

Schönes oder Erhabenes geben würde“ (AA 09: 228). „Der ‚sensus communis‘ tritt in der ästhetischen Urteilsbildung an die Stelle des *status civilis* mit seinem Gerichtshof“ (436). Hier nimmt Brandt die Idee von aktiven Subjekten wieder auf, die diesen *sensus communis* auf republikanische Weise bilden sollen.

Die Frage nach der Bestimmung des Menschen findet auch in der teleologischen Urteilskraft, die die Natur als ein Reich der Zwecke betrachtet, reichlich Material, weil neben der moralischen auch eine natürliche Bestimmung des Menschen gegeben ist. Wie Brandt richtig bemerkt, geht Kant hier rein *theoretisch* vom *Faktum* der lebendigen Naturgebilde aus, bei denen wir eine Zweckmäßigkeit voraussetzen müssen. Ich denke, es wäre wünschenswert gewesen, wenn Kant auch die *apriorische* Aufgabe behandelt hätte, wie die Freiheit ihre Zwecke in der Natur *realisieren* kann, weil er dann vielleicht zu unserem organischen Leib gelangen wäre (siehe AA 05: 196.1–3). Neben der theoretisch reflektierenden Urteilskraft, die über der Naturzweckseite kompetent ist, nimmt Brandt auch eine praktisch reflektierende Urteilskraft für den Endzweck an, bringt aber eigentlich nur einen Beleg (AA 05: 456.11–15), wo von einer praktischen (nicht notwendigerweise von einer praktisch reflektierenden) Urteilskraft die Rede ist.

Der fünfte und letzte Abschnitt (497–531) behandelt den bereits bekannten Vorschlag Brandts über die Notwendigkeit einer vierten Kritik, die von Kant weder erwähnt noch geschrieben wurde, deren unvermeidliche Aufgabe aber darin läge, die Einheit und den Zusammenhang der drei vorhandenen Kritiken zu untersuchen und zu begründen, eine Aufgabe, „die jedoch keiner der drei Gleichberechtigten leisten kann“ (502). Brandt gibt zahlreiche Beispiele, in denen Kant sich der Teilung in vier Teilen (*Quaternio*) bedient (510–521). Aber alles aus Prinzipien herzuleiten, wie z. B. Fichte getan hat, hätte Kant zum unlösbaren Problem der Letztbegründung geführt, erläutert Brandt. Das bedeutet aber für ihn, „den Skeptizismus nicht überwunden zu haben“ (530). Meiner Ansicht nach war es für Kant schon hinreichend, eine architektonische Idee des Ganzen zu geben, die das Zusammenfügen der einzelnen Teile seiner Philosophie andeutet und rechtfertigt. Das hat er am weitesten in den Einleitungen der KU geliefert.

Brandts Buch ist durchdrungen von der Absicht, die Bestimmung des Menschen als „Zentrum“ des kantischen Philosophierens auszuweisen, „um das herum andere Entdeckungen gelagert wurden“ (533). Das Ergebnis ist ein Werk mit reichen und interessanten Informationen, Bemerkungen und Auslegungsvorschlägen, das aber wegen seines manchmal viel zu lockeren Diskurszusammenhangs vielleicht etwas von seiner Aussagekraft einbüßt.

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Kenneth R. Westphal: *Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004. 299 p. ISBN 0-521-87220-025-6.

In this undeniably formidable book, Westphal aspires to show that there is a Kantian type “transcendental proof of realism *sans phrase*”, by which he means, not Kant's empirical realism, but unqualified realism (34–35). That is to say, according to Westphal we can have a Kantian style proof of the necessary ways in which “we are cognitively dependent on a commonsense spatiotemporal world” (3) without

subscribing to the doctrine of transcendental idealism, which Westphal thinks even Kant himself shows is “groundless” (!) (3). Most crucially, Westphal believes there are grounds for criticizing Kant internally. In order to do this, Westphal has resort, not only to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR), but also to less often probed theoretical works of Kant, most prominently the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (MFNS).

