Abstract
What is it to have a reason? According to one common idea, the Factoring Account, you have a reason to do A when there is a reason for you to do A which you have—which is somehow in your possession or grasp. In this paper, I argue that this common idea is false. But though my arguments are based on the practical case, the implications of this are likely to be greatest in epistemology: for the pitfalls we fall into when trying to defend the Factoring Account reflect very well the major developments in empiricist epistemology during the 20th century. I conjecture that this is because epistemologists have been—wrongly—wedded to the Factoring Account about evidence, which I conjecture is a certain kind of reason to believe.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The case, of course, comes from Williams (1981). Let me make clear, however, that Williams himself did not distinguish between objective and subjective reasons, nor even between normative and motivating reasons. Before Williams wrote there was a common false presupposition that “Humean” accounts of reasons could only account for subjective reasons, and not for objective reasons. Williams originally used the gin-and-tonic case in order to demonstrate that Humeans can account for objective reasons. But Williams’ account is designed to account for both objective and subjective reasons, under a single unified account. I don’t believe there is any such category of thing, reason, such that objective and subjective reasons are two sub-varieties of reasons. So I am drawing conclusions based on careful consideration of Williams’ case that he would not himself endorse.
It is not, however, a distinction between two kinds of reason; see footnote 1.
“If we do speak in this way, of motivating and normative reasons, this should not be taken to suggest that there are two sorts of reason, the sort that motivate and the sort that are good. There are not. There are just two questions that we use a single notion of a reason to answer” Dancy (2000, p. 2). Yet Dancy allows that there are good reasons that fail to motivate because agents don’t have them, and allows that not all reasons that agents have and which motivate them are good reasons. So despite his denials, he does seem to believe in two senses of “reason”. I infer that what he really means by saying that there are not “two sorts of reason” is that though there are two senses of “reason”, they are closely related by being different manifestations of reasons—a third relation which is the common denominator between normative and motivating reasons. Dancy has assented to this characterization of his view in personal conversation.
At the very least, the evidentialist will also claim that you must base your belief on this evidence that you have. So to the extent that having turns out to be a fundamentally disjunctive relation, so will the basing relation, along with all of the important work that it is supposed to do for epistemological theory.
See Schroeder (2007).
See especially Armstrong (1973, pp. 157–161) on this point.
McDowell (1994).
McDowell (1994).
References
Armstrong, D. (1973). Belief, truth, and knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ayer, A. J. (1955). Foundations of empirical knowledge. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Chisholm R. (1957). Perceiving: a philosophical study. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Conee, E., & Richard, F. (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dancy, J. (2000). Practical reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, C. I. (1946). An analysis of knowledge and valuation. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.
McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Pollock, J. (1974). Knowledge and justification. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Russell, B. (1959). The problems of philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schroeder, M. (2007). Reasons and agent-neutrality. Philosophical Studies, doi: 10.1007/s11098-007-9087-y .
Williams, B. (1981). Internal and external reasons. In B, Williams (Ed.), Moral luck (pp. 101–113). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks to Ned Block, Jim Pryor, Barry Lam, Gideon Rosen, Early Conee, Jeff Speaks, Mark Johnston, and the members of the Princeton University graduate student dissertation seminar, for helpful or stimulating comments or discussion.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Schroeder, M. Having reasons. Philos Stud 139, 57–71 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9102-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9102-3