Abstract
This essay attempts to implement epistemic logic through a non-classical inference relation. Given that relation, an account of '(the individual) a knows that A' is constructed as an unfamiliar non-normal modal logic. One advantage to this approach is a new analysis of the skeptical argument.
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Schotch, P.K. Skepticism and Epistemic Logic. Studia Logica 66, 187–198 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026713415568
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026713415568