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JOHN DEWEY'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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By

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

It was one of Dewey's deepest convictions that philosophers, because of the special intellectual nature of their activity, tend to read into experience elements that are not involved in it as it originally occurs. And, perhaps even more importantly, they tend to ignore elements that are involved in experience as it originally occurs. Philosophers are engaged in an activity of inquiry; they look at experience from a cognitive point of view. They ask themselves what experience is like, and inadvertently take as a typical example of experience the obviously intellectual and cognitive kind of experience in which they are engaged while inquiring about experience. But in doing so they are projecting into all experience an attitude and a content that are simply not present in much of the experience that we have, and are ignoring an attitude and a content that are involved in much of our experience. For in much of our experience, even that of a philosopher, we are not engaged in knowing or cognition at all; we are engaged in loving, pursuing, escaping, hating, hoping, trying, doing, etc. And such experience is really of a non-cognitive sort.

What Dewey means here may become clearer if we consider the analogy of studying events in another age of man's history. It is a notoriously difficult and, indeed, perhaps impossible task to recapture the point of view that another people had upon themselves and the world. If one is studying ancient Greek history, for example, one's first inclination is

to understand the attitude and behavior of these people from one's own point of view. In learning about Socrates, for example, many students find it ridiculous that this man behaved as he did at the trial and then in the prison. They see Socrates as a fool for not doing what his accusers expected of him, or of not at least escaping when the possibility of doing so was given to him by Crito and other friends. But, of course, in doing so such students are projecting their own and their age's values and priorities into Socrates. They are viewing Socrates as being fundamentally the same as themselves. In doing so, of course, they fail to understand Socrates and ancient Greece at all.

Now the situation is analogous when one tries to understand experience from the point of view of his present kind of experience, when that experience is of a cognitive sort. What results, Dewey says, is an impoverished view of what experience is.

An example of the distortion of experience that occurs when a philosopher views experience in this entirely cognitive manner is the kind of view most philosophers take of perception. According to such a typically philosophical reading of perception, what one actually sees when one sees, for example, a chair, are the

> "color that belongs to it under [certain] conditions of light, the shape which the chair displays when viewed from this angle, etc." The man who has the experience, as distinct from a philosopher theorizing about it, would probably say that he experienced the chair most fully not when looking at it but when meaning to sit down in it, and that he can mean to sit down in it precisely because his experience is <u>not</u> limited to color under specific conditions of light and angular shape. He would probably say that when he looks at it, instead of experiencing something less than a chair he experiences a good deal more than a chair: that he lays hold of a wide spatial context, such as the room where

> the chair is, and a spread of its history, including the chair's period, price paid for it, consequences, public as well as personal, which flow from its use as household furniture, and so on.[1]

Dewey puts this point more colorfully a few pages later:

> I would rather take the experience of the dog of Odysseus upon his master's return as an example of the sort of thing experience is . . . than trust to such statements [as the above]. A physiologist may for his special purpose reduce Othello's perception of a handkerchief to simple elements of a color under certain conditions of light and shapes seen under certain angular conditions of vision. But the actual experience was charged with history and prophecy; full of love, jealousy, and villainy, fulfilling past human relationships and moving fatally to tragic destiny.[2]

Now it seems to me that Dewey is quite right in this criticism of the typical way in which philosophers think about perception. Not only was it true of the philosophers whose view he was criticizing, but it is true of many who do philosophy today. The quotation he gives sounds very familiar. Perception is still interpreted in an overintellectualized way. I believe, therefore, that a careful reading of Dewey's view will throw considerable light on this question of the nature of perception. For Dewey describes our experience with the kind of sensitivity one finds in a novel. It is therefore an enlightening and even refreshing experience to read him. Most philosophers content themselves, it seems to me, with repeating the same old tired formulas with regard to experience. Dewey never fails to uncover something new. Even if he is wrong, he is excitingly wrong.

One might even make use of one of pragmatism's best-known theories --that a person's perception occurs only by virtue of his being involved in a problematic situation to which awareness of the things perceived is relevant--and say that it was precisely Dewey's great interest in life

and of ways to improve it that made him so sensitive to it. I am suggesting, that is, that the reason for the impoverished state of much contemporary philosophy is the puny interest in life of its practitioners. It is not relevant to the problematic situation of such persons what various kinds of experience are really like, since living in a full and complete sense of the term is not an end of their lives. I remember Charner Perry's ridiculing G. E. Moore for recognizing "as by far the most valuable things which we can know or imagine"[3] only social intercourse with friends and contemplation of beautiful objects. This, Perry said, is an expression of the emasculated world of the British professor of philosophy. But surely life is richer than this. For there are many other kinds of people than professors of philosophy at Cambridge University, and there are correspondingly many other activities that people find to be most valuable in life. Life includes among its most valuable activities, for example, giving assistance to suffering and needy people, avenging an injustice to a friend, "paying attention," as Dewey puts it, perhaps a bit professorially himself, "to a young woman," repairing a defective automobile, making a beautiful object, solving a problem in physics, learning the history and present conditions of an Indian tribe in the mountains of Mexico, making and sailing a boat across the Atlantic Ocean, climbing a mountain, playing a tennis game, and so on.

For Dewey, as for Terence, nothing human was alien. And I believe it is this constant readiness and zealous desire to return to the facts and to consider all kinds of phenomena (all kinds of perception, for example) that made his view as enlightening as it is.

In what follows, then, I would like to offer this immensely rich and ingenious view for the reader's consideration. I believe a very good case can be made for it, and I shall try to do so. But even if, in the last analysis, its basic theses cannot be defended, it is a view which has nevertheless shed tremendous light on our experience and which has the capacity to open our eyes to aspects of reality not sufficiently noted or appreciated before. And that is something that cannot be said of views which, though perhaps more easily defensible, are so by virtue of being innocuously general and superficial, like that of the philosopher whom Dewey quotes in the passage from Experience and Nature referred to above.

NOTES

1. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (first edition; La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1925), pp. 45-46.

2. Ibid, p. 56.

3. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962 [first published, 1903]), p. 188.

CHAPTER I

PERCEPTION IN GENERAL

Dewey recognizes, I believe, three kinds of perception: (1) perception as feeling; (2) perception as awareness of signification; and (3) perception as presence of sense. He makes a further distinction between sense-perception, on the one hand, and perception of objects in other modes of awareness, such as memory, imagination, hallucination, and so on, on the other. Before discussing in detail in subsequent chapters the three basic kinds of perception, I shall, in this chapter, attempt to give the reader a general idea of what they are and how they relate to each other. And I shall show how exactly Dewey distinguishes sense-perception from other kinds of perception of objects.

