Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

According to the language of thought (LOT) approach and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), thinking is the processing of symbols in an inner mental language that is distinct from any public language. Herein, I explore a deep problem at the heart of the LOT/CTM program—it has yet to provide a plausible conception of a mental symbol.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Anderson J. (2007) How can the human mind occur in the physical universe? Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Aryo, D. (1996). Sticking up for oedipus: Fodor on intentional generalizations and broad content. Mind and Language, 11(3).

  • Aydede, M. (1999). “On the type/token relation of mental representations”, Facta Philosophica: International Journal for Contemporary Philosophy, 7(12).

  • Aydede, M., & Robbins, P. (2001). Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations? The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31(1).

  • Braun D. (2001) Russellianism and prediction. Philosophical Studies 105: 59–105

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crane T. (1990) The language of thought: No syntax without semantics. Mind & Language 5(3): 187–212

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elman, J. (1998). Generalization, simple recurrent networks, and the emergence of structure. In M. A. Gernsbacher & S. Derry (Eds.), Proceedings of the 20th annual conference of the cognitive science society. Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

  • Fodor J.A. (1975) The language of thought. Thomas Crowell, NY

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. A. (Ed.). (1989). Substitution arguments and the individuation of belief. In A theory of content and other essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990. (Originally appeared in Boolos, G. (Ed.), Method, reason and language. Cambridge, UK: The Cambridge University Press, 1989.)

  • Fodor J. A. (1994) The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics. MIT Press, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J. A. (1998) Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J A. (2000) The mind doesn’t work that way. MIT Press, Cambridge MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J. A., LePore E. (1992) Holism: A shoppers’ guide. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J. A., McLaughlin B. (1990) Connectionism and the problem of systematicity: Why Smolensky’s solution doesn’t work. Cognition 35: 183–204

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis (also in Connectionism: Debates on psychological explanation (Vol. 2). Eds. by C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995).

  • Gazzanig, M. S., Ivry, R. B., & Mangun, G. R. (2002). Cognitive neuroscience, 2nd edn. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

  • Harnad S. (1990) The symbol grounding problem. Physica D 42: 335–346

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hawkins J. (2005) On intelligence. MacMillan, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis D. (1983) New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61: 343–377

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loewer, B., & Rey, G. (Eds.). (1993). Meaning in mind: Fodor and his critics. Oxford, UK; Cambridge: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macdonald, C., & Macdonald, G. (1995). Connectionism: Debates on psychological explanation (Vol. 2). Oxford: Blackwell.

  • Marcus G. (2001) The algebraic mind. MIT Press, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Millikan R. G. (1993) On mentalese orthography. In: Dahlbom B. (eds) Dennett and his critics: Demystifying mind. Blackwell, Cambridge, MA, pp 97–123

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Reilly, R., & Munakata, Y. (2000). Computational explorations in cognitive neuroscience. MIT Press.

  • Pessin A. (1995) Mentalese syntax: Between a rock and two hard places. Philosophical Studies 78: 33–53

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pinker S., Prince A. (1988) On language and connectionism: Analysis of a parallel distributed processing model of language acquisition. Cognition 23: 73–193

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prinz J. (2002) Furnishing the mind: Concepts and their perceptual basis. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Richard M. (1990) Propositional attitudes: An essay on thoughts and how we ascribe them. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Schneider S. (2005) Direct reference, psychological explanation, and Frege cases. Mind and Language 20(4): 223–447

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schneider S. (2009a) The language of thought. In: Calvo P., Symons J. (eds) Routledge companion to philosophy of psychology. Routledge, NY

    Google Scholar 

  • Schneider, S. (2009b). The nature of primitive symbols in the language of thought: A theory. Mind and Language, 24(5).

  • Searle J. (1980) Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3(3): 417–457

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smolensky, P. (1988). On the proper treatment of connectionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11.

  • Smolensky, P. (1995). Reply: Constituent structure and explanation in an integrated connectionist/symbolic cognitive architecture. In C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald (Eds.), Connectionism: Debates on psychological explanation (Vol. 2). Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

  • Stich S. (1983) From Folk psychology to cognitive science: The case against belief. MIT Press, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • van Gelder T. (1990) Why distributed representation is inherently non-symbolic. In: Dorffner G. (eds) Konnektionismus in Artificial Intelligence und Kognitionsforschung. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp 58–66

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and Institute for Research in Cognitive Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 19104-6304, USA

    Susan Schneider

Authors
  1. Susan Schneider
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Susan Schneider.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Schneider, S. LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room. Synthese 170, 235–250 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9581-1

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9581-1

Keywords

Search

Navigation