not pursuing this project. Rather, I will suggest that he was trying to make sense of quite a different notion of what is said: one on which both speaker and audience may be wrong about what is said. On this sort of notion, psychological reality is not a requirement. So objections to Grice based on a requirement of psychological reality will fail.

¹ For an excellent discussion which raises many serious problems still facing Grice, see Davis (1998). For responses to some (but not all) of these problems, see Saul (2001).



Once Grice's project and that of relevance theorists are seen as distinct, it will be clear that they can happily coexist.² They are simply discussing different subject matters. One may start to wonder, however, about who is really discussing *what is said*, a topic that both camps claim. I will not attempt a conclusive answer to this question. But I will suggest that Grice's view, despite certain shortcomings, has advantages which seem all too often to have gone unnoticed.

1. WILSON AND SPERBER'S EARLY ATTACK ON GRICE

The best known work by relevance theorists is, of course, Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson's book, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* (Sperber and Wilson 1986). But although it is clear that they view Grice's version of the saying/implicating distinction as a competitor to theirs (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 183), and that they prefer their own version of this distinction, they are not very explicit in their criticism of Grice on this point. An earlier paper of theirs (Wilson and Sperber 1981), contains much more detailed attacks on Grice's views. This paper, I will argue, involves systematic misunderstandings of both the overall aims of Grice's work and the details of his theory. As we turn later to relevance theory in Part 2, we will see that these misunderstandings persist, and continue to colour relevance theorists' thoughts about Grice.

2. WILSON, SPERBER, AND GRICE: AUDIENCE INTERPRETATION

2.1. *Wilson and Sperber on Grice's Goals*

Wilson and Sperber (1981) begin with the claim that, in his theory of implicature, "Grice seems to be attempting to provide a framework into which every aspect of the interpretation of an utterance can be fitted" (1981: 156). In their first footnote, they mention that "Grice's theory is in fact an account of how utterances are interpreted . . ." (1981: 175, footnote 1). They claim that the distinction between what is said and what is implicated is meant to be crucial to understanding interpretation, and that Grice takes it that "every aspect of interpretation can be assigned to one

² More cautiously: they can happily coexist so far as this conflict goes. There are, of course, other conflicts that might prevent happy coexistence. One example of such a conflict is over the role in the audience's reasoning of the supposition that the speaker intends her intention to be recognised. For more on this conflict see Bach (forthcoming).

or the other category” (1981: 156).³ Wilson and Sperber, then, are very explicit that they take Grice’s goal to be that of accurately describing the process by which utterances are interpreted. Their own goal, they state, is “to do greater justice to the processes involved in the interpretation of utterances” (1981: 156). It is very clear throughout the paper that their concern is with what interpretations audiences actually arrive at, and with how (psychologically) they get to these interpretations. Their improvement on Grice, then, is meant to be the provision of a better description of the utterance interpretation process.

2.2. *Grice’s Real Goals*

All of the above represent serious misunderstandings of Grice’s goals. An accurate description of the utterance interpretation process would be a wonderful thing to have, and pursuing it is a very worthwhile project. But it was not Grice’s project. Grice’s theory of implicature was formulated as a response to what he saw as the excesses of Ordinary Language Philosophy. In particular, it was meant to provide a corrective to the tendency to argue too swiftly from facts of usage to facts of meaning. (See Grice 1989: “Prolegomena”.) Grice’s immediate goal was to find a way to defend the traditional understanding of logical vocabulary like ‘and’ which could respect the facts of ordinary usage rather than dismissing them as faults of an imperfect natural language. Nowhere does he cite as a goal that of giving a psychologically accurate description of utterance interpretation.

Grice, of course, had plenty of other language-related interests. Aside from his theory of implicature, he famously provided a theory of meaning based upon speaker intentions. From this foundation, he attempted to provide an understanding of what is said by a sentence, which was based upon what speakers in general mean when they use that sentence. This line of Grice’s thought, then, was fairly strongly grounded in the role of speaker intentions, and in generalisations about such intentions. None of this work had as its goal accurately describing or explaining the interpretation process, and it would have been a poor way to go about doing such things. The process of interpretation is one that the *audience* engages in. The audience will of course attempt to discover speaker intentions, and will draw upon her beliefs regarding generalisations about such intentions, but the audience does not have access to the speaker’s actual intentions, and may well be wrong in her generalisations. A theory based around actual speaker intentions and true generalisations about these intentions

³ This view of Grice’s project has had a strong influence on other relevance theorists. Blakemore (1987: 22), for example, echoes it almost exactly.

is unlikely to yield a psychologically accurate description of audience interpretation processes.

We have seen that Grice's stated goals did not include that of providing an accurate description of the utterance interpretation process. Nonetheless, it could turn out that an examination of his theory of conversation would reveal this to be one of his interests. But this is not so: as will see, a brief look at what Grice says about conversational implicatures and about what is said reveals that these notions, as he understood them, are singularly unsuited to describe the interpretation process.⁴

2.3. *Grice on Implicature*

Grice's most famous characterisation of conversational implicature includes requirements relating to both the speaker and the audience (1989: 31).

[One] who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that *p* has implicated that *q*, may be said to have conversationally implicated that *q*, provided that (1) he is presumed to be following the conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, *q* is required to make his saying or making as if to say *p* (or doing so in *those* terms) consistent with this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required.