In general, I shall be concerned to offer not only an explication of Dewey's views, but an evaluation of them as well. Where I believe he is correct, I shall defend his view by presenting his own reasons for taking the view he takes, considering objections that have and seem to me can be made, and finally defending his view against these objections.

One of the most important reasons why Dewey's theory of perception seems plausible to me is that it allows for a solution of certain very thorny problems about the nature of mind and its relation to the body. Accordingly, after I have examined his view of perception in Chapters One, Two, and Three in some detail, and have considered various objections and defenses that arise within the specific area of perception itself,

I shall, in Chapter Four, attempt to show that it--as contrasted with other theories--enables us to solve the much more general mind-body problem.

Dewey uses the term "perception" in a very general way to refer to any awareness we may have of an object,[1] my awareness now, for example, of the coffee cup on my desk. And an object he defines as "a set of qualities treated as potentialities for specified existential consequences."[2] But perceptual awareness need not be awareness of an object "contemporaneously affecting the bodily organs."[3] My nostalgic awareness of that fine old coffee cup I used to have but which is now gone is also a case of perception. This is perception by way of recall. It is different from sense-perception in that it is not perceived by means of contemporaneously operating sense-organs (hands, feet, nose, eyes, etc.), but by means of "some other organic structure."[4] Sense-perception is then awareness of an object in "some present space-relation" with one's presently operating sense-organs.[5]

That the perception of an object which I am now having is a sense-perception and not a memory-perception or anticipation-perception or imagination-perception is not an intrinsic characteristic of the presented qualities themselves. Intrinsically, the two kinds of presentation are the same; the sensed coffee cup and the remembered coffee cup (one could add the dreamed and the illusory coffee cup) are all, in themselves, equally capable of being interpreted as sense-presentations. There is no characteristic, that is, in the nature of a memory-perception or illusory-perception taken by itself why it should be considered a memory-

perception or illusory-perception. The reason is extrinsic to it.[6]

Now what exactly is involved in saying the presentation is regarded as being a sense-perception or a presentation of some other kind only by virtue of something extrinsic to it? Let us consider an example: Former President Eisenhower has just died and I have been sitting up much of the night watching reruns of scenes from his life. That night I wake from my sleep and see a little figure on my bedroom wall which seems to be a little Dwight Eisenhower. It is as though the former President has come to pay me a visit in the night.

Now how do I go about determining whether this figure is an object of sense-perception or of hallucination? By reflecting on the presented qualities themselves, the particular shape, color, size, etc." Or perhaps by reflecting on the act by which I apprehend the presentation? Dewey's point is that neither of these is the way to determine whether one is having a sense-perception, a hallucination, a dream, or whatever. The only way to do it is by means of consideration of material extrinsic to the presented qualities themselves. There are two ways in which this can be done: (1) One can inquire into the causative conditions of the presented material; (2) one can check to see if the consequences of acting on the assumption that, for example, the figure on my wall really is Eisenhower--whether acting on that assumption produces consequences which square with what one can expect if a little Eisenhower really is there.[7]

What fundamentally characterizes a sense-perception as opposed to a remembered or hallucinated perception is that a sense-perception can be "overtly acted upon <u>now</u> or immediately. . . . When inquiry reveals

that an object external to the organism is now operative and affecting the organism, the pertinency of overt action is established and the kind of overt adjustment that should be made is in evidence."[8]

If I am lying in bed seeming to see a little Dwight Eisenhower on my wall, no amount of inspection of the presented material itself will tell me whether I am sense-perceiving, hallucinating, or something else. The contents of sense-perception do not come labeled as such, nor do the acts of sense-perception come with labels or characteristics which distinguish them so well from all other kinds of perception that they might as well be said to have labels.[9]

What is necessary to determine what kind of perception I am having is, as indicated above, to inquire into causative conditions and to perform experiments to determine future consequences. Now one of the causative factors in the case in question is, of course, the evening's activity of viewing Eisenhower on television. This fact will be relevant in judging whether the presented figure is an object of sense-perception as opposed to some other kind of perception.

The other way of finding out what kind of perception is going on is to acquire further presented material by means of some new overt action. By squinting my eyes, reaching over and turning on the light, putting on my glasses, I have subsequent presented material which, if it squares with the figures of my initial experience, will serve to verify that experience as having indeed been sense-perception and not hallucination. Or if I address the figure and receive an appropriate response, then again I have evidence that, unusual as it may seem, I have been having a sense-perception.

Implicit in Dewey's analysis is his view that sense-perception is an experience which indicates the relevance of a present overt action. To sense-perceive is to experience some presented material which means that a certain action is relevant now. When I merely recall or imagine a coffee cup, immediate action is not relevant. I cannot reach out and take a drink from it. I cannot pour some more coffee into it.

The determination of presented material as sense-perceptual rather than conceptual or fanciful takes place in the course of inquiry. And the "ultimate need of the inquiry is found in the necessity of discovering what is to be done, or of developing a response suitably adapted to the requirements of a situation."[10]

Dewey is here arguing against an old bugaboo of his dating from the days of Essays in Experimental Logic and earlier--viz., the so-called spectator theory of knowledge. According to this theory, a kind of disembodied mind can, simply by examining the object of its awareness or "intention," determine whether the object is perceived or merely fanciful, valid or invalid. Clarity and distinctness might be the criteria. For Dewey, on the contrary, prior to some kind of overt, experimental action, we have no way of knowing whether a thing really exists. "We do not believe a thing to be 'there' because we are directly cognizant of an external origin for our perception; we infer some external stimulation of our sensory apparatus because we are successfully engaged in motor response."[11]

How do I know, then, that I am sense-perceiving? Because my responding is working.

In summary, we have seen that sense-perception for Dewey occurs when presented material, e.g., the presented coffee-cup-data, is found, upon inquiry, to be contemporaneously affecting one's sense-organs. (The way we know, in the course of inquiry, that we are perceiving by means of our sense organs, to which the presented material in question is being contemporaneously presented, will become clear later when we discuss perception of sense. Suffice it to say now that this fact is perceived directly as the funded result of previous activities of inquiry.) And the way we know that presented material is contemporaneously affecting our sense organs is not by inspecting the data themselves, but by means of overt acts that test whether the data presented square with subsequent or previous presented data.

