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DΔL: a dynamic deontic logic

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Abstract

This paper suggests that it should be possible to develop dynamic deontic logic as a counterpart to the very successful development of dynamic doxastic logic (or dynamic epistemic logic, as it is more often called). The ambition, arrived at towards the end of the paper, is to give formal representations of agentive concepts such as “the agent is about to do (has just done) α” as well as of deontic concepts such as “it is obligatory (permissible, forbidden) for the agent to do α”, where α stands for an action (event).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

    Krister Segerberg

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  1. Krister Segerberg
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Correspondence to Krister Segerberg.

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In memory of Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003).

This paper was completed during the author’s stay, as part of a Humboldt Prize, in the philosophy department at the Goethe University of Frankfurt-am-Main 2010–2011. For the history of this paper, see the postscript.

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Segerberg, K. DΔL: a dynamic deontic logic. Synthese 185 (Suppl 1), 1–17 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9953-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9953-1

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