

IN DEFENCE OF EXPLOITATION

JUSTIN SCHWARTZ

Ohio State University Law School

1. INTRODUCTION

Roemer has a striking and novel criticism of Marx's thesis that capitalism is exploitative. Even if so, Roemer claims, that does not establish that it is morally objectionable. He argues from idealized models that involve what he calls 'Marxian exploitation', but do not have the consequences which, he says, Marxists think make exploitation bad – domination, alienation, and inequality – or have them only in unobjectionable ways. These models, Roemer thinks, show that the moral problem with capitalism that Marxian exploitation locates only imperfectly is unjust inequality. He develops an alternative notion of 'property relations exploitation', based on this charge, to replace the morally uninteresting notion of Marxian exploitation in assessing arguments for socialism.

My object is to elucidate what Roemer's arguments in fact establish, which is other and less than what he claims. First, they do not show that the charge of exploitation, if it can be sustained, is morally uninteresting. Exploitation, as Roemer understands it, does not imply the evils in question. But his models abstract misleadingly from the real world features of historical capitalism that connect exploitation to its objectionable effects. If such features are built into more realistic models in something like the way Marx suggests, we can see how exploitation produces these evils. Second, central among the features which Roemer neglects is the coercion Marx regards not as an effect but partly constitutive of exploitation. Coercion, and unfreedom generally, is far

Thanks are due to Elizabeth Anderson, Milton Fisk, Phil Gasper, Stephen J. Gold, Nancy Holmstrom, Don Hubin, Peter King, Kai Nielsen, Calvin Normore, John Roemer, David Schweickart, Kris Shaw, Gil Skillman, Frank Thompson, Nat Voorhees, Paul Warren, Howard Wial, and several anonymous referees.

more important for Marx's own critique than injustice. But, third, Roemer does show that injustice may stick against capitalism independently of Marx's notion of exploitation. Finally, Roemer shows how the charge of exploitation depends on the feasibility of a morally superior alternative. In sum, Roemer's account turns out to be compatible with, and indeed a necessary supplement to, the traditional Marxist critique of capitalism.

I do not argue that capitalism is exploitative in Marx's sense – only that *if it is*, that is a morally damaging charge. Marx develops his account of capitalist exploitation using a controversial labour theory of value (LTV). The LTV is widely dismissed by economists, including Roemer, and whether Marx needs the LTV is contested. Showing that capitalism is exploitative depends on a case either that criticisms of the LTV fail or, as I think, that exploitation does not depend on the LTV.¹ I do not offer one here. But Roemer's objection is deep and powerful in part because he argues, in effect, that exploitation is morally uninteresting even if the LTV holds.² My question is, does it matter whether capitalism is exploitative? I argue that, at least as far as Roemer has shown, it does. The significance of this conclusion depends on a defence of exploitation theory against attacks on the LTV.

2. MARXIAN EXPLOITATION AND MARXIST EXPLOITATION: THE ISSUE OF UNFREEDOM

Roemer defines Marxian exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour for goods (1986b, p. 260). A worker is exploited if and only if the amount of labour embodied in the goods she can purchase with her wage is less than the labour she expended to earn the wage. A capitalist is an exploiter if and only if the amount of labour embodied in the goods he can sell is greater than that (if any) he expended to acquire these goods. The notion of 'embodied labour' derives from the LTV. A commodity 'embodies' an amount of labour in that its value is determined by the socially necessary labour time required to produce it. Marxian exploitation is non-relational (Roemer, 1986b, p. 261). We can say only that *C* is an exploiter, *W* is exploited, not that *C* exploits *W*.

Is this an adequate understanding of Marx?³ And is it plausible as a

¹ Holmstrom (1983) defends the LTV. Buchanan (1982) Cohen (1988) Peffer (1990) and Schwartz (1995) argue in different ways that Marx does not need it; the latter sketches an argument that he may not hold it.

² Roemer says that if we grant the LTV, Marxian exploitation would be morally interesting because it is equivalent to unequal incomes, which he regards as morally important (personal communication, 6 December 1992). But that is not why Marx thinks exploitation is morally interesting.

³ Roemer does not purport to offer an interpretation of Marx. But if his arguments are taken as criticisms of Marx's theory, it is relevant if they miss Marx's actual views. That they are to be so taken is suggested by his calling the target of his critique *Marxian* exploitation.

conception of exploitation? Roemer's is what might be called a pure surplus (value) transfer theory, where the surplus (value) is the amount of embodied labour remaining after workers have purchased their consumption bundles with their wages. Capitalists appropriate the rest. If all value is due to labour, workers transfer the entire net (value of the) surplus to capitalists, and so are Marxian-exploited.⁴ In my terms, Marx's general theory of exploitation should be expressed in terms of surplus transfer. Value applies only in market economies where exploiters want the surplus for its exchange value. The notion of surplus transfer need not be understood in terms of embodied labour. We may take the surplus to be the quantity of stuff or value, however measured and whatever its source, produced above what is expended in the process of production, including what is consumed by the producers. Transfer is the appropriation of that stuff or value by non-producers. Nothing here depends on the difference between surplus and surplus value, so I henceforth suppress the reference to value.

Surplus transfer is only a pattern. It might come about unobjectionably, and thus may fail to be exploitative. Marx thinks that setting aside 'funds for those unable to work' in socialism or 'poor relief' in capitalism (1989, p. 85) is permitted or even required. A normative premise is needed to establish that some surplus transfer, for example, from workers to capitalists, is exploitative. Roemer thinks that the premise must be about justice. For him the key question is whether 'people deserve what they get' (1988, p. 3). For Marx, though, the premise concerns freedom, not justice. This highlights the vital difference between Roemer's and Marx's notions of exploitation.

We may distinguish between Marx's *Marxist* exploitation and Roemer's *Marxian* exploitation. For Marx, exploitation is *forced* surplus transfer (Schwartz, 1995; Holmstrom, 1977; Reiman, 1987).⁵ Roemer's notion leaves out coercion. The element of force or, generally, unfreedom is not incidental for Marx, given the centrality of freedom in his moral theory (Brenkert, 1983). Marx rejects appeals to justice (1989, p. 87; Wood, 1980, 1986). For him, what's wrong with exploitation is that it involves unnecessary unfreedom because surplus transfer in class societies takes place under coercive conditions. Marx rejects as ideological the view that 'the only force that brings [capitalist and worker] together is ... the private interests of each "constrained" only by their own free will'

⁴ Even if all value is not due to labour, workers are exploited insofar as they (must) transfer any value which is due to labour. The significance of the parenthetical qualification will become apparent in a moment.

⁵ Holmstrom and Reiman treat exploitation as forced surplus labour rather than forced surplus transfer. The distinction does not matter here, but in Schwartz, (1995, pp. 159–61) I explain it and defend the surplus transfer view both as a reading of Marx and as the correct account of exploitation in class societies.

(1967a, p. 176). On the contrary, '... the "free" labourer ... agrees, *i.e.*, is compelled by social conditions, to sell ... his very capacity for work, for the price of the necessities of life' (Marx, 1967a, p. 271, emphasis added). The coercive social conditions in question are those which ensure that the worker has nothing to bring to market but his capacity to work, his labour power. Marx writes:

The serf belongs to the land and turns over to the owner of the land the fruits thereof ... The worker belongs neither to the owner [like the slave] nor to the land, but eight, ten, twelve, fifteen hours of his daily life belong to him who buys them ... The worker ... cannot leave the *whole class of purchasers, that is, the capitalist class*, without renouncing his existence. He belongs not to this or that capitalist but to the *capitalist class* (1977, p. 203, emphasis in original).

Workers are unfree in a sense relevantly like the unfreedom of the slave or the serf. I call the intended sense *coercion*, by which I mean to capture Marx's idea that exploited producers are forced to transfer surplus to exploiters. They must do so because they lack productive assets, that is, because of their class position.⁶ Moreover, this situation is avoidable. Capitalism and other forms of class society involve unnecessary unfreedom due to the alterable class structure of society. A 'realm of necessity' remains even under communism in the form of necessary labour (Marx, 1967b, p. 820), but in class society, differential ownership of productive assets (DOPA) creates unfreedom which need not exist. The existence of such 'surplus unfreedom' is Marx's objection to capitalist exploitation. That this unfreedom is unnecessary depends on the claim that it would not occur in a feasible alternative.⁷

That workers are coerced is controversial, since no worker need be coerced by any individual capitalist. Cohen (1986a) argues that the working class is collectively coerced by the capitalist class, but for Marx, each worker is coerced as an individual. Marx appeals without defence to the intuition that I am coerced if my freedom is restricted by alterable social arrangements – here by DOPA. (DOPA is sufficient but not necessary for coercion.) Elsewhere, I defend Marx's view against Cohen's,

⁶ Cohen (1978, p. 73) defines class in terms of relations to productive assets, so that workers are by definition people who own all their own labour power and no productive assets. Slaves own none of either. Serfs own some of both, but are forced to work by direct threats of violence.

⁷ The available alternatives may vary in different circumstances. Marx thinks socialism is such an alternative in developed capitalism, but not, *e.g.*, in feudalism, where the productive forces are too little developed. In that case, serfs are exploited with reference not to socialism, but to capitalism, and wage labour is their better alternative.

but for my purposes here either claim will do.⁸ The intuition is widely held, and not just by Marxists. Berlin claims that if I am too poor to afford something I am no more free to have it than if it were forbidden by law (1969, p. 122). This is the point of Anatole France's bitter quip that, 'The law in its majestic egalitarianism prohibits rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges'. Berlin and France indicate in different ways the sort of unfreedom I call coercion.

Since Roemer endorses at least Cohen's view (Roemer, 1986b, p. 273), whether workers are coerced is not an issue between us, and I will not defend the intuition here. But without the coercion condition, the notion of Marxist exploitation fails. Coercion imparts a relational character to Marxist exploitation. Surplus is transferred from *W* to *C* because of force exerted by *C* (collectively) on *W* (individually, for Marx; collectively, for Cohen). Thus Marx holds that the capitalist class exploits workers – for Cohen, the working class – not just that workers are exploited, capitalists exploiters.⁹

Roemer's force-free definition of exploitation and his exclusive focus on justice direct his attention to whether the distribution of productive assets and income is fair. Pace Marx, that is a good question, but we may also ask whether transfer of surplus is free and unforced. Coercion is itself an objectionable (constitutive) feature of Marxist exploitation, and it relates to other (nonconstitutive) consequences of exploitation. First, the coercion involved in DOPA is a logical implication of Marxist exploitation, since that is defined as forced surplus transfer. This is so independently of its further effects. Coercion is *prima facie* objectionable whether or not property is fairly distributed, because freedom is a good such that, other things being equal, the more of it, the better.