When we sense-perceive, then, presented material has the meaning of being relevant to contemporaneous actions. In a passage in Experience and Nature in which he discusses types of perception, Dewey recognizes two other general types of meaning that presented material may have.[12] First, there are "conceptual" meanings; secondly, "non-cognitive" meanings. Conception, or the presence of conceptual meanings, occurs when presented material mean or indicate a state of affairs that "cannot be [overtly] acted upon now or immediately, but to which action of a practical sort is nevertheless relevant." My thought now of a place I would like to be during the Christmas vacation is the awareness of a conceptual meaning. The image of, say, the narrow alleys of Guanajuato, Mexico, is not something that I can walk through at this moment. Perhaps at some future, "deferred" time I shall be able to do so, but not now, contemporaneously.

Similarly, the boxer in training for an upcoming fight is not sense-perceiving his opponent now as he shadow-boxes, does road work, and punches his bag and his sparring partner. If he were sense-perceiving his upcoming opponent, he could hit him now, instead of the bag and his sparring partner. He is, rather, conceiving him as someone he will be able to sense-perceive (hopefully mostly with his fist rather than his head) later.

The second non-sense-perceptual kind of meaning which presented material may have Dewey calls "non-cognitive" perception. On page 339 of Experience and Nature Dewey includes in non-cognitive perception (as distinguished here from conceptual perception and sense-perception) only perception involving the sort of meaning that one is aware of in imaginative or fanciful contexts. It is the kind of perception one has when one looks at a painting or watches a play or reads a novel. One is not, Dewey says, involved, in such cases, in a problematic situation of a practical sort to which overt action on one's part is relevant. If you see Othello about to stab Iago, you do not leap to his defense, or even call a cop. And this not just because you are a contemporary and therefore uninvolved man. Overt action is irrelevant altogether, both now and later.[13]

In general, then, such non-cognitive perceptions do not affect one's vital, practical interests, but call for actions of a "dramatic or literary or playful sort."[14] And for this reason Dewey does not refer to them as sense-perceptions. But elsewhere Dewey includes among non-cognitive perceptions the perception one has in "affection, love and hate, desire,

happiness and misery."[15] The young man "paying attention to a young woman" is an example of this kind of perception.[16] He is not usually "observantly" aware of her. And yet practical, vital action in response to her is relevant indeed. This is not a play or a novel. If it were, many a reader of novels would be far less dissatisfied with the kind of experience he is having than in fact he is.

This kind of so-called "non-cognitive" perception is obviously a very important part of our lives. And I think Dewey is right in distinguishing it from the kind of perception one has of things when involved in deliberate inquiry about them. The young man "paying attention" may be sizing up his girl to see whether she would make him a good wife. In such a case, his perception of her would become cognitive: certain characteristics would be explicitly noted as signifying certain things he may expect from her. But usually he is not, in Dewey's view, inquiring about her, but just responding to her in an "affectional," "social," and "aesthetic" way.[17] The same difference can be seen in many cases. Eating Chinese food in an active-affectional-enjoying way, on one hand, and eating it in an effort to determine the ingredients, their proportions, etc., on the other.

It seems to me that, in interpreting Dewey's theory of perception, it is necessary to distinguish the kind just discussed from all three of the previous types. It is clearly not conceptual, since it is a kind of perception in which we are dealing with objects contemporaneously affecting our sense organs. Nor is it fanciful or playful, since overt action is relevant. Finally, as we have just seen, it is not like cognitive

sense-perception in that it is not a product of inquiry that has just preceded it.

But, as we shall see in greater detail later, this kind of non-cognitive sense-perception is not relevant to the passage from Dewey just quoted[18] because it does not, in Dewey's view, involve any meaning. It is a mere response to felt qualities, which qualities are not interpreted either as the qualities they are or as parts of an object. The perception of the sidewalk as one walks on it is an example of this. One neither remarks its cracked quality as cracked, nor interprets it, even implicitly, as being a sidewalk. One just feels qualities and responds.

But there is another kind of "non-cognitive" perception recognized by Dewey. This is a kind of perception one does have in contexts of inquiry, but which is not itself cognitive. It is a perception of a thing in a direct and immediate way as relevant to a problem at hand. If my car breaks down on the expressway, I perceive the cars bearing down on me and the shoulder over on the side of the road in this non-cognitive way. That is, I perceive them as cars and as a shoulder in this non-cognitive way. The qualities that mean cars and that mean shoulder are perceived non-cognitively and, as we shall see, Dewey calls this meaning sense.[19] But the perception of the cars and the shoulder as meaning "I'd better get over there or I will be smashed"--this perception is cognitive. Dewey calls it perception as awareness of signification.[20] The old familiar objects which previous inquiry-experience has taught me about I experience non-cognitively; but the new meaning

they have in combination with each other in this situation I experience cognitively.

Now this kind of non-cognitive perception occurs, according to Dewey, only in problematic situations where reflection and inquiry are going on. It is therefore different from the perception that was discussed above in which we are involved in an active-social-affectional-enjoyment kind of activity. For in this kind of perception, e.g., in which one is uninquiringly courting a girl, one is not aware of a meaning at all. One is simply responding to qualities. So this kind of experience Dewey sometimes does not even call perception at all (although, as we have seen, sometimes he does)[21] because he sometimes limits perception to awareness of meaning. And this kind of perception involves the mere presence of qualities (which mere presence Dewey calls feeling) and the immediate, unreflected response to such qualities.

Another kind of perception which Dewey recognizes but which does not seem to fall under any of the three types previously mentioned is memory-perception. The recalled coffee-cup, for example, is not sense-perceived, for it is not an object contemporaneously affecting my sense organs. Nor is it conceptual, since it is not anticipatory, but rather retrospective. Finally, it is not fanciful or playful, but rather either cognitive or non-cognitive, but nevertheless revelatory of reality. When one remembers, that is, he either explicitly and consciously cognizes his past, or, as a result of previous such cognitions, he remembers without reflection, as when one unreflectingly remembers that those things approaching him on the expressway are cars.

We should, therefore, it seems to me, add a fourth type of perception recognized by Dewey--viz., memory. And under this we should again make the distinction between perception as awareness of signification and as presence of sense.

Now let me try to put all of these kinds of perception together in the following outline. This whole discussion has necessarily been sketchy and cannot make complete sense at this point. Hopefully it will become clearer in the detailed discussions that follow.

