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The Specificity of Hatred.
An Analysis Based on
the Aristotelian-Thomistic Concept

Introduction

The emotion of hatred and the accompanying problem of hate speech is becoming increasingly relevant and needs a solution. It is therefore essential to look at the specifics of how this emotion works. To understand this specificity, let us first explain the role of emotions in human life, their place in the human entity structure, and their relationship to human volitional power. A lack of knowledge about how hatred works makes it difficult to identify and even leads to labelling other unpleasant emotions as hatred. To distinguish it from other emotions, hatred must be analyzed in detail. In this paper, I point out that all issues related to emotions of hatred must be considered not only in the context of the functioning processes of the sensory desirability order, but also within the order of human decision-making action. This will enable a fuller understanding of phenomena based on hatred while also making it possible to distinguish the latter from other emotions. Human emo-

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tions are subject to certain powers. They are not separate from one another, nor are they separate from human will; they can co-occur with each other and are dependent on human intellectual powers. This is why an integral view is crucial to understand the issue of emotions and, by extension, the emotion of hatred.

In considering the emotion of hatred, I will refer to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. Referring to the works of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinae motions juxtapose their theory of emotion.[1] By contrast, with respect to the *Nicomachean Ethics*,[2] I will address the notion of good and evil, which are related to the functioning of emotions, especially the antagonistic pair of love-hate.[3] Thomas Aquinas refers to the powers and emotions in the *Summa theologiae*[4] and *Quaestiones de passionibus*.[5] Aristotle describes emotions, including hatred, in *Rhetoric*, Book II. The paper will be supplemented by Krąpiec's position based on *I–Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*,[6] which will pro-

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[1] Due to the differences in the use of terminology relating to the theory of emotion, in the article I use "emotions" also in case of the feelings that occur with great tension and which cause significant organic changes.

[2] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, edited by Sarah Broadie, translated by Christopher J. Rowe (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[3] See Thomae Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae: cum textu ex recensione Leonina*, Vol. 1*, Prima Secundae* (Torino: Casa Editrice Marietti, 1963), q. 23, a. 4, resp.

[4] Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, I; Thomae Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae: cum textu ex recensione Leonina*, Vol. 2, *Pars IIa IIae* (Torino: Casa Editrice Marietti, 1963).

[5] Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Miejsce i rola uczuć w strukturze bytowej człowieka" [The place and role of emotions in the structure of human being]. In Tomasz z Akwinu, *Dysputy o uczuciach: dysputy problemowe o prawdzie: kwestie 25–26. Quaestiones de passionibus: quaestiones disputatae de veritate: quaestiones 25–26* [Disputes on emotions: disputed questions on the truth: questions 25–26], edited by Andrzej Maryniarczyk and Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, translated by Aleksander Białek (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2020).

[6] Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, *I–Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, translated by Marie Lescoe, Andrew Woznicki and Theresa Sandok (New Britain, Connecticut: Mariel Publications, 1985).

vide a comprehensive account of the specifics of how hatred functions. The object of emotions is examined in the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept, the tradition of the philosophy of being, which is at the core of the interests of the Lublin School of Philosophy.[7] The School explores anthropological and ethical issues,[8] emphasizing a holistic view of the structure of the human being, which fits within the scope of this paper.

Following the Lublin School of Philosophy, the considerations in this paper will be based on the *a posteriori* method and the intuitive-reductive explanation.[9] The *a posteriori* method is an object-oriented synthesis of the study of human fact based on a holistic view of it. The intuitive-reductive research procedure has been developed by Krąpiec and Kamiński. Intellectual intuition captures states of affairs, mainly in a general and existential aspect, whereas reductivity leads to theory-shaping thinking. Based on ontic consequences, i.e., effect states, one can find and accept their ultimate, objective ontic rationale.[10] Using the

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[7] It should be noted that the Lublin School of Philosophy places particular emphasis on the continuation and development of the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept. See Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec and Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, translated by Hugh McDonald (Lublin: PTTA, 2010).