Second, whatever the independent interest of DOPA (*e.g.*, its injustice or improper coerciveness), as part of Marxist exploitation, it is a source, not just a barometer or an index of evils connected to unfreedom. Domination functionally explains surplus transfer and is part of the cause of alienation. Moreover, exploitative surplus transfer reproduces and exacerbates inequalities. These claims about the effects of exploitation are explained and defended in Sections 4–7.

In the remainder of this section, I take up unfreedom as an evil

⁸ Cohen claims that workers are not individually coerced because they each have the option of leaving the working class by going into business for themselves, but they are collectively coerced because they cannot all do so. In Schwartz (1993c) I argue that workers are individually coerced because the difficulty, costs, and risks for each of thus opting out are prohibitively high and, moreover, that if they are not thus individually coerced, they are not collectively coerced either because, in the absence of difficulty, costs, and risks, nothing prevents them all from exercising this option.

⁹ As noted in the context of domination (Section 4.2), whether capitalists intend to coerce workers or merely take advantage of workers' unfreedom is immaterial to whether capitalism is exploitative.

and the relation of coercion to exploitation. Roemer objects that coercion or unfreedom generally is not necessarily bad if it is just. Imprisoning a felon may be morally OK. What is morally bad is unjust unfreedom deriving (in capitalism) from unjust DOPA.¹⁰ Now, freedom itself might indeed be an issue of justice, for example, if freedom were unfairly distributed or if unfreedom violated individuals' rights. These might be further charges against capitalist exploitation. But Marx's critique of capitalism as exploitative, based on unfreedom without (he thinks) injustice, shows that surplus transfer under coercive conditions may be objectionable because of coercion, justice aside, simply because where it occurs there is less of the good of freedom than there might be.

The justice of imprisoning felons is not a counterexample to the claim that freedom is, *ceteris paribus*, independently good. Indeed, it is because freedom is a good that imprisonment is punishment. Just imprisonment may be morally right even if it reduces the overall amount of good, including freedom. But even if it increases the net amount of good, for example, through its deterrent effect, the unfreedom itself goes into the debit column. Its justice mitigates, and may warrant imposing, its badness, but does not erase it. Unjust imprisonment involves two wrongs: injustice and unfreedom. So if exploitation involves unfreedom, that is grounds to condemn it apart from any injustice. Injustice only makes unfreedom worse.

Criticizing Reiman (1987), Roemer (1989a) argues further that force or coercion, whether or not it is *prima facie* objectionable, is irrelevant to the charge of exploitation. Suppose that Bob could survive by producing with his own machine, but Andrea has a more productive machine which she has come to own through an unjust process. She hires him at wages which allow him to purchase the same consumption bundle for less labour. Roemer claims that Bob is not forced to work for Andrea but is still exploited because the circumstances of the offer are unjust. Thus we do not need force for exploitation as long as we have some normative complaint, specifically injustice.

Unjust though noncoercive relations indeed can be exploitative. But coercive relations can be exploitative whether or not they are unjust. Wrongful surplus transfer is exploitative whatever the source of its objectionableness, be it unfreedom or injustice. But Marx's focus is on the central cases where the objectionable feature is wrongful unfreedom. This move drops coercion as a constitutive condition of exploitation in general, but that is not damaging as long as the cases which involve coercion are

¹⁰ Personal communication, 6 December 1992. Roemer does not remark, but might have, that unfreedom cannot be an unqualified evil for Marx, since he would prohibit capitalist acts by consenting adults. I think, however, that Marx would do this in the name of enhancing freedom rather than promoting justice.

the standard ones. Marxist exploitation, which does involve coercion by definition, will then be a special case of exploitation – call it producer exploitation.

Were Marx to accept justice as a basis for a normative critique,¹¹ he might grant that the relation between Bob and Andrea is exploitative, but insist that the case is historically marginal and anomalous. Capitalist exploitation, he thinks, arose because producers were dispossessed of everything but their labour power. This, not the view that producers were robbed, is the point of his discussion of primitive accumulation, in which process, he says, 'great masses of men were suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence and hurled as free ... proletarians on the labour-market' (Marx, 1967a, p. 716). Moreover such exploitation is maintained and perpetuated by DOPA to a degree amounting to dispossession. Marx thinks, quite plausibly, that proletarians in fact lack means of subsistence to survive without wage labour.

Coercion may be a matter of degree. Workers need not lack any productive assets whatsoever to be coerced, as long as their options are sufficiently difficult, unattractive, or risky. If the alternatives to wage labour are acquiring an expensive education while working two jobs, or humiliating welfare dependence, or a gamble of one's home to start a small business with a high probability of failure, workers facing these choices may be coerced without facing starvation. Similarly a victim of extortion or blackmail need not face death to be coerced. The coercion is lesser in either instance, but nonetheless real. But for simplicity's sake and because the extreme case was the historical one and, outside developed capitalism, remains so for many workers, I follow Marx in setting aside lesser coercion.

3. MODELS AND HISTORY

The methodological issue arises here of the relation of history to the sort of analytical models that Roemer invokes against Marx. Marx's target is the existing capitalism produced by a historical reality in which workers were dispossessed of sufficient productive assets to live and the feasible capitalisms which might come about given the mechanisms which produced existing capitalism. The historical cases are central for Marx because they are the historical ones. He is not interested in merely conceptual possibilities. The strength of his theory, Marx might say, is its fit with real-world conditions, which supports his claim to have identified the causal mechanisms – 'the laws of motion' – operating in those

¹¹ In Schwartz (1993a), I criticize Marx's rejection of justice because his argument – that justice is ideological – would take out all normative considerations, including freedom. On subsequent reflection, I find a version Marx's critique related to that expounded by Wood (1986) more subtle and plausible, though not ultimately persuasive.

conditions and any which are likely to emerge. The historical cases are evidence for claims about the causal mechanisms constraining any feasible capitalism. If Marx is right about these, the merely conceptual possibility of a noncoercive capitalism is as idle as that of an efficient planned economy in abstraction from the causal mechanisms that would in practice, if Hayek and many market socialists are correct, defeat any such economic system (Arnold, 1990, pp. 246–62).

Roemer, too, wishes to 'provide microfoundations' for a normative critique of capitalism, that is, to 'explain mechanisms which do lie behind otherwise apparently teleological claims'. For this task, he says, 'the tools *par excellence* are rational choice models: general equilibrium theory, game theory, and the arsenal of modelling techniques developed by neoclassical economics' (1986c, pp. 192–3). Roemer is not interested in the models for their own sake. 'If models are good', he says, 'they will clarify the ethics whose root lies in the actual history' (Roemer, 1986c, p. 200). Exploring the logical properties of analytical models, including rational choice and Walrasian models, is a legitimate exercise. To determine the consequences of sets of precisely specified assumptions can be useful in assessing the possibility or generality of given explanatory claims about real history. Marx is concerned to do this in his own work as a political economist, in which he presents analytical models of capitalism.

The issue here is how good the models are, how well their results capture causally relevant facts about the historical operation of economic institutions. Roemer's motivation for using rational choice theory is that he thinks it provides microfoundations which exhibit the mechanisms which produce the morally significant phenomena interesting to us in actual history. But this means that unless the rational choice models get the underlying mechanisms right, they will not provide the correct microfoundations, the actual causes of the behaviour in question. 'The purpose of any modelling exercise', Roemer says, is to 'learn about the mechanisms' (Roemer, 1986c, p. 200). Whether rational choice theory applies to humans is controversial, as Roemer acknowledges in an aside: 'When the new cognitive psychology is fully integrated into economic theory, a new microeconomics will emerge, which may look quite different from neoclassical economics' (1986c, p. 193). Still, explanations on a broadly rational choice pattern are important for Marx himself, as Elster (1985) and Little (1986) insist, so their appropriateness cannot be, as some Marxists claim, a point of contention between Roemer and Marx.

But if we are, in fact, to exhibit the mechanisms even within a broadly rational choice framework, the framing of the choice situations – the feasible set – must be correctly described, for this will often do as much of the explanatory work as agents' optimizing behaviour. The choice between Marxian and Marxist exploitation depends on the

characterization of the feasible set. Roemer's use of rational choice models is less problematic than his use of specifically Walrasian or neoclassical models, key assumptions of which fail to incorporate features of the choice situation which Marx identifies as causally relevant to understanding exploitation, including the presence of coercion and the incompleteness of contracts, as discussed below. It is these that produce the evils Roemer wishes to disconnect from exploitation. But he does so by abstracting away from the historical features surrounding surplus transfer in real world capitalism that connect it to those evils. This shows not that no such connection exists, but that the models which fail to exhibit them are too impoverished.

To put the point in another way, Roemer constructs models in which (Marxian) exploitation does not involve coercion nor produce domination or (objectionable) alienation and inequality. In a world like that of these models, these evils will not be associated with exploitation. But the question is whether ours is such a world, or whether Marx's models, in which (Marxist) exploitation has these objectionable consequences, are more adequate to actual history and real world capitalism. Similarly, the National Rifle Association argues that 'guns don't kill people, people kill people'. It is possible to model a world in which that is true. Guns need not, logically, kill people. But in our world, given the facts about human psychology and social relations, people do kill people *with guns*. The NRA's implicit model leaves out the conditions which connect firearms to homicide. It may be reasonably criticized as naive or disingenuous. Roemer is neither. But he may nonetheless be mistaken.