THE TYPES OF PERCEPTION RECOGNIZED BY DEWEY

A. Sense-Perception

1. Cognitive--Perception as Awareness of Signification

2. Non-cognitive--

a. Mere Feeling or Having of Qualities

b. Active, Social, Affectional, Enjoying Perception; Perception as Response to Had Qualities

c. Perception of Sense, Occurring Only in Contexts of Inquiry

B. Conceptual Perception

C. Fanciful or Playful or Dramatic or Literary Perception

D. Memory-Perception

There are, then, for Dewey, at least five basic kinds of perception. And there are also five kinds of sense-perception.

First, there is the kind of sense-perception illustrated in the experience one might have of the cutting down of trees in front of his apartment building, after being rudely awakened by the cacophonous, jarring sounds made by the automatic saws and the raucous voices. One gets up and participates

in a little bit of inquiry to determine just what the source of that horrible sound is. Perception of the contemporaneously occurring events which results when one raises his shade and peers out in an act of experimental inquiry, although not a very systematic one, is cognitive sense-perception. In this case, it is the perception of the visual data of the men outside and their rapidly moving saws as being the source of the cacophonous, jarring, and obnoxious sounds one had been hearing. Note that as cognitive it occurs as the solution of a problem. The perception, then, is of *something as being an explanation of something* else. This is a case of perception of signification.

But one's first perception of those sounds, before any inquiry began to take place, took place in the mode of what Dewey calls feeling. One is not interpreting them or attributing any meaning to them at all, although he may nevertheless respond to them by grimacing, moaning, or even jumping up and slamming the window. This kind of sense-perception Dewey sometimes regards as including the active, affectional, social, etc., kind of perception in which, as I have said, he thinks we are involved in much of our experience. He includes the latter in the class of *feeling-perception* because he believes no meaning is present in it. I shall therefore discuss it in Chapter Three, which is concerned with feeling.

Finally, when one looked outside in an attempt to determine the source of all the noise, one noticed saws and men. These were grasped immediately as such. One did not have to reflect in order to recognize the saw-qualities as saws and the man-qualities as men. These were grasped immediately as such. These kinds of inference one had made in the past and

they were now automatic. Such perceptions, which, be it noted again, do involve grasping a meaning and occur, according to Dewey, only in contexts of inquiry, Dewey calls perception of sense.

In the passage in Experience and Nature which suggested this discussion (p. 338 f.), Dewey neglects the kind of perception of meaning called perception of sense. I suspect this is because of his concern at this point to show that presented material is not intrinsically one or another kind of perception. Subsequent inquiry is required to determine whether it is sense-perception, imagination, anticipation, or whatever. This particular kind of non-cognitive perception--i.e., perception of sense--does not, however, show itself to be sense-perception as a result of a consideration of extrinsic matters revealed to inquiry. It is immediately taken to be sense-perception. So it seems to be an exception to the view that only extrinsic considerations enable us to judge a perception to be of one sort or another.

Dewey's answer here is that such non-cognitive sense-perceptions are a result of previous cognitive sense-perceptions.[22] At one time, that is, we were aware of the nature of men and saws by way of anticipation of consequences which this kind of thing had come to suggest to us. We were not sure what a saw was; we had to think about it and what was to be done with it, in the way the new driver is not sure of what the clutch is and what is to be done with it. But now, of course, we do not have to stop and think about a saw or a man. We experience the meanings of these things without reflection, or "automatically."

As we have seen, Dewey uses the word signification for the kind of

meaning qualities do have when we are cognizantly aware of them. This is the way we are aware of qualities and their meanings when we are engaged in a problematic situation. But when we become familiar with such qualities as those of a saw or a man, its anticipated consequences become an "integral and funded feature" of those qualities themselves. The future consequences, the meaning, of the qualities "already belong to the thing"; they become "commuted" into the qualities themselves and are grasped at the same time as the qualities themselves. This Dewey calls grasping the sense of the qualities.[23]

I shall discuss in detail below, in Chapter Two, these two distinct kinds of perception, the cognitive one of grasping the signification of a set of qualities, and the non-cognitive one of getting the sense of them.

We see, then, that Dewey recognizes two types of perception of the meaning that presented material has, the first being perception of signification, the second of the sense of that material. Now the presentation of the material itself is the other kind of perception which I am arguing that Dewey recognizes, even though he does not usually use the term perception to refer to it. In every case of sense-perception there is necessarily involved a presentation of qualities themselves, and this <u>having</u> of qualities Dewey calls <u>feeling</u>. Feeling is a non-cognitive, non-observant kind of awareness. Sometimes it occurs together with the interpretation or meaning constituted by sense and signification, but in lower animals which are locomotive and which have distance-receptors, and sometimes perhaps in man, it occurs totally without any interpretation.

Feelings may be pains, pleasures, odors, colors, noises, tones, or whatever; but they are so only "proleptically and potentially."[24] In themselves, they are simply had qualities, totally uninterpreted, unclassified, unlocated. The felt state of consciousness which one might later learn to call "hunger" is, before such use of language to classify and locate it, neither bodily nor mental, neither intense nor weak, directed neither toward milk nor toward liver; it simply is. It may cause responses, but it is not known or understood. There is the hunger and the crying, but there is not hunger, the recognition, "Hunger," and then the crying.

Dewey seems to have changed his mind between the writing of the "Introduction" to Essays in Experimental Logic and the writing of Logic: The Theory of Inquiry on the question of whether feeling ever occurs in human beings totally unaccompanied by interpretational activity. In the "Introduction" to the Essays he claims that although feeling may perhaps sometimes occur without interpretation or meaning, it usually does not and possibly never does. Most of our experience occurs in a primarily non-cognitive framework, in which there is a minimum of cognitional activity going on. But "some element of reflection or inference may be required in any situation to which the term 'experience' is applicable in any way which contrasts with, say, the 'experience' of an oyster or a growing bean vine."[25]

But in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry[26] he says "that either an immediate overt response occurs, like using the typewriter or picking up the book (in which cases the situation is not a cognitional one), or . . . the object directly noted is part of an act of inquiry directed

toward knowledge." And we see from a passage in Experience and Nature that it is his view that "the readier a response, the less consciousness, meaning, thinking it permits."[27] So that it seems clear that he came to think that, in a good deal of our experience, feeling does occur without any accompanying interpretation and meaning.

In discussing above the fact that feelings, when they occur without interpretation, are only proleptically odors, sounds, colors, etc., I used as an example one that Dewey himself uses, the feeling of hunger. In its original state, this felt quality is not really hunger; it is merely the potentiality for a later interpretation of it as hunger. Now perception of it as hunger, when it does occur, is not, strictly speaking, a case of sense-perception. For Dewey limits the term sense-perception to objects the perception of which begins with external sense-organs. This distinction between "peripherally initiated perceptions and ones internally initiated is not one that perceptions come marked with; it is a product of analytical observation."[28] Nevertheless, Dewey does recognize this as a legitimate distinction.