The presence of clause (3) guarantees that there will be cases in which the audience is wrong about what is conversationally implicated. Imagine, for example, that I believe my student Fred to be applying for a job as a typist. I write a reference for him, discussing only his typing abilities and punctuality, as I think these are the traits his potential employers are interested in. I actually think that Fred is a fine philosopher, but I don't take that to be relevant to his prospective employers' concerns. Sadly, I've been misinformed, and Fred is applying for a philosophy job. The audience will take me to have conversationally implicated that Fred is a poor philosopher. But I certainly did not think that the audience was capable of working this out from my utterance – I don't believe that Fred is a poor philosopher, and if I'd thought the audience would arrive at this conclusion, I would not have made the utterance that I did. Clause (3), then, fails to be satisfied. This means that my utterance did not implicate that Fred is a poor philosopher. The audience, then, is wrong about what was implicated. Further, it is Grice's deliberate and explicit inclusion of non-audience-oriented criteria which brings this about. Grice's own explicit characterisation of conversa-

⁴ I discuss Grice's views on implicature in more detail in my (2002).

tional implicature makes it clear that this notion is unsuited to describing the actual interpretations audiences arrive at.⁵

2.3.1. *Grice on saying*

According to Grice, what is said by a sentence is in large part a matter of conventional meaning. (See, for example, Grice 1989: 87–88.) In addition, however, Grice gestures at the involvement of contextual factors in determining the referents of indexicals and in disambiguation, which he takes to be aspects of what is said. (See, for example, Grice 1989: 89.) Finally, Grice requires that what is said must be meant by the speaker (Grice 1989: 87–88). This, for Grice, is a matter of speaker intentions. If what the speaker means differs from the sentence's conventional meaning, then she only makes as if to say what that sentence conventionally means. What matters to our purposes is the broad outline that he gives, and this is one according to which what is said by a sentence will be in large part a matter of linguistic meaning and speaker's intentions.⁶

2.4. *Audience Interpretation, Saying, and Implicating*

All this guarantees that audiences will sometimes be wrong about what is said. This seems like a reasonable thing to want to ensure, but also possibly rather unsurprising and therefore uninteresting. It has important consequences, however. As illustration, consider the following case, which occurred in London in 1999. A black actress and singer, Patti Boulaye, who was running for office as a Conservative Party candidate, was quoted as having uttered sentence (1).⁷

⁵ Grice does discuss possible processes of audience interpretation (see, for example 1989: 31), but his focus is on the *possibility* of such interpretation processes, rather than on the question of what processes actually take place. This is indicated by the fact that the discussion is a discussion of calculability of implicatures, and Grice clearly indicates that calculation like that which he describes need not actually take place. (For more on calculability, see 3.1 below.)

⁶ It is genuinely unclear whether Grice would allow other factors to play a role in determining what is said, as he does not discuss the determination of indexical reference or disambiguation in much detail. What is clear, however, is that linguistic meaning and speaker intentions are the only determinants of what is said that we can be sure he would accept.

⁷ The correction, from *The Guardian*, 18 March 1999, reads as follows:

... In the course of the article we quoted Ms Boulaye ... as saying: 'This is a time to support apartheid ... I mean people say "Why didn't you support it when it was in government?" Because it would have been the fashionable thing to do so. This is the time to support apartheid because it's unfashionable'. What Ms Boulaye actually said was 'a party', meaning the Conservative Party. At no time during the interview was apartheid mentioned. The journalist concerned misheard Ms Boulaye's remarks but then asked no follow up questions

- (1) This is the time to support apartheid because it is unfashionable.

The sentence she actually uttered was (1*).

- (1*) This is the time to support a party because it is unfashionable.

The audience, a *Guardian* reporter, took Boulaye to have said what is generally said by utterances of (1).⁸ But, according to both common sense and Grice's theory, this is not what she said. For Grice, this fails to be said both because Boulaye did not intend it and because it conflicts with the conventional meaning of the sentence that she in fact uttered. We have, then, a case in which the audience is wrong about what is said. It is perhaps worth noting further that an audience may be wrong about both what is said and what is implicated, at the same time. Indeed, this is likely to happen when an audience is wrong about what is said. In the example above, the reporter might well have taken Boulaye to be implicating that she supports apartheid. Since, however, Boulaye did not think that the audience could work this out from her utterance (to put it mildly), Grice's third necessary condition for conversational implicature failed to be fulfilled. Boulaye did not implicate that she supported apartheid, and the audience was therefore wrong about what was implicated.

Grice's theory, then, makes it very clear that audiences can be wrong both about what is said and about what is implicated. And this is where the important consequences come in. If the audience is wrong about what is implicated, then what is implicated is not a part of the audience's interpretation, and it needn't play any role at all in the interpretation process. The same is true regarding what is said. These notions, then, as understood by Grice, are very poorly suited to providing an accurate descriptive theory of the interpretation process. Indeed, it is clear that accurately describing the audience's interpretation will require some additional notions – audiences still have interpretations of utterances when they are wrong about both what is said and what is implicated. Given all this, it's quite unlikely that the notions of what is said and what is implicated are meant to encompass "... every aspect of the interpretation of an utterance ...", as Wilson and Sperber suggest (1981: 156).

about what she thought she heard. The offense was compounded by the picking out of part of these misheard remarks as a subsidiary heading

Boulaye later successfully sued for libel. I am extremely grateful to Chris Hookway for bringing this story to my attention.

⁸ I'm abstracting here from issues regarding indexical reference, as they are not relevant to the point.

Wilson and Sperber, then, are wrong about Grice's goals. We see this both from what Grice says about his goals and from the nature of Grice's theories, which would be very poorly suited to accomplishing the goals that they attribute to him. We will see that this confusion is at the heart of relevance theorists' objections to Grice's notions of what is said and what is implicated. Once Grice's theory is clearly seen to have a different subject matter from that of relevance theorists, the objections lose their force.

2.5. *Wilson and Sperber's Problem Cases*

Wilson and Sperber discuss two kinds of cases which they take to pose problems for Grice's understanding of what is said. They start from the following understanding of Grice on what is said (1981: 156):

What is said (in our terms, what proposition the utterance is taken to express) is largely determined by linguistic rule, while what is implicated is largely determined by social and other maxims.

Reference assignment and disambiguation

The first sort of case Wilson and Sperber discuss concerns the determination of reference for indexicals, and disambiguation. What is said, they rightly note, is crucially affected by what reference an indexical term has and by what meaning is given to an ambiguous word. These factors, though a part of what is said, are not determined by linguistic rules alone. Wilson and Sperber argue persuasively that the maxims of conversation are likely to play an important role in the audience's reasoning about indexical reference and disambiguation. These phenomena, they suggest, pose three problems for Grice.

