

Original citation:

Schnurr, Stephanie, Homolar, Alexandra, MacDonald, Malcolm and Rethel, Lena. (2015) Legitimizing claims for 'crisis' leadership in global governance. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 12 (2). pp. 187-205.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2014.974636>

Permanent WRAP url:

<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/66847>

Copyright and reuse:

The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work of researchers of the University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.

This article is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0) and may be reused according to the conditions of the license. For more details see: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>

A note on versions:

The version presented in WRAP is the published version, or, version of record, and may be cited as it appears here.

For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: publications@warwick.ac.uk

warwick**publications**wrap

highlight your research

<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk>

LEGITIMIZING CLAIMS FOR 'CRISIS' LEADERSHIP IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Stephanie Schnurr, Alexandra Homolar, Malcolm N. MacDonald & Lena Rethel

To cite this article: Stephanie Schnurr, Alexandra Homolar, Malcolm N. MacDonald & Lena Rethel (2015) LEGITIMIZING CLAIMS FOR 'CRISIS' LEADERSHIP IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, Critical Discourse Studies, 12:2, 187-205, DOI: [10.1080/17405904.2014.974636](https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2014.974636)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2014.974636>



© 2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis



Published online: 12 Nov 2014.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 209



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

LEGITIMIZING CLAIMS FOR ‘CRISIS’ LEADERSHIP IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The discourse of nuclear non-proliferation

**Stephanie Schnurr, Alexandra Homolar,
Malcolm N. MacDonald and Lena Rethel**

This paper explores the discursive processes of legitimizing leadership claims in the context of the nuclear proliferation crisis. Three complementary analyses of texts are carried out: discourse analyses of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and relevant speeches by members of the US administration, as well as a corpus analysis of news media accounts of nuclear proliferation published in prominent US and UK broadsheets. Findings suggest that leadership claims are legitimized through a range of discursive strategies, which are echoed across the different text types. However, a combination and comparison of the different datasets puts these findings into perspective and reveals that the various contexts and text types in which these leadership claims are made differ remarkably in terms of their use of relevant terms relating to leadership and crisis. We argue that this dynamic is best captured by the notion of an (inter)discursive chain of legitimization.

KEYWORDS crisis; leadership; discourse; nuclear; security; UNSC; media; international politics

1. Introduction

Over the past two decades, crises in global governance have become the norm rather than the exception (Broome, Clegg, & Rethel, 2012). They have attracted substantial scholarly attention in the two academic disciplines that inform this study. First, the field of discourse studies (Lischinsky, 2011; Rasti & Sahragard, 2012) has focused in particular upon the ways in which different actors in crises are positioned in specific types of text. Second, in the field of International Relations (IR) these crises have led to renewed questions about the efficacy and legitimacy of contemporary forms of global governance (Scholte, 2011; Widmaier, Blyth, & Seabrooke, 2007). Nevertheless, the important issue of crisis leadership in international politics has largely escaped academic scrutiny (Bradford & Lim, 2011; Gill, 2012). This is puzzling not only because leadership is a central element of any form of governance, but also because leadership can be seen as crucial during moments of crisis (Boin, Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005; Boin, McConnel, & Hart, 2008). Our paper aims to address this gap by exploring leadership in the context of global security. More specifically, we explore some of the key discursive processes through which claims for international leadership are made in relation to the nuclear proliferation crisis in global security governance and how different sets of actors seek to legitimize these claims across different sets of texts.

Legitimation has been described as ‘a complex social act that is typically exercised by talk and text’ (van Dijk, 1998, p. 260). It is often defined as ‘discourse that explains and justifies social activity’ and that provides motivation and justification for the speakers’ past and/or future actions (Cap, 2008; Oddo, 2011, p. 289; Sowinska, 2013). Chilton (2004, p. 117) distinguishes between epistemic and deontic types of legitimation and maintains that the former is concerned with ‘the speaker’s claim to have better knowledge, recognition of the “real facts”’, while the latter refers to the speaker’s implicit or explicit claims ‘to be not only right in a cognitive but “right” in a moral sense’.

Questions of legitimation have long been the focus of much research, particularly in political science. While there is an ongoing debate about what precisely constitutes legitimacy, recent research explores the processes through which legitimacy is constructed with various audiences in mind, by whom, and to what purpose (Rethel, 2011; Reus-Smit, 2007). A considerable amount of discourse analytic research has identified and critically discussed various legitimization strategies that are employed by leading political agents in their attempts to justify specific courses of action (Dunmire, 2005; Fetzer & Bull, 2012; Kerr, 2008; Oddo, 2011; Salama, 2012; Sowinska, 2013). In times of crisis, as they tend to require speedy but not necessarily popular policy responses, the close relationship between leadership and legitimacy is particularly important. As van Dijk (1998, p. 257) notes, legitimization ‘become[s] imperative in moments of crisis [...] and becomes part of the strategy of crisis management’.

The relationship between crisis and leadership can, however, also be understood as a specific mode of governance that increases the ability of political agents to pursue specific interests. In a study comparing speeches by political and corporate leaders Kerr (2008, p. 202), for example, identifies and describes ‘the means by which contemporary leaders are orchestrating a global civil war, keeping us in permanent crisis to maintain their sovereignty’. He argues that leaders in both the corporate and political worlds are constantly imagining and constructing crises in attempts to authenticate and legitimize their own claims for leadership. While research on issues of leadership and legitimization in crisis contexts has primarily focused on emergency politics (Balzacq, 2005; Huysmans, 2008; Williams, 2011) as well as so-called ‘call-to-arms speeches’, such as those made by the Bush administration in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War (Oddo, 2011; Roe, 2008), this paper explores the topic in the context of the challenges posed to international security by the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in the contemporary era. It thereby also serves to report on a key aspect of an interdisciplinary research project,¹ which investigates the dynamics that shape the emergence, success, and failure of crisis leadership in global governance.

The end of the Cold War had evoked early hopes of a decline in the threat of nuclear weapons. Yet although the size of the nuclear arsenals of the two former competing superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union, has been reduced considerably, the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities to countries and non-state actors beyond the five official nuclear powers has remained high on the international security agenda. Since the early 1990s, regimes that are perceived to operate outside the norms of international society have been a particular focus of concern (Homolar, 2011). The nuclear ambitions of North Korea, for example, have frequently led the USA to the brink of using military force to counter the apparent threat to international stability and US national security

interests. Iran's alleged nuclear aspirations over the past decade have similarly led political agents in the USA, in particular those on the right end of the political spectrum, to repeatedly suggest, even threaten, military action.