The perception of hunger, then, or of any other internal state, is not then a case of sense-perception, but perception by means of some proprioceptive organ.[29] Strictly speaking, then, it seems that we should add another kind of perception to our outline above. The terms feeling, signification, and sense should then be viewed as applying to perception in general, one sub-category of which is sense-perception, another of which is perhaps "proprio-ception." The tripartite division would seem also to apply to many, if not all, of the other types of perception,

although Dewey does not, as far as I can tell, explicitly apply it in this way. In perception by way of recall, for example, one may be feeling or having qualities which are not produced by objects contemporaneously affecting one's sense organs, or one's proprioceptive organs either. They are produced by "some other organic structure," as he puts it in the essay, "A Naturalistic Theory of Perception."[30] And these qualities are interpreted, either in the sense of acquiring a sense or in that of acquiring a signification, as meaning some past event in one's life. Similarly, imaginary perception may be based on qualities felt as a result of some other organic structure than one's external sense-organs, or one's proprioceptors, both of which testify to a contemporaneously occurring event. Such qualities then come to have some signification or sense as an interpretation of these qualities.

Dewey's view that there is no intrinsic difference between the various kinds of perception (i.e., between sense-perception, hallucination, imagination, and so on) perhaps strikes the reader at first as highly implausible. For there do surely seem to be fundamental and obvious differences between them, differences that are intrinsic, not extrinsic. One does not have to engage in inquiry, even of a primitive sort, to know that he is now <u>remembering</u> what he was doing around noon yesterday, or that he is now <u>seeing</u> or sense-perceiving certain objects around him, and so on. The difference between these various kinds of perception is just obvious. When I remember, I know I remember. And so on with the others. Of course, there are borderline cases (and borderline people, viz., madmen) in which one may not be sure whether he is imagining or sense-perceiving. And here

it is necessary to engage in investigative or inquiring activity. But such instances are rare, and it would be preposterous to infer from such instances of difficulty in identifying the type of perception one is having to the conclusion that all are intrinsically like them and cannot be known to be what they are without extrinsic considerations being made.

Furthermore, even if we grant Dewey's contention that perceptions do not differ intrinsically but only extrinsically (whether these extrinsic considerations be current ones or ones that were made in the past and have now vouchsafed this sort of perception, in this sort of circumstance, as being memory, imagination, or whatever), a further difficulty arises.[31] When one engages (or is engaged) in this investigative procedure to determine whether a set of presented qualities which he is now having are, let us say, imaginary or cases of sense-perception, he must perform some act and then have more presented qualities as a result of that act. But what about this perception? Is it one that is known to be sense-perception intrinsically, or does it too require further, extrinsic considerations before it can be definitely determined to be a case of sense-perception and not imagination, memory, or whatever? If the latter, as Dewey's view would seem to commit him to holding, then an infinite regress seems to result. For obviously the same question will arise about this putative sense-perception as well: What kind of perception justifies it? A perception known intrinsically to be sense-perception, or some further sense-perception known itself only extrinsically to be sense-perception? And so on endlessly.

Now, of course we do not, and could not, engage in an infinity of

tests for any particular sense-perception we think we are having. It follows, therefore, that either we never do have a legitimate sense-perception, a view that Dewey's theory results in, or we have some sense-perceptions, a view Dewey explicitly denies.

Dewey answers this type of objection in the chapter of Logic: The Theory of Inquiry called "Immediate Knowledge."[32] He describes the objection as

> a dialectical argument which has been used ever since the time of Aristotle, and is still current today. It is argued that inference must rest upon something known from which it starts, so that unless there are true premises which serve as such a basis it is impossible, no matter how adequate inference and discursive reasoning may be, to arrive at true conclusions. Hence the only way of avoiding a regressus ad infinitum is said to be the existence of truths immediately known. . . . But the dialectical reply is simple. It suffices to have hypothetical (conditional) material such that it directs inquiry into channels in which new material, factual and conceptual, is disclosed, material which is more relevant, more weighted and confirmed, more fruitful, than were the initial facts and conceptions which served as the point of departure.[33]

Every inquiry, then, for Dewey, begins with certain things taken for granted. These are not taken for granted because they are self-evident, immediately known, indubitable truths. They are simply the "funded" results of previous inquiries. And there are two sorts of such things, which Dewey refers to as "conceptual" and "perceptual" or "factual objects."[34] Conceptual objects are well-established hypotheses or theories about what will happen if certain actions are performed. They "may be and usually are abstracted from application to this and that immediate existential situation. But on that very account, they are instruments of a wide, indefinite scope of operational application, actual application being made as special conditions present themselves."[35]

Let us take as an example of such a conceptual object that of "dangerous situation." This object indicates, in a general way, that undesirable and possibly even catastrophic consequences may result if certain developments occur or if certain preventive actions are not taken. But of course it is sufficiently general to be applicable to a tremendous variety of factual situations. The filling in of the subject of the judgment to which the conceptual object, "dangerous situation," is a predicate is done by means of a determination of what Dewey calls a perceptual or factual object. The breakdown of my car on a crowded expressway might be an example of a perceptual object. My judgment would then become, "The breakdown of my car on this expressway is a dangerous situation."

Now the two objects, perceptual and conceptual, did not come to us in a moment of contemplative speculation, nor were they the products of intuition. They are the products of previous inquiries in response to previous problematic situations. I perceive this as a breakdown of my car because of previous experience with cars that suddenly lose speed without either being out of gas, having been decelerated, etc. Such an object is "a set of qualities treated as potentialities for specified existential consequences."[36]

When we are trying to determine what the meaning of a particular set of qualities is, e.g., the sudden deceleration of one's car, we are attempting to determine or define a perceptual object. What does this situation mean? Just as in the case of the offensive sounds that woke one from sleep, one engaged in some overt, experimental acts to determine what they meant. In the course of such an inquiry we encounter other

objects, both perceptual and conceptual, which are the products of previous inquiries--such as the cars bearing down upon one from behind, the shoulder onto which one might be able to pull off and out of their path, etc. Or, in the case of the offensive sounds, men using mechanical saws on dead trees. And of course inquiry usually stops here. We take for granted that these things are really there, contemporaneously affecting our sense-organs. The reason we do this is, again, not that they are given as self-evidently and indubitably sense-perceptions, rather than imagination-perceptions, delusion-perceptions, or hallucination-perceptions. It is rather that they are <u>taken</u> to be sense-perceptions because we see no grounds for doubting them to be such. These objects are the alternative to the "hard data" and "first principles" which other philosophers think are presupposed in all our judgments about the world. Some objects or principles, Dewey recognizes, are presupposed in all inquiry or judgment, but these need not be objects or principles about which we can be absolutely certain, but ones which are taken as being established hypotheses and objects "so instituted and confirmed in the course of different inquiries, that it would be a waste of time and energy in further inquiries to make them objects of investigation before proceeding to use them."[37]

One might, however, ask further how any perceptual object ever got established in the first place, if there were no other perceptual objects to use to establish it. Granted that now we have perceptual objects like men, trees, saws, etc. to use in making other perceptual judgments. And granted that they are pretty well established and founded, so that it would be a "waste of time and energy" to call them in question. But

isn't this precisely because they have been seen in the past to be confirmed by those "hard," indubitable data that certain philosophers refer to?