- (i) Since the conversational maxims play an important role in determining what proposition the audience takes the speaker to have expressed, they play an important role in determining what is said. This, they argue, falsifies the claim that "the maxims play no role in determining what is said", which they attribute to Grice (1981: 156).
- (ii) The role of the maxims in the audience's interpretation process also counts against the claim that "any aspect of interpretation governed by the maxims must be analysable as a conversational implicature", another claim that they attribute to Grice (1981: 156).
- (iii) The fact that there are elements of what is said that "are not explicitly given by semantic rule but implicitly determined by the context and the maxim of relevance" shows that "[t]he semantics-pragmatics distinction cross-cuts the distinction between saying and implicating". (1981: 156)

Wilson and Sperber are right that indexical reference determination and disambiguation represent elements of what is said which are not given by a linguistic rule, and they may well be right that the audience will use the conversational maxims in trying to figure out what has been said. But they are wrong to think this poses problems for Grice.

Objection (i) involves an important mistake concerning Grice's notion of what is said. As we have seen, Grice does not take what is said to be the proposition that the audience takes to have been expressed – the audience can quite easily be wrong about what is said. So involvement of the maxims in determining what the audience takes to have been said does not show involvement of the maxims in determining what has been said.⁹

The claim attributed to Grice in (ii) is one that he never made, and would almost certainly reject. He is quite clear that the conversational maxims follow from general principles of cooperative behaviour, and he nowhere suggests that their role in conversation should be limited to implicatures. This would be an odd limitation for him to make, given that he takes them (or their close correlates) to be involved in all kinds of cooperative endeavours, including car-fixing and cake-baking (Grice 1989: 28–29). The idea that the maxims should play a role in the audience's reasoning about what is said would probably be quite congenial to him.

In (iii) Wilson and Sperber's own description of Grice's view (Wilson and Sperber 1981: 156) rightly indicates that Grice only requires that what is said be *largely determined* by linguistic meaning. There is nothing odd, then, about the revelation that there are aspects of what is said which fail to be "explicitly given by a semantic rule". This is just what should be expected, and what Grice himself clearly expects. This is well-illustrated by the discussion of applied timeless meaning in "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions" (Grice 1989).

2.5.1. *Further contextual involvement*

Next, Wilson and Sperber discuss an example in which John Smith is playing the violin, and one audience member utters (2) to another.

(2) John plays well.

⁹ It is not actually out of the question that the maxims should play some role, for Grice, in determining what is said in such cases. As noted earlier, Grice does not commit himself to any particular view on how such reference is determined, and he could certainly allow the maxims some involvement in this.

They claim that the utterance would naturally be interpreted as expressing the proposition expressed by (3). (I am not so sure that this claim is right, but I will grant it for the sake of this discussion.)

(3) John Smith plays the violin well.

They rightly note that reference assignment for 'John' (John Smith rather than any of the other Johns) and disambiguation of 'plays' (plays a musical instrument rather than plays a game) are the sorts of issues already addressed in the discussion of reference assignment and disambiguation. But elements of the interpretation corresponding to 'the violin' (henceforth, *the violin*) are another matter, and one that they think poses serious problems for Grice.

Wilson and Sperber claim that "Grice's framework forces us to ask whether in cases like the above the speaker of [(2)] SAID [(3)], or merely implicated it" (1981: 158). (Emphasis theirs.) They argue that neither answer is satisfying because:

- (a) The claim given by (3) appears to be cancellable,¹⁰ which indicates that it is an implicature; but
- (b) The claim made by (3) provides the basis from which implicatures will be worked out, so it cannot be an implicature.

Both of these considerations are problematic. (a) is simply mistaken, as cancelability is meant to be necessary but not sufficient condition for conversational implicature.¹¹ This is clear in Grice's original presentation, in which he introduces cancelability as simply a feature which conversational implicatures "must possess" (1989: 39). It is even clearer in Grice's later discussion, in which he notes that he never meant to be giving a decisive test for conversational implicature (1989: 42–43). An appearance of cancelability, then, cannot be taken as decisive evidence that a claim is implicated. Finally, no arguments are offered in support of the claim that (3) provides the basis from which implicatures will be worked out. This claim is far from obvious.¹² These objections, then, are rather weak.

¹⁰ Roughly, a purported implicature that *p* is cancellable if the speaker can go on to assert that not-*p* without contradiction. So, "Someone threw a grenade and I got hit" (an utterance from Bob Dole) would usually implicate that the thrower was not the speaker. But the speaker could continue with "in fact, it was me" without contradiction. (In fact, it turned out that the incident Dole was describing was one in which he was throwing a grenade which accidentally exploded.) The implicature, then, is cancellable.

¹¹ Strangely, Sperber and Wilson seem aware of this. They note that reference assignment and disambiguation give rise to similar phenomena, and that Grice counts them as part of what is said.

¹² In addition, one might wonder whether it really is right to suppose that implicatures cannot generate implicatures. I thank Kent Bach for discussion of this point.

I suspect, however, that other considerations, prominent in the rest of the article, are actually the driving force behind Wilson and Sperber's second sort of problem case. If I'm right, then the real concern arises from a conflict slightly different from the one suggested above. Wilson and Sperber claim that (2) will be taken to express [the proposition expressed by] (3). According to their rendering of Grice's theory, this means that (2) will say [the proposition expressed by] (3). But in their discussion of their first objection, they seem to suggest that there is something anomalous (on Grice's theory) about elements of what is said which are not determined by a linguistic rule. Although we have seen that this is not quite right in general, it does seem right that there would be something odd, for Grice, about *the violin* being a constituent of what is said: it is too far removed from the linguistic meaning of the sentence. If Wilson and Sperber are right that *the violin* must be a constituent of what is said, then Grice may indeed be in trouble.

