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Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Specification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 November 2021

Frederick Schauer Open the ORCID record for Frederick Schauer [Opens in a new window]
Frederick Schauer*
Affiliation:
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA
*
Email: fschauer@law.virginia.edu
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Abstract

Philosophical debates over statistical evidence have long been framed and dominated by L. Jonathan Cohen's Paradox of the Gatecrasher and a related hypothetical example commonly called Prison Yard. These examples, however, raise an issue not discussed in the large and growing literature on statistical evidence – the question of what statistical evidence is supposed to be evidence of. In actual practice, the legal system does not start with a defendant and then attempt to determine if that defendant has committed some unspecified or under-specified act, as these examples appear to suppose. Rather, both criminal and civil litigation start with a sufficiently specified act and then attempt to determine if the defendant has committed it. And when we start with a more fully specified act, the statistics look very different, and these prominent examples no longer present the paradox they are claimed to support. Examining the issue of specification, however, does more than simply undercut the prominent examples in a long and extensive literature. The examination also raises normative issues challenging the legal system's traditional reluctance to base liability on the conjunction of probabilities.

Keywords

Statistical evidenceproof paradoxlegal epistemologyspecificationaggregate probabilities
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 2023 , pp. 367 - 376
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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