Abstract
The dominant methodological assumptions in climate ethical debates are rational-individualistic. The aim of this paper is to examine whether the rational-individualistic methodological framework is compatible with a theory of moral responsibility for climate change. I employ three fitness criteria of moral agency: (1) a normatively significant choice, (2) sufficient knowledge and (3) control. I demonstrate that the rational-individualistic methodology does not provide a framework in which rational agents meet the three criteria. I conclude that rational-individualistic agents are not fit to be held morally responsible for climate change. The paper demonstrates that the dominant climate-ethical view rests on a methodology that does not allow for a conceptualisation of a moral agent of climate change.
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Notes
The discussion of control touches upon the philosophical debate on determinism and free will (Fischer and Ravizza 1998). In the present context, control refers to whether relevant choices are available within what is referred to later in this paper institutional behavioural spaces.
A theory is indirectly self-defeating ‘when it is true that, if someone tries to achieve his theory-given aims, these aims will be, on the whole, worse achieved’ (Parfit 1984, 5). The theory is not directly self-defeating if it remains rational for one to aim to achieve the theory-given aims (Parfit 1984, 13). Furthermore, self-interest theories are directly collectively self-defeating ‘when it is true that, if all of us successfully follow the self-interest theory, we will thereby cause our theory-given aims to be worse achieved than they would have been if none of us had successfully followed the self-interest-theory’ (Parfit 1984, 53).
A critical point of the rational-individualistic methodology should be added. It can be questioned whether it makes sense to discuss the moral significance of the future in economic discount rates. Why should the moral significance of the future and future people be dependent on an economic and rational theory of valuing? Most commonly, discount rates differentiate events temporarily. However, as Parfit rightly points out, it is a mistake to discount values for pure time. The fact that negative consequences may be temporarily (or geographically) remote does not make them less likely or less important. Indeed, when applied farther to the future, many predictions become more likely. Alternatively, people could discount for probability. Again, as Parfit explains, it may be rational to be less concerned about the more remote effects of our current acts and behaviour, but this would never occur because these effects are more remote. Rather, the reason for less concern would be because they are less likely to occur. In other words, if effects are likely to occur, it is rational to discount for them. Following this line of argument, we ought to be equally concerned about the predictable effects of our acts, whether these will occur in one, one hundred, or a 1000 years (Parfit 1984, 483–486).
The prisoner’s dilemma explains the occurrence of social coordination problems when (1) agents have complete information, e.g. they know the full structure of the game and the plausible outcomes, and (2) communication between the agents is forbidden or impossible. Consider the example illustrated in Matrix X below. Two persons are questioned separately about a joint crime. The attorney suggests two alternatives to each prisoner: confess to the crime or not confess. If neither confesses, they will both receive 2 years’ punishment for some minor crime [B, B].
Matrix X
Agent II
Agent I
A (confess)
B (not-confess)
A (confess)
10, 10
12, 0
B (not-confess)
0, 12
2, 2
If the persons both confess, they will be receive less than the most severe sentence [A, A] (see Parfit 1984, 56–60; Ostrom 1990, 3–28, 217). The initial preference ordering is [B, A], [B, B], [A, A] and [A, B] for both agents. This prisoner’s dilemma game illustrates the problem that it is impossible for the agent to choose the decision with the best outcome if she is unable to take into account the decisions of the other players. The agent’s dominant strategy is to play not-confess, but the outcome of the game depends on the choice of Agent II. Given that neither Agent I nor II knows what the other Agent plays, the initial preference ordering is unreliable and may be self-defeating.
The value of 20 units may be lower due to a decrease in marginal utility of the last 5–10 units.
An exchange situation in which the highest level of collective utility is not reached is called a Pareto-inferior exchange.
Following Ostrom, the preference function for Agent B can be represented by: u2 = π2 − δs, where π2 is payoff obtained and δs is the decrease in the value of π2 for violating the social norm (Ostrom 2005, 122).
Note that the snatch dilemma is not a test of the prisoner’s dilemma but emphasises instead the limited use of the prisoner’s dilemma in social dilemmas with common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990, 183–184).
Questions of distribution are set aside here.
By applying this institutional analysis to several empirical studies, Ostrom demonstrates that governing the commons sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails. (Ostrom 1990, 29). The explanation of success and failure can be found in the particular institutional arrangements.
Note that it is uncertain to what extent guilt and shame are effective in motivating people to engage in environmentally friendly behaviour. For further discussion (Swim et al. 2009).
To avoid discussion about to what extent it is fair to give priority to human entities over non-human entities, π(nature) and π(animals) are not taken into consideration. The subject of possible possitive effects of climate change is also set aside. Some evolutionary biologists argue that changes in the planet’s climate and atmosphere have positive consequences for new species and better living conditions for certain types of animals (Jablonski 2001, 5393–5398; de Perthuis 2011, 36).
Whereas the first two outcomes are examples of environmental pollution, the latter is an example of spatially and temporally diffused climate change; I distinguish between the two later in this paper.
By contrast, others believe that people have at least two sets of motives: one related to economics and self-interest and the other related to moral questions. If we accept this, one important challenge is to establish institutional arrangements that appeal to both sets of motives (Frey and Jegen 2000; Le Grand 2006).
To what extent it is impossible or too expensive for someone to buy an environmentally friendly car depends, of course, on her wealth. Such an expense is less expensive for wealthy people compared to poor people. This issue of financial inequality is set aside here.
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I am grateful to Simon Caney, Eva Erman and Christian Rostbøll for their comments on an earlier draft.
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I am grateful to Simon Caney, Eva Erman, Anders Berg-Sørensen, Christian Rostbøll and Fabian Schuppert for their comments on an earlier draft.
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Scavenius, T. The Issue of No Moral Agency in Climate Change. J Agric Environ Ethics 30, 225–240 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-017-9663-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-017-9663-x