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BOOK REVIEWS 83 three different manuscripts, none of them Descartes's original (which is lost). An edition utilizing all three sources seemed to be called for. 2. The Crapulli edition offers (a) a careful introductory study of the three sources; (b) the Regulae in the newly established Latin text, with the Dutch translation on facing pages and the variants in the footnotes; (c) notes containing the editorial apparatus; and (d) an Appendix giving the contemporary texts relating to the Regulae more fully than does AT. 3. The Crapulli edition is superior by virtue of the meticulous care and balanced judgment that went into it, and because of its use of all three sources. One unexpected result is a much smoother, more idiomatic and therefore more readable Latin text. However, meaning is affected only in a few instances, despite the large number of new readings. Excepting trivial emendations (changed word order, better grammar, etc.) I find some twenty-two materiM changes. 0nly seven or eight of them alter the meaning significantly; none of them affects a vital text. Three examples must suffice (I cite page and line in AT, Volume X, and italicize CrapuUi's reading): 368.13 inductio/deductio; 448.26 relatum/rotatum; 46725 discursu/ decursu. 4. Scholars and translators will henceforth have to work with Crapulli's version, using their judgment where he, too, had to resort to conjecture. But Scholars are unlikely to abandon the habit of citing AT as well--it would make the use of earlier work difficult. Unfortunately Crapulli does not give a tabular concordance between his edition and AT (though he indicates the AT pagination), and the complex organization of his book makes correcting one's AT volume extremely time-consuming and tedious. It would be appropriate for the editors of the revised AT edition to provide such a concordance. Meanwhile a short list of the more significantnew readings may be obtained from this reviewer. Ga~ott SEnsA Emory University Convenzione e Ipotesl nella Formazione della Filosofia Naturale di Thomas Hobbes. By Arrigo Pacchi. (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1965,Pp. xiii + 250. L. 2,500.) This volume is a detailed, critical examination of the various drafts of Hobbes's De Corpore from 1636to 1655,taking into account a series of his unpublished manuscripts that are devoted to the subject matter of that treatise. Most important among these (with presumed dates) are : De Principlls Cognitionis et Actionis (1636); Logica (1645); Philosophia Prima (De Motu, Loco, et Tempore) (1646); First Draft of De Corpore (1648-49); Revision of this version (1651); Published version, De Corpore (1655). The first of these is known only through an English summary, discovered by Mario M. Rossi and discussed by him in his L'evoluzione del pensiero di Hobbes aUa luee di un nuovo manoo scritto, in "Civilt~ Modero~", 1941. Arrigo Pacchi accepts, with most interesting implications, Rossi's interpretation that this essay must have been il risultato di quel periodo di raccoglimento che fece seguito al viaggio di Hobbes in Europa nel 1634-36,periodo nel quale il pensatore inglese cerc5 di dare una prima forma alle intuizioni che avevano occupato la sua mente durante l'intera traversata del continente, e che egli aveva (solo verbatmente, forse) communicato a Mersenne. In questa fase, il pensiero di Hobbes denuncla ancora una stratifieazione degli influssi successlvamente recevuti, dagli scolastici di Oxford a Bacone, dagli aristotelici padovani a Galileo, pur dimostrando gi~ l'indubbia originalit ~ di talune prese di poslzione che caratterizzerano la filosofia hobbesiana nell'intero arco della sua evoluzione (pp. 42-43). Pacchi then explores the various attempts of Hobbes to arrive at an adequate empirical basis for the principles of modern science, especially for the analysis of "motion, time, and 84 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY space" as presented by Galileo. The implications of Scholastic nominalism, of Grosseteste)s "metaphysics of light", of the Renaissance idea (adopted by Francis Bacon) that the mind is a mirror of nature, and the new French geometry, are all considered by Hobbes. They yield two very different philosophies of science, with both of which Hobbes works: (a) the hypothetical nature of scientific knowledge; (b) the conventional nature of its basic concepts. After several years of experimentation...

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