Wilson and Sperber do not, however, succeed in establishing that *the violin* must be a constituent of what is said. The only suggested reason for it being such a constituent is that it is a part of what the audience takes the speaker to have said. But as we have noted, what is said is not, for Grice, the proposition that the audience takes the speaker to have expressed. That the audience takes the violin to be a constituent of the proposition expressed, then, does not indicate that it is such a constituent. Without some reason to believe that *the violin* makes it into what is said, Wilson and Sperber's problem for Grice disappears.¹³

Wilson and Sperber are simply pursuing a different project from Grice's, and their projects can happily co-exist. Wilson and Sperber are seeking a theory of utterance interpretation. Grice is not. They are right that Grice's theory would be a bad theory of utterance interpretation, but this needn't worry Grice, as utterance interpretation was not his concern. Moreover, much of what they say in this discussion about how utterance interpretation works would probably be quite acceptable to Grice.¹⁴

2.6. *Saying and Audience Interpretation*

It is perhaps important to note at this point that Wilson and Sperber are wrong not only about Grice's theory, but also – it seems to me – about

¹³ As a matter of fact, there may be no problem for Grice even if Wilson and Sperber are right that *the violin* makes it into what is said. For more on how a Gricean could accommodate this, see Francois Recanati's excellent discussion in *Direct Reference* (1993), pp. 256–258.

¹⁴ Of course the portions of their work in which (for example) they reject the Gricean Cooperative Principle and maxims would presumably not be acceptable to Grice.

saying.¹⁵ They write that what is said is “what proposition the utterance is taken to express” (1981: 156). This claim is crucial to their objection (i) and to the second reconstruction I have given of their *the violin* objection. But it is seriously at odds with our ordinary notion of saying. The Boulaye example serves nicely to hint at this but the point can be brought out even more strongly by considering an utterance Clinton made when the Lewinsky sex scandal first started to emerge. Clinton famously uttered the words, “there is no sexual relationship”. For a brief time (slightly longer in the UK than in the US), this was taken as a denial that there had ever been a sexual relationship. Then Clinton’s audience began to remember how carefully he speaks. Gradually, everyone realised that Clinton had not denied the sexual relationship, and demand grew for him to make a full denial. What people had realised was that what Clinton had *said* would be true even if there had been a sexual relationship in the past. And this, everyone agreed, was what he’d said, even though his audience failed to realise it at the time. The audience did not take Clinton to have said this until some time after his utterance. Yet nobody suggested that what Clinton said had changed, or that the later reflections on what he said must be wrong. Quite the opposite: everyone realised that they were originally wrong about what Clinton had said.

One might suppose this means simply that there was a very long interpretation process, and that the audience’s interpretation should really be taken to be the final one. However, it might have been the case that a naive public failed to arrive at this final interpretation, and stuck with the original one. This would not have changed what Clinton said.

A final problem for the view that audience interpretation determines what is said comes with the fact that audiences may have different interpretations. If a naive portion of the public never arrived at the temporally-limited interpretation of what Clinton said, while a cynical portion of the public did, would Clinton have said two different things? Or nothing at all? Neither of these seems remotely plausible. Intuitively, the audience’s interpretation does not determine what Clinton said.

So Wilson and Sperber are wrong to claim that what is said is “what proposition the utterance is taken to express” (1981: 156). But it is also reasonable to suppose that they do not really hold this view: it is, after

¹⁵ What is at stake in this section is related to that which is under discussion in recent debates regarding “semantic minimalism”. It might seem that in this section I am defending a minimalist semantics. However, my focus here is somewhat narrower – my interest is in attacking the claim that what is said must be psychologically real to the audience. One could deny this claim and oppose a minimalist semantics – arguing, for example, that speaker meaning must make extensive contributions to what is said in a way that goes well beyond semantic minimalism.

all, strikingly implausible. The first thing to note about this worry is that, whether or not they hold this view, it does play a vital role in some of their arguments. If they don't hold this view, then, this gives us all the more reason to abandon these arguments. (The other arguments, we have seen, should be abandoned for independent reasons.)

Even if we do not read Wilson and Sperber as committed to the view just discussed, they are clearly committed to the view that what is said must be part of the audience's interpretation. That is, even if the audience interpretation does not *determine* what is said, it is clear that being part of the audience's interpretation is (for them) a *necessary condition* for being said. In fact, this might be a more charitable way of reading their stronger, less plausible claim discussed above. (Though it is not clear to me that it can play the argumentative role that the less plausible claim does.) It is worth noting, then, that this claim, too, seems to be false.

If it were true, then an audience's misunderstanding of a person's utterance would prevent them from saying what they meant to say, even if they uttered all the right words. (They might turn out to have said nothing, or they might turn out to have said what the audience took them to say, or perhaps something else entirely. But they could not say what they meant to say, as that was not a part of the audience's interpretation.) On this view, Clinton did not *say* what we now take him to have said until we arrived at that interpretation. If we had never arrived at that interpretation, he never would have said it. This seems very odd. Again, there will be problems with audiences who come up with multiple interpretations – it's unclear whether anything would be said in such cases. What is clear, however, is that we don't require that that what is said must be a part of the audience's interpretation.¹⁶

Grice's theory, on which we can all be wrong about what someone has said, respects this intuition. A theory of saying built on the goal of accurately describing the utterance interpretation process will not. This helps also to show us why we shouldn't be surprised that Grice's theory doesn't do well as a theory of utterance interpretation. If it did, it wouldn't accomplish his goals. Grice's goal is not to offer an account of how we work out what is said either in general or on any particular occasion. In-

¹⁶ The view I've argued for here – that audience interpretation should not have an impact on what is said – is also defended by Kent Bach in his (2001a, b). His argument draws (compellingly, I think) on intuitions about cancelability, and about which pairs of sentences *say the same thing*. Bach argues that these intuitions support Gricean views about what is said by certain utterances, rather than those suggested by relevance theorists. He suggests, I think correctly, that relevance theorists and their followers have neglected intuitions like these, which count against their views. My argument above differs importantly from Bach's in drawing directly on intuitions about whether audience interpretation affects what is said.

stead, his theory can be understood as an account of when we are *right* about what is said. These are different topics, and they require different theories.¹⁷

2.7. Persistence of Confusion

The misunderstandings of Grice itemised above persist in later work by Wilson and Sperber, including their best known work, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* (1986). Although *Relevance* is mostly devoted to the articulation of their own positive view, Sperber and Wilson do offer a summary of how their view is meant to improve on Grice's views concerning what is said and what is implicated (italicised emphases mine, bold theirs):