Both North Korea and Iran have generally been portrayed as norm violators and have faced significant international sanctions because they contravene the principles of the nuclear proliferation regime, whose main legal framework consists of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).² A series of prominent confrontations between 2006 and 2012 has further intensified the situation between the USA and the international community on the one hand and the Iranian and North Korean regimes on the other, increasing significantly the demand for a global solution. Nuclear proliferation thus represents an important site for international leadership research. To contribute to a better understanding of how leadership is actually *done* in this context, the key focus of this paper lies on exploring some of the main discursive processes through which claims for leadership are made by different actors and how these claims are legitimized in different text types relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the contemporary era.

2. The Complexity of Leadership

Leadership is a highly complex concept which is notoriously difficult to define. It is thus not surprising that there is little agreement among scholars regarding what exactly falls within its scope (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012; Grint, 2005). Established accounts of leadership often focus on material properties, especially the attributes and actions of specific 'leaders'. For example, there is a considerable body of literature in business and organizational studies that adopts Weberian notions of authority and distinguishes between traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic leadership (Robins, Millett, Cacioppe, & Waters-Marsh, 1998; Yukl, 2002). More recent approaches to leadership, however, have started to acknowledge its dynamic nature (Jackson & Parry, 2008). In spite of this on-going debate as to what exactly constitutes leadership, most researchers now agree that in order to capture its complex and multifaceted nature, it is more useful and ontologically accurate to understand leadership as an activity – as something people *do* – rather than as a personal characteristic or a position of authority (Hosking, 1997; Northouse, 1997).

A closer look at what actually constitutes leadership also reveals that many of the activities that have been identified as indexing leadership, such as creating a vision, or making and ratifying decisions, involve a discursive element. Or, as Fetzer and Bull (2012, p. 134) maintain, '[l]eadership is interactionally organized in discourse, in other words is brought into the discourse and is brought out in discourse'. This increasing acknowledgement of the relevance of discourse fostered 'a discursive turn' in leadership research, and researchers across different disciplines increasingly recognize the benefits offered by discourse analytical approaches (Fairhurst, 2007).

A theoretical framework developed to address some of the challenges of analysing the discourse of leadership is that of *Discursive Leadership* (Fairhurst, 2007). This relatively new approach often positions itself in opposition to traditional leadership psychology (Chen, 2008; Fairhurst, 2007). While leadership psychology is mostly concerned with the perceptions and self-reflections of leaders, discursive leadership focuses on language

in use and explores the specific processes through which leadership is communicated and accomplished in and through discourse (Schnurr & Chan, 2011). This means that research in the tradition of discursive leadership is no longer primarily interested in establishing 'grand theories of leadership' (Clifton, 2006, p. 203). Rather it seeks to gain a better understanding of the discursive dynamics and practices that constitute leadership and assist particular agents in making and legitimizing leadership claims.

3. Discourses of Global Security Leadership

In order to access wide-ranging empirical evidence of the ways in which claims for leadership are made and legitimized in relation to the global control of the spread of nuclear weapons, we undertook three complementary analyses of texts: an analysis of relevant resolutions drawn up by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (one of the main arenas of global governance where issues of nuclear security are hotly debated) using both qualitative and corpus analysis techniques; a discourse analysis of two prominent speeches given by members of the US administration within relevant fora in the global arena; and a corpus analysis of related accounts published in prominent broad-sheets either side of the Atlantic. By focusing on these three sites we follow van Dijk (1998, p. 256) who acknowledges that 'legitimation is not only engaged in by persons in some official position, but also by institutional actors, such as organizations, official bodies, parliaments and so on'.

As a starting point we use insights gained through an analysis of the UNSC resolutions to establish the interrelation between this institution and specific discourses with a particular focus on the legitimacy that discourses of leadership derive from the institution in which they were produced (Salama, 2012, p. 211). UNSC resolutions were selected because these are the official documents in which this inter-governmental organization makes decisions binding amongst the participating state actors, and in which the USA plays a dominant political role. We have looked at all the UNSC resolutions between 2006 and 2012 (available at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>).

Observations gained from this analysis are then examined in relation to the claims for leadership uttered in selected speeches by members of the US administration. Based on the attention these speeches have received in the media, we have chosen President Obama's 'Prague Speech' and a speech by Vice President Biden on 'The Path to Nuclear Security' (available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/>). In these speeches, Obama and Biden explicitly formulate claims for US international leadership and attempt to legitimize them. Our analysis draws on previous discourse analytic research which identified a range of discursive strategies used in political speeches when claiming and trying to legitimize leadership (Dunmire, 2005; Kerr, 2008; Oddo, 2011; Salama, 2012; Sowinska, 2013). We suggest that speeches are a useful text type for analysing the discourse of leadership and legitimization because as Fetzter and Bull (2012, p. 132) have claimed, 'in the context of a political speech, leadership tends to be performed in a more explicit manner' (Kerr, 2008).

As a final step we use a corpus of newspaper articles to explore how these claims for leadership are co-constructed with and responded to by the media. A specific focus here is on how leadership roles are assigned to specific agents and how the scenario of a crisis is

discursively constructed to legitimize specific leadership claims. Four prominent US and UK broadsheets were chosen to examine the ways in which claims to leadership were made and legitimized within the public sphere of these two principal players in the UNSC, who are also signatories to the NPT. We focus on the USA in particular due to its contemporary role as the pre-eminent global military power, with the UK being its principal strategic ally with respect to concerns of international security. Targeted texts were selected according to specific search terms which enabled us to examine the construction of leadership in relation to the issue of the global control of nuclear weapons. We have analysed this corpus by drawing on different theories and methodologies from discourse analytic traditions, including discursive leadership (Fairhurst, 2007; Tourish, 2007), corpus-assisted discourse analysis (Baker, 2006; Baker et al., 2008), and political discourse analysis (van Dijk, 1997; Dunmire, 2012). The corpus was further treated to analyse commonalities and patterns in words and phrases occurring across large numbers of texts. To this end we used *WordSmith tools* (Version 5, Scott, 2008) in order to reveal patterns of collocation and concordance within the collection of texts, as well as their comparability with another baseline corpus – the British National Corpus (hereafter, BNC, 2007) – through analysing words that were statistically significant, or 'key'.