I will not attempt to construct explicit models in which generalizations about surplus transfer plus some additional initial conditions, for example, coercion, permit us logically to deduce the objectionable consequences of Marxist exploitation. That task I leave to economists. Instead I will offer a qualified defence of Marx against Roemer, at least with regard to his insistence on a number of conditions, including coercion, which Roemer denies. Modelling exercises may be useful, particularly because there is reason to doubt that Marx's own (less than fully explicit) statements of his models have these results (Skillman, 1995). This may not matter if nomological deduction is a flawed account of explanation (Salmon, 1989). Roemer's own mechanical model of micro-foundational explanation does not, on the face of it, involve laws or deduction. But I need not here take any position on the theory of explanation, a matter that would take us too far afield. Even if such deduction is helpful or necessary for explanation, it must include the relevant generalizations and initial conditions. My argument is that Marx is better on this than Roemer even if the details of Marx's own models require reformulation.

4. DOMINATION

Roemer considers and dismisses three evils as reasons to be interested in exploitation: domination, (differential) alienation, and inequality. He considers coercion only incidentally. With regard to domination, and indeed all of these purported evils, Roemer assumes that the issue is injustice. 'If we argue that domination is unjust, then exploitation theory provides at least a partial theory of the injustice of capitalism' (1986b, pp. 266–7). Roemer's neglect of unfreedom as an independent moral issue is unfortunate here. That surplus transfer in capitalism takes place under conditions of domination is a major sense in which it is forced and unfree.

The domination with which Roemer is mainly concerned is domination at the point of production, 'the hierarchical and autocratic structure of work' (1986b, p. 267), and not the social and political domination that goes into enforcing property relations. The justifiability of the latter, which Roemer calls 'domination¹', is, he claims, parasitic on that of DOPA, because if unequal ownership is morally unobjectionable, then maintaining and enforcing it is likewise unobjectionable. This is not quite true, since legitimate ownership may be upheld by illegitimate means.¹² But set that aside. With regard to the former, 'domination²', Roemer claims that (Marxian) exploitation is only a 'barometer' of domination², so 'if our interest is domination, there is no reason to invoke exploitation theory' (1986b, p. 267). (I henceforth use 'domination' to refer only to domination².)

Roemer uses a contrast of two simplified models to show that exploitation can occur without domination. First, imagine a society of petty commodity producers with subsistence preferences. They will work just as long as necessary to produce their subsistence. Call this Labour Market Island (LMI). Given DOPA, two technologies for producing corn (a capital-intensive Factory and a labour-intensive Farm), and a market in labour, Roemer shows that the rational optimizing behaviour of these agents will produce exploitation in that since the asset-poor will have to work more than the asset-rich, what they can buy with their wages will embody less labour than what they produced, and vice versa for the asset-rich. With a labour market, classes emerge as producers with unequal endowments 'choose their own class positions' (Roemer, 1986a, p. 90), and class correlates with wealth. (Since the asset-poor have only one choice of class position, this expression reveals Roemer's insensitivity to issues of coercion.)

Marxian exploitation can occur without a labour market, merely as a result of differential initial wealth. To show this, Roemer constructs a

¹² Marx seems to have believed that this is the rule. See, e.g., his comment on the suppression of the Paris Commune (1986a, p. 348) – not that he thought the property claims upheld by the French government were legitimate!

parallel Credit Market Island (CMI) with markets in credit but not labour. The asset-poor hire capital and are exploited; the asset-rich rent it and are exploiters. This turns out to be 'functionally isomorphic' to the first model: the conditions of class and exploitation in the two societies are identical. Invoking an expression of Wicksell and Samuelson, Roemer argues that in a competitive model it does not matter whether labour hires capital or capital hires labour (1988, p. 96). The poor are exploited and rich exploiters in any case. This isomorphism holds for a wide range of models. 'The key question is the wealth position of the operator and not which market is used' (1986a, p. 93).

The point is that there is domination on LMI, but not on CMI. In the former, the asset-rich who hire the asset-poor direct their activities in the process of production, but in the latter, since there is no labour market and each actor works only for himself with the resources he has or borrows, there is none. One real world analogue is the case of sharecroppers who might 'have our ethical sympathy on grounds of exploitation but not domination' (1986b, p. 270).

At least three major problems attend this argument.¹³ Roemer's model, first, abstracts from the specifically capitalist conditions that relate exploitation to domination. Second, it ignores the functional role of domination in capitalist conditions, viz., to maximize exploitation. Third and most fundamentally, its assumption that the LMI market is in labour rather than in labour *power* assumes away the basic facts about the capitalist labour market that make domination functional for this purpose.

4.1 Capitalism and the Labour Market

Roemer's models threaten to miss the point concerning *capitalist* exploitation by abstracting from the labour market conditions that help explain domination. If Roemer's LMI is isomorphic to CMI, it abstracts too sharply from the real differences between them, since whatever capitalism requires, it requires a labour market. Capitalism can be *defined* as generalized commodity production by wage labour, and Marx so defines it (1967a, p. 170n1). Similarly, if, seeking a biology with universal application to any conceivable life form, we abstract away from important but parochial features of terrestrial life, for example, that it is carbon-based, we will fail to capture crucial, explanatorily relevant facts about real world biology (Schwartz 1992b, p. 109).¹⁴ No model that fails

¹³ See Dymski and Elliot (1989), Devine and Dymski (1991), and Bowles and Gintis (1990) for more technical treatment of some of the following points as well as related issues.

¹⁴ In the cited paper, I offer an extensive defence, in the context of a criticism of a certain sort of functionalism in psychology, of what I call 'provincial explanation', which abandons the demand for absolute generality to focus on what is explanatorily relevant for particular cases, e.g., psychologies, biologies, or indeed modes of production.

to pick up the fact that capitalism requires wage labour is realistic enough to be adequate to real world capitalism.

Roemer would reply that this begs the question. The isomorphism is supposed to show that the fact that capitalism has labour markets does no explanatory work in the story about exploitation. This reply shows that Marxian (or Marxist) exploitation is a general notion of producer's exploitation that does not pick out capitalist exploitation in particular. Marx regards all class society as exploitative. For him, exploitation does not require a labour market (1967a, p. 217); slaves and serfs are exploited in nonmarket economies. They need not suffer the kind of domination to which workers are subjected in the developed stages of capitalism. Marx thinks that serfs in feudalism or artisans in the transition to capitalism were not thus subjected. That is the point of his distinction between the 'formal' and the 'real [subsumption] of labour [under] capital'. (Marx, 1967a, pp. 510–11). Only the latter involves capitalist reorganization of the labour process; the former involves merely wage labour itself. (Marx thus agrees with Roemer that exploitation does not imply domination, even in capitalism.)

So if the result is that labour markets are unnecessary for exploitation, that is not an objection. Marx's claim is that labour markets are necessary for *capitalist* exploitation and explain in part features special to exploitation under capitalism, notably the domination produced by the fine-grained division of labour, the hierarchical factory system, and the intensification of exploitation under capitalism, as opposed to other modes of production in which 'no boundless thirst for surplus labour arises from the nature of the production itself' (Marx, 1967a, p. 235). The existence of labour and other markets explains not the fact of exploitation but what Marx calls its 'character' under capitalism (pp. 359–68).

But if the CMI–LMI isomorphism is as deep as Roemer thinks, then we might expect to find domination in credit market cases with sharecroppers and simple commodity producers like small farmers. And we do. Terms of tenancy or credit are set by banks which lease land or lend money and 'have the power to determine not only what crops shall be planted in what quantities, varieties, and sequence; but also fertilizer is to be applied ... If a farmer wants to raise hogs, the bank may say, "Not with our money. You plant beans"' (George, 1979, p. 25). Such producers have no overseer looking over their shoulders, but they are dominated from a distance. Roemer admits that 'domination exists in practice in actual capital market economies' (1988, p. 97).

This domination is not a logical consequence of credit markets per se, any more than its labour market counterpart is a logical consequence of labour markets, but it is a causal consequence of credit markets *in capitalist conditions*, likewise its labour market counterpart. So the fact that 'it is not true that an exploited agent is *necessarily* dominated or that an

exploiter is *necessarily* dominating' (Roemer, 1986b, p. 270, emphasis added) is neither here nor there.¹⁵ Roemer has assumed away the conditions which establish the connection. If exploitation in either market causes domination, that is a reason for interest in exploitation, just as cancer is a reason for interest in smoking. Here too, there is no logical connection, but given facts about human physiology and plant biochemistry, the connection can be established.

4.2 The Function of Domination

Why should we expect to find domination in capitalist labour markets? Roemer grants that the 'hierarchical, nondemocratic relations of capitalist workplaces' which constitute domination 'presumably create (additional) profits' and 'therefore [Marxian] exploitation', but he regards this as irrelevant since 'the converse is *in general* not the case. Exploitation does not imply the existence of domination' (Roemer, 1986b, pp. 267–8, emphasis added). But to insist that to explain *y*, *x* must imply *y simpliciter* violates ordinary scientific practice. Even if one wants implication, the initial and boundary conditions must be correctly specified. Smoking explains cancer causally even though it does not imply cancer and, as the American Tobacco Institute argues, *in the general case* one can have smoking without cancer.¹⁶ But given the carcinogens in tobacco and their effect on human tissues, this happy result is less common than it might be.

Nor ought Roemer to reply that the causal relations run the other way, from domination to exploitation. They do, but the main direction is the converse. The explanatory relation is *functional*. Functional explanation of *y* by *x* admits that *y* causally affects *x* while retaining the explanatory primacy of *x* (Cohen 1978, 1986b; Schwartz, 1993b). Capitalists institute domination – at considerable expense and trouble – *in order* to increase exploitation, thus profits.¹⁷ The minute division of labour and the hierarchical organization characteristic of modern capitalist production, two key elements in domination'... were introduced so that the capitalist got himself a larger share of the pie at the expense of the

¹⁵ Roemer objects that if domination is an objection to exploitation, then in cases where the exploited are not dominated or the exploiters dominating, the parties have a 'confused ethical status' (1986b, pp. 270). This is not true unless domination is the *only* objection to exploitation. Exploitation might still be objectionable on grounds other than domination, such as the coercion which partly constitutes it.

¹⁶ Roemer's narrow conception of scientific practice is further underlined by his argument that domination ought not to be a basis for interest in exploitation because domination is observable and exploitation is not (1986b, p. 270). But what is wrong with explaining observables by unobservables? Isn't the location of underlying but unobservable causal factors the rule in science?

