Abstract
The tracking theory treats knowledge as counterfactual covariation of belief and truth through a sphere of possibilities. I argue that the tracking theory cannot respect perceptual knowledge, because perceptual belief covaries with truth through a discontinuous scatter of possibilities. Perceptual knowledge is subject to inner derailing: there is an inner hollow of perceptual incompetence through which the differences are too small to track. Perceptual knowledge is subject to outer derailing: there are outlying islands of perceptual competence that extend well past skeptical sinkholes.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Armstrong, D. (1973): Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
DeRose, K. (1995): ‘Solving the Skeptical Problem’, The Philosophical Review 104, 1–52.
Heller, M. (1999): ‘The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti-Luck Epistemology’, Philosophical Perspectives 13, 115–129.
Lewis, D. (1979): ‘CounterfactualDependence and Time’s Arrow’, Nous 13, 455–476.
Nozick, R. (1981): Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sosa, E. (1999): ‘How to Defeat Opposition to Moore’, Philosophical Perspectives 13, 141–153.
Watson, C.S. (1973): ‘Psychophysics’, in B.B. Wolman (ed.), Handbook of General Psychology (pp. 275–306). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Williamson, T. (1994): Vagueness, London: Routledge.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Schaffer, J. Perceptual Knowledge Derailed. Philosophical Studies 112, 31–45 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022590626235
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022590626235