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Hume on the Self

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Metaphysica

Abstract

In the Treatise Hume argues that a person is “nothing but a bundle of perceptions”. But what precisely is the meaning of this bundle thesis of a person? In my paper, an attempt is made to articulate two plausible interpretations of this controversial view and to identify and evaluate a number of problems for this thesis that is central to Hume’s account of the self.

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Notes

  1. One might object that trailblazers are most unlikely to draw attention to problems associated with their innovative ideas. This rejoinder strikes me as moot when one takes into account the scathing criticisms leveled by Hume against his rivals. As a philosopher more than willing to wield a critical ax against his intellectual opposition, Hume is obliged to acknowledge potential shortcomings in his own views: something he does not do in the section “Of personal identity.” And when he does come clean in the appendix and acknowledge that there are problems with his account of the self, the problems that he identifies there do not concern the status of his theory on the self but concern its justification.

  2. Hume appears to subscribe to a naïve view of science, according to which scientists need merely look for evidence that confirms their theories. Many critics of this model of science, most notably Karl Popper, point out that the failure to actively seek refutation instances to test one’s theory encourages the researcher to become highly selective in determining the status of the theory at hand. (See Popper 2002)

  3. Is this the justification that Hume would use had he to explore this issue explicitly? It is difficult to say with any precision how Hume would respond to the problems that I am alluding to here. For this reason it is prudent to couch the suggestions here as speculative proposals.

  4. Might this be a case of Hume wanting his cake and eating it at the same time? The analysis that follows will hopefully throw a little light on this issue.

  5. From this, it follows that our willingness to talk about the mind and its nature belies a fundamental problem that we ought to acknowledge—in this instance, that we literally do not know what we are attempting to talk about.

  6. One is reminded of Berkeley’s doctrine from his Principles that to be is to be perceived: esse est percipi.

  7. But precisely where does this conception of himself come from? Surely not from his impressions? For this would appear to be circular: impressions would then be asked to both serve as the means to verify his thesis on the identification of the mind with its impressions and to serve as the source of his conception of himself. Something needs to be said by Hume on this important issue. Unfortunately, he appears to be silent on the issue.

  8. It would not be verifiable at the moment, but had the singular expressions to acquire extensions in the future the identity statement would become verifiable then. In short, the identity statement is a contingent statement, dependent on the circumstances.

  9. My argument here trades on what I believe is the traditional conception of identity provided to us by Leibniz. That is to say, X can be identified with Y if, and only if the properties of X are the same as the properties of Y.

References

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Correspondence to Alan Schwerin.

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All references to the Treatise are to David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature.

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Schwerin, A. Hume on the Self. Int Ontology Metaphysics 13, 65–85 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-012-0094-x

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