¹⁷ Fisk (1989) and Schwartz (1993b) argue that functional explanation is consistent with the intentional promotion of something because it has a function.

worker' (Marglin, 1982, p. 286). The point is to maximize surplus transfer. In this account, exploitation is explanatorily primary even though – in fact, because – domination causes exploitation.

Roemer grants this but denies its moral significance. Unequal incomes, he says, are indeed morally bad in part because to induce them, capitalists dominate workers in a morally bad way, but capitalists are not trying, in doing so, to induce Marxian exploitation, unequal exchange of labour values. That is a byproduct of what capitalists intend and, in itself, is morally uninteresting.¹⁸ But first, capitalists do indeed try to induce such unequal exchange or surplus transfer. Acquisition of profits through domination may be described as the appropriation of surplus produced by workers, and may be regarded as the functional explanation of domination. A theoretically revealing and morally interesting explanation of agents' behaviour need not be framed in terms that they would use to describe their own actions, although it is more likely that capitalists would say that they wish to induce surplus transfer (Marglin's 'larger share of the pie at the expense of the worker') than to induce unequal incomes.

Second, this objection confuses the culpability of capitalists with a condemnation of capitalism. The point is that capitalism is an exploitative system and should be criticized on that basis, not that capitalists are blameworthy because they are exploiters. Benign intentions, if genuine, may exculpate capitalists, but not capitalism. The bad effects of innocent actions are not morally uninteresting because they are unintended. Smoking can be condemned as carcinogenic even though (we presume) tobacco company executives do not mean to kill people by selling carcinogens. And even were capitalists merely innocent beneficiaries of coercive circumstances they did not create, that is no reason not to condemn the circumstances if they are alterable.

4.3 Labour and Labour Power

Why is domination functional for increasing exploitation? The answer highlights a third problem with Roemer's argument which turns on a crucial assumption of his models. In these what workers sell is *labour*, not labour power, or, equivalently, labour contracts are costlessly enforceable (1986b, p. 269). This is a consequence of the Walrasian assumption that there are no transaction costs, including those of contract enforcement, that is, that markets are 'complete'. But this assumption is not a minor technical issue. Its effect is to undermine domination as an ethical reason for interest in exploitation by calling into question the explanatory interest *simpliciter* of domination.

Marx argues that workers sell labour *power*, their ability to work

¹⁸ Personal communication, 6 December 1992.

(1967a, pp. 167–9). The capitalist's problem is extracting labour from this labour power (1967a, pp. 177, 184). This points the way on the capitalist's side to domination and on the worker's to resistance, thus class struggle in production. As Roemer acknowledges, 'the principle reason domination exists is that the labour contract is not costlessly enforceable' (1986b, p. 269). Since capitalists want more work done than workers want to provide, capitalism requires a hierarchical structure of production to monitor and increase the extraction of labour from labour power.

In Roemer's models, by contrast, workers sell their labour in an exchange which is 'as simple and enforceable a transaction as trading an apple for a dime' (1986b, p. 269). Workers are conceived of as automata who contract to costlessly deliver a predetermined quantity of labour to the capitalist with no coaxing, threats, or struggle. They are related to their labour not as their own activity but as a commodity which they can be counted on to deliver at a constant rate over a certain amount of time. Unsurprisingly, 'in such a world, exploitation continues to exist, but domination does not' (Roemer, 1986b, pp. 269–70), since the extraction of labour from labour power which necessitates it has been assumed away.

Roemer grants that existing capitalism is 'replete' with domination, but says that this is 'a phenomenon of second order in a *Marxist* condemnation of capitalism, being associated with imperfections in the writing and enforcing of contracts, while Marxist arguments should apply to a capitalism with frictionless contracts' (Roemer, 1986b, p. 270, author's emphasis). The claim about the proper scope of Marxist arguments requires explanation. Roemer invokes Marx's use of models that are frictionless in that there is no cheating, 'and that means contracts are well-defined and observed by all' (Roemer, 1986b, p. 269). The assumption that wage contracts are costlessly enforceable is justified, he thinks, because Marxists should have a condemnation of 'perfect' capitalism, one without cheating. If domination is the problem with capitalism, however, Marxists have no such condemnation. This claim, though, faces methodological, substantive, and normative difficulties.

First, a methodological point. Idealizations are necessary, but we must not idealize away anything essential. Marx wants to condemn capitalism without appeal to extra-economic factors such as robbery, extortion, and fraud, the historical role of which he considers in his account of primitive accumulation, but only after his initial account of the source of profit in exploitation, without such 'cheating', is complete. By 'no cheating' Marx does not mean that 'contracts are well-defined and observed by all' in Roemer's sense of costless enforcement. Marx's frictionless capitalism is a model in which the 'law of value' holds, that is, in which equivalents exchange for equivalents (Marx, 1967a, p. 194). The worker's wage equals the full value of her labour power. That is what Marx intends by 'no cheating'. The terms of the wage contract stipulate

monetary remuneration for the use of the worker's labour power for an agreed-upon period. What is to be done with that labour power is then up to the capitalist. The contract is fulfilled if the worker gets her wage and works to the capitalist's satisfaction. Marx would not regard it as 'cheating' for capitalists to get as much labour out of workers' labour power as they can.

Second, a connected substantive point. Marx's 'no cheating' claim is meant to abstract from plain robbery, not from important features of wage labour. Idealizing away the 'friction' abstracts from a deep fact about labour – that it is variable. People are not machines who can sustain constant effort for an agreed-upon period, but must work at various rates and kinds of tasks over any measurable period.

For workers, the inherent variability of labour is related to Marx's ideas about why labour promotes self-realization. 'Mechanical' activity will not do this; the 'charm' of labour is in its 'individual character' (Marx and Engels, 1976, pp. 490–1). Or as Marx puts it generally, '... constant labour of one uniform kind disturbs the intensity and flow of a man's animal spirits, which find reaction and delight in mere change of activity' (Marx, 1967a, p. 341). This is an empirical claim, supported by numerous studies in economic psychology, not a piece of a priori philosophical anthropology (see Scitovsky, 1992; Lane, 1991; Karasek and Theorell, 1990).

Moreover, productive activity is sufficiently complex and indeterminate that it could not be wholly mechanized even if workers could be. For capitalists, this explains why 'work-to-rule' is a form of labour action. When workers 'meticulously abide by the contract and any written company rules and work procedures ...; take no short cuts, show no initiative in solving problems', production slows to a crawl (La Botz, 1991, p. 16). Jobs cannot in general be fully specified in advance.

Marx does idealize away variable *skill* in assuming that the relevant sort of labour is 'abstract' (1967a, pp. 50, 56, *et passim*), that is, unskilled; socially necessary *abstract* labour time is his measure of value and only this plays a role in his models. But abstraction from skill does not remove the essential variability of effort or indeterminacy of work, or the distinction between labour power and labour would collapse and Marx's assumption would be the same as Roemer's.

Because effort is essentially variable and work is inherently indeterminate, to enforce contracts stipulating a particular expenditure of effort or amount and kind of work is costly. That markets are thus 'incomplete' with respect to labour is not a second-order phenomenon. It is fundamental. This explains why real labour contracts are for the use of labour power over a period in which capitalists strive to extract the maximum amount of labour. *The terms of the wage contract are unspecifiable with respect to labour output.* So real labour contracts require costly enforcement, that

is, domination. Thus ensures class struggle in production, which is largely over the unspecified terms of the wage contract.¹⁹

In sum, Marx gives domination a complex role in his account of capitalism. Domination is functional for exploitation, which causally explains it and which it promotes. The need for domination in a capitalist context derives from deep facts about human labour, and domination is a cause of class struggle as well as alienation. Roemer relegates domination to a purely normative role, holding the only explanatory interest of exploitation to be its putative role in accounting for capitalist accumulation.²⁰ Domination then turns out to be a function of the fact that bosses, for some reason, like to be bossy, and workers curiously (for automata) resent it. Marx's model is more explanatorily powerful. Roemer treats a central feature of existing capitalism as a second-order phenomenon explicable by technical friction, while Marx explains it by giving it a causal role.

Third, the normative dimension. Roemer claims that 'Marxists would be almost as critical of ... a perfect capitalism as they are of existing capitalism (1986b, p. 270). He wants an objection to capitalism in principle. Thus his claim that a properly Marxist condemnation of capitalism should apply primarily to the idealized case (without domination). But this is a very strange claim. If capitalist exploitation did not generally cause domination, it would be less objectionable, and domination would be weak grounds for a critique of capitalism as exploitative. But if such exploitation does systematically cause domination, given the facts about the capitalist character of production, the nature of the labour market, and the anthropological facts about labour

¹⁹ Someone might argue that a loophole exists in the argument that wage contracts are essentially incomplete. Consider contracts for *labour services*, where that means payment is for a completed task, as one pays a plumber for fixing the sink, which do not require, it seems, monitoring of the labour process (thus domination), merely ascertainment that the task is done. A Roemer-like model – Labour-Service Market Island (LSMI) – could be constructed showing that exploitation occurs here without domination. However, as with the real-world credit market cases, real-world labour service market cases can and typically do involve domination from a distance, without direct supervision of the labour process. In this case the issue concerns what counts as a completed task, since that is no more fully determinate than what counts performing a task in the labour power market: 'You call that fixing the sink? It drains slowly.' 'Sir, that's as fast as it *will* drain.' Like the extraction of labour from labour power, the provision of labour services depends on unspecifiable contingencies, and enforcing the contract thus will be costly, i.e., will typically require domination (from a distance), insofar as there will be conflict about whether the service *has* been provided, as anyone who has dealt with a plumber or other contractor can testify. In fact, the prevalence of labour rather than labour-service contracts in capitalism suggests that the latter are more costly to enforce than the former.

²⁰ Roemer does say in a note that domination might cause class struggle. But since he regards exploitation as irrelevant to domination, he thinks that 'exploitation as defined ... cannot cause class struggle' (1986b, p. 279n34). The 'as defined' is crucial. My argument has been that *Marxist* exploitation can and does cause class struggle.

power itself, it is a strong basis for critique. Similarly, if smoking did not reliably cause cancer, given the relevant facts about biology and chemistry, cancer would be a weak basis for an interest in smoking. But smoking does cause cancer, which is therefore a strong basis for such an interest.

