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Probabilistic Truth, Relativism, and Objective Chance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 February 2023

Svenja Schimmelpfennig Open the ORCID record for Svenja Schimmelpfennig [Opens in a new window]
Svenja Schimmelpfennig*
Affiliation:
University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
*
Email: schimmelpfennig.svenja@gmail.com
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Abstract

In Probabilistic Knowledge Sarah Moss proposes that our credences and subjective probability judgments (SPJs) can constitute knowledge. Mossean probabilistic knowledge is grounded in probabilistic beliefs that are justified, true, and unGettiered. In this paper I aim to address and solve two challenges that arise in the vicinity of the factivity condition for probabilistic knowledge: the factivity challenge and the challenge from probabilistic arguments from ignorance (probabilistic AIs). I argue that while Moss's deflationary solution to the factivity challenge formally works, it leaves us ill-equipped to handle probabilistic AIs. An account of probabilistic knowledge that cannot overcome probabilistic AIs makes knowledge of thoroughly probabilistic contents a rare and unstable phenomenon, at best, or, at worst, impossible. I hold that establishing a metaphysically enriched account of probabilistic truth is therefore mandatory. I go on to develop a truth-conditional approach on probabilistic factivity that is relativistic in its nature and centers on objective chances. I show that while the approach is still compatible with Moss's overall semantics for probabilistic knowledge, it provides us with a simple but forceful answer to probabilistic AIs.

Keywords

Probabilistic truthprobabilistic knowledgetruth-relativismobjective chanceprobabilistic Gettier cases
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 2023 , pp. 757 - 777
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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