First, he [Grice] does not envisage the kind of enrichment of logical form involved, for instance, in *interpreting* 'will' as **will very soon**; he treats comparable cases, for instance the *interpretation* of 'and' as **and then** in some contexts, as cases of implicature. Most Gricean pragmatists assume without question that any pragmatically determined aspect of utterance *interpretation* apart from disambiguation and reference assignment is necessarily an implicature. In fact, recent work has shown that a number of problems with classical analyses are resolved when the 'implicatures' are reanalysed as pragmatically determined aspects of explicit content. (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 183)

In this summary, Sperber and Wilson suggest that their view is superior to Grice's because it better captures certain facts about utterance interpretation. Since Grice's goal was not that of explaining utterance interpretation, this is no objection to Grice. Next, they claim that Griceans are committed to classifying all aspects of utterance interpretation other than disambiguation and reference assignment as implicature. This is surely false. We can see this by reflecting again on the example of my reference letter for Fred (2.2.1): what the audience took to be implicated was a part of their interpretation, but it is not, on Grice's understanding, an implicature. Their final claim, that there are benefits to treating certain cases (which Grice would classify as implicatures) as part of explicit content, deserves fuller discussion, and will receive it in 3.2.

¹⁷ It's probably worth noting here that Grice's view does not perfectly capture our ordinary notion of saying: he requires that what is said be meant by the speaker, and we do not generally do this. When someone mis-speaks, we take them to have *said* the wrong thing, while Grice would take them not to have said anything. My point above is simply that relevance theorists' requirements do not seem right, and arguments built on them should be rejected. Grice's theory may still need revision, but not for the reasons that relevance theorists give.

3. CARSTON, PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY, AND GRICE

The difference in goals between Grice and the relevance theorists, and the confusion this gives rise to, can be seen in the work of other theorists building on the work of Sperber and Wilson. As an illustration, I will discuss the work of Robyn Carston.

3.1. *Carston's Theoretical Framework*

Carston's objections to the standard Gricean distinction between what is said and what is implicated turn, broadly, on the claim that the principles commonly used to draw this distinction are not "appropriate principle[s] for a PSYCHOLOGICALLY plausible theory of utterance interpretation" (Carston 1991: 39 – her emphasis). If what I have argued here is right, this is no objection to Grice, as giving a psychologically plausible theory of utterance interpretation was not his goal. Rather, a psychologically plausible theory of utterance interpretation – different from Grice's theories of what is said and what is implicated – can exist alongside Grice's own theories. As the theories will be theories about different subject matters, there need be no conflict.

This misunderstanding of Grice's project affects the specifics of Carston's objections as well. In her discussion of Gricean conversational implicatures, she notes that they must be calculable.¹⁸ As she summarises this, "something isn't an implicature if it isn't possible to give an account of a reasoned derivation of it based on the assumption that the speaker is observing pragmatic principles" (1991: 35). She argues that such an inference process requires the implicature and what is said (the 'explicature' in her terminology) to function independently in the hearer's mental life. This, she says, requires that what is implicated cannot entail what is said. Otherwise, what is said "is redundant, playing no independent role in inference" (1991: 35). This requirement she dubs the "Functional Autonomy" requirement. From this requirement, she builds an argument that a great deal more of what is said than Grice would have expected must be contextually determined. We needn't actually go into the details of this argument in order to see that it is mistaken.

A first, not very interesting, problem with the argument is that Carston is wrong about what is required for propositions to have independent roles in a thinker's mental life. Propositions which stand in entailment

¹⁸ Grice's calculability requirement: "The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as an implicature" (Grice 1989: 31).

relations to one another can perfectly well play such independent roles. If this weren't the case, logical and mathematical proofs would be either utterly pointless endeavours or impossible. So concern with the independent functioning of implicatures and what is said does not lead to Carston's Functional Autonomy requirement.¹⁹

More importantly, Carston is wrong to claim that Calculability requires what is said and what is implicated to function independently in a hearer's mental life. Grice's Calculability requirement is simply that it must be possible to give a reconstruction of how an implicature *might* be calculated. He is quite explicit that the implicature may in fact be 'intuitively grasped' (Grice 1989: 31). It is hard to see how this sort of a requirement demands that what is said and what is implicated should in fact function independently in the audience's mental life. I suspect that the reason Carston takes calculability to require this is that she is taking Grice's theory to be a theory of the utterance interpretation process. If it were such a theory, some sort of functional independence requirement (though not, as we've seen, precisely the one she formulates) would perhaps seem reasonable.²⁰

3.2. Carston on 'and'

Sperber, Wilson, and Carston suggest that abandoning Grice's conception of what is said and what is implicated helps to solve certain problems faced by Gricean theories. Now we will turn to this suggestion. The most commonly cited example of such an improvement on Grice's theory is

¹⁹ Recanati (1991: 110–111) and Garcia-Carpintero (2001: 113) object to this principle for other reasons.

²⁰ It seems to me that Francois Recanati makes some of the same errors that Wilson, Sperber, and Carston do. In particular, he argues that calculability demands that "we have *distinct conscious representations* for 'what is said' and for 'what is implicated' by a given utterance" (1993: 245). Recanati seems to demand such conscious psychological representations of both the utterer and the audience. He uses this demand for psychological reality (which clearly includes the audience's conscious representation of what is said as a necessary condition) to motivate his Availability Principle (1993, 248): "In deciding whether a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance meaning is part of what is said, that is, in making a decision concerning what is said, we should always try to preserve our pretheoretic intuitions on the matter". In a later paper (Recanati 2001: 80) he makes it clear that the relevant 'we' for the Availability Principle are the speaker and the hearer, rather than the theorists (as it might seem from the earlier discussion). My arguments above, against the claim that what is said must be psychologically real to the audience, if successful, undermine the motivation Recanati gives for his Availability Principle. Kent Bach (2001a, b) also argues against Recanati's Availability Principle, suggesting both that there is no reason to expect ordinary speakers to be sensitive to the saying/implicating distinction, and that once they are sensitised to the distinction their intuitions will be far more Gricean than relevance theorists and Recanati have supposed. (See also note 16 regarding Bach's arguments.)

