Abstract
Central to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s philosophical revival of rhetoric and dialectic is the importance given to the temporal character of argumentation. Unlike demonstration, situated within the “empty time” of a single instant, the authors of The New Rhetoric understand argumentation as an action that unfolds within the “full time” of meaningful human life. By taking a broader view of his work beyond The New Rhetoric, I first outline Perelman’s understanding of time and temporality and the challenge that it poses for the study of argumentation. Next, I emphasize the distinction between argumentation’s internal and external temporal structures, and then show how Perelman problematizes a static view of a number of basic argumentative concepts by bringing out their essentially temporal character. Finally, in clarifying what is at stake in Perelman’s account, I conclude by drawing attention to a number of issues in contemporary argumentation studies that may benefit from a reconsideration of Perelman’s analysis of time.
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Notes
To avoid confusing Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s essay with the commentary provided by Bolduc and Frank accompanying their English translation, when referring to the former I cite the pagination of the original French version from Perelman’s Rhétoriques (2012a). When citing Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca I also include the corresponding pagination from Bolduc and Frank’s English translation in brackets for comparison. Unless indicated otherwise the translations used are those of Bolduc and Frank.
For an overview of critical appraisals of the New Rhetoric, see van Eemeran et al. (2014), pp. 289–293.
This is also why Perelman wants to dissociate “adherence” from all ideas of “proof” found in rationalist theories of demonstration. These approaches rely upon a notion of immediate and intuitive “evidence” to account for the way in which the mind grasps propositions as being certain and true all in one go. See for example, “Évidence et preuve” and “Une théorie philosophique de l’argumentation” in Rhétoriques (Perelman 2012a).
All punctuation marks are Kennedy’s.
Tindale argues for something similar in The Philosophy of Argument and Audience Reception (2015), p. 23.
I have chosen “schemes” to translate “patrons”, rather than “examples” as Bolduc and Frank do, because Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s use of the term here is much closer to the contemporary meaning of “argumentation schemes” as found in Walton et al. (2008), for example.
For an overview of some of the developments in visual argumentation, see Groarke et al. (2016).
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Curtis Hyra and Michael Yong-Set for the discussions that led to some of the ideas discussed in this paper. I would also like to thank the reviewer for their thoughtful feedback.
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Scott, B.D. Argumentation and the Challenge of Time: Perelman, Temporality, and the Future of Argument. Argumentation 34, 25–37 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-019-09493-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-019-09493-z