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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Three of the most venerable objections to anthropomorphic conceptions of the divine are traceable to Xenophanes and his critique of the early Greek gods. Though suitably revised, these ancient criticisms have persisted over the centuries, plaguing various religious communities, particularly those of classical Christian commitment. Xenophanes complained that anthropomorphism leads to unseemly characterizations, noting that both over the ages, the list of unseemly characteristics has expanded somewhat.
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11 See Freud, Sigmund, The Future of an Illusion, Strachey, James, editor (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1964)Google Scholar, ch. III, for Freud's position. Gordon Allport develops his views in Allport, Gordon W., The Individual and His Religion: A Psychological Interpretation (New York: Macmillan, 1960). See especially pp. 33 ff. and 121–5.Google Scholar
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