Marxists are not committed to rejecting capitalism come what may, but because they think it causes evils such as domination and implies coercion. They need not condemn models which idealize away those evils. 'The Marxist ethical view of capitalism comes not from economic models, but from history', says Roemer; 'If the models are good, they will clarify the ethics whose root lies in the actual history' (1986c, p. 200). Then why demand that a Marxist condemnation must apply primarily to a 'perfect capitalism' which lacks relevant features of the real thing?

Roemer might say that this reply ignores the need for a *theoretical* interest in exploitation, one based in the economic theory of capitalism. Marx appears to shuffle off the exploitation as something independent of the proper (legal) forms of economic transactions – sale, purchase, contract. On that view of the purview of economic theory, exploitation is not an economic fact about capitalism. This would not trouble Marx, who took himself to be offering a *critique* of political economy for ignoring phenomena with explanatory and normative relevance. Anticipating this sort of objection, he writes, 'The sphere we are deserting, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. Here alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham [egoism]' (Marx, 1967a, p. 176). But in a richer theoretical context, that sphere appears exploitative in an interesting and objectionable way. Part of the issue is what counts as economics. Roemer's models presuppose a narrow view of the purview of economic theory in which Marx's concerns simply cannot be stated. But that is arguably a defect of this view rather than a problem for Marx, particularly if the point of the modelling exercise is to 'clarify the ethics whose root lies in the actual history'.

Marxists may also want a condemnation which applies to a 'perfect' capitalism. Here Roemer's claims about injustice in DOPA may be a valuable supplement for Marx's freedom-based condemnation of existing capitalism. Marx too has such an in-principle critique. Even without domination and other causal effects of exploitation, he can cite the coercion involved in DOPA against a 'perfect' capitalism. But the availability of such a critique, whether based on injustice or unfreedom, does not demote the further evils of existing capitalism, insofar as these are real, to concerns of a 'second order'. Cancer is a good objection to smoking even if there are arguments against smoking which hold apart from cancer.

5. DIFFERENTIAL ALIENATION

Roemer's treatment of alienation turns on the idea that exploitation might be an 'indicator' for unjustly differential alienation. Roemer construes alienated labour as 'labour performed to produce goods for exchange, not for use'. The concern is that 'some people alienate more labour than they receive from others and some alienate less labour than they receive back' (1986b, p. 271), arguably a failure of the reciprocity necessary for justice.

If Roemer regards domination as a moral problem, but only of second order, he sees differential alienation as unobjectionable in its own right. So while he argues that while exploitation is possible without domination, he claims that it does not matter that differential alienation necessarily accompanies Marxian exploitation. Roemer rejects two sorts of condemnations of such alienation – first, 'welfarist', Paretian, or consequentialist considerations, and, second, rights. He mentions but does not discuss one of Marx's grounds, that is, 'perfectionist' considerations of self-realization. 'There are other forms of alienation in Marx', says Roemer, but differential alienation 'appears to be the only kind for which exploitation as unequal exchange of labour is an indicator' (1986b, p. 271). I return to this in Section 6.

Roemer's procedure is to produce a model in which differential alienation appears to pass the standards of the theories he mentions. He infers from this that differential alienation is morally OK in real world circumstances. In this model, rationally optimizing agents with equal initial assets but different preferences choose a relationship in which one of them, Karl, performs alienated labour for the other, Adam. Karl is differentially alienated because after an initial setup period, Adam performs no labour at all. As before we have a labour intensive Farm and a capital intensive Factory. Karl is averse to working in the present, and desires to consume a limited amount of corn, while Adam prefers to accumulate corn.²¹ Karl rents or borrows Adam's corn for interest, dividing his labour between Farm and Factory, while Adam lives off the interest accumulated by lending to Karl (Roemer, 1986b, p. 272).

First, the *welfarist* case. We have exploitation and differential alienation, but this is the outcome both choose on grounds of utility maximization. It is efficient in the Pareto sense that no change would improve the situation of one party without worsening that of the other. Karl is free to accumulate corn by Farm work, cutting his future work hours, but given his rate of time discount, he would rather not. Karl could end differential alienation by such work, avoiding transactions with Adam, but that would be irrational given his preferences. Adam, too, gets what he wants: accumulation.

²¹ The parties are renamed Ron and Maggie in Roemer (1989a, 1989b).

Roemer then considers whether differential alienation might nonetheless be objectionable on grounds of *rights*. In the model, he notes, Karl is not *forced* to suffer differential alienation, so no violation of rights arises from coercion (Roemer, 1986b, p. 273). How can his rights be violated if he does what he chooses? Moreover, Roemer doubts that 'people, in historical reality, have had an aversion to performing alienated labour. Indeed many (including Marxists) argue that production for the market has been a liberating process for many populations ... which they enter into willingly' (1986b, pp. 273–4).²²

What this is supposed to show is less than clear. The second objection to differential alienation is rights-based, not consequentialist. So the principle invoked should not make the correct set of rights be one that maximizes preference-satisfaction. It should be something like: no rights are violated if no one objects, where a right is a claim to have one's preferences respected, given equal consideration for those others. It is plausible that the preferences of all have been thus respected if no one objects. So if people willingly accept differential alienation, we may conclude that their rights have not been violated.

I agree that there is no strong objection to alienated labour as production for exchange, or, therefore, to differential alienation.²³ Focusing on differential alienation, however, misses Marx's richer and more promising objection to exploitation on grounds of alienation from human nature. First, though, I remark on the weakness of Roemer's case against the moral significance of differential alienation. Roemer grants preferences unquestioned moral status. We must 'take preferences seriously' (1986d, p. 70). The parties, in the model or history, do not mind, and that settles it.

Now preferences do have a prima-facie claim to our respect, but they may be subject to critique. First, a preference may be wrong because it is for something intrinsically or independently bad. Suppose Karl chooses to sell himself to Adam as a slave because of a preference

²² Given the real history of primitive accumulation, this rather rosy Ashtonite-Hayekian picture of the development of capitalism is one-sided, to say the least. Whatever some Marxists may have thought, it would surprise no one more than Ure and Arkwright, respectively the ideologist and the architect of the factory system, the former of whom says of the latter, 'It required ... a man of a Napoleon nerve ... to subdue the refractory tempers of work-people accustomed to irregular paroxysms of diligence' (Marglin 1982, p. 296). Pollard writes, 'The modern industrial proletariat was introduced to its role not so much by attraction or monetary reward, but by compulsion, force, and fear ... The typical framework is that of dominance and fear, fear of hunger, of eviction, of prison for those who disobey the new industrial rules' (1965, pp. 207–8).

²³ Marx differs; see, e.g., his comments on James Mill (1975b). Marx seems to think that production for exchange causes alienation from species being. That, however, makes the objectionableness of the former depend on that of the latter, which will therefore be secondary and derivative. For discussion, see Arnold (1990, p. 42–3), Moore (1993, Chapter 2), and Schwartz (1994).

for subordination. It might be plausibly maintained that freedom is an inalienable right, which even voluntary slavery would violate. Showing this is another matter, but I think the burden of proof lies with the advocates of voluntary slavery. Granted, voluntary slavery presents a conflict for our pre-theoretical convictions. Who appears to have the burden of proof will depend on which of these we stress. But there is a conflict. That an outcome is voluntary and accords with the preferences of all concerned does not settle the issue. A preference for alienated labour (production for exchange), however, is not *prima facie* wrong in this way, so the objection is to Roemer's argument, not to his conclusion. It might well apply, though, to a claim that a preference for species-being alienation deserves our respect.

Second, the moral weight of preferences may be diminished if they are formed under wrongful conditions which make those preferences rational. That someone is making the best of a bad lot is no reason to discount her preferences, but if the bad lot is morally objectionable, that she prefers the lesser of evils confers no legitimacy on the state of affairs that presents her with that choice. So if people have historically preferred alienated labour to serfdom or slavery, it does not follow that alienated labour is *therefore* unobjectionable. Roemer says that in the Karl-Adam model, 'not enough information [is] provided to decide whether the distribution of assets is just ... [If] the preferences of the two agents are a product of their past unequal opportunities, or differential wealths ... there might be grounds for saying that Adam is taking unfair advantage ...' (Roemer, 1986c, p. 71). One might wonder why Roemer structures the model as he does, if the information is insufficient, and if so, what the model shows.

This matters to the moral relevance of any historical preference for alienated labour. Roemer acknowledges that in the real world, unlike in his models, 'there is no Farm to return to' (1988, p. 26). I do not deny that the historical choice was rational or that preferences count. They count in favour of alienated labour *vis-à-vis* bond labour – but not of alienated labour *simpliciter*, at least if people would not choose it had they a third alternative.²⁴ This is what backs Marx's view that alienated labour is objectionable even if it represents moral progress over previous forms of unfree labour.

Roemer says that to treat the lack of a Farm as creating coercion 'lead[s] straight into a discussion of [DOPA], which is not the issue here' (1986b, p. 273). It does so lead, but DOPA is not irrelevant. Should the DOPA that produces the preferences be justifiable, we may have no basis to discount them. But should it be otherwise, we have such a basis. There

²⁴ In fact people seem on the whole to have preferred independent production to wage labour. Brenner (1985) argues that capitalism arose first in England because there, unlike in, e.g. France, peasants were dispossessed and so driven into wage labour.

may be a right to disalienated labour in this sense, and the historical preference for such labour, if formed under these conditions, may not undermine it. I have not argued, and do not believe, that there is any such right.

6. SPECIES-BEING ALIENATION

Marx is more concerned with alienation from species being or human nature *Gattungswesen* than with mere production for market. The latter does not provide a subhead in his famous fourfold account of alienation in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, but the former is its centre-piece (Marx, 1975b, pp. 270–82).²⁵ Roemer briefly acknowledges this (1988, p. 176), but he remarks only that the issue with such alienation is not justice. He neglects this sort of alienation in part because justice is his sole normative interest and in part because (he thinks) differential alienation is the only form of alienation which can be tied to exploitation (Roemer, 1986b, p. 271). Differential alienation is *logically equivalent* to Marxian exploitation. But Roemer is misled by his neglect of unfreedom. Species-being alienation is a causal result of the forced character of exploited labour, in particular of domination. (Hereafter, 'alienation' refers only to species-being alienation.)