By combining these three text types in our analysis, we follow Salama (2012, p. 212) and others who have also combined qualitative and quantitative discourse analysis methods in analysing political discourse and whose findings show that both 'should be perceived as interdependently co-working towards an overall goal'. Moreover, such a combination, we suggest, contributes to a better understanding of the complex processes through which claims for leadership are made – and by whom – in the international arena, and how these claims are legitimized by different agents in different texts. Our methodological approach pursued is therefore necessarily multiperspectival. Not only does it combine different approaches *within* discourse analysis and applied linguistics, but also *across* the disciplines of discourse studies and applied linguistics on the one hand, and IR on the other.

4. Claiming and Legitimizing Leadership

In this section we first look at the UNSC resolutions before analysing in more detail two key speeches by members of the US administration. Finally we conduct a corpus analysis of accounts of nuclear proliferation published in prominent US and UK broadsheets. By looking at these different text types we aim to contribute to a better understanding of the complex and multifaceted ways in which claims for international leadership are made and legitimized in and through discourse in the context of nuclear proliferation.

4.1. *Claiming and Legitimizing Leadership in the UNSC Resolutions*

The UNSC is the inter-governmental forum which addresses issues of global security. It comprises 15 members: 5 permanent members – China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA – and 10 non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for a 2-year term. According to its webpages, 'the Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression'

(<http://www.un.org/en/sc/>). Here, the UNSC appears to be asserting its knowledge as to what these threats or aggressive acts might be, or in Chilton's terms claiming 'epistemic' legitimation (2004, p. 117) for its acts of determination. The grounds for the legitimacy of the UNSC can be attributed to its constituency, being made up of the five nuclear-armed nations with the largest military arsenals in the world as well as a quasi-democratic inclusion of representatives from 10 rotating, elected states. The Council's determinations as to 'threats' and 'acts of aggression' – along with recommendations as to how to counteract them – are published in regular written edicts which are debated, drawn up, and published by the Council on the global security issues of the day. These UNSC resolutions are a highly distinctive type of document, idiosyncratic in their structure and formulaic in their use of language. Between 2006 and 2012 the UNSC published 440 resolutions, an average of 63 resolutions per year – of which 18 were directly relevant to nuclear proliferation. While we use corpus tools to establish some basic lexical frequencies within these texts, we have also read core texts from this sub-corpus intensively to gain insights into which actors are making claims to leadership within this institutional context and how leadership is legitimized.

The claims for leadership made within our sample of UNSC resolutions are rather oblique. In particular, the nuclear proliferation resolutions are notable for the absence of lexical items which explicitly refer to leadership. The noun 'leadership' only appears once, and there are no occurrences of any forms of the verb 'lead', or the noun form 'leader(s)'. Furthermore, explicit references to national leadership are also absent; for example, there is no direct reference to the USA or the names of either of the two American presidents over this period. However, it has long been established that there is a relationship between the formal features of genre and the communicative purpose of a text (Swales, 1990). Previously, we have also argued that there is a dialectical relationship between genre and institutional context in which documents circulate (MacDonald, 2002; MacDonald, Badger, & O'Regan, 2009). This is as true for security discourse as it is for the discourses of medicine, law, and the hard sciences. The UNSC resolution as a text type is composed of a series of propositions relating to global 'threats' or 'acts of aggression' which are directly articulated by the Security Council itself. In this respect the distinctive, legalistic genre of the resolution conveys the authority of the Council itself, legitimated through the discursive practice of debating, voting, and agreeing on the resolution of the day, carried out by its members in its elaborately designed chamber (Figure 1).

A resolution consists of a series of enumerated, indirect commands, introduced by a regular range of mostly verbal or behavioural process types (after Halliday & Matthiesen, 2006). These commands are declared impersonally, with the Security Council as agent. The most frequently occurring verb in our nuclear proliferation sub-corpus is the mental process 'decides' ($n = 103$), as well as 'requires' ($n = 9$) and 'emphasizes' ($n = 7$). However, verbal processes occur more regularly, including 'calls' ($n = 67$), 'requests' ($n = 61$), 'encourages' ($n = 38$), 'urges' ($n = 19$), 'affirms' ($n = 16$), 'reaffirms' ($n = 10$), 'welcomes' ($n = 9$), and 'concludes' ($n = 3$). One or two material verbs are also used metaphorically for these purposes, for example, 'underlines' ($n = 23$) and 'undertakes' ($n = 4$). The concordance data shown in Figure 2 illustrate the usage of the particularly strong verbal process 'urges'. Here the Security Council draws on its authority not only to invoke its own subcommittees on nuclear proliferation – 'the 1540 Committee' and the 'IAEA' – but also Iran, the DRNK,



FIGURE 1
The Security Council chamber (UN Photo/DN)³

and other members of the international community to 'intensify their efforts' to prevent nuclear proliferation.

As well as achieving legitimization through the discursive practice that takes place within the Council chamber, authority is also established at the outset of each resolution relating to nuclear proliferation, through a complex web of intertextuality referring to previous resolutions. For example, resolution 1673 published in 2006 – the earliest in our corpus – starts with the following paragraph (emphasis in original):

Having considered the report of the Security Council Committee establish pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), hereafter the 1540 Committee (S/2006/257), and reaffirming its resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, ...⁴

Here Resolution 1540, published in 2004, sets out the initial principles of non-nuclear proliferation with regards to the case of Iran which echo right through our nuclear proliferation sub-corpus up until 2012. Having referenced other 'doxic texts' as a source of legitimization, a resolution typically continues to restate certain core principles appertaining to the regulation of nuclear proliferation, for example,

