Unified transparency account of self-knowledge
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Date
28/11/2018Author
Schwengerer, Lukas
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Abstract
In this thesis I propose an account of knowledge of one’s own mental states. My goal is set
on a unified transparency account of self-knowledge. It is unified, because the proposal will
account for the generation of beliefs about mental states of all types, regardless of whether
they are propositional, non-propositional, experiential or non-experiential. My account will
thereby be applicable to knowledge of any mental state, from beliefs and desires to fears,
hopes, and sensations such as pain. Moreover, it will be a transparency account because it
holds on to Gareth Evans’s (1982) observation that self-ascribing mental states is done by
attending outwards instead of inwards. There is a sense in which we attend to the world
when we find out whether we believe something, and my proposal aims to capture this
intuition.
The core idea I am exploring is the following: generally, when one produces a first-order
mental state, one also forms a corresponding, dispositional second-order belief about that
state. Both attitudes share elements of their production, which ensures reliability while
retaining fallibility. For instance, when you form a belief ‘there is a red car’ by perceiving a
red car, you also generate the dispositional belief ‘I believe that there is a red car,’ if
everything goes right. I argue that almost all features that make self-knowledge special can
be explained with this basic idea. The assumption that the production of a first-order
mental state and a second-order belief about the state go hand in hand has surprising
explanatory power. Moreover, there are at least no obvious reasons why the assumption
should be ruled out. The upshot will be a view that we should take seriously as a contender
for an explanation of self-knowledge. I will not be able to conclusively show that it is the
best explanation, but I argue that it is one worth thinking about.
The thesis is structured in three parts. The first part (chapters 1-3) focuses on the
phenomenon of self-knowledge and the transparency idea. These chapters serve as the
setup for my later proposed view. Chapter 1 and 2 discuss what exactly we want to explain
when we say that we aim to explain self-knowledge. I thereby provide an overview of the
conceptual landscape of self-knowledge and argue that we should understand the
peculiarity of self-knowledge in terms of features of belief and belief-formation. Moreover,
I commit myself to the view that the peculiarity has something to do with our cognitive
access to mental states and relate that to the goal of a unified account of self-knowledge.
Chapter 3 discusses how we ought to understand the other qualification of my goal: a
transparency account of self-knowledge. I provide an overview of transparency accounts in
the literature and lay out the path to avoid common problems of transparency accounts.
In the second part (chapters 4 and 5) I propose the single process model of self-knowledge
as a unified, transparency account of self-knowledge. I provide the core principles of the
view and show how it explains the features of self-knowledge I aim to explain. Chapter 4
focuses on attitudes, both propositional and non-propositional. Chapter 5 expands the view
to phenomenal states, such as being in pain.
The third part (chapters 6 and 7) connects the epistemological discussion of the single
process model to research on cognition. Chapter 6 proposes a cognitive story of predictive
processing that is compatible with the single process model. I thereby discuss the
plausibility of the predictive processing idea and its empirical support. I provide a predictive
processing story of self-knowledge that fits with the single process model of self-knowledge.
In chapter 7 I discuss extended mental states. Clark & Chalmers (1998) propose
that at least some mental states, such as beliefs, can be extended to external devices. Given
that my aim is a unified account, I ought to say something about knowledge of these
extended beliefs. I argue that they cannot be known by the same processes as non-extended
mental states because beliefs about extended beliefs show different features
than beliefs about our non-extended states that we formed by introspection. Hence, even if
my view cannot account for them this is not a problem, because they are not formed by
genuine introspection. Instead, we come to know extended mental states by a distinct
process that we might call extended introspection.
Finally, chapter 8 provides a brief conclusion of the thesis for and points out some placed
that require further development. The account is promising as an explanation of self-belief
and self-knowledge, but whether it is correct also depends on future research outside the
scope of philosophy.