Such alienation is the denial, under exploitative conditions, of the basic human need for free noninstrumental labour, only through which, Marx claims, self-realization is possible. The issue is not whether such alienation is a valid objection to capitalism – Roemer agrees that it is – but whether it can be related to exploitation in a way that makes a focus on the latter illuminating. The concept has two main components. First, such alienation denies a sort of freedom which is realized in or only in activity with a particular character – free labour, that is, that performed for its own sake, not merely for a further purpose, such as earning wages. Second, it denies a basic human need for such activity; we cannot attain self-realization or happiness if we are thus alienated.

Labour is a 'manifestation of freedom', says Marx, when 'only the individual himself posits [its aims]'; this is 'real freedom [*reale Freiheit*], whose action is precisely work'. Through taking the aims of labour as one's own goals, the external constraints on it 'are stripped of their character as merely external natural necessity' (Marx 1986b, p. 530; 1983, p. 512). This is Marx's Hegelian version of Rousseau's thesis that 'freedom is obedience to the law one has prescribed to oneself', which Rousseau calls 'moral liberty' as opposed to 'natural' and 'civil' liberty (Rousseau, 1987, p. 151). The latter are roughly

²⁵ Although he drops these particular terms in his mature work, Marx never abandons his concern for species-being alienation. As evidence for this, I explicate his views using statements from the *Grundrisse*, *Capital*, and other later writings.

negative liberty as freedom from constraint and positive liberty as effective power to act.

Moral liberty or real freedom is something further. It involves the conscious acceptance of the goals of one's activity as one's own in the strong sense that the activity is done primarily for its own sake. The notion is close to the conception of autonomy defended by Frankfurt (1989). Real freedom can only be attained, for Marx, outside the production of material needs, because this remains under the best of circumstances 'a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is *an end in itself*, the true realm of freedom' (Marx 1967b, p. 820, emphasis added). Real freedom is found in productive activity as an end in itself. (This is consistent with its having further purposes as well.) Necessary labour, even if voluntary, is unfree because it is necessary. Marx's example of really free labour is composing music (1986b, p. 530).

Marx also claims that only in such free labour do the aims of the individual become posited as 'self-realization, objectification of the subject' (1986b, p. 530). This is less than clear, and I shall gloss it here, incompletely, by saying that it means at least that human beings have a basic need for such free labour, without which their development is stultified and they cannot be happy (Miller, 1981). This is the 'perfectionism' on which Roemer remarks. Marx thinks that such labour is necessary for becoming fully human in the sense of realizing human potentials – those for real freedom itself (setting one's own aims), for the use and expansion of mental and physical powers, and, as the example of music suggests, for artistic creativity. Labour in 'a form that stamps it as exclusively human', he says, involves the labourer 'realizing a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will' – a Rousseauian–Hegelian trope – in a way that 'he enjoys as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers' (Marx, 1967a, p. 178). So we may take 'self-realization' to mean the use and development of characteristically human powers and capacities in free labour. Marx's claim is that this is a basic need in that we are harmed if it is prevented.

The expression 'objectification of the subject' alludes to Marx's idea that such self-realization requires 'work upon the objective world', in which 'man really proves himself to be a species being' (Marx, 1975a, p. 277), that is, realizes his nature. The claim is roughly that the overcoming of obstacles thrown up by the independent nature of the external objects on which we (freely) work forces us to develop our powers and is necessary for such self-development. As stated, this is false or incomplete. Free labour in the external world may be sufficient for self-realization, but it is not obvious that it is necessary. Marx overlooks nonproductive self-realization through, for

example, political participation, which plays such a large role in Rousseau and J. S. Mill.

Even if there are other sorts of self-realization, it is an objection to capitalist exploitation if it blocks self-realization through labour; and, as Mill argues, political self-realization is impeded without productive self-realization (Mill, 1991, Chapter 3). The key thing, however, is that we have a need, based in our nature, for free labour. Free labour might be a good, because it involves freedom, even if we had no such need. But since Marx thinks we do have such a need, he holds that denial of free labour frustrates the realization of human nature as well as abrogating freedom.

Marx claims that real freedom and self-realization are denied under exploitation. Exploited labour is alienating because of coercion and domination. Because of the coercion associated with DOPA, workers must answer to aims which are not freely adopted as their own.²⁶ Their 'very labour power refuses its services unless it has been sold to capital' (Marx, 1967a, p. 360). Unlike the activity of 'the really free worker', Marx says, '... in its historical forms of slave-labour, serf-labour, and wage labour, work is always repulsive and always appears as *externally imposed, forced labour*, and as against that non-work [may be seen] as "liberty and happiness"' (1986b, p. 530, Marx's emphasis). Roemer abstracts away this coercion by giving Karl a Farm (productive assets) to which he can retreat. Real workers, as Roemer admits, have no Farm.

Moreover, this means labour under conditions of domination that deprive workers of the free development of their powers and capacities that constitutes self-realization. Capitalistic manufacture 'subjects the previously independent workman to the discipline and commands of capital [and] ... creates a hierarchic gradation of the workmen themselves', a domination which 'converts the labourer into a crippled monstrosity at the expense of a world of productive capabilities' (Marx 1967a, p. 369). Domination, as well, inhibits worker's abilities to act on their own aims. In capitalist production, 'time for education, for intellectual development, for fulfilling of social functions and for social intercourse, for the free play of ... bodily and mental activity ...' is 'moonshine!' (Marx, 1967a, p. 264). Labour under these conditions 'confiscates every atom of freedom, both in bodily and intellectual activity' (1967a, p. 423).

That such alienation is an evil is plausible. At least it would be better were there none, or less than there is. Roemer agrees, although he does

²⁶ Suppose they do adopt them as their own? Thus the question raised in Section 5 about a preference for species-being alienation. Marx's first response must be that such ends are not *freely* adopted, even when they are adopted, because of DOPA. I consider this again in Section 7. A second response is that mentioned in Section 5 about some preferences being for something intrinsically bad. This would have to be defended in terms of Marx's eudaimonistic conception of human nature.

not make much of this because it is not a matter of justice. One might argue that workers are *more* alienated than capitalists, and that this is unjust because burdens are unfairly distributed; but then alienation must be, independently, a burden. For Marx, its being a burden is more important than its unfair distribution.

Marxist exploitation does not logically imply real unfreedom and stultification of human nature. Rather, it causes such alienation in the manner described under specific conditions of developed capitalism, typically, those associated with the 'real subsumption of labour under capital',²⁷ in particular, domination. It is capitalist control of the labour process, designed to maximize extraction of surplus, to pump the most labour out of labour power, that produces alienation from human nature. Such alienation is a by-product of capitalist exploitation facilitated by domination. Perhaps the tight links Roemer wants between alienation and exploitation do exist. If DOPA itself means that workers must submit to the aims of others to survive, perhaps they are really unfree – thus stultified, since self-realization requires free labour – simply in virtue of being propertyless (see, e.g., Marx, 1967a, p. 360). Even if no such logical link exists, the causal links are strong. Some remain even if the logical case can be made out. Those involved with domination are causal even if those involved with DOPA are logical. And if exploitation, under certain circumstances, causes species-being alienation, that is a reason to be interested in it.

7. INEQUALITY

The final basis for interest in exploitation Roemer considers is as an indicator for inequality, specifically DOPA. For Roemer, the issue is whether 'the labourer [has] access to the means of production he is entitled to' (1986b, p. 278). Unjust inequality in DOPA is the basis of his own objection to capitalism. But while Marxian exploitation is equivalent to DOPA in a series of models, he says, this provides no reason to be interested in such exploitation rather than in DOPA. The latter is fundamental. 'Exploitation may be thought of as an *innocuous* appendix to our true ethical concerns' (Roemer, 1986b, p. 274). Echoing Marx's claim that 'the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single [phrase]: abolition of private property' (Marx and Engels, 1976, p. 498), Roemer says that Marxists should call for an end to DOPA, not to exploitation (Roemer, 1986b, p. 275).

The reason is that in 'the general case', when preferences for income

²⁷ As noted in the cases of real world credit markets (Section 4.1) and labour services (note 19), domination does not require intensive supervision and detailed monitoring. It can occur 'from a distance' and without 'real subsumption'. It normally takes that form, however, for the good reason that real subsumption maximizes surplus transfer.

versus leisure diverge across agents, Marxian exploitation is an unreliable index for DOPA. In particular, Roemer argues that Marxian exploitation can go in the reverse direction from DOPA. The poor can exploit the rich if we assume suitable preference structures. Since DOPA and exploitation need not match up, the abolition of private property can only be justified on grounds of inequality, not exploitation.

The model which shows this is as follows (Roemer, 1986b, pp. 275–6). Given the Farm and Factory technologies above and unequal initial property endowments, assume the following preference structures: Karl, who is asset-poor, would rather lend his assets to Adam, who is asset-rich, and live off interest than work, while Adam is content to work. So Adam gets richer and Karl stays poor, even though embodied labour flows to Karl. Karl is a Marxian-exploiter and Adam is Marxian-exploited. But this is not objectionable if it accords with their preferences. Since the exploitation goes in the reverse direction from the DOPA, the latter is no basis for criticism of the former. (Indeed, Roemer notes, equalization of initial assets will make the exploiter better and the exploited worse off in terms of their own preferences.) So if exploitation is a ‘proxy for the underlying injustice (more precisely, the inequality) of stocks’ (Roemer, 1986b, p. 277), it is an inadequate proxy.

Wrong-way exploitation is possible only because Marxian exploitation lacks the coercion condition. To make the pure surplus transfer objectionably exploitative, we need a normative premise. The injustice of DOPA (as Roemer shows) will not do in this case. But in general the coerciveness of DOPA will do – though not here – since it is ruled out by the model. For Marxist exploitation, one needs coercion, more broadly, unfreedom. That derives not merely from inequality in initial distribution, but from workers’ lack of productive assets. Since, in the model, Karl and Adam both can retreat to the Farm, this real-world condition fails to apply. Neither is forced to work. Despite unequal exchange of embodied labour, Adam is not exploited in the Marxist sense.