C. I. Lewis' theory is an example of this view. There are, he says in Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, certain "terminating judgments" which can be verified directly and certainly. And it is the possibility of certain confirmation of such judgments that enables us to have the conviction we do about any particular judgment which is not so verifiable--for example, the perceptual judgment that those men out there are sawing a tree. "Only," Lewis says, "if something is conclusively true by virtue of experience, can any existence or fact of reality be rendered even probable."[38]

At this point I think we might, in defense of Dewey's view, refer to the thought of another pragmatist who, of course, had considerable influence on Dewey, C. S. Peirce. Peirce, in a brilliant essay called "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,"[39] discusses the question of whether we have any intuitive cognition. This he defines as a cognition or judgment not "determined" or supported by some other cognition. This is the kind of cognition or knowledge which Lewis thinks is necessary if we are ever to have any factual knowledge at all. And the assumed necessity for this is what is in back of this entire argument against Dewey's view.

Peirce refers to this argument in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" as an argument which claims that there must be some such self-evident, self-confirming judgments to found the ordinary

perceptual judgments we make. And one of his counter-arguments seems to me to offer an excellent reason for believing Dewey's view to be plausible and the objection we have been considering untenable. This is his point that a variety of premises, none of which is itself certain, may offer support for a conclusion to such an extent that it is more certain than any one of them.

> Let us suppose, for example, that a dozen witnesses testify to an occurrence. Then my belief in the occurrence rests on the belief that each of these men is generally to be believed upon oath. Yet the fact testified to is made more certain than that of any of those men is generally to be believed.[40]

Now, similarly, if I am concerned to inquire into the precise nature of the perception of Dwight Eisenhower on my bedroom wall (e.g., by putting on my glasses and looking around the room for other sources for the image), I may be led to the conclusion that it is a shadow that was cast there by a street lamp. This shadow so cast upon the spot where I thought I had seen a little Eisenhower disconfirms my original inference as to what I was seeing. But now how do I know that the shadow is indeed a shadow and not really a delusion or hallucination or memory? In short, how do I know that I <u>am</u> sense-perceiving? The answer is that I do not <u>know</u> in the sense of being absolutely certain, but that there are many other sense-perceptions, themselves also not absolutely certain, with which the inference that this is a shadow so cast square. There is a street lamp and it casts a light across the photographic enlarger which is sitting on a table in my room, and the shadow is roughly the same shape as the head of the enlarger. Furthermore, I did not have my glasses on, and without them cannot be sure just what I am seeing, and I had been seeing

scenes from the life of Eisenhower on television before I went to bed.

The way that I have what Dewey calls "warranted assertibility" (he prefers to avoid the term "knowledge") is through the fact that this interpretation does seem to account for the phenomena of the situation. It is, then, if you will, a kind of coherence theory of knowledge and hence, since knowledge is involved in cognitive and indirectly in non-cognitive perception, a coherence theory of perception. There is, then, no regressus ad infinitum not because we reach a case of inherently and intrinsically knowable sense-perception. Rather it is because we reach a perception which squares with the other perceptions which we are having, with those we have had in the past, and with those we expect to have in the future. And with the perceptions which other people tell us they are having.

Something like this must be the way in which we first come to distinguish our sense-perceptions from our imagination-perceptions, dream-perceptions, etc. It is because some of them cohere with others, none of which is itself known to be a sense-perception. And some are not borne out by subsequent developments among the perceptual material and do not square with what has come before. None of one's perceptual experiences of, say, his mother as she tends to him in his crib is really certainly a sense-perception, but the fact that they all square with each other and do not come and go in the way the "bad man" of one's dreams do must make the distinction between the real and the imaginary, for example, begin to take hold in the child's mind.

NOTES

1. Strictly speaking--of a "factual object" in some "existential situation"--as opposed to a "conceptual object," which is abstracted from any particular existential situation. See above, p. 25 ff.

2. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1938), p. 129.

3. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (second edition; New York: Dover Books, 1958 [first published, 1929]), p. 338. All subsequent quotations from Experience and Nature will be from the second edition unless otherwise indicated.

4. John Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization (New York: Capricorn Books, 1963), p. 190.

5. Ibid., p. 190.

6. See Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 338 f., for development of this point.

7. Ibid., p. 321. The discussion in Experience and Nature beginning on p. 308 and ending on p. 353 is the most extensive treatment of perception in Dewey's work and provides the basis for much of my analysis of his view.

8. Ibid., p. 339.

9. There is a qualification to be made to this, however--viz., that certain qualities do become funded as being of one type or another: such things as pink elephants are generally interpreted, because of past experience, as hallucinatory, and the familiar objects of one's room as sense-perceptual. See below, p. 77, for further explication of this.

10. Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 338-39.

11. Ibid., p. 335.

12. Ibid., p. 339. The precise nature of meaning as Dewey uses this term is discussed below on p. 64 ff.

13. I exclude applause because this is a response not, e.g., to the feigned action of stabbing, but to the action of acting. The stabbing is perceived "non-cognitively," but the acting, when evaluated qua good or bad acting (appraised, then, rather than merely prized) is sense-perceived.

14. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 339.

15. Ibid., p. 310.

16. John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1954 [first published, 1916]), p. 5.

17. Ibid., p. 2. On p.60 below I discuss in greater detail and criticize as being implausible this view of Dewey's on what our ordinary perception is like. I claim there that Dewey, in his zeal to avoid what he sees as a typical over-intellectualization on the part of philosophers of the nature of our experience, comes himself to take an under-intellectualized view of it.

18. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 339.