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security, ...⁵

N Concordance

1 of experts before the end of each December; 10. Urges the 1540 Committee to continue to engage
 2 of contact for assistance by 31 August 2011; 15. Urges the 1540 Committee to continue
 3 the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004); (e) Urges the 1540 Committee to continue to
 4 in order better to coordinate their efforts; 13. Urges the 1540 Committee to encourage and take
 5 the Committee's assistance template to that effect; Urges States and international, regional and
 6 Committee's assistance template to that effect; 14. Urges States and relevant international, regional
 7 possible use of the Committee's website, and Urges the Committee to conduct, with the
 8 services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and Urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon
 9 intent to continue to follow the work of the Panel; 5. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies
 10 intent to continue to follow the work of the Panel; 5. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies
 11 Committee any updates to this program of work; 4. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies
 12 Committee any updates to this program of work; 4. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies,
 13 and capacity building in this regard; 27. Urges all States to take all appropriate national
 14 with its findings and recommendations; 27. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies
 15 mandate with its findings and recommendations; 3. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies
 16 with its findings and recommendations; 30. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies
 17 to the Six Party Talks without precondition, and Urges all the participants to intensify their efforts
 18 the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2009/82), which Urges Iran to suspend immediately construction at
 19 protocol in making nuclear export decisions; 20. Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear

FIGURE 2

Concordance data: 'urges'

As with the main propositions within each resolution, 'reaffirming' is here just one of a formulaic range of participial verbs which are used to consolidate the operational principles of the UNSC each time a resolution is agreed and published. In our nuclear proliferation sub-corpus, these again include predominantly verbal process types, such as 'recalling' ($n = 46$), 'reaffirming' ($n = 38$), 'emphasizing' ($n = 13$), 'welcoming' ($n = 11$), 'expressing' ($n = 9$), 'stressing' ($n = 8$), 'determining' ($n = 7$), 'deploring' ($n = 7$), 'addressing' ($n = 7$), 'endorsing' ($n = 6$), 'reiterating' ($n = 5$), 'calling' ($n = 4$), 'claiming' ($n = 2$), and 'affirming' ($n = 2$); but also a few mental process such as 'noting' ($n = 34$), 'recognizing' ($n = 10$), 'monitoring' ($n = 7$), and 'realizing' ($n = 5$). Three material processes are used metaphorically – 'acting' ($n = 33$), 'underlining' ($n = 6$), and 'adopting' ($n = 4$). 'Ensuring' also occurs seven times, as the paradigmatic example of what Mulderigg (2011) refers to as 'managing actions' in her typification of the 'grammar of governance'. By realizing its verbal agency through this range of process types, the Security Council directly asserts its authority, and implicitly makes claims for leadership over other actors both internal and external to the UN.

The internal intertextual realizations of the UNSC, however, extend beyond the remit of resolutions themselves. Interviews with expert informants gleaned for our wider-ranging ClIGG database indicated the importance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in bestowing a technological legitimacy on the principles and policies set out in the UNSC resolutions. According to its website, 'the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as the world's central inter-governmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the nuclear field' (<http://www.iaea.org/>). It is therefore unsurprising that 'IAEA' occurs as the 24th most frequent lexical item in the nuclear proliferation resolutions corpus ($n = 192$). In

this respect, Resolution 1696, the second resolution in our sub-corpus of resolutions relating to nuclear proliferation opens by prioritizing the role of the IAEA as a form of empirical justification, for example,

Noting with serious concern that the IAEA Director General's report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran's nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

Thus within its paradigmatic text, the resolution, it is not necessary for the Security Council's claims to be realized through explicit lexical reference either to its own leadership or to that of its members. Rather its claims to leadership are realized directly through the grammar of the text, being in an agentive position with respect to a range of verbal and mental processes associated with governance (Mulderigg, 2011). This textual realization is legitimized as the outcome of the discursive practice of participatory debate carried out by a melange of executive and elected council members within the UN chamber. In the next section, we will consider how these more implicit leadership claims of the resolutions relate to those made orally by national leaders and their representatives.

4.2. Claiming and Legitimizing Leadership in Speeches by the US Administration

The ways in which claims for leadership are made in and through the UNSC resolutions are somewhat contrasted by our analysis of selected speeches delivered by members of the US administration. In contrast to the UNSC texts which tend not to make any explicit leadership claims and which do not explicitly ascribe a leadership role to any national agents, the speeches by members of the US administration portray a rather different picture.

We have chosen two key speeches here to explore the discursive processes through which members of the US administration discursively construct a leadership role for the USA and how they justify demanding other states (most notably Iran and North Korea) to destroy their nuclear weapons while at the same time maintaining their own arsenal. The two speeches that were selected for this purpose are 'The Prague Speech' by President Obama and 'The Path to Nuclear Security: Implementing the President's Prague Agenda' by Vice President Biden. The public Prague Speech was delivered by newly elected President Obama on 5 April 2009 to a crowd of over 10,000 people in Hradcany Square in Prague. It was given only a few hours after North Korea had launched a long-range rocket. We have chosen this speech for our analysis here because in it Obama takes a clear position towards nuclear non-proliferation and outlines the objectives of his administration for nuclear disarmament. Perhaps not surprisingly, this speech has received a lot of attention in the media and is said to have engendered enthusiasm, as well as hopes and expectations around the world for major developments in nuclear disarmament. Biden's speech, despite having received considerably less media coverage, is often perceived as following on from this speech and explicating in more detail the practical implementation of the vision and agenda that Obama outlined in Prague. This aim of Biden's speech, delivered on 18

February 2010 at the National Defense University, is not only reflected in its title, *'Implementing the President's Prague Agenda'*, but also in the frequent intertextual links that it establishes with Obama's speech.

In both speeches Obama and Biden, respectively, make several claims for leadership. For example, they explicitly construct a leadership role for the USA in the context of nuclear security. In his speech, Obama proclaims that *'we cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it'*; and Biden ends his speech in a similar vein by remarking *'Together, we will live up to our responsibilities. Together, we will lead the world'*. Through the lexical choices and syntactic parallelisms in both speeches, the USA is portrayed as playing a leading role in this context, which is not only closely related to having a vision and initiating the change that is necessary to achieve it, but also as having the moral responsibility to take on this leadership. In addition to these instances where both speakers explicitly describe the USA as *doing* leading there are several examples throughout where they implicitly invoke leadership associations, for example, by referring to Obama's *'vision for protecting our country from nuclear threats'* (Biden) and outlining future actions, *'Now, let me describe to you the trajectory that we need to be on'* (Obama). Creating and communicating a vision and outlining future actions are both activities that are typically associated with leadership (Kotter, 2001; Yukl, 2002).

