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Physicalism, functionalism and conscious thought

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Abstract

In this paper, I provide further elaboration of my theory of conscious experience, in response to the criticisms made by David Cole, and I directly address a number of the issues he raises. In particular, I examine Cole's claim that functionalism rather than neurophysiology is the theoretical key to consciousness. I argue that weak type-physicalism provides an analysis which is more fine grained, makes weaker assumptions, and allows more scope for empirical methods.

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Schweizer, P. Physicalism, functionalism and conscious thought. Minds and Machines 6, 61–87 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00388918

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00388918

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