Carston's analysis of 'and'. Griceans argue that 'and' always has just its logical meaning, and thus that sentences like (4) and (4*) express the same proposition, as do sentences like (5) and (5*).

- (4) Georgina and Horace got married and had children.
- (4*) Georgina and Horace had children and got married.
- (5) The President was impeached and his popularity rating went up.
- (5*) The President's popularity rating went up and he was impeached.

According to the Gricean story, the suggestions of temporal order in (4) and (4*), and of causal relationships in (5) and (5*), are merely implicated rather than said. These implicatures comes about via the maxim of manner, as speakers are generally expected to list events in the order in which they occurred, and to cite causes before effects. To do otherwise would be (in most cases) to violate the maxim of manner, so utterances of the sentences above will generally carry suggestions of temporal order and causal relationship as conversational implicatures.

It is commonly thought to be problematic for Grice that a sentence like (6) seems as though it might be true, even if Georgina and Horace are married with children. (See, for example, Cohen (1971); Neale (1992).)

- (6) If Georgina and Horace got married and had children, then the traditionalists will respect them; but if Georgina and Horace had children and got married, then the traditionalists will not respect them.

One way for (6) to be true is if the antecedents of both conditionals are false (for example, if neither Georgina nor Horace has ever been married). But even if Georgina and Horace are married, and do have children, it seems that (6) could be true. Yet, if the Gricean story is correct, it cannot be. For on that story all suggestions of temporal order are implicated rather than said; so (6) is of the form *If P then Q; but if P then not-Q*. If P is true, then such a claim must be false.

Carston's proposal is that the suggestions of temporal order in (4) and (4*), and of causal relationships in (5) and (5*), are a part of what is said rather than of what is conversationally implicated. According to her account, they are pragmatically determined elements of the propositions

expressed, which are not called for by any constituents of the sentences expressing them (much like *the violin* in Sperber and Wilson's story about (2)). This allows her to maintain both that 'and' always has only its strict logical meaning and that (4) and (4*) and (5) and (5*) may differ in what they say, and thus in truth value. The same move allows her to maintain that (6) may be true even if Georgina and Horace are married with children. She suggests that the propositions expressed by the two conjuncts contain different pragmatically supplied indicators of temporal order (in their antecedents), and so say different things.

If the Gricean was without the resources to explain the intuition that (6) may be true even if Georgina and Horace are married with children, there would indeed be reason here to prefer Carston's story. Carston claims that this is the case (1991: 45):

Those who wish to maintain an implicature analysis have to say that the alleged temporal ... implicatures contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance in which they occur, that is, to the explicit content (what is said) since they follow Grice in the view that the explicature is another term for the truth-conditional content of the utterance.²¹

The assumption here seems to be that the Gricean has no choice but to find a story on which (6) expresses a truth (even if Georgina and Horace are married with children). But this is obviously not so. Just as the Gricean argues that our intuitions regarding (4), (4*), (5), and (5*) derive from implicatures, Carston may argue that our intuitions regarding (6) derive from implicatures. That is, she may – and should – maintain that (6) cannot be true if Georgina and Horace are married with children, but that it implicates a proposition which may be true, that expressed by (6*):

- (6*) If Georgina and Horace got married and *then* had children, then the traditionalists will respect them; but if Georgina and Horace had children and *then* got married, then the traditionalists will not respect them.

The Gricean can offer a perfectly reasonable explanation of how this implicature is produced, one which turns on the maxim of manner. The explanation will precisely parallel the one given above. So, *contra* the claims of relevance theorists, Grice's theory can explain this sort of example.

²¹ The final clause of this quotation is slightly strange, as Grice does not use the term 'explicature', nor do Grice's followers. But once 'what is said' is substituted for 'explicature', Carston's meaning seems clear enough. It is worth noting that Carston's free substitution of 'explicature' for Grice's 'what is said' is a very clear indication that she does not take her subject matter to be different from Grice's.

The Gricean only appears unable to explain examples like (6) if we assume that what is said must be a psychologically real part of the audience's interpretation process. Once this assumption is abandoned, we see that Gricean theory has a viable response to this sort of objection. Again, we have an objection based on misunderstanding Grice's project.

3.3. *Expansion*

Carston argues that there are many other sorts of cases in which the proposition a Gricean would take to be expressed by an utterance of a sentence cannot be what is said by that sentence. This argument turns on examples like (7).

- (7) The park is some distance from where I live.

Carston notes that the proposition a Gricean would take to be expressed by an utterance of (7) (one which is truth conditionally equivalent to that expressed by "my home and the park are not contiguous") is trivially true.²² Carston argues that such a proposition cannot be what is said because "it's very unlikely that that's what a speaker wants to convey on a given occasion of utterance or that that's what a hearer would take her to be saying. If this was all the speaker was saying, she wouldn't be observing pragmatic principles which enjoin relevance and informativeness" (1991: 40). She continues her case against the Gricean view by noting that what would be said on a Gricean construal of the utterance would not have any function in the mental life of the hearer. She supports this claim with her functional independence criterion: "[What the Gricean takes to be said] is entailed by the implicature: if the park is further away from my house than the hearer had been assuming, it follows that it is some distance or other from my house" (1991: 40). There are two objections here, which I will address separately.

First, Carston argues that the speaker could not be observing Gricean maxims and still be saying only the suggested Gricean proposition. The problem with this claim is that a key way of generating implicatures, according to Grice, is to violate maxims at the level of what is said (1989: 33–34). Consider a typical Gricean example, in which I write a letter of reference for a poor student applying for a philosophy job, containing only the sentence, "Ignatius is an excellent skydiver with good oral hygiene". By doing this, I hope to convey the message that Ignatius is not a good philosopher, but without actually saying such a thing. A letter like this,

²² Actually, it's not so clear that a Gricean needs to hold this view. See again Recanati's discussion (1993: 258).

according to Grice, says something irrelevant. It is this irrelevance which makes it possible work out the far more relevant implicature, *Ignatius is not a good philosopher*. Generating implicatures in this manner is a standard way of being cooperative. Using the uninformative “the park is some distance from where I live” to implicate something more informative, such as, *the park is further away from where I live than you think*, fits perfectly into this standard pattern. So this argument fails: a speaker can perfectly well be cooperative by saying something trivial and implicating something non-trivial.²³

Carston’s next argument concerns the audience more directly. We’ve already seen reason to dismiss her Functional Autonomy requirement, when formulated in terms of entailment. In addition, I have argued that Carston is wrong to argue for the more general claim that Grice’s calculability requirement demands that what is said and what is implicated have independent functional roles in the hearer’s mental life. The fact that the audience will (most likely) not at any point explicitly entertain the trivial proposition that the Gricean takes to be said by (7) in no way counts against the claim that it is said. In order to maintain that it is said, all the Gricean needs to show is that some richer implicature, like, *the park is further away from where I live than you think*, could be calculated from it – not that it actually is so calculated. Once we see that Grice is not providing a theory of the psychology of utterance interpretation, it becomes clear that objections like this one cannot succeed.