For want of space, my criticism here of Westphal’s account in support of his main claim is limited to two points, the second of which I shall consider only fleetingly and warrants a more substantial analysis. (1) I am unconvinced by Westphal’s thesis that Kant’s notion of ‘transcendental affinity’ provides the basis for a theory about a so-called “transcendental *material* condition of possible experience” (87). I believe that to read transcendental affinity in the way that Westphal does betrays a fundamental, indeed deleterious, misunderstanding of the transcendental nature of Kant’s theory of experience. I shall expand a bit on this point further below. (2) Westphal centrally argues that since, allegedly, CPR is dependent for achieving its goals on MFNS, any flaws that might show up in MFNS (and they show up for certain, according to Westphal) redound upon CPR, indeed present Kant with a “gap” (128, 172) in his transcendental theory. This argument rests on a contentious reading of the Analogies as essentially having to do with showing that experience requires, not just the possibility of objects *in general*, but the existence of *physical* objects, the analysis of which, according to Westphal, the Analogies themselves fail to provide and is only first provided in MFNS.

I believe that both these points aptly illustrate the way in which Westphal mistakenly seeks to impose a naturalism on Kant that is not only entirely foreign to Kant’s idealism, as Westphal himself claims, but also to Kantian transcendental philosophy *tout court*, which makes the central thrust of Westphal’s book – namely providing an internal criticism of Kant, whilst giving a Kantian proof of realism based on transcendental arguments (3–4) – practically nugatory. Ironically, given his consistent criticism of Kant on this score, Westphal’s reading of Kant strikes me as a paradigm case of begging Kant’s very question.

I shall disregard, and leave for other experts to assess, Westphal’s assiduously detailed account of MFNS, despite various apparently consequential criticisms of MFNS, specifically concerning the ostensible circularity of several of Kant’s arguments (190 ff.). Once it is seen that Kant’s account in the Analogies doesn’t *presuppose* a theory concerning *physical* objects and that consequently CPR isn’t dependent on MFNS, as Westphal argues extensively that it is (165–172, esp. 169, 170, 171) – instead MFNS might be seen as a further elaboration, a ‘filling in’, if you will, of the basic formal, transcendental framework provided in CPR – it becomes apparent, in my opinion, that it’s Westphal’s *parti pris* for naturalism (realism *sans phrase*) that stands in the way of his understanding of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and a fortiori his interpretation of MFNS and its relation to CPR, more than anything that might be wrong with transcendental idealism itself. The book contains several other topics, which Westphal seems to intend to be central to his undertaking but might appear subsidiary, that I must leave out, in particular his flimsy account of Kant’s notion of transcendental reflection (chapter 1), the particularities concerning the controversial doctrine of transcendental idealism (chapter 2, where interestingly he advances a *metaphysical* dual-aspect reading of Kant’s idea-

lism), and an analysis of Kant's view of freedom and his ostensible response to global scepticism (chapter 7).

Let me return to my first point: Westphal argues that "Kant's own transcendental analysis of the necessary a priori conditions for the possibility of unified self-conscious human experience ultimately provides a sound version of the standard objection to Kant's arguments for transcendental idealism, the so-called 'neglected alternative'" (3–4). Notice the use of the adjectives 'self-conscious' and 'human' in conjunction with the substantive 'experience' here and throughout the book. Kant doesn't normally employ these terms, whenever he refers to possible experience or experience (*Erfahrung* in the strict sense). The reason that Westphal interpolates, unwarrantedly, these adjectives and in particular talks repeatedly about 'self-conscious experience' relates to the core of his argument against Kant's idealism. By phrasing it in this way, Westphal makes it appear as if the analysis of the conditions of *experience* of objects concerns *merely* the necessary conditions under which we, as *subjects*, take objects to be, rather than *also*, as Kant himself clearly asserts (CPR A 111, B 138, B 197), the conditions under which *objects* necessarily stand in order to *be* objects. Westphal wrongly takes Kant's talk of self-consciousness, specifically transcendental self-consciousness, to mean psychological mental activity as distinct from material objects.