These implicit and explicit claims for leadership are legitimized throughout the speeches through several discursive strategies. Following Chilton (2004), in contrast with the epistemic legitimation exercised by the UNSC, most of the discursive strategies used by Obama and Biden in the chosen speeches could be described as deontic legitimation. For example, here Biden warns his audience about the dangers of the misuse of nuclear weapons:

The horror of nuclear conflict may make its occurrence unlikely, but the very existence of nuclear weapons leaves the human race ever at the brink of self-destruction, particularly if the weapons fall into the wrong hands. Many leading figures of the nuclear age grew ambivalent about aspects of this order. Kennan, whose writings gave birth to the theory of nuclear deterrence, argued passionately but futilely against the development of the hydrogen bomb. And Robert Oppenheimer famously lamented, after watching the first mushroom cloud erupt from a device he helped design, that he had become *'the destroyer of worlds'*.

Rather than justifying the danger of nuclear weapons by supporting it with scientific evidence (e.g. in the form of statistics or scientific experiments), Biden's arguments are mainly grounded in evoking fear in his audience about the possible consequences of a use of these weapons (see his lexical choices *'horror'*, *'at the brink of self-destruction'*, *'wrong hands'*, *'the destroyer of worlds'*). This effect is further intensified by making intertextual links to other texts and historical figures (here and at other points throughout both speeches), which is another legitimization strategy (Salama, 2012) that lends further authority and moral weight to his claims. This is achieved here by referring to *'many leading figures of the nuclear age'*, mentioning Kennan, and quoting Robert Oppenheimer to support the potential horror scenario for the future that Biden projects throughout his speech.

Another key legitimization strategy (Oddo, 2011; Sowinska, 2013) that frequently occurs in both speeches is creating an 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy where the 'us' usually refers to a large group of people/states including the speaker and the audience, and 'them' refers to a smaller group of 'others' who are often depicted as doing 'the wrong' or 'bad' things. The following quote is an example taken from Obama's speech:

Some countries will break the rules. That's why we need a structure in place that ensures when any nation does, they will face consequences.

With this comment, Obama places '*some countries*' in opposition to a '*we*' that seems to include the UNSC, the US administration, and by implication also the Czech audience to whom he delivers his speech. The ways in which '*they*' are portrayed, namely as '*break[ing] the rules*' is then used as a justification of the leadership role that '*we*' take on, and which includes establishing some rules and regulations as well as making sure that '*they*' will '*face consequences*' if they do not abide by '*our*' rules. A bit later in his speech Obama is very explicit about who '*they*' actually are, namely North Korea, Iran, and interestingly, '*terrorists*' who are mentioned as a third albeit less clearly defined group in this context. Obama also outlines the options that he sees for these countries: subscribing to the vision of the US administration or facing '*increased isolation, international pressure, and a potential nuclear arms race in the region that will increase insecurity for all*'.

Another legitimization strategy that is closely related to creating an 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy (van Dijk, 2001) is the frequent use of strong assertions which have been described as 'the cornerstone of legitimation' (Sowinska, 2013). Both speeches contain numerous strong assertions on which the speakers' argument is built, such as Obama's claim that '*The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War*'. What is noticeable in both texts is that in most instances these assertions are followed by claims about deontic legitimation which relate to moral righteousness and obligations, with a noticeable lack of epistemic legitimation in the form of 'lists, statistics and sources that the speaker presumes the hearer will accept as authoritative' (Chilton, 2004, p. 117). This predominance of deontic legitimation strategies can perhaps be explained by the dilemma in which the USA find themselves, namely on the one hand demanding other states to destroy their arsenal of nuclear weapons and refrain from obtaining new ones, while on the other hand insisting themselves on maintaining what they describe as the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons world-wide. Biden acknowledges this dilemma in his speech when he states that:

As both the nation to have used nuclear weapons, and as a strong proponent of non-proliferation, the United States has long embodied a stark but inevitable contradiction.

However, Biden is in no way apologetic about this '*inevitable contradiction*' but rather uses it as a highly paradoxical, moral justification for his demands, as does Obama in his speech when he maintains that:

as a nuclear power – as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act.

These historical facts are used here as a motivation and rationale to construct the USA as a leader with '*a moral responsibility to act*'. What is particularly interesting about

this claim, of course, is the fact that the USA is unapologetic about its possession of nuclear weapons and rather than committing to disarmament activities itself, its possession of these weapons is specifically used as a justification and legitimization of its claim for a leadership role in asking other states to destroy their own weapons. This is thus another example of how both speeches build their leadership claims around deontic rather than epistemic legitimation. And it is perhaps not surprising that Obama's comment about '*a moral responsibility to act*' is closely followed by a claim for a leadership role for the USA in the context of nuclear non-proliferation: '*We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it*' (as discussed above).

However, it is noteworthy that in both these speeches and the UNSC resolutions there is no direct reference to the course of events surrounding nuclear proliferation as a 'crisis'. That is, although Obama and Biden construct the situation around nuclear disarmament as being critical, and although they build and legitimize their claims for leadership on this understanding, they refrain from explicitly describing it as a 'crisis'. In this respect, the word 'crisis' appears in neither the UNSC resolutions nor the speeches. This observation is particularly interesting as it is in sharp contrast to the reporting of the issue of nuclear proliferation in prominent UK and US broadsheets over this period.

4.3. *Claiming and Legitimizing Leadership in Selected UK and US Broadsheets*

The exercise of sovereignty is generally understood as contiguous with the implementation of a 'state of exception' (Agamben, 2005, p. 1, after Schmitt, 1922/1934). On this argument, the naming of a particular state of affairs as a crisis is paramount to legitimizing the position of a particular actor (or actors) as 'sovereign', or as leader (Kerr, 2008). While the resolutions documents produced by the UNSC in the international political sphere appear almost self-consciously to avoid asserting that the proliferation of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is a crisis, evidence from our corpus of broadsheets indicates that the notion of crisis is regularly invoked within the national public sphere in relation to nuclear proliferation. The search terms 'nuclear proliferation' or 'nuclear crisis' yielded 1590 articles from the news database Nexis UK published between the years 2006 and 2012 from the following broadsheets: *The Times* and *The Guardian* in the UK; and *The New York Times*, and *The Washington Post* in the USA.