3.4. Underdetermination

Carston will also serve as our example of a final sort of argument against Grice. According to this line of thought, utterances of many sentences, like “Jane can’t continue”, require extensive contextual supplementation (what

²³ A different argument one might make - which Carston perhaps also intended – stems simply from the claim that it’s implausible to suppose that a speaker could mean anything like *the park and my home are not contiguous*. Since Grice does require speakers must mean what they say, it would then follow that the speaker could not have said anything like *the park and my home are not contiguous*. As I have already noted (see footnote 17), Grice’s requirement that speakers must mean what they say is one which not many would accept, and which should perhaps be rejected. Bach (1994, 2001a, b) offers a solution to this problem which involves rejecting this claim of Grice’s. It’s worth noting also that this argument would be an odd one for Carston to make, given her audience-centred framework. With this in mind, it might be more natural to interpret even this argument as concerned with the audience – concern with the plausibility of the speaker saying that *p* would then be read as concern that the audience would never be able to figure out that the speaker said that *p* (given the implausibility of the speaker saying this). This wouldn’t produce an argument very different from the second one that I discuss above.

is it that Jane can't continue doing?) in order to express truth-evaluable propositions. Thus, what is said by utterances of such sentences requires more contextual supplementation than a traditional Gricean would allow.²⁴ At first blush, this objection does not seem to stem from concerns about psychological reality. But now consider why it is that we should think these sentences don't express complete propositions. As Emma Borg (manuscript) has argued, one could perfectly well view an utterance of this sentence as expressing a complete proposition, one which is true just in case there's something that Jane can't continue doing. A Gricean could accept this, and claim that the more substantive material communicated (Jane can't continue with her studies, Jane can't continue humming Eurovision songs, etc.) is communicated by way of implicatures. So why does Carston reject this view of what is said by the utterance? She is not explicit on this point, but in her discussion of the example (1991: 35–36), she focuses exclusively on what claims will form part of the audience's interpretation. Nowhere in this interpretation do we find a claim which is true just in case there is something that Jane can't continue doing. This seems to be Carston's reason for thinking that no such claim could be what is said by the utterance. This reason for rejecting Borg's view of what is said turns out to derive, once more, from the requirement that what is said must be psychologically real to the audience. Since we have already seen that this requirement should be rejected, we no longer have good reason for rejecting the traditional Gricean's (or Borg's) view on what is said.²⁵

²⁴ Again, this is not necessarily so. Arguably, a Gricean could allow quite a bit of contextual supplementation in what is said by an utterance of such a sentence. See for example Recanati's discussion (1993: 258). It becomes even easier for a Gricean or a minimalist to accept such supplementation if they agree with Carston that without it no proposition would be expressed. If that is the case, then such supplementation is in accord with the minimalist principle Recanati has called the Minimal Truth-evaluability Principle (1993: 242), which maintains that contextually determined aspects of meaning can be a part of what is said if they are needed in order for the utterance to express a proposition. (Some Griceans might accept this sort of principle, though others (like Bach 1994, 2001a, b) are more restrictive.) Carston herself notes (1991: 39) that what is required by this example is not really very radical.

²⁵ One might also argue that Borg's view on what is said should be rejected because what is said must be meant by the speaker, and the speaker would not mean that *there is something that Jane can't continue doing*. (I actually don't find it very strange to suppose that this might be amongst the things that the speaker means, but I am aware that others might.) But, given the audience-centered discussion of the example in her paper, this is not a plausible argument to attribute to Carston. Since few accept the view that speakers must mean what they say, this argument should not carry much weight with others either.

4. THE RELEVANCE-THEORETIC ALTERNATIVE

Relevance theorists have offered a positive alternative to Gricean theory, which seems at first glance to be able to accommodate some of the concerns I have been raising. We'll see, however, that the same sort of confusion found in relevance theorists' interpretations of Grice colours their positive theory as well. The result of this confusion for the positive theory is inconsistency.

According to relevance theorists, what is said and what is implicated will both be parts of (what they call) the *correct interpretation of an utterance*. The notion of correct interpretation is logically prior, for them, to the notions of what is said and what is implicated. The correct interpretation of an utterance, according to Sperber and Wilson, is the first one that the audience arrives at which is consistent with the principle of relevance. The principle of relevance states: "Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance" (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 158). Relevance is understood as a ratio of cognitive effects²⁶ to processing effort.

The obvious question now is what is required for consistency with the principle of relevance. We will see that Sperber and Wilson offer conflicting answers to this question. However, these answers can only be seen to conflict with one another when we look closely at some cases of imperfect communication. Once we do this, we will see that Sperber and Wilson are trying to accomplish too many disparate goals with one notion. (In what follows, I will be focussing exclusively on the notion of consistency with the principle of relevance, without attention to which bits of the correct interpretation are said and which bits implicated. These issues do not even begin to arise until the correct interpretation is arrived at.)

Audience Version

Sperber and Wilson, as we have seen, are very much concerned with the audience's interpretation process. They make it quite clear that they take consistency with the principle of relevance to play an important role in this process (1986: 185):

The hearer should choose the solution involving the least effort, and should abandon that solution only if it fails to yield an interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance.