Part of the problem is in Roemer’s treatment of inequality as solely an issue of injustice, not unfreedom. Just or not, DOPA is partly constitutive of Marxist exploitation. It is the coercion condition. Marx displays no interest in distributive justice as regards wealth and income. For him, what is wrong with inequality is its coerciveness. First, in denying the exploited sufficient productive assets to live, DOPA denies them the sort of ‘positive’ freedom involved in having the resources to do as they might, to exercise their options. Second, such inequality is a causal condition of domination and species-being alienation. As a middle term, exploitation does work in causally connecting inequality with its objectionable effects. No doubt Marx should not dismiss justice, but he is right to focus on the independent issues of freedom associated with inequality. In Roemer’s wrong-way exploitation model, this concern

vanishes, first because Karl has productive assets and so can exercise his options, and second, because contract enforcement is costless, so there is no domination or alienation.

If the inequality involved in exploitation is also unjust, that is another evil to chalk up against exploitation. On top of everything else, it is based on unjust or wrongful inequality. But even if the inequality is *not* unjust, it may be condemned as a condition of exploitation and so unfreedom. Indeed, even if the inequality is *just* by some standard, that does not necessarily cancel the charge that it promotes exploitation and its related evils. Its involvement with coercion and its resulting, via exploitation, in domination and alienation counts against both it and exploitation. These may outweigh the justice, if any, of the DOPA which produces them. Exploitation, then, remains interesting on grounds of the unfreedom tied to inequality as well as on those of any injustice it may involve.

Roemer might object that unfreedom is irrelevant since the situation satisfies the preferences of all even if a model is constructed where there is force. I cannot see how both to preserve the reverse flow of surplus and include coercion, since that is due to DOPA, but the issue is whether I can be forced to do what I want to do anyway and would do without being forced. If freedom is merely the ability to do what I want, the answer is *no*: it is no constraint to be unable to do what I do not want to do. Marx needs a conception of freedom on which freedom involves the availability of significant options whether or not I prefer them. If that can be maintained, he can say that I am coerced if my ability to act is restricted by alterable social arrangements. In that case the answer is *yes*.

I shall not here offer a defence of Marx’s notion (but see Schwartz, 1995 and 1993c). If, however, preferences formed under wrongful, for example, coercive, conditions are subject to criticism on those grounds and are not entitled to the unqualified respect we owe to preferences formed under unobjectionable conditions (Section 5) – this does not mean, as noted, that we may dismiss them outright – then that some model (or reality) satisfies the preferences of all cannot establish the legitimacy of its outcomes if those preferences depend on wrongful conditions. Roemer abstracts from conditions which might form a basis for a critique of preferences, but the model is therefore unilluminating for cases where inequality is due to Marxist exploitation, which involves precisely such conditions.

This is relevant to another problem with Roemer’s dismissal of inequality as a reason for interest in exploitation. Marxist exploitation not only derives from inequality *qua* DOPA, it causes inequality both by reproducing DOPA and by creating an unequal distribution of surplus. Workers may not grow poorer as capitalists grow richer, but an increase in relative inequality may be objectionable even if the workers’ share grows absolutely (Marx, 1977, p. 221). This may be an issue of freedom as

well as justice. Not only will capitalists have more positive freedom than workers in a way that lacks obvious justification, but workers will have less, absolutely, than they might. Roemer's model is beside the point if exploitation in Marx's sense causally aggravates inequality, because Marxist exploitation depends on ruling out the Farm, that is, on coercion. And much real-world inequality, plausibly, is caused by surplus transfer under coercive conditions, even if that is not true in all models, notably those without coercion. The consequences of (Marxist) exploitation are a basis for interest in their cause.

8. PROPERTY RELATIONS EXPLOITATION

I conclude by contrasting Roemer's alternative account of exploitation with Marx's. 'The central ethical question, which exploitation theory is imperfectly equipped to answer', says Roemer, 'is: what distribution of assets is morally all right?' (1986b, pp. 281–2; 1982b). For different reasons, Marx agrees that his theory is not designed to answer this question. It is a mistake 'to make a fuss about the so-called *distribution* and put the principal stress on it' (Marx, 1989, p. 87). Both may err about the value of Marx's theory for a critique of capitalism as unjust: Roemer, because he has the theory wrong; Marx, if his dismissal of justice is ill-motivated. But Roemer's alternative, while a necessary supplement to Marx's, is no substitute for it.

Roemer's general theory of exploitation is as follows: a group *W* is exploited if there is a conditionally feasible alternative *X* under which its members would be better off in terms of wealth and leisure; a group *C* is exploiting if they would be worse off under *X* (1986a, p. 103). The core idea is that of 'exploitation as the possibility of a better alternative' (1986a, p. 104). Various sorts of exploitation in this sense are possible – feudal, capitalist, even socialist. Our concern is with the second. *W* is 'capitalistically exploited' just in case:

- (1) Were *W* to withdraw from society with its per capita share of society's alienable productive assets, *W* would be better off.
- (2) If *C* were to withdraw, *C* would be worse off.
- (3) If *W* were to withdraw with its own (share of these) assets, *C* would be worse off (Roemer, 1982a, p. 285).

(1) expresses the idea that DOPA is central to capitalistic exploitation, that is, that workers are worse off under capitalism than they might be under socialism; (2) and (3) express the idea that capitalists benefit by inequality in productive assets. Roemer's exploitation is to be understood relative to a hypothetical egalitarian distribution, *X*. The numbers are ratios of ownership of alienable assets.

	X	Y	Z
C	2	4	3
W	2	3	1

Y is not exploitative because there is no better feasible alternative for *W*; *Z* is because there are such alternatives. That this is Roemer's view is supported by his claim that only 'inequality ... that could be eliminated by an equal distribution of endowments of alienable resources' is to be condemned. 'Differential reward to skill does not constitute capitalist exploitation' (1986a, p. 108). (Marx would agree.) The inequalities in *Y* might be OK if they are due to differences in skill (Marx would not agree: he condemns the principle of a return to labour contribution as a 'tacit recognition of] unequal individual endowment ... as [a] natural privilege' (1989, p. 86).)

Although Roemer claims that a main advantage of his property relations approach over Marx's surplus transfer theory is that 'it makes clear what the ethical imperative of the Marxian theory is' (1986a, p. 112), he is surprisingly reticent about the basis of that imperative. Presumably the imperative is 'the abolition of private property', but why should private property be abolished merely because one group, *W*, does worse under a regime of private property than under a feasible alternative? Libertarians will argue that as long as the distribution of property is just, it is unfortunate that some may suffer relative to what they might enjoy under different circumstances, but the situation cannot be rectified without violation of property rights.

On what grounds can Roemer defend the 'ethical imperative', as he construes it, of Marxism? His concept of exploitation clearly has affinities with Rawls's (1971) difference principle, on which, roughly, inequalities must be to the advantage of the least well off. Sometimes Roemer talks this way. He rings Rawlsian (or Marxian) changes on the moral irrelevance of inherited talents and dispositions (Roemer, 1988, pp. 60–71). But elsewhere he rejects a Rawlsian approach for Cohen's natural rights argument that self-ownership plus joint ownership of the world implies public ownership of the means of production (Roemer, 1988, pp. 155–60; Cohen, 1985, 1986c). His grounds are that since Cohen's argument has 'a more conservative premise, any egalitarian conclusion derived has more force' (Roemer, 1988, p. 160).

This seems a poor basis for the choice of a theory of justice. Even if Cohen's general sort of argument is a good *ad hominem* reply to pro-capitalist arguments (and I think it is; see Schwartz, 1992a), that is a poor reason to accept natural rights theories without positive reason to think that they are true. The 'fit' between something like Rawls's theory of justice and Roemer's notion of exploitation makes that package

theoretically attractive if a Rawlsian account is defensible.²⁸ Roemer has now come around to this point of view, at least insofar as rejecting natural rights (1994, Chapter 1).

The 'ethical imperative' differs depending upon whether we emphasize DOPA as involving unjust inequality or as a component of freedom-denying (Marxist) exploitation. As Roemer notes, the former leads to the view that 'socialist revolution entails redistribution or nationalization of the means of production', while the latter 'gives rise to industrial democracy as the key aspect of socialist transformation' (1986b, p. 274). Whether one wants 'the abolition of private property' mainly to institute justice or to enhance freedom makes a difference in practical politics. Roemer's market socialism (1994, Chapter 6) has no central place for worker self-management. So those who favour the latter have another reason to prefer Marx's account, though they need not follow his dismissal of justice.

Praise before criticism. Roemer's account of exploitation has two great virtues that Marx's lacks, at least in Marx's presentation. First, as advertised, it highlights the moral and explanatory significance of DOPA. This is central in Marx's account as well, but as Roemer complains, its significance is apt to be missed – and, indeed, in discounting freedom as a moral issue, Roemer misses it. With Roemer's theory of exploitation, no such danger exists. Moreover, Roemer's theory shows that exploitation may be condemned as unjust even if no surplus transfer account will wash, and independently of concerns about freedom. Since the theoretical foundations of surplus transfer theories are vexed (though, I believe, defensible), this is a point of signal importance.

The second great virtue is that Roemer's story properly gives pride of place to alternatives to capitalism. The normative bite of a critique of capitalism, as Arnold (1990) argues, depends on the possibility of avoiding the evils Marxists impute to capitalism. If socialism would be no improvement, meliorative reform is the most that is called for. Thus Arnold can cheerfully admit that Marx is right about alienation, while denying that this provides grounds for a socialist revolution, because socialism, he thinks, would do no better on this score (Arnold, 1990, pp. 61–2, 275–80). Marx, notoriously, refused to 'write [recipes] ... for the cookshops of the future' (1967a, p. 17). In his day, this was an intellectual failing. In ours, after practical experience with some disastrous alternatives, it would be a moral and a political failing. Roemer is right that socialists must show they can do better or give up their project. Roemer,

²⁸ Peffer (1990) makes the case that Marxists can and should use a modified Rawlsian theory of justice. Miller (1975) and Fisk (1975, 1989) raise doubts of a sort which I find persuasive about Rawlsian theories. Fisk (1989) offers a different and generally superior account of justice more suited to Marxian concerns, if infected with a superfluous and unattractive relativism. In Schwartz (1993a) I argue that Fisk's account can be made nonrelativistic.

among others, has been developing models of democratic market socialism.²⁹

But now criticism. Roemer claims that 'to characterize exploitation in terms of an alternative egalitarian distribution of private property ... captures precisely what Marxists mean by exploitation' (1986a, p. 106). Not so. Marx makes exploitation-based unfreedom central to his critique: coercion due to DOPA, domination, and alienation from human nature, that is, denial of real freedom and self-realization. In Roemer's story, these concerns drop out, and Marxian exploitation is a mere statistic, and not always a good one, for inequality. Property relations exploitation leaves out deeply objectionable consequences of capitalist exploitation which Marxist exploitation locates and explains.