19. See below, Ch. 3, for a further development of this.

20. See below, Ch. 3, for a further development of this.

21. Dewey does call it perception in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 150, and Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 256.

22. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 182.

23. Ibid., p. 182.

24. Ibid., p. 258.

25. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 3.

26. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 143.

27. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 314.

28. Ibid., p. 333.

29. Ibid., p. 334.

30. Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 190.

31. I am indebted to Professor William Earle for this argument against Dewey's view.

32. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Ch. VIII, p. 140 f.

33. Ibid., pp. 142-43.

34. Ibid., p. 132.

35. Ibid., p. 132.

36. "Powder is what will explode under certain conditions; water as a substantial object is that group of connected qualities which will quench thirst, and so on." (Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 129.)

37. Ibid., p. 140.

38. C. I. Lewis, Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, Ill., Open Court Publishing Co., 1946), p. 204.

39. C. S. Peirce, "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man," reprinted in Philip P. Wiener, Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), pp. 15-38.

40. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

CHAPTER II

FEELING

We come now to the detailed analysis of Dewey's view of the first of the three kinds of perception he recognizes. This he calls feeling. As I have indicated above, each of the three kinds perception can occur in any of the various forms of perception. Feeling is not limited to qualities that are received through external sense-organs, but can be produced by internal, proprioceptive sensors, or other "organic structures," this last source being responsible for qualities interpreted as memories, for example.

Dewey does not generally call feeling a kind of perception.[1] He usually limits that term to the kind of awareness we have of qualities together with their meaning, which meaning is either the signification or the sense of the qualities or presented material. I am including his view of it in my discussion of his theory of perception, however, because it is a kind of awareness which is customarily discussed in philosophical accounts of perception, many philosophers considering it a kind of perception. Furthermore, as we shall see (p. 45), it is in Dewey's view precisely because philosophers have viewed what Dewey calls "feeling" on an analogy with the cognitive kind of perception which Dewey calls "awareness of signification" that many of the problems of perception arise.

Feeling is the having, in a non-cognitive way, of qualities. It is the occurrence of these qualities in a living organism. These qualities

include such things as colors, sounds, shapes, etc., which are sensed by sense-organs, as well as such qualities as painfulness, obnoxiousness, pleasure, settled, disturbed, harsh, barren, etc. This last group Dewey, following Santayana, often calls "tertiary" qualities. But such qualities are not felt as what they are, as, for example, disturbed. Because feeling is dumb; it does not know what is being had or even that anything is being had: feeling is just qualities occurring. Dewey's view, then, is like that of James in "Does Consciousness Exist?" Qualities, or "neutral data" (as James refers to them), just happen. There is no act of being conscious of their happening. There is no knowledge involved. And there is no subject to which the felt qualities occur.

As we saw in Chapter One, felt qualities, in their original state, before interpretation occurs, are only "proleptically" hunger or red or fear, or bodily or environmental. They have no character or meaning or classification at all in their original state. They just are. They may cause responses, but they do not do so because they mean something that makes that response relevant. A dog may perk up its ears when it hears thunder, but this is merely a response, not a reaction to an interpretation of a sound-quality as meaning thunder or even danger.

In order to try to make clearer what Dewey is getting at here, I would like to ask the reader to imagine what the experience of Helen Keller must have been like prior to that momentous occasion when she came to learn that things have names. If the reader has seen the play or movie, "The Miracle Worker," he will remember what a terribly exciting moment it was, both for Helen Keller and her teacher.

What happened was a revolution in Helen Keller's experience, a revolution her teachers had been trying to accomplish for some time. They had been trying to teach her that things have names and what some of those names are.

Now, what I would like the reader to try to imagine is what Helen Keller's experience was like prior to that time. Well, of course some qualities did bring forth responses, but were these phenomena, these qualities, in any sense known or cognized? Perhaps it is impossible to say, but I believe it is possible that her experience was much like that of the higher animals who have feeling, but not mind. Let us anyway suppose that this was roughly what her experience was like, and, in trying to imagine it, I believe we will get very close to what Dewey means by feeling.

Let us suppose, then, that prior to discovering that all that pressure on the hand meant a word or sign, Helen Keller really did not have knowledge. Because, in her experience, nothing really represented anything else. There was water and then there was the response of running away or shivering, but there was no cognition of it as water.

Now the kind of experience which she must have had of the world prior to learning about language and representation or signification corresponds to what Dewey calls feeling. What happens in experience of this type is simply that qualities occur. There is, for example, a wet, cold quality. It is not known as being wet and cold; it is not recognized; it calls forth neither memory nor expectation. There is just the wet or just the smell, in the case of, say, an olfactory sensation.

Now these qualities may cause one to act in a certain way, but unless

with the smell one anticipated that action or thought of such action, unless, in short, the smell referred back to something in the past or ahead to something in the future, there was no knowledge or meaning. There was just a brute, qualitative event.

This is the kind of experience I am supposing Helen Keller had prior to that moment at the pump when she learned the name for water and thereby learned that there were names and meanings. There had been (indeed, there must have been for life to survive) qualities, movements, and satisfactory completions of those movements--as in eating, for example. But these, I am supposing, occurred in what Dewey calls a

> brutely serial fashion. . . . The small, S, is replaced (and displaced) by a felt movement, K, this is replaced by the gratification, G. Viewed from without, as we are now regarding it, there is S-K-G. But from within, for itself, it is now S, now G, and so on to the end of the chapter. Nowhere is there <u>looking before and after</u>;[2] memory and anticipation are not born. Such an experience neither is, in whole or in part, a knowledge, nor does it exercise a cognitive function.[3]

So we may suppose that Helen Keller had previously learned to respond to the water from the pump by drinking it. But there was just the water and the drinking, occurring in a "brutely serial" fashion. The water did not cause her to "look ahead" to the drinking; it did not symbolize it. It simply called forth the response of the drinking.

It is only when the qualities of wet and cold contain in themselves, by way of anticipation, the drinking and the gratification, that signs and mind are born. This Helen Keller had not achieved. Apparently she had even learned the names of some things, but again in a brutely mechanical fashion, not in a truly representative fashion. The water caused her to make certain pressures on her hand, and presumably she could even,

after receiving these pressures, respond appropriately by making her way to the water. But the pressures themselves did not mean, contain immanently in themselves, the water itself. Not until that moment at the pump did she learn that and what signs are, and thereby become a human being.