Concordance analysis of the broadsheet corpus revealed that the word 'crisis' occurs 1119 times. Unsurprisingly 'nuclear' appears as the top collocate of 'crisis' ($n = 626$), with the phrase 'nuclear crisis' occurring 589 times. Additionally, 'Iran' emerges as a top collocate of the phrase 'nuclear crisis' ($n = 37$), other top collocates being the adjectives 'Iranian' ($n = 58$) and 'Korean' ($n = 22$). Often these combinations occur where there is a rhetorical need to legitimize an intervention on the part of the 'western' powers against either of the deviant regimes. For example, here the diplomatic moves being undertaken by prominent members of the Security Council are legitimized by their polarization against Iran, which is constituted lexically as being coterminous with the 'nuclear crisis' itself:

The Security Council's five permanent members and Germany failed to reach agreement at a meeting Monday on how to respond to the Iranian nuclear crisis but said they would forge ahead in the coming days to break the impasse. (Lynch, 2006)

Likewise, in this second example, the strategy of reification appears to take place through the use of the nominalization 'North Korean nuclear crisis', which serves to legitimize the American President's confrontational stance towards the Kim Jong Il regime:

Ever since the North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in 2002 after the discovery of a clandestine nuclear program, the Bush administration has insisted that North Korea should not be rewarded for its bad behavior – and many of the U.S. offers have required Pyongyang to give up a lot before it could receive anything in return. (Kessler & Cody, 2007)

The word 'crisis' also appears particularly where there is a discussion about 'exceptional' measures being used to curb breaches to UN resolutions on the part of North Korea or Iran. In the first example, an assertion of leadership on the part of George W. Bush is paraphrased as he publically contemplates rather nebulous 'repercussions' against North Korea:

President Bush said that he had 'no intention of attacking' the isolated Stalinist regime and that he would pursue 'all diplomatic efforts' in response to North Korea's first atomic explosion ... But he made it clear that President Kim Jong Il must face 'serious repercussions' for sparking the world's latest nuclear crisis. (Bone & Parry, 2006)

However, in this second example, Tony Blair appears to break ranks with the US president over the threat of attacking Iran for its continuing deviation from the NPT:

But he also used the topic to strengthen his public opposition to a nuclear attack on Iran, apparently stepping back from his previous readiness to follow the Bush administration's line in leaving options open in the Iran nuclear crisis. (Cowell, 2006)

In both cases the intensification of the urgency of a state of affairs lent by invoking the word 'crisis' – and more dramatically the deployment of the apocalyptic phrase 'nuclear crisis' – serves to legitimize the threat of 'exceptional' measures being carried out in retaliation against the two allegedly deviant regimes.

Likewise, while there is little explicit attribution of leadership with the UNSC corpus, in the newspaper corpus we do find a range of lexical items which reference leadership directly, for example, 'leaders' ($n = 720$), 'leader' ($n = 522$), and 'leadership' ($n = 342$). While the three noun forms are statistically significant – or 'key' – when compared with the BNC, the verb forms 'lead' and 'leads' only occur 379 and 45 times, respectively. This observation is perhaps not surprising given that many of the national leaders may simply be referred to by their title (such as 'president') or by their last name (such as 'Obama'). The most frequently occurring phrase is 'world leaders', for example,

Pressure mounted on Iran yesterday to halt its nuclear programme as world leaders at the United Nations warned of the threat posed by Tehran to a global consensus on disarmament. (Philp, 2009)

Here, the attribution of the Iranian transgression of the NPT to 'world leaders' once again appears to legitimize the warning relayed to the UK national populace. However, the attribution of leadership to specific countries appears less frequently – with 'American leaders' ($n = 12$) being rather less prominent than other principal state actors, for example, 'Chinese leaders' ($n = 26$), 'Iranian leaders' ($n = 24$), 'Iran's leaders' ($n = 23$), and

'European leaders' ($n = 20$). Moreover, the most prominent epithets associated with 'leadership' were 'American' and 'Iranian', curiously in equal measure ($n = 20$). However, these attributions are used in the press with different meanings of the word. References to 'American leadership' very much emphasize the pre-eminent role of the superpower, in particular reflecting the debate over its unilateral or global nature, in part contributing to the vision of American global leadership we have already seen articulated above by President Obama in his speech. One 'visionary' example is outlined here with reference to Obama winning the Nobel peace prize at the beginning of his first term of presidency:

What the president promised was a 'global plan', not an American plan. The same is true on all the other issues that the Nobel committee cited, from nuclear disarmament to climate change – none of these things will yield to unilateral approaches. They'll take international cooperation and American leadership. (Bono, 2009a)

However, the use of the term 'leadership' in relation to Iran is used almost exclusively to refer to the state government. Here, reference is made to the 'Iranian leadership' to construct the dichotomous 'us' and 'them' relationship (van Dijk, 2001) between the two administrations, which serves to maintain a sense of polarization between the opposing blocs, for example,

The Iranian leadership has spurned Obama's offer of negotiation and shows no willingness to compromise over its nuclear programme. (Bono, 2009b)

Our analysis of prominent US and UK broadsheets suggests that even the national elite press appears to subscribe to a doctrine of 'exceptionalism' in using more dramatic lexis to index events surrounding nuclear proliferation over this period. Furthermore, claims for legitimization are made through ascribing 'leadership' and the role of 'leader' explicitly to prominent state actors.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

Our analysis of UNSC resolutions, prominent speeches by members of the US administration, and newspaper articles from selected UK and US broadsheets has shown how claims for leadership are made and legitimized through a range of discursive strategies, which are echoed across these different text types. At the same time, we found remarkable differences between these texts – especially with regards to their use of relevant terms relating to leadership and crisis. Comparing the ways in which claims for leadership are made and legitimized across these different text types has demonstrated how a dynamic network of meanings is created. On the one hand, as the discursive construction of US leadership moves away from the US administration to the UNSC, it becomes more diffuse and the rhetorical foregrounding of the USA is elided; on the other hand, as the discourse of nuclear proliferation becomes de-located from the UNSC and relocated in the US and UK broadsheets the urgency of the situation is sharpened by its (re)configuration as a 'crisis' within the public sphere. We suggest that this dynamic is best captured by the notion of an *(inter)discursive chain of legitimization*.