[8] Paweł Gondek, "Sapientis Est Ordinare: On the Metaphysical and Methodological Phenomenon of the Lublin Philosophical School," in *The Lublin Philosophical School. History—Conceptions—Disputes*, edited by Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik and Paweł Gondek (Lublin: KUL, 2020), 90–91; Arkadiusz Gudaniec, "Metaphysics of the Person: The Specificity of Personalism in the Lublin Philosophical School," in *The Lublin Philosophical School. History—Conceptions—Disputes*, edited by Agnieszka Lekka--Kowalik and Paweł Gondek (Lublin: KUL, 2020), 122.

[9] Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Krąpiec all adopted the *a posteriori* method. The intuitive-reductive approach was adopted by such scholars as Thomas Aquinas, Gilson, and Krąpiec. See Stanisław Kamiński, "On the Nature of Philosophy," in *The Lublin Philosophical School. History—Conceptions—Disputes*, edited by Paweł Gondek and Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik (Lublin: KUL, 2020), 299.

[10] For more on the methods I used, see Stanisław Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics. Z metodologii metafizyki*, edited by Wojciech Daszkiewicz, translated by Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin–Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2018), 198, 247.

reductive method, I will conduct an analysis, reflection, and reduction (i.e., regression) by considering the specific functioning of the emotion of hatred and its comparison with other emotions against the backdrop of the structure of human action.

The paper is divided into two sections. The first explains what emotions are and the role they play in human life. It includes an analysis of the emergence and functioning of emotions, providing an understanding of how emotions arise and how they work. In the first paragraph, I also refer to acts of will and to how human emotions are ordered. Since this paper involves an analysis of the functioning of hatred based on the personal structure of the human being, which is necessary to understand how hatred works, the first section only includes content that makes it possible to identify, distinguish, and illustrate the essence of this issue. Consequently, the second section deals with the role of hatred and its relationship to the will, as well as its relation to other emotions.

Emergence and Functioning of Emotions in the Human Personal Structure

To illustrate the role of emotions in human life, one must consider the very nature of emotions, as well as their manifestations and forms, and their relation to actions. Given that emotions affect what a person desires or hates, it is vital to examine those that significantly impact human action. An emotion is a psychic experience that is characterized by the emergence or disappearance of indifference toward the "stirring" object. There occurs the desire to either move "towards" or "away" from the given object. Emotions are acts of the sensory appetite associated with organic change. They are manifestations of fulfilled or unfulfilled aspirations aimed at obtaining a specific good. Influenced by these experiences, people make decisions that differ

from their usual ones, an act that is accompanied by pain or pleasure. The emotions are linked with the Greek word *pathē*.[11] Construed in this manner, it means "experiencing" or "passively receiving something." Like Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas understands emotion as a movement and sensation (Latin: *passio*), which presupposes man's acceptance of the good following a judgment on the good itself. Sensory cognition is accompanied by emotions. Their structure is related to three integral elements: mental, physiological, and cognitive. Emotions are not isolated from each other. They merge with each other, forming a single whole. Therefore, while each dimension of emotion can be discerned, it cannot be separated from the others.

One can distinguish between functional and genetic modes of emotional manifestation. Emotions can be pleasant or unpleasant due to the way they function and may manifest genetically as bodily and sensual experiences. These differ in how their components are arranged. Corporeal manifestations originate in the body; then, the individual experiences them as pleasure or pain. In the case of sensory emotions, cognition of a particular object comes first, followed by fondness or disgust. This in turn triggers a physiological response in the body. When bodily emotions are transformed into sensual emotions, one can speak of a moral factor in human life because of the possibility of aligning sensual emotions with the will and reason; after moral valuation, these emotions become either morally good or bad. This processing takes place through the ultimate desire for a bodily experience, which gives rise to sensual emotions by evoking representations of the object to which it refers in the imagination. In this manner, physiological agitation is reinforced or perpetuated. Thus, a bodily sensation generates a representation of the given object in the imagination, and

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[11] Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, translated by John Henry Freese, The Loeb Classical Library 193 (London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann, 1959), 1378 a 8, 21–22.

the desire for it sustains the physiological process in the consciousness, transforming it into a desire for materialization.[12]

The moral factor in human life occurs when the organism experiences some kind of transition that is then realized. The human being experiences it as pleasure or pain. This creates an image of the object in the imagination, evoking desire or disgust depending on whether the person likes it. Not only does this maintain the physiological process, but it also intensifies it.[13] The negative emotion here is secondary, as it arises from the fact that the desired object lacks the properties that arouse fondness. At the sensory level, we speak of liking, desire or disgust and aversion. At a higher mental level, when the will comes into play, we speak of desire or love (Latin: *amor*) and hatred (Latin: *odium*). In the functional manifestation of emotions, one can distinguish states of pleasure and pain. These intensify if they occur in immediate succession. Sensual activities that proceed uninterrupted are pleasurable, whereas those that encounter obstacles are experienced as unpleasant. This is because sensual activities belong to a good of sensory nature that is the behavior of the individual and the species. Therefore, these activities are good for nature itself. Pleasure, experienced via sensory functions, regulates activities, while pain interrupts them.[14] Aristotle labels everything that is pleasant or unpleasant as emotions. The sensation of pleasure and pain is the reaction of the sensory power to good or evil as such. Pleasure is equated with good, and pain with evil.[15]

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[12] Krąpiec, *I–Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, 199–200. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *The Treatise on Human Nature: Summa Theologiae 1a 75–89*, translated by Robert Pasnau, The Hackett Aquinas (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), q. 81, a. 3, resp.

[13] This process occurs only in the case of the sensual desire. See Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 22, a. 3, resp.

[14] Krąpiec, *I–Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, 199–200.

[15] Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, 1378 a 1, cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1105 a 4–6, 1105 b 21–23. Pleasant things include desire, courage, joy, love, longing and

In *Rhetoric*, Aristotle distinguishes the following types of emotions: anger, appeasement and mildness, friendship and hatred, fear and courage, shame and shamelessness, benevolence, pity, indignation, envy, and ambition.[16] In turn, Thomas Aquinas writes of three pairs of emotions comprising the concupiscible passion (Latin: *vis concupiscibilis*): love and hate; desire and loathing; joy and sadness. As for the irascible passions (Latin: *vis irabilis*), these include hope and despair; fear and courage; as well as anger, which has no opposite emotion. Referring to this tradition, Krąpiec lists eleven emotions in the order in which they arise: love, hatred of evil, desire, flight from evil, hope, despair, fear, courage, anger, joy at the good achieved and sadness at the evil present. In this breakdown, love is the primary predilection. The emotional life involves acts of the will, i.e., emotions of a higher order, if the latter emerge under the influence of reason. Reason and volitional acts can vitalize the emotional life, gaining a better means of achieving personal goals through it. Acts of emotion and acts of will are not separate from each other, which is why they are sometimes referred to as the same thing. Volitional acts are not limited to physiological transformations, unlike acts of sensory emotions, which are inseparably tied to such transformations, due to these ties belonging to the essence of emotions. Acts of will, accompanied by reason and emerging under its influence, can actualize the emotional life and become a means of attaining goals and developing appropriate, favorable dispositions for action—as long as they are conscious. Emotions that arise before volitional acts need to be tempered; otherwise, they may lead to ill-advised actions. Unrestrained emotions, ahead of

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pity. Unpleasant things include anger, fear, envy, hatred, and jealousy. Aristotle *De Anima. Books II and III*, translated by David Walter Hamlyn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 431 a 8–12.

[16] Aristotle describes these emotions in *Rhetoric*, Book II. Appeasing is the opposite of falling into anger and mildness is the opposite of anger.

actions and without the involvement of reason, can limit and under-
mine freedom and cause destruction. Such actions can be caused espe-
cially by unpleasant emotions, i.e., anger, jealousy, and hatred. These
actions can manifest themselves in speech, in deeds or, on the contrary,
in dejection. Krąpiec adds that psychological aspirations towards the
good arise through the will—a psychological source—since man can
experience desire that is directed towards the intellectually knowable
good. Here, certain aspirations need to be overcome. Strictly speaking,
this means that a psychological personality is formed in a person
through cognition and the will, with the latter ultimately organizing
itself in decisions. Therefore, there is a power in the human being that
is revealed through acts of pursuing an intellectually knowable good.[17]

Four elements can be distinguished in volitional pursuit. The first,
physiological, includes reflexive, instinctive and habitual movements.
It is distinguished by neural and biochemical phenomena of a deeper
nature, e.g., in respiration. Its mode of execution is not directly influ-
enced by the will, except for the achievement of intended goals or cog-
nitive representations. The second, cognitive-sensory, known as senso-
ry agitation, concerns cognitive representations, i.e., perceptions,
ideas, concepts, and judgments. It is associated with sensual emotions.
It occurs before or after the physiological or desire-psychological ele-
ment. It refers to emotions associated with impressions or imaginings.
If attention is focused on the object evoking the emotion, this increas-
es the emotion's intensity. In turn, its intensity decreases when one
does not focus on the object. The third element, desire-psychological,
is a set of emotions and desires of the senses, leading "towards" or
"away" from the desired object, as well as desires that constitute an

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[17] Krąpiec, *I–Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, 196–202. Cf.
Aquinatis, Summa theologiae, I, q. 23, a. 4, resp; Artur Andrzejuk, *Tomasz z Akwinu
jako psycholog* [Thomas Aquinas as a psychologist]. (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo von
Borowiecky, 2020), 67–68.

intellectual predilection for it, caused by the judgment of practical reason. The desire-psychological element constitutes an "agitation" desire. This agitation urges one to move "towards" or "away" from a particular object. It is also characteristic of all states of desire. This includes volitional ones, where there occurs an adaptation and movement "towards" a beloved object or aversion towards a hated one. The fourth element, volitional, is willingness construed as an act of spiritual love. These elements constitute a functional unity of desire and volition. Human freedom and acts of decision are related to the practical judgments through which humans determine their actions; for example, through a voluntary act of love, one may choose a non-ideal or irrational practical judgment that determines them to act.[18]

The subject of the emotional field is the sensory-desire powers.[19] Desire involves an entire sphere of desire and aspiration, which is distinct from the cognitive sphere. St. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between two powers of desire: the sensual desire and the cognitive desire, depending on the type of cognition that the desiring entity possesses. Each of these desires is preceded by cognition. While both are concerned with a material object, they differ in terms of its formal aspect, and as such, sensory and intellectual desire are separate powers. Cognitive desire, i.e., the will, is a consequence of intellectual cognition. The goal pursued by the will may also be intangible goods inaccessible to the senses, e.g., knowledge. In contrast, the sensual-desire power is emotionality. It is formed through the influence of sensory cognition. Since humans behave differently towards a good that is easily attainable compared to that which involves overcoming obstacles and greater effort, one can distinguish between two non-conjugate

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[18] Krąpiec, *I–Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, 198–99, cf. 326–329.

[19] External senses include sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell, whereas internal senses comprise memory, imagination, instinct, and common sense. For more on this issue, see Krąpiec, 196.

powers of sensual desire: the concupiscible, the object of which is a specific, easily attainable and sensually cognizable good, as well as the irascible, also known as the power of anger. The latter involves achieving a difficult good or rejecting evil. In the case of the concupiscible domain, man seeks to avoid what is harmful and desires what is appropriate according to the senses. The irascible domain, as opposed to the concupiscible one, involves difficulty in obtaining or avoiding something that requires more effort. Those overwhelmed by it focus on overcoming adversities that bring them harm and deprive them of what suits them.[20] There arises resistance or attack against evil or enthusiasm towards a good that is difficult to attain.

The concupiscible power distinguishes between emotions on the basis of opposites, as one of these emotions relates to good and the other to evil. Good or evil is the object of concupiscible emotions. When one experiences goodness through the senses, a predilection arises. The pleasant good is linked to what is originally desired. This gives rise to the emotion of love. Indeed, love is this initial orientation of desire towards a particular good. What gives rise to this purely sensual love is an easily attainable good. It therefore represents a union of the one who loves with the object of love. Good attracts desire and evil repels it. Thus, if a bad, unpleasant thing appears instead of a pleasant one, this gives rise to aversion, disgust or hatred, as opposed to love. It triggers emotional flight and loathing—a condition opposite to desire. The irascible power involves difficulty in attaining good or eschewing evil. As such, the way to achieving good or eschewing evil includes hindrances, which give rise to the task of overcoming them. It is then that these obstacles inhibit love and the pursuit of the respective good

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[20] The concupiscible is as much about what is agreeable as it is about what is disagreeable. In turn, the role of the irascible is to combat the disagreeable. See Aquinas, *The Treatise on Human Nature*, Ia, q. 80–81, a. 2, resp. Cf. Maryniarczyk, "Miejsce i rola uczuć w strukturze bytowej człowieka," 380–381.

or the avoidance of evil. Human efforts are directed at overcoming obstacles, not explicitly at attaining good or avoiding evil. If one is positive about the possibility of conquering difficulties, with the consequence being the attainment of a difficult good, there is hope of achieving it. Upon determining that this is impossible, one experiences despair. If one overcomes a difficulty, they feel joy; if not, they feel sadness. The hardship of attaining a good is associated with a stronger drive to overcome a given difficulty. Therefore, when the good is easy to achieve, man is guided by the concupiscible power, and if it is difficult, the irascible power comes to the forefront.[21] Having established how emotions arise and what characterizes them in the human personal structure and having marked the place of hatred in the classification of emotions, let us proceed to analyze the specific functioning of the emotion of hatred.

The Specificity of Hatred

In *Rhetoric*, Aristotle presents the emotion of hatred as opposed to love but does not analyze it in detail. In contrast, Thomas Aquinas writes about hatred as a sensual emotion or act in the context of distancing the concupiscible power from a particular evil. Aquinas points out that the cause of hatred is love. However, hatred can arise not only from love but also from jealousy, because jealousy is sadness at the good of another person, which becomes hated by someone else.[22] Hence, sadness can cause hatred in much the same way that pleasure is the cause

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[21] Krąpiec, *I–Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, 200–201.

[22] Man can also experience pleasure in other's misfortune. See Magdalena Płotka, "Tomasz z Akwinu o radości ze zła, które przytrafia się innym" [Thomas Aquinas on taking pleasure in another's misfortune]. *Roczniki filozoficzne* 71, nr 1 (2023): 231–246, https://doi.org/10.18290/rf23711.11.

of liking. Man craves pleasure and flees from sorrow.[23] Although hatred belongs to the concupiscible power, because of its belligerence, it can also be associated with the irascible power.[24] Therefore, it can be the result of entrenched anger. Just as one cannot reduce the concupiscible to the irascible, so, too, anger and hatred—which originate from two different powers—cannot be reduced to each other.[25] Aristotle also distinguishes hostility, to which insult and slander can contribute. Hostility, unlike anger, can exist without personal resentment. Hatred stems from the assumption that a person is characterized by something special, such as thievery or denunciation.[26]

According to Aquinas, hate is evil in the same way that love is good.[27] The subject of love is good, and the subject of hate is evil. In intrinsic[28] and cognitive desire, love is the congruence of desire with what one considers suitable, and hate represents a certain incongruence of desire with what one considers hostile and harmful.[29] Hatred towards an object may be general, resulting from its very nature, and not stemming from the fact that the object is a particular thing. An example could be a person who hates something (e.g., mosquitoes) in

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[23] Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, II, q. 34, a. 3, 6, resp. It indirectly develops Aristotle's idea that hatred is the opposite of love, which is included in *Rhetoric*, Book II. Cf. Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, 1382 a 1. Krąpiec adds that the source of all emotions is love (primordial predilection) in *I–Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, 200–201. Thus, hatred is an emotion that has its origin in love, but is the only opposite of love.

[24] Aquinas, *The Treatise on Human Nature*, q. 81, a. 2, resp. ad. 3.

[25] Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, translated by Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954), q. 25, a. 2, ad. 7.

[26] This is about assuming that someone's characteristics make us hate them. They are distinguished by a certain negative feature. For example, if someone is a thief or a denunciator, this can trigger our hatred of that person, as stated by Aristotle in his work *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, 1382 a 4–6.

[27] Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, II, q. 34, a. 3, resp.

[28] Also called intrinsic, related to the cognition of the object.

[29] Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 29, a. 1, resp.

general, not just a specific thing. One may feel anger only because of a specific cause—actions towards a specific person—because they are always individual in nature. Therefore, Aristotle concludes that anger refers to individual objects, but this is not necessarily the case with hatred.[30] If a change in a person contributes to the disappearance of hatred, this does not prove that the emotion was anything other than hatred. Notably, hatred continues to be experienced unless there is some change in the individual related to the experience or the will to change this state of affairs and strive to that end. Hence, hatred can apply to universal objects as well as to individual things with which one interacts on a sensory level. One may persist in hatred based on what one believes to be a general description true of many things in a given category. Therefore, it is just as easy for a person to hate the one mosquito that bites them as it is for them to hate mosquitoes in general.[31] A distinction must also be made between hatred stemming from nature, like that of a man towards a mosquito, and hatred where a man is naturally not an enemy to another.[32] The latter is born due to the addition of something to this nature, due to which one begins to hate the other.[33] Such an addition to nature can be construed as something hostile, evil, and threatening.

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[30] Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 29, a. 6, resp. Aristotle goes on to add that hatred can be directed against whole groups and that everyone hates thieves and denunciators. Though anger fades with time, hatred is incurable. See Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, 1382 a 4–31.

[31] Brian Davies, *Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 176–77.

[32] Also worth mentioning in this context is self-hatred. Yet, since this is a topic for a separate publication, for more on this see Keith Green, "Aquinas's Argument against Self-Hatred," *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 35, No. 1 (2007): 113–139.

[33] Thomas Aquinas, *Disputed Questions on the Virtues*, edited by E. Margaret Atkins and Thomas Williams, translated by E. Margaret Atkins, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), a. 8, resp. ad. 7.

For Aristotle, hatred involves causing harm. Someone who hates does not care to see the consequences of their actions. Compared to anger, hatred is not accompanied by pain because an angry person suffers, while the one who hates does not. The hateful do not show mercy; the angry may well be merciful. The reason is that an angry individual wants the instigator of their anger to suffer for their wrongdoings, whereas a person who hates desires the destruction of the instigator. Aristotle argues that these considerations make it possible to decide whether an act was done out of hatred.[34] To summarize, hatred differs from anger in that the one who hates does not suffer and shows no mercy towards the instigator.

Yet, as noted by Thomas Aquinas, experiencing harm does not necessarily cause hatred. The expression of perfect love can be to show kindness towards the person who has wronged us.[35] By an act of the will towards the other person, we can overcome evil to guard against hatred and, by showing goodness towards the person who has wronged us, change their behavior so that they stop doing evil. But when the harm proves too great, and the wronged person cannot overcome the evil, hatred arises. For hatred to emerge, it must be preceded by a love of a particular good of which one may be deprived by evil. According to Aristotle, an evil person is one who does morally harmful and unpleasant deeds. Because of desire or imagination, that which is morally harmful is seemingly good when it is not based on reason.[36] While love is triggered by a particular known good that arouses liking and desire in the cognitive subject, hatred is born as a result of the taking away of this good, which causes the person to experience disgust

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[34] Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, 1382 a 1.

[35] Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, II, q. 25, a. 9, resp.

[36] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1104 b 32–34. Cf. Thomae Aquinatis, *Aristotelis librum De anima: commentarium*, edited by Angelo Maria Pirotta, Editio sexta (Torino: Marietti Editori Ltd., 1959), L. III, 1. XV, 827.

and aversion. This aversion is a consequence of hatred and is characterized by a desire to avoid that which arouses resistance.[37]

Under natural law, man is oriented towards the good. This law governs man's rational nature and determines the order of morality in which man should do good and avoid evil.[38] Therefore, one cannot be hateful towards another, i.e., they may do evil but not be evil or hateful themselves. Indeed, one may consider something that is not objectively evil to be evil and deem something objectively evil to be good; therefore, hating evil and loving good is not necessarily a positive thing. In other words, if someone were to wrongly attribute a negative property to a good, then hatred towards that property would be wrong. Someone may love one thing while another may hate it because the same thing may be suitable for one person but not the other.[39] Hating someone is opposed to the innate emotion of loving them. That is, one gives up what is innate and beloved because one wishes to avoid something to which avoidance is innate. Man strives to like what is pleasant because he sees that it brings him something good, while hating what is sad because he believes it brings him something bad.[40] Love and hate are emotional attitudes towards an object. They are a straightforward pursuit of sensual desire in relation to objects.[41]

If something is good and in harmony with nature but is regarded as evil because of the corruption of nature itself, then there exists a hatred

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[37] Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 26, a. 1, resp., q. 29, a. 1, resp.

[38] Thomas Aquinas, *The Treatise On Law: Being Summa Theologiae, I–II, QQ. 90 through 97*, edited by Robert J. Henle, *Notre Dame Studies in Law and Contemporary Issues*, Vol. 4 (Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 56.

[39] Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 29, a. 1, resp. ad. 3.

[40] *Ibid*., II, q. 34, a. 6, resp.

[41] Peter King, "Emotions," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, edited by Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump, Oxford Handbooks (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 220.

of apparent, unreal evil, which is a vice. In contrast, hatred of actual evil is not a vice, because actual evil is opposed to natural good.[42] Evil is the absence of good in an entity. Indeed, evil always involves the absence of a certain element, some integrating or refining part that a particular entity ought to possess. Evil does not exist in itself; it has no nature because it is a lack, construed as the absence of goodness.[43] The interpretation of evil as the absence of goodness rejects the idea that there are essential forms of evil which would exist independently and be entities, such as harm.[44] According to Aristotle, absence is a kind of contradiction. The inability to have something or not having what a person ought to have constitutes a lack, be it a general or specific one. A contradiction is always a lack, but not necessarily vice versa, since something can be lacking in different ways.[45] Therefore, based on opposites, it can be said that hatred is the absence of love and evil is the absence of good in an entity. The result is that the good appears within a certain range.

In the case of all concrete goods, reason can consider the issue of having some good, as well as the absence of some good that features aspects of evil, and in this respect, deem each of these goods either deliberately chosen or avoided. That is, any particular thing can always

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[42] Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, II, q. 34, a. 5, resp. ad. 3. See also Artur Andrzejuk, Mieczysław Gogacz, foreword to *Uczucia i sprawności: związek uczuć i sprawności w Summa Theologiae św. Tomasza z Akwinu* [Emotions and habits: the relation between emotions and habits in Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae] (Warszawa: „Navo", 2006), 74, 89.

[43] Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being*, translated by Theresa Sandok, Vol. 2 (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 172–173.

[44] Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality of the World of Persons and Things*, translated by Hugh McDonald, (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2016), 117.

[45] Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, translated by John Henry McMahon (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 2007), 1055 b 4–16.

be viewed as good or not good in some way. Since it is always possible to find aspects of good and evil in each option, it is always possible to discern more than one way of doing things. Thus, it is always possible to discover why something is worth or not worth doing.[46] If a thing is perceived as not good, it is associated with pain. Pain is the reaction of the sensory power to evil and an unpleasant state accompanies the emotion of hatred because man experiences sensual activities that encounter difficulty as undesirable. When analyzing hatred, as with any sensation, there are three things to consider: the disposition of those who hate, the ones they hate, and the reason behind this hatred.

Hate, like love, is part of the concupiscible power because it belongs to the will if it performs acts similar to those of the concupiscible power.[47] Love can be lost through active contempt or acts contrary to love under the pressure of desire or fear.[48] Hate, understood as disgust and turning away from the other person, is linked to personal life. Like love, it pertains mainly to other people, and in a lesser and secondary sense to non-personal objects. Krąpiec explains that desire is repelled if an unpleasant thing appears instead of the expected good. This is also when the disgust that constitutes sensual hatred arises. The object that one finds unpleasant causes negative agitation. There occurs a movement "away" from the object of disgust. Desire, which can take the form of craving or longing, emerges when a person does not possess a pleasurable good but is strongly drawn towards it, which arouses the tension to obtain it. When one is threatened by evil, aversion and loathing arise following the emergence of revulsion. This

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[46] Stephen Wang, "The Indetermination of Reason and the Role of the Will in Aquinas's Account of Human Freedom," *New Blackfriars* 90, No. 1025 (2008): 115, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-2005.2008.00235.x.

[47] Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, q. 25, a. 3, resp. ad. 5.

[48] Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, II, q. 24, a. 12, resp. ad. 2.

makes one stop resisting a hated evil that they could have avoided. Sensual hatred can exist without loathing. As secondary acts of emotional manifestations, desire and loathing reveal the existence of liking-love or loathing-hate. The latter are initial acts that remain more hidden than the secondary ones. When one cannot avoid the evils that have aroused hatred and loathing, one experiences sadness. As the evil persists, the hatred increases and the loathing disappears, overwhelmed by the sadness preventing escape. Only sadness at the present evil remains. Such emotions develop through the good or by means of specific evil opposed to it. Opposing emotions do not usually coexist, but if they do, hatred cannot exist without love, whereas happy emotions may occur without sad ones.[49] Hatred cannot exist without love, just as evil cannot exist without good. Hatred is the opposite of love, and evil is the opposite of good.

Conclusions

This paper focused on the emotion of hatred and the specificity of its functioning in relation to the processes of human action. The aim was to characterize how emotions of hatred function in the processes of human moral action. References to Aristotle's concept of emotions in the rhetorical context of argumentation, and the philosophical background for the explanation of emotions by Thomas Aquinas as interpreted by the Lublin School of Philosophy, made it possible to analyze the emotion of hatred in relation to the processes of human decision-making action and the functioning of other emotions. In this paper, issues related to the emotion of hatred must be considered both in the context of the functioning processes of the sensory desirability order and within the sphere of human decision-making action. Considering

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[49] Krąpiec, *I–Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, 200.

the emotion of hatred within the framework of the orders presented made it possible to showcase how it arises from a lack of love and affects human action. Indeed, this also made it possible to functionally distinguish hate from emotions that can be equated with it, such as anger. Finally, it showed that the emergence of emotions of hatred can be influenced by one's intellectual activity. The analysis made it possible to present the specific functioning of the emotion of hatred through a holistic view of the human being.

Unlike other emotions, hatred arises from a lack of love. It can stem from jealousy when someone feels sad due to another person's well-being, and thus begins to hate that individual. While hatred belongs to the concupiscible power, it can be the outcome of perpetuated anger belonging to the irascible power. Since these emotions belong to different powers, one cannot be reduced to the other. Emotions of hatred are sometimes equated with anger. Nevertheless, anger has no opposite emotion, and that opposite to hatred is love. Hate, unlike anger, can be directed against entire groups because it does not necessarily refer to a specific person, whereas anger does. Further, anger can only be experienced because of a specific reason—concrete actions affecting a person—which always relates to a single individual.

With hatred, one may perceive the other person as having hostile or threatening features that characterize them accordingly. Then, this person is ascribed some hostile quality or element that is rooted in their very nature, effectively making it impossible to eliminate this factor without eliminating the hated individual. The hater equates the given element with the person. It identifies one with the other, viewing the hated person through the lens of their characteristics, not the whole picture and essence.

As illustrated by the above considerations, the emotion of hatred is not isolated from the structure of human decision-making action. The act of hatred, chosen based on a judgment of practical reason, pushes man to act because, in volitional striving, human freedom and acts of

decision are linked to practical judgments chosen by man. Through acts of the will, emerging under the influence of the intellect, they can increase their influence not only on whether and how they externalize hatred, but even on whether or not they feel it. Otherwise, hate that emerges before volitional acts can lead to reckless behavior manifested in speech or action. This paper forms the basis for a further study of emotions of hatred and related phenomena, such as hate speech.

The Specificity of Hatred. An Analysis Based on the Aristotelian-Thomistic Concept

SUMMARY

This paper aims to present the specific functioning of the emotion of hatred from the point of view of the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of emotions. This perspective is particularly relevant to the issue at hand because of its holistic and integral view of understanding human beings, including their emotional functions. In this paper, I consider the issue of the emotion of hatred in relation to other emotions against the backdrop of the structure of human action. When analyzing how hatred functions, I consider the notion of good and evil, which are linked to emotions and acts of will that play a vital role in the sphere of emotions. By correctly channeling one's will towards the good, one is able to notice hatred arising within, and thus reflect upon it. Understanding how the emotion of hatred functions is essential for further research into how it is expressed.

Keywords: Emotion, hate, love, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, good, evil

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