Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Goodness in an age of pluralism: On Charles Taylor's moral theory

  • Published:
Res Publica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

References

  1. C. Taylor,Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

    Google Scholar 

  2. Supra n.1 at x.

    Google Scholar 

  3. C. Taylor,Philosophical Papres: Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Seesupra n. 3 at 15–44;supra n. 1 C. Taylor,Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). at ch. 2; C. Taylor,The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 35–41.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Supra n.3 at 28.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Supra n.1. at 368–90. This three-fold classification of Taylor's paradigmatic goods I borrow from H. rosa, “Goods and life-forms: Relativism in Charles Taylor's political philosophy”,Radical Philosophy 71 (1995), 20–26, at 23. After this piece was substantially written I came across Rosa's interesting paper which makes the same argument, though in a different way. However, I think Taylor would object to being labelled a relativist on the grounds that it assumes we can view ourselves from outside the goods we hold, which is just what the strong claim says we cannot do.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Supra n.1, at 53–85, 337–51.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Supra n.1. at 53–90. I have homogenised Taylor's critics somewhat. Rawls is a liberal, though not really a proceduralist; Habermas a proceduralist but not a liberal. For two liberal replies to Taylor see W. Kymlicka, “The Ethics of Inarticulacy”,Inquiry 43/2 (1991), 155–82, and D. Weinstock, “The Political Theory of Strong Evaluation”, inPhilosophy in an Age of Pluralism, ed. J. Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 171–93. See also J. Habermas, “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State” inMulticulturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. A. Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 107–48.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Supra n.1. at 4.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Supra n.1, at 52.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Supra n.1. at 27.

    Google Scholar 

  12. C. Taylor, “Responsibility for Self”, inThe Identities of Persons, ed. A. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 281–99, at 299.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Supra n.1. at 495–96.

    Google Scholar 

  14. I. McKenzie, “Taylor and Ricoueur on Narrative Identity”, inContemporary Political Studies: Volume II, ed. P. Dunleavy and J. Stanyer (Belfast: Political Studies Association, 1994), 730–39 at 735–36.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Supra n.1, at 93.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Supra n.1, at 93.

    Google Scholar 

  17. C. Taylor, “Comments and Replies”Inquiry 34/2 (1991), 237–54, at 243.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Supra n.1, at 64.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Supra n.8, at 53–90. I have homogenised Taylor's critics somewhat. Rawls isa a liberal, though not really a proceduralist; Habermas a proceduralist but not a liberal. For two liberal replies to Taylor see W. Kymlicka, “The Ethics of Inarticulacy”,Inquiry 43/2 (1991), 155–82, and D. Weinstock, “The Political Theory of Strong Evaluation”, inPhilosophy in an Age of Pluralism, ed. J. Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 171–93. See also J. Habermas, “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State” inMulticulturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. A. Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 107–48. at 161.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Supra n.8. at 177.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Supra n.8. at 177.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Supra n.1, at 48.

    Google Scholar 

  23. Compare A. MacIntyre,After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1984, 2nd ed.), ch. 15.

    Google Scholar 

  24. P. Digeser,Our Politics?, Our Selves? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 87.

    Google Scholar 

  25. Supra n.1,, at 36.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Supra n.1,, at 38.

    Google Scholar 

  27. See C. Taylor,Philosophical Papers: Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 181–210.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Supra n.1,, at 58.

    Google Scholar 

  29. Supra, n.1,, at 75.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Supra, n.1,, at 24.

    Google Scholar 

  31. Comparesupra n.6,.

    Google Scholar 

  32. C. Taylor, “Explanation and Practical Reason”, inThe Quality of Life, ed. M. Nussbaum and A. Sen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 213–30 at 222–23.

    Google Scholar 

  33. Supra n.1,, at 11.

    Google Scholar 

  34. Supra n.1,, at 62.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Supra n.1,, at 503.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Supra n.1,, at 511.

    Google Scholar 

  37. M. Löw-Beer, “Living a Life and the Problem of Existential Impossibility”,Inquiry 34/2 (1991), 217–36 at 219–20, 220 (emphasis added), 220.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Supra n.37, at 220.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Supra n.37, at 226.

    Google Scholar 

  40. Supra n.17,, at 250.

    Google Scholar 

  41. C. Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition” in Gutmannsupra n.8,, at 25–73.

    Google Scholar 

  42. Supra n.41,. I have homogenised Taylor's critics somewhat. Rawls is a liberal, though not really a proceduralist, at 30.

    Google Scholar 

  43. Supra n.41,, at 32–35.

    Google Scholar 

  44. Supra n.41,, at 66–67.

    Google Scholar 

  45. Supra n.41,, at 73.

    Google Scholar 

  46. Supra n.27,, at 125.

    Google Scholar 

  47. Supra n.41, ;supra n.27, C. Taylor,Philosophical Papers: Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1985), 181–210.

    Google Scholar 

  48. Supra n.27,, at 130.

    Google Scholar 

  49. J. Rawls, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”,Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7/1 (1987), 1–25, at 12.

    Google Scholar 

  50. Supra n.8,, at 129.

    Google Scholar 

  51. Supra n.41,, at 59.

    Google Scholar 

  52. J.D. Moon,Constructing Community (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

    Google Scholar 

  53. Supra n.52,, at 108.

    Google Scholar 

  54. Supra n.52,, at 109.

    Google Scholar 

  55. Supra n.52,, at 116.

    Google Scholar 

  56. For this argument see N. Smith, “Charles Taylor, Strong Hermeneutics and the Politics of Difference”,Radical Philosophy 68 (1994), 19–27, at 23–24.

    Google Scholar 

  57. K.A. Appiah, “Identity, Authenticity, Survival”, in Gutmannsupra n.8,, 149–63, at 160. I have homogenised Taylor's critics somewhat. Rawals is a liberal, though not really a proceduralist:

    Google Scholar 

  58. Supra n.57,, at 161.

    Google Scholar 

  59. Supra n.41,, at 30.

    Google Scholar 

  60. Supra n.57,, at 162–63.

    Google Scholar 

  61. Supra n.1,, at 502.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Government, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

    Jonathan Seglow

Authors
  1. Jonathan Seglow
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Seglow, J. Goodness in an age of pluralism: On Charles Taylor's moral theory. Res Publica 2, 163–180 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02340090

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02340090

Keywords

Search

Navigation