This *(inter)discursive chain of legitimization* is operationalized in the creation, maintenance, and transmission of the governance of the world-wide proliferation of nuclear

weapons. While mechanisms of recursivity and feedback loops always have to be monitored, nevertheless the UNSC appears to sit at the top of this chain. Here the complex and apparently democratic, discursive practice of election, debate, and voting which takes place within its powerfully symbolic chamber lends legitimacy to the legalistic texts which it regularly produces in the distinctive, legalistic genre of the resolution. However, this seemingly democratic veneer of the Council procedures is in tension with the rhetorical and military might of the five permanent members, each of whom retains the right of veto, and vote in accordance with their own national interests. Nevertheless, this process in turn legitimizes the authority and stance of national leaders and their representatives – particularly those who represent the five permanent members such as the USA and the UK – as is evidenced in the two speeches which we have analysed above. In public speeches, leaders and their representatives can display a more proactive stance towards UN propositions – but that stance is always legitimized in the last instance by the position taken by the UNSC. This dialectic that takes place between national leaders and the Council is in turn relayed in the national media. Here, quotes taken from speeches transmit selected messages from resolutions which appear to be in keeping with the national interest and ideology. Prominent broadsheets, in particular within western democracies, can themselves influence the actions of social groups such as politicians, business leaders, and voters. Therefore, this final link in the chain should not be seen as merely descriptive, but can in itself lead to the realization of social action within the public sphere.

Clearly, leadership – in particular in the context of crises in the arena of global governance – remains a highly pressing topic, and more research is necessary to better understand the processes that contribute to informing, shaping, reinforcing, and sometimes also questioning and challenging the claims made by various global actors in relation to leadership on the global stage. This will also enable us to draw inferences on the efficacy and legitimacy of crisis leadership in international politics. Such research, we suggest, will ultimately contribute to a better understanding of the processes involved in global governance.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Rachele Vessey, Rachel Lewis, Georg Loefflmann, and Nazia Hussein for their research assistance, and various members of the GRP Global Governance and the PAD research group at Warwick University for their advice and encouragement. The research was supported by a University of Warwick Strategic Award (# RDF1063), and the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number ES/K008684/1).

Notes

1. More details about the project are available at: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/priorities/globalgovernance/projects/global_crisis_leadership.
2. The NPT promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy and it legally binds all signatory countries to non-proliferation. While it recognizes five countries as official nuclear powers that are also the permanent members of the UNSC – the USA, the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and China – and assigns the remaining signatories the right to peaceful use

of nuclear energy, the NPT represents a binding commitment of nuclear weapons states to nuclear disarmament. The CTBT complements the NPT by banning all nuclear explosions. While over 160 countries have ratified the CTBT, this excludes the USA. Iran, which has ratified the NPT and is a signatory of the CTBT, is regarded as regularly being in breach of both treaties while denying any of these allegations. North Korea, in turn, withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and has not signed the CTBT.

3. The Security Council chamber, designed by Norwegian artist Arnstein Arneberg. A large mural by Per Krohg, covering most of the east wall, symbolizes the promise of future peace and individual freedom (www.un.org/en/sc/about/).
4. Security Council Resolution 1673. *Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, S/RES/1673* (27 April 2006). Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2006.shtml>.
5. Ibid.

References

- Agamben, G. (2005). *The state of exception*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Alvesson, M., & Spicer, A. (2012). Critical leadership studies: The case for critical performativity. *Human Relations, 65*, 367–390.
- Baker, P. (2006). *Using corpora in discourse analysis*. London: Continuum.
- Baker, P., Gabrielatos, C., Khosravini, M., Krzyzanowski, M., McEnery, T., & Wodak, R. (2008). A useful methodological synergy? Combining critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics to examine discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press. *Discourse and Society, 19*, 273–306.
- Balzacq, T. (2005). The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context. *European Journal of International Relations, 11*, 171–201.
- Boin, A., Hart, P., Stern, E., & Sundelius, B. (2005). *The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boin, A., McConnell, A., & Hart, P. (Eds.). (2008). *Governing after crisis: The politics of investigation, accountability and learning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bone, J., & Parry, R. L. (2006, October 12). Neighbours block 'act of war' searches after test. *The Times*, p. 42.
- Bono. (2009a, October 18). Rebranding America. *The New York Times*, p. 10.
- Bono. (2009b, January 19). United States: Obama's first year: The big issues. *The Guardian*, p. 22.
- Bradford, C. I., & Lim, L. (2011). *Global leadership in transition: Making the G20 more effective and responsive*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- Broome, A., Clegg, L., & Rethel, L. (Eds.). (2012). Special issue on global governance in crisis. *Global Society, 26*(1), 3–17.
- Cap, Piotr. (2008). *Legitimation in political discourse: A cross-disciplinary perspective on the modern US war rhetoric*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars.
- Chen, L. (2008). Leaders or leadership: Alternative approaches to leadership studies. *Management Communication Quarterly, 21*, 547–555.
- Chilton, P. (2004). *Analysing political discourse. Theory and practice*. London: Routledge.
- Clifton, J. (2006). A conversation analytical approach to business communication. *Journal of Business Communication, 43*, 202–229.