But Roemer is not logically blocked from incorporating Marx's concerns into his account, nor Marx Roemer's, so perhaps their differences may be *aufgehoben*. Were Roemer to acknowledge the moral significance of unfreedom and to include the richer set of conditions which involve or produce several kinds of unfreedom in his account, he might accept the concerns about domination and alienation which move Marx under their cause, DOPA. He would have to acknowledge that the fact that domination and alienation cannot be reduced to or derived from DOPA (at least not without additional conditions) does not make them of secondary importance. Were Marx to accept that justice matters and that a theoretically elaborated alternative to capitalism is indispensable for his case, he could add property relations exploitation to his account of surplus transfer exploitation. With these emendations, the two accounts are not incompatible and indeed are mutually complementary and supportive.

REFERENCES

- Albert, Michael and Robin Hahnel. 1991. *The Political Economy of Participatory Economics*. Princeton University Press
- Arnold, N. Scott. 1990. *Marx's Radical Critique of Capitalist Society*. Oxford University Press
- Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. 'Two concepts of liberty'. In *Four Essays on Liberty*, pp. 118–72. Oxford University Press
- Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert. 1990. 'Contested exchange: new microfoundations for the political economy of capitalism'. *Politics and Society*, 18:165–222
- Brenkert, George. 1983. *Marx's Ethics of Freedom*. Routledge & Kegan Paul
- Brenner, Robert. 1985. 'Agrarian class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe'. In *The Brenner Debate*, pp. 10–63. T. H. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin (eds.). Cambridge University Press
- Buchanan, Allen. 1982. *Marx and Justice*. Rowman and Allenheld
- Cohen, G. A. 1978. *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence*. Princeton University Press
- Cohen, G. A. 1985. 'Nozick on appropriation'. *New Left Review*, 150:85–105

²⁹ See Roemer (1994) and Schweickart (1993) for market socialist models. A democratic planning model is developed in Albert and Hahnel (1991). For other models, see Schwartz (forthcoming b).

- Cohen, G. A. 1986a. 'The structure of proletarian unfreedom'. In *Analytical Marxism*, pp. 237–59. John Roemer (ed.). Cambridge University Press
- Cohen, G. A. 1986b. 'Forces and relations of production'. In *Analytical Marxism*, pp. 11–22. John Roemer (ed.). Cambridge University Press
- Cohen, G. A. 1986c. 'Self-ownership, world-ownership, and equality, Part II'. In *Marxism and Liberalism*, pp. 97–126. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., Jeffrey Paul, and John Ahrens (eds.). Blackwell
- Cohen, G. A. 1988. 'The labour theory of value and the concept of exploitation'. In *History, Labour, and Freedom*, pp. 209–38. Clarendon Press
- Devine, James and Gary Dymksi. 1991. 'Roemer's "general" theory of exploitation is a special case: the limits of Walrasian Marxism'. *Economics and Philosophy*, 7:235–75
- Dymksi, Gary, and John Elliot. 1989. 'Marx vs. Roemer: should anyone be interested in exploitation?' In *Analyzing Marxism: Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supp. Vol. 15, pp. 333–74. Robert Ware and Kai Nielsen (eds.). University of Calgary Press
- Elster, Jon. 1985. *Making Sense of Marx*. Cambridge University Press
- Fisk, Milton. 1975. 'History and reason in Rawls's moral theory'. In *Reading Rawls*, pp. 53–82. Norman Daniels (ed.). Basic Books
- Fisk, Milton. 1989. *The State and Justice*. Cambridge University Press
- Frankfurt, Harry. 1989. 'Freedom of the will and the concept of a person'. In *The Inner Citadel*, pp. 63–76. John Christman (ed.). Oxford University Press
- George, Susan. 1979. *Feeding the Few: Corporate Control of Food*. Institute for Policy Studies
- Holmstrom, Nancy. 1977. 'Exploitation'. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*: 353–69
- Holmstrom, Nancy. 1983. 'Marx and Cohen on exploitation and the labour theory of value'. *Inquiry*, 26:287–307
- Karasek, Robert and Tores Theorell. 1990. *Healthy Work*. Basic Books
- La Botz, Dan. 1991. *A Troublemaker's Handbook*. Labour Notes
- Lane, Robert. 1991. *The Market Experience*. Cambridge University Press
- Little, Daniel. 1986. *The Scientific Marx*. University of Minnesota Press
- Marglin, Stephen. 1982. 'What do bosses do? The origins and functions of hierarchy in capitalist production'. In *Classes, Power, and Conflict*, pp.287–98. Anthony Giddens and David Held (eds.). University of California Press
- Marx, Karl. 1967a [1867]. *Capital*, Vol. 1. Trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. Frederick Engels (ed.). International Publishers
- Marx, Karl. 1967b [1894]. *Capital*, Vol. 3. Frederick Engels (ed.). International Publishers
- Marx, Karl. 1975a [1844]. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. In *Collected Works [CW]*, Vol.:229–346
- Marx, Karl. 1975b [1844]. *Comments on James Mill*. In [CW], Vol. 3:211–28
- Marx, Karl. 1977 [1849, 1891]. *Wage Labour and Capital*. In [CW], Vol. 9:197–228
- Marx, Karl. 1983. 'Ökonomische Manuskripte 1857/1858'. In *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Werke*, Band 42. Dietz Verlag
- Marx, Karl. 1986a [1871]. *The Civil War in France*. In [CW], Vol. 22:307–68
- Marx, Karl. 1986b [1857–58]. *Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58 [Grundrisse]*. In [CW], Vol. 28
- Marx, Karl. 1989 [1875]. *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. In [CW], Vol. 24:75–99
- Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. 1976 [1848, 1888]. *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. In [CW], Vol. 6:477–519
- Mill, J. S. 1991 [1861]. *Considerations on Representative Government*. Prometheus Books
- Miller, Richard. 1975. 'Rawls and Marxism'. In *Reading Rawls*, pp. 206–29. Norman Daniels (ed.). Basic Books
- Miller, Richard. 1981. 'Marx and Aristotle'. In *Marx and Morality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supp. Vol. 7, pp. 323–52. Kai Nielsen and Steven Patten (eds.). Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy
- Moore, Stanley. 1993. *Marx Versus Markets*. Pennsylvania State University Press

- Peffer, Rodney. 1990. *Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice*. Princeton University Press
- Pollard, Sidney. 1965. *The Genesis of Modern Management*. Edward Arnold
- Rawls, John. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Harvard University Press
- Reiman, Jeffrey. 1987. 'Exploitation, force, and the moral assessment of capitalism'. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 16:3–41
- Roemer, John. 1982a. 'Property relations versus surplus value in Marxian exploitation'. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 11:281–314
- Roemer, John. 1982b. *A General Theory of Exploitation and Class*. Harvard University Press
- Roemer, John. 1986a. 'New directions in the Marxian theory of exploitation and class'. In *Analytical Marxism*, pp. 81–113. John Roemer (ed.). Cambridge University Press
- Roemer, John. 1986b. 'Should Marxists be interested in exploitation?' In *Analytical Marxism*, pp. 260–82. John Roemer (ed.). Cambridge University Press
- Roemer, John. 1986c. "'Rational choice" Marxism: some issues of method and substance'. In *Analytical Marxism*, pp. 191–201. John Roemer (ed.). Cambridge University Press
- Roemer, John. 1986d. *Value, Exploitation, and Class*. Harwood Academic Publishers
- Roemer, John. 1988. *Free to Lose*. Harvard University Press
- Roemer, John. 1989a. 'What is exploitation?' *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 18:91–7
- Roemer, John. 1989b. 'Second thoughts on property relations and exploitation'. In *Analyzing Marxism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supp. Vol. 15, pp. 257–66. Robert Ware and Kai Nielsen (eds.). University of Calgary Press
- Roemer, John. 1994. *A Future for Socialism*. Harvard University Press
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1987. *On the Social Contract*. In *The Basic Political Writings*, pp. 141–227. Trans. Donald A. Cress. Hackett Publishers
- Salmon, Wesley. 1989. 'Four decades of scientific explanation'. In *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. XIII: *Scientific Explanation*, pp. 3–219. Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon (eds.). University of Minnesota Press
- Schwartz, Justin. 1992a. 'From libertarianism to egalitarianism'. *Social Theory and Practice*, 183:259–88
- Schwartz, Justin. 1992b. 'Who's afraid of multiple realizability?' In *The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms*, pp. 89–112. John Dinsmore (ed.). Lawrence Erlbaum
- Schwartz, Justin. 1993a. 'Revolution and justice'. *Against the Current*, 42:37–41
- Schwartz, Justin. 1993b. 'Functional explanation and metaphysical individualism'. *Philosophy of Science*, 60:278–310
- Schwartz, Justin. 1993c. 'Women's oppression and exploitation'. Unpublished
- Schwartz, Justin. 1994. 'Marx, market socialism, and economic calculation'. Unpublished
- Schwartz, Justin. 1995. 'What's wrong with exploitation?' *Nous*, 29:158–88
- Schwartz, Justin. (ed.) Forthcoming. *Beyond Communism and Capitalism*. Humanities Press
- Schweickart, David. 1993. *Against Capitalism*. Cambridge University Press
- Scitovsky, Tibor. 1992. *The Joyless Economy*, revised edn. Oxford University Press
- Skillman, Gilbert. 1995. 'Ne hic saltaveris: Marx's theory of exploitation after Roemer'. *Economics and Philosophy*, 11:83–105
- Wood, Allen. 1980. 'The Marxian critique of justice'. In *Marx, Justice, and History*, pp. 3–41. Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon (eds.). Princeton University Press
- Wood, Allen. 1986. 'Marx and equality'. In *Analytical Marxism*, pp. 283–303. John Roemer (ed.). Cambridge University Press