Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind

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Cambridge University Press, May 31, 1983 - Philosophy - 278 pages
John Searle's Speech Acts (1969) and Expression and Meaning (1979) developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third in the sequence, in effect it provides the philosophical foundations for the other two. Intentionality is taken to be the crucial mental phenomenon, and its analysis involves wide-ranging discussions of perception, action, causation, meaning, and reference. In all these areas John Searle has original and stimulating views. He ends with a resolution of the 'mind-body' problem.
 

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Contents

The nature of Intentional states
1
The Intentionality of perception
37
Intention and action
79
Intentional causation
112
The Background
141
Meaning
160
Intensional reports of Intentional states and speech acts
180
Are meaning in the head?
197
Proper names and Intentionality
231
Epilogue Intentionality and the brain
262
Subject Index
273
Name Index
277
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