- Cowell, A. (2006, May 9). Blair resists pressure to set departure date. *The New York Times*, p. 8.
- van Dijk, T. (1997). What is political discourse analysis? In J. Blommaert & C. Bulcaen (Eds.), *Political linguistics* (pp. 11–52). Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- van Dijk, T. (1998). *Ideology. A multidisciplinary approach*. London: Sage.
- van Dijk, T. (2001). Critical discourse analysis. In D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen, & H. Hamilton (Eds.), *The handbook of discourse analysis* (pp. 352–371). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Dunmire, P. (2005). Preempting the future: Rhetoric and ideology of the future in political discourse. *Discourse & Society*, 16, 481–513.
- Dunmire, P. (2012). Political discourse analysis: Exploring the language of politics and the politics of language. *Language and Linguistics Compass*, 6, 735–751.
- Fairhurst, G. (2007). *Discursive leadership: In conversation with leadership psychology*. London: Sage.
- Fetzer, A., & Bull, P. (2012). Doing leadership in political speech: Semantic processes and pragmatic inferences. *Discourse & Society*, 23, 127–144.
- Gill, S. (Ed.). (2012). *Global crises and the crisis of global leadership*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Grint, K. (2005). *Leadership: Limits and possibilities*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Halliday, M. A. K., & Matthiessen, C. M. I. M. (2006). *Construing experience through meaning: A language-based approach to cognition*. London: Continuum.
- Homolar, A. (2011). Rebels without a conscience: The evolution of the rogue states narrative in US security policy. *European Journal of International Relations*, 17, 705–727.
- Hosking, D. M. (1997). Organizing, leadership, and skilful process. In K. Grint (Ed.), *Leadership: Classical, contemporary, and critical approaches* (pp. 293–318). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huysmans, J. (2008). The jargon of exception – On Schmitt, Agamben and the absence of political society. *International Political Sociology*, 2, 165–183.
- Jackson, B., & Parry, K. (2008). *A very short, fairly interesting and reasonably cheap book about studying leadership*. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
- Kessler, G., & Cody, E. (2007, February 14). U.S. flexibility credited in nuclear deal with N. Korea. *The Washington Post*.
- Kerr, R. (2008). Discourse and leadership: Using the paradigm of the permanent state of emergency. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 5, 201–216.
- Kotter, J. (2001). What leaders really do. *Harvard Business Review. Special Issue on Leadership*, 79, 85–96.
- Lischinsky, A. (2011). In times of crisis: A corpus approach to the construction of the global financial crisis in annual reports. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 8, 153–168.
- Lynch, C. (2006, March 21). Security council fails to reach accord on Iran. *The Washington Post*.
- MacDonald, M. N. (2002). Pedagogy, pathology and ideology: The production, transmission and reproduction of medical discourse. *Discourse & Society*, 13, 447–467.
- MacDonald, M. N., Badger, R. G., & O' Regan, J. P. (2009). The social cognition of medical knowledge: With special reference to childhood epilepsy. *Critical Inquiry in Language Studies*, 6, 176–204.
- Mulderigg, J. (2011). The grammar of governance. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 8, 45–68.
- Northouse, P. (1997). *Leadership: Theory and practice*. London: Sage.
- Oddo, J. (2011). War legitimization discourse: Representing 'us' and 'them' in four US presidential addresses. *Discourse & Society*, 22, 287–314.

- Philp, C. (2009, September 25). Tehran feels heat as world leaders declare war on threat of nuclear weapons. *The Times*, 42–43.
- Rasti, A., & Sahragard, R. (2012). Actor analysis and action delegitimation of the participants involved in Iran's nuclear power contention: A case study of The Economist. *Discourse & Society*, 23, 729–748.
- Rethel, L. (2011). Whose legitimacy? Islamic finance and the global financial order. *Review of International Political Economy*, 18, 75–98.
- Reus-Smit, C. (2007). International crises of legitimacy. *International Politics*, 44, 157–174.
- Robbins, S., Millett, R., Cacioppe, R., & Waters-Marsh, T. (1998). *Organisational behaviour. Leading and managing in Australia and New Zealand* (2nd ed.). Sydney: Prentice Hall.
- Roe, P. (2008). Actor, audience(s) and emergency measures: Securitization and the UK's decision to invade Iraq. *Security Dialogue*, 39, 615–635.
- Salama, A. (2012). The rhetoric of collocational, intertextual and institutional pluralization in Obama's Kairo speech: A discourse-analytical approach. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 9(3), 211–229.
- Schmitt, C. (1922/1934). *Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität*. München: Duncker & Humblot.
- Schnurr, S., & Chan, A. (2011). Exploring another side of co-leadership: Negotiating professional identities through face-work in disagreements. *Language in Society*, 40, 187–209.
- Scholte, J. A. (2011). 'Towards greater legitimacy in global governance'. *Review of International Political Economy*, 18, 110–120.
- Scott, M. (2008). *Wordsmith Tools version 5*. Liverpool: Lexical Analysis Software.
- Sowinska, A. (2013). A critical discourse approach to the analysis of values in political discourse: The example of freedom in President Bush's State of the Union addresses (2001–2008). *Discourse & Society*, 24, 792–809.
- Swales, J. (1990). *Genre analysis: English in academic and research settings*. Cambridge: CUP.
- The British National Corpus*, version 3 (BNC XML Edition). (2007). Distributed by Oxford University Computing Services on behalf of the BNC Consortium. Retrieved from <http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/>
- Tourish, D. (2007). Communication, discourse and leadership. *Human Relations*, 60, 1727–1740.
- Widmaier, W., Blyth, M., & Seabrooke, L. (2007). 'Exogenous shocks or endogenous constructions? The meanings of wars and crises'. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51, 747–759.
- Williams, M. C. (2011). Securitization and the liberalism of fear. *Security Dialogue*, 42, 453–463.
- Yukl, G. (2002). *Leadership in organizations* (5th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Stephanie Schnurr (author to whom correspondence should be addressed) is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Applied Linguistics at the University of Warwick. She has published widely on leadership discourse in different contexts. Her research papers have appeared, for example, in *Language in Society*, *Journal of Pragmatics*, *Research on Language and Interaction*, and *Intercultural Pragmatics*. Stephanie is also the author of *Leadership Discourse at Work. Interactions of Humour, Gender and Workplace Culture* (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) and *Exploring Professional Communication. Language in Action* (Routledge 2012). Centre for Applied Linguistics, The University of Warwick, CV4 7AL, Coventry, UK. E-mail: s.schnurr@warwick.ac.uk

Alexandra Homolar is Associate Professor of International Security in the Department of Politics and International Studies and currently holds an ESRC Future Research Leaders award (2013–2016). Her research focuses on the political economy of security, international security governance, and US defence and security policy. She held research fellowships at Yale University, Johns Hopkins University, and the Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt. Her publications include articles in journals such as the *European Journal of International Relations*, the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, and the *Review of International Political Economy*. Department of Politics and International Studies, The University of Warwick, CV4 7AL, Coventry, UK. E-mail: A.Homolar@warwick.ac.uk

Malcolm N. MacDonald is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Applied Linguistics, University of Warwick. His main research interests lie in institutional discourse, especially security discourse and medical discourse; and intercultural communication, especially intercultural ethics. Malcolm also edits the journal *Language and Intercultural Communication*. Centre for Applied Linguistics, The University of Warwick, CV4 7AL, Coventry, UK. E-mail: M.N.MacDonald@warwick.ac.uk

Lena Rethel is Associate Professor in International Political Economy at the University of Warwick. She works on global financial governance and financial development in Southeast Asia. Her book *The problem with banks* (co-authored with Timothy J. Sinclair) was published by Zed Books in 2012. Department of Politics and International Studies, The University of Warwick, CV4 7AL, Coventry, UK. E-mail: L.Rethel@warwick.ac.uk