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Causality, referring, and proper names

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Abstract

I argue that (a) the causal theory of proper names and (b) Kripke's chain of references thesis are logically independent of each other, and that the case for (a) is very weak. I observe that rejecting (a) we lose one powerful reason for treating proper names as rigid designators. I then consider reasons for subscribing to (b), and I argue that (b) is compatible with either a rigid or a non-rigid (descriptive) semantic treatment of proper names.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, USA

    David S. Schwarz

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  1. David S. Schwarz
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Additional information

This paper has as ancestors two APA presentations: ‘A Conventional Theory of Names’, at the 1975 Pacific Division meetings in San Diego, Bernard Linsky commenting; ‘On Referring and Causality’, at the 1976 Eastern Division meetings, James Higgenbotham commenting. In its present form the paper owes much to conversations with Murray Kiteley, Herbert Heidelberger, John Searle, Christopher Peacocke, Alan Reeves, Stephen White, Ralph Kennedy, and Thomas Ballmer.

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Schwarz, D.S. Causality, referring, and proper names. Linguistics and Philosophy 2, 225–233 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00350257

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