In the long chapter 3, centrally important for his case against idealism, Westphal claims that Kant's notion of a 'transcendental affinity' among appearances helps to defend a Kantian proof of realism *sans phrase*. Transcendental affinity, Westphal reasons, is Kant's own way of showing that we need to be thoroughgoing realists. Kant speaks of transcendental affinity only in a few places, and then only in the A-edition of the Transcendental Deduction. He also talks about "the law of the affinity of all concepts" at A 657 / B 685, which Westphal adduces for support of his reading of transcendental affinity in the A-Deduction. At A 668 / B 696 Kant speaks of "the principle of affinity". But in both these instances something different is meant from what Kant means by what Westphal terms a "transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold" (TASM) (23) and which occurs in Kant's text at A 113 ("the affinity of the manifold", "the thoroughgoing affinity of the appearances"), A 114 ("transcendental affinity") and then again at A 122, where affinity is Kant's label for the "objective ground of all association of appearances". Now Westphal claims that TASM is a "key necessary material condition" (23), that is, a transcendental or formal *material* condition (87) that is required in addition both to the formal *intuitive* constraints and the transcendental *conceptual* condition of the unity of apperception which is the "key necessary 'mental' condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience" (23). He refers – inappropriately, I think, for these terms have a certain pre-critical ring to them – to the distinction between *ratio essendi* and *ratio cognoscendi* (91). Simply put, Westphal appears to believe that Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, transcendental apperception for short, is merely the necessary rule (or set of rules) under which representations are united into an identical self-consciousness *as opposed to* the necessary rule (or set of rules) under which the *objects*, or more precisely the sensations in the manifold representations, of which a self-conscious subject has experience, must stand in order to become objects of experience. The first set is necessary but supposedly not sufficient for full-blown experience of objects, for only when objects are associable as fit for experi-

ence is self-conscious experience possible. The second set of rules provides the sufficient condition or “objective ground” (cf. CPR A 121) for the latter, indeed it is “constitutive of the possibility of self-conscious experience” (24). TASM provides this ground. Or so Westphal thinks. Westphal’s reasoning is based on the simple idea that the regularity of experience (in his sense) requires that the conceptual rules governing mental activity (experience) have their material grounding, in a one-to-one mapping mode, in the regularly associable structure of the objects that are being experienced; sensory content must show some degree of structure in order for a self-conscious subject to be able to conceptually reconstruct (not construct [91]) it in her mind as objective (cf. 24–25, 33 and 87–92). This construal of TASM manifests a glaring conflict with Kant’s own views in this respect, and so to all appearances, contrary to Westphal’s insistence, TASM does not at all yield an argument *for* realism sans phrase that would be provided by Kant internally.

Westphal’s reading of TASM crucially rests on firmly distinguishing between transcendental apperception and TASM. But Kant markedly *identifies* apperception and affinity at A 122 (AA 04: 90.26–30); it is the principle of the unity of apperception *itself*, by way of “a synthesis in the imagination that is grounded a priori on rules” (A 123), which provides the objective ground for the association of appearances, and of which, noticeably, “the affinity of all appearances [...] is a necessary consequence [!]” (A 123), not a ground. Although one can formally differentiate a conceptual unity of representations from what Kant calls its objective ground, i.e. the *a priori* synthetic unity of representations, this distinction doesn’t remotely yield an argument for a material condition in the way that Westphal wants, namely as constituting a *contrast* with transcendental apperception being the allegedly merely conceptual condition of experience. Moreover, if TASM were to be the material condition of experience, what then is the role of ‘empirical affinity’, which Kant says is the consequence of TASM (CPR A114)? Whilst more space would be required to fill it out, my impression is that Westphal hasn’t got a complete grasp of the meaning of “objective ground” in the context of Kant’s analysis of the grounds of knowledge, which leads him (Westphal) to misconstrue TASM in terms of naturalism (or in his words: realism *sans phrase*).

Westphal’s unfortunate rendering of TASM is not tangential to the book’s undertaking. It sits squarely within Westphal’s project of trying to find an argument internal to Kant’s philosophy, which yields a thoroughgoing realism and disproves idealism. It is clear from the start that this is a tall order. Westphal is aware of the challenge and the tensions, but in his boldness he often blatantly misrepresents the textual evidence so as to find support in Kant, of which his reading of TASM is the clearest example. This is certainly not to depreciate the philosophical adroitness of Westphal’s probing into the intricacies of specifically Kant’s arguments in MFNS. I have, perhaps unfairly, given short shrift to Westphal’s account of them here but I’m sure that specialists will want to thoroughly study it as a serious contribution to the literature on Kant’s philosophy of nature.

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