So when she learned that the pressure on the hand was a sign, knowledge and mind were born. She no longer responded to things merely in their immediacy, but began to be capable of remembering the past instances of such things and anticipating future ones. In doing so, she began to have the second kind of perception which Dewey recognizes--the perception of the signification of qualities. Now she was able to anticipate the taste and the thirst-quenching qualities, the easy penetrability, the coolness of the water just from the words spelled out on her hand. This anticipation marked an advance to the level of perception called signification. When experience reaches this level, Dewey says

> qualitative immediacies cease to be dumbly rapturous, a possession that is obsessive and an incorporation that involves submergence: conditions found in sensation and passions. They become capable of survey, contemplation, and ideal or logical elaboration; when something can be said of qualities they are purveyors of instruction. . . . Even the dumb pang of an ache achieves a significant existence when it can be designated and descanted upon; it ceases to be merely oppressive and becomes important.[4]

This passage seems to me one of the most richly suggestive passages in Dewey's writings. It is an example of the sort of thing I was saying in the Introduction about the way in which Dewey's account of experience reveals so much about our experience. He never contents himself with simply recounting the obvious facts and then trying to find an interpretation of them which will be more dialectically defensible than that of some other equally trite and hackneyed account. He actually dares to

say something novel.

The notion of qualities as being "obsessive" seems to me especially rich in suggestions as to what feeling is like. "Obsessive" here implies, I believe, as does "submergence," the relative inability one has of escaping from the qualities one is feeling. One has a toothache, but one does not know that it is a toothache and therefore does not know what to do about it. One is submerged in it. Only when signs and their meanings come into existence is it possible to escape this submergence in the obsessive, "dumbly rapturous" world of bare qualities. Then one can compare present experience to others, remember what one did then, and get out. "Survey" becomes possible and, through it, escape from pain.

An experience I once had, which I have already referred to, illustrates this notion of the "submergence" and relative impossibility of escape that characterizes feeling. While I was asleep early one morning, the air in my bedroom had become permeated with a thick, smoky, sulphuric content given off, presumably, by some old soft coal that the janitor had decided to use. I slept in the midst of this ghastly, dangerous pollution for I do not know how long before I woke gasping and coughing. I suddenly realized I had been breathing and tasting this "gook" for some time, but without, of course, even thinking of the possibility of escaping from it. The moment I woke up, of course, I threw the window open and breathed the wonderfully fresh Chicago air from outside. (I never thought I would find Chicago air refreshingly clean.) Now as I lay there in the midst of that stuff, I believe I was perceiving purely in the mode of what Dewey calls feeling. I was suffering, and I was perhaps coughing,

but I had no idea that I was suffering or coughing or what I was suffering. I was dumbly and obsessively immersed in a set of qualities, and, since I was not conscious, which only exists when meanings are given to qualities, I was not capable of interpreting those qualities or of doing anything to escape from them. When I woke, when mind and capacity for naming and grasping meanings returned to my experience, my first effort was to characterize these qualities I was experiencing. To the dumb, animal-like absorption in them which characterized my earlier experience (feeling), they were neither smelled, breathed, seen, felt, heard, due to internal or external causes; they just were. But consciousness immediately classified: "I'm breathing it; it's in the air," and then entertained possible courses of action to escape this oppression: (a) run out of the apartment immediately; (b) throw open the window; (c) try another room, perhaps it's only in this one; and so on.

When qualities begin to be interpreted, when signs and meanings come into existence, the world begins to become organized into objects. Whereas before it was a swimming mass of "blooming, buzzing" qualities, without character or significance, now some of those qualities become separated off and form objects. In the case of Helen Keller's experience, a set of qualities became, through the acquisition of a meaning, a bucket of water, a bell, my teacher, the porch, and so on. And they were thus formed into objects in that they came to signify what could be done with them and what one could expect from them. An object is precisely that: the signification of a set of qualities with regard to future eventualities.

But, after a time, some of these future eventualities that a set of

qualities like those of water had previously signified come to be immediately apprehended as part of those qualities. This, too, of course must have happened to Miss Keller. She came to experience the taste, the thirst-quenching quality, etc. of the water, no longer as indicated or referred to by the given qualities, but as actually contained in them. Such perception, as we have seen, Dewey calls perception of the sense of a set of qualities.

The sense of a set of qualities is inherent in it and is grasped immediately. But this occurs, I take Dewey to maintain,[5] only in contexts of inquiry. In such a context, the thing, which is a set of qualities with a sense, itself signifies some new, anticipated eventuality, like, in the case of water perceived in the mode of sense, giving some of this to a person one knows is very thirsty. The qualities, plus their immediately contained sense, signify an action not itself part of the essence of water. So what was before awareness just of presented material itself has now matured, through experience and consequent "funded" meanings, into awareness of objects themselves as signifying possible eventualities.

Now Dewey's view of feeling is similar to that which some philosophers have of what they call immediate knowledge or knowledge by acquaintance. These philosophers, however, claim that this most elementary kind of awareness is a cognitive kind of awareness, that in it we are knowing the world. Russell is an example of a philosopher who holds this view. Consider the following passage from his Problems of Philosophy:

> We shall say we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths. Thus in the presence of

> my table I am acquainted with the sense-data that make up the appearance of my table--its colour, shape, hardness, smoothness, etc.; all these are things of which I am immediately conscious when I am seeing and touching my table. The particular shade of colour that I am seeing may have many things said about it--I may say that it is brown, that it is rather dark, and so on. But such statements, though they make me know truths about the colour, do not make me know the colour itself any better than I did before: so far as concerns knowledge of the colour itself, as opposed to knowledge of truths about it, I know the colour perfectly and completely when I see it,[6] and no further knowledge of it itself is even theoretically possible. Thus the sense-data which make up the appearance of my table are things with which I have acquaintance, things immediately known to me just as they are.[7]

So, for Russell, the qualities which we are immediately aware of in our experience are known. Dewey disagrees with this. He admits, as we have seen, that there is a stage in our experience in which certain brute, dumb qualities are present. But he denies that we know, or are even conscious of, these qualities. For him, we simply have them; they are present.

There are several reasons why Dewey takes this view, and I would like now to indicate what they are.

First, there is the testimony of a careful look at the facts themselves, the sort of method some philosophers call "phenomenology," and which Dewey calls the "empirical, denotative method."[8] Dewey thinks that philosophers like Russell, who think of our initial or most elementary perception of reality as being a kind of knowledge, are simply not looking at experience, but are rather manipulating abstract concepts. If one looks at the facts, Dewey says, he will find that we have constantly a kind of perception which is totally non-cognitive. Every time we respond to a stimulus, which we do in much of our living, we are perceiