Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of MindJohn Searle's Speech Acts (1969) and Expression and Meaning (1979) developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third in the sequence, in effect it provides the philosophical foundations for the other two. Intentionality is taken to be the crucial mental phenomenon, and its analysis involves wide-ranging discussions of perception, action, causation, meaning, and reference. In all these areas John Searle has original and stimulating views. He ends with a resolution of the 'mind-body' problem. |
Contents
The nature of Intentional states | 1 |
The Intentionality of perception | 37 |
Intention and action | 79 |
Intentional causation | 112 |
The Background | 141 |
Meaning | 160 |
Intensional reports of Intentional states and speech acts | 180 |
Are meaning in the head? | 197 |
Proper names and Intentionality | 231 |
Epilogue Intentionality and the brain | 262 |
273 | |
277 | |
Common terms and phrases
affairs answer argument aspects Background beliefs and desires bodily movement brain causal chain causal relations causal theory causally self-referential Chapter completing Fregean sense conditions of satisfaction counterexamples definite description descriptivist dicto direction of fit entities event example experience of acting explain extensional fact forms of Intentionality Fregean sense function causally Furthermore identical illocutionary act illocutionary force indexical expressions intention in action intentional action Intentional causation Intentional component Intentional content Intentional object Jones Kripke language linguistic literal utterance meaning intention mental mind-to-world Network notion perceive perceptual experiences perform phenomena philosophers present problem proper names propositional attitudes propositional content question raise my arm realized reference regularity relevant representation rigid designator Sally satisfied semantic content sentence simply sorts speaker speech acts statement suppose things tional truth conditions twin earth type-identical visual experience visual perception words yellow station wagon