Journal of the History of Philosophy

BOOK REVIEWS 1 19 The last chapter, "Passivity and Activity in the Philosophical Anthropology of Karl Marx," discusses the results of the concept of praxis. If we see that man produces his own conditions of life, we are able to relate human spontaneity and receptivity as inseparable aspects of subjectivity (83). The recovery of spontaneity requires the abolition of alienation (89). Marx substitutes the concept of real corporeal man for Hegel's analyses of mental labor and abstract subjectivity (96). Marx goes beyond Kant and Hegel in that he understands how the ideals of freedom and community merely posited by the idealists are the real result of the process of life (io8). Marx's view of praxis is of "utmost philosophical significance" (l 12). Hoffman is correct to point to subjectivity as an ongoing problem in German idealism, although his account is too narrow. A crucial weakness is his failure to discuss Fichte, who was above all concerned with the synthesis, within the limits of human subjectivity, of the different forms of activity distinguished by Kant. Ii-German idealism is intrinsically unable to think the unity of theoretical and practical forms of subjectivity, this point must be shown with respect to Fichte, I am further hesitant to regard Marx's position as the positive outcome of German philosophy since, although I applaud recognition of its philosophical importance , I reject the inference that it differs fundamentally from the idealist tradition in which it emerges, To begin with, the concept of interest is not novel with Marx, but already constitutive of Kant's position, not to mention Fichte's. In the second place, while Marx did advance a view of corporeal man which he held to be absent in Hegel, like the other left Hegelians he was largely influenced in the formation of his positive view of subjectivity by Fichte. Thirdly, it is difficult to view the analysis of labor as indicative of a fundamental difference between Marx and Hegel unless one can explain away the latter's discussion of the "System of Needs" in the Philosophy o] Right, which is not mentioned here. Finally, while some forms of knowledge may require as their condition an end to alienation, that point cannot be correct for all forms of epistemology on pain of self-stultification. To conclude, Hoffman's good discussion of the problem of subjectivity in German idealism would have been more insightful if his account of this period had been fuller. Although he is correct to point to the philosophical significance of Marx's view, there seems no reason to regard it either as an intellectual panacea or as standing in some conceptual limbo beyond idealism. TOM ROCKMORE Fordham University Linda McAlister. The Development of Franz Brentano's Ethics. Atlantic Highland, N.J, Humanities Press, 1982. Pp. 171. $16.25 (cloth). Students of Brentano's ethics have long been faced with a dearth of coherent and reliable documentation of his views. During his lifetime, he published ,just one slender volume, the lecture Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntis. The longer work, Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik, did not appear until decades after his death. It consists of 120 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 23:1 JANUARY 1985 lecture notes edited in a free-handed fashion by followers who wished the work to conform to what they took to be his true and final views. In the Preface to her book, Professor McAlister tells us that it is her intention to trace and analyze the development of Brentano's ethical theory, to present background information for purposes of elucidation, and to furnish some critical comments on Brentano's philosophy. She is particularly concerned with distinguishing his earlier ethical theory, presented in the Ursprungand the notes used as the basis for Grundlegung, from the later view contained in the Nachlassand in later essays and letters. To do this, McAlister undertook the laborious task of examining all of the microfilms of Brentano's unpublished writings and checking the text of the Grundlegungagainst the lecture notes, doing us the service of providing a fuller and less distorted view of Brentano's actual development . In ~968, when she completed this volume as her dissertation, it served another...