The process described in this quotation is one which only makes sense if audiences are able to discern whether or not an interpretation is con-

²⁶ Cognitive effects are: (1) interaction with audience's prior assumptions to 'yield new implications'; (2) contradiction of existing assumptions leading to their abandonment; and (3) strengthening the audience's confidence in existing assumptions (Carston 1991: 42).

sistent with the principle of relevance. We will see that this requirement conflicts with Sperber and Wilson's other claims about consistency with the principle of relevance.

Speaker Version

One counterintuitive consequence of focussing only on audience interpretation, we have already seen, is that the audience's interpretation of an utterance may bear little relationship to what the speaker takes herself to be communicating. (Think, for example, of *The Guardian's* reporting of Boulaye's comment.) Sperber and Wilson (1986) seem to some extent to share this concern, as they offer an understanding of consistency with the principle of relevance which takes the speaker's perspective into account (1986: 169):

To be consistent with the principle of relevance, an interpretation does not have to be optimally relevant to the addressee; it must merely have seemed so to the communicator.²⁷

The problem with this move is that whether or not a speaker takes an interpretation to be optimally relevant is not something to which audiences have access. Take, for example, the case of Jocasta, who is obsessed with the Kennedy assassination, and takes every conversation she wanders into to be concerned with it. She utters (8), having given no indication to her audience that she is thinking about the Kennedy assassination. (She doesn't think she needs to indicate this, as she falsely believes that everyone is talking about it all the time.)

(8) The grassy knoll is the answer.

She thinks the most relevant interpretation of her utterance will be something like (8*).

(8*) The grassy knoll provides the key to the truth about the Kennedy assassination.

Unfortunately, Jocasta's audience has been discussing where to have their picnic lunch, and they take her to be proposing that they dine on the nearby grassy knoll. The interpretation that Jocasta takes to be maximally relevant

²⁷ One might offer an alternative reading of this claim by taking 'the communicator' to be the *rational* communicator. But if we do this, it doesn't make much sense to talk about how the interpretation *seemed* to that communicator in cases in which the actual communicator was not rational. Since Sperber and Wilson want their theory to cover failed as well as successful communication, such cases must be accounted for, and we can't even begin to account for them on this reading.

is not one to which the audience has any kind of access. The audience has no way to know that this is the interpretation Jocasta takes to be maximally relevant, and so no way to know that this is the interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance. They cannot, then, use consistency with the principle of relevance as a guide in their interpretation process.

Rational Speaker Version

Cases like this make it somewhat appealing to suppose that what really matters is not what strange speakers like Jocasta think, but what rational speakers would think. Sperber and Wilson also offer an understanding of consistency with the principle of relevance which reflects this concern (1986: 166):

Let us say that an interpretation is *consistent with the principle of relevance* if and only if a rational communicator might have expected it to be optimally relevant to the addressee.

On this definition, an irrational communicator could well be wrong about whether or not an interpretation is consistent with the principle of relevance. Jocasta, in the example above, is just such a speaker. The interpretation she takes to be optimally relevant is not the interpretation that a rational communicator would have taken to be optimally relevant. This definition, then, is in conflict with the previous one.

In addition, it conflicts with what Sperber and Wilson say about the audience interpretation process. Whether or not a rational speaker would take an interpretation to be optimally relevant may also be something to which audiences lack access. This can happen in at least two ways. First, the audience may fail to be rational and thus be wrong about what rational utterers would do. (To see this, imagine that Jocasta is the audience for an utterance of (8) made by one of the picnickers. Jocasta will take the utterance to concern the Kennedy assassination even though a rational utterer would not take this to be the optimally relevant interpretation.) Second, the audience may be wrong about the utterer's epistemic situation. Suppose that I have just left a concert hall in which I heard Kevin give a brilliant performance on the triangle. I run into some acquaintances whom I take to be emerging from the same concert and I utter (9).

(9) Kevin plays well.

The interpretation that I, quite rationally, think my audience will arrive at is (9*).

(9*) Kevin plays the triangle well.

However, unbeknownst to me, my acquaintances are on their way to a meeting (which they falsely take me to be attending as well) to decide who

should play on the local water polo team. So for them, quite rationally, the most relevant interpretation will be (9**).

(9**) Kevin plays water polo well.

The interpretation that I, a rational speaker, took to be consistent with the principle of relevance, is not one to which the audience has access – through no fault of theirs. If this version of consistency with the principle of relevance is assumed, then, the notion cannot play the role it is meant to in the audience's interpretation process.

It is perhaps worth noting in addition that adopting the 'rational speaker' version of consistency with the principle of relevance means accepting that the correct interpretation may in fact have no psychological reality at all: there is no guarantee that either speaker or audience will arrive at the interpretation which a *rational* speaker would take to be maximally relevant. So this version of consistency with the principle of relevance is one that conflicts not only with Sperber and Wilson's other claims specifically about consistency with the principle of relevance, but also with relevance theorists' overarching concern with the psychological reality of what is said and what is implicated.

5. CONCLUSION

The speaker's and the audience's perspectives on communication are importantly different. Due to lack of knowledge of relevant information, failures of rationality, and simple carelessness, communication is often less than perfect. In imperfect cases, the speaker's and audience's views about what is said will differ. It is important to note also that their views of what is said may differ from what really is said. It is this third notion, one which allows room for errors by both speaker and audience, that was Grice's focus in his work on saying and implicating. Relevance theorists' objections to Grice miss their mark by focussing too much on the audience's perspective. Their objections, potentially very good ones to Grice's theory as a theory of audience interpretation, do not succeed against Grice's theory as a theory of saying and implicating. Relevance theorists' own alternative is also marred, I've suggested, by a failure to keep separate the speaker's perspective, the audience's perspective, and what is really said or implicated. In this case, however, the failure is not one of focussing exclusively on the audience's perspective. Instead, the problem is that, while they take note of and want to accommodate all three perspectives, they try to do so with a single notion. This leads, we have seen, to incoherence. Once we

are careful to view these perspectives as distinct ones, we can see that their objections give us no reason to reject Grice's views, and that their own view, as it stands, does not succeed. Both projects, however – Grice's and relevance theorists' – can be pursued alongside each other rather than in competition.²⁸

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