Abstract
A measure of coherence is said to be reliability conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence (as measured) results in a higher likelihood that the witnesses are reliable. Recently, it has been proved that several coherence measures proposed in the literature are reliability conducive in a restricted scenario (Olsson and Schubert 2007, Synthese 157:297–308). My aim is to investigate which coherence measures turn out to be reliability conducive in the more general scenario where it is any finite number of witnesses that give equivalent reports. It is shown that only the so-called Shogenji measure is reliability conducive in this scenario. I take that to be an argument for the Shogenji measure being a fruitful explication of coherence.
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Schubert, S. Coherence reasoning and reliability: a defense of the Shogenji measure. Synthese 187, 305–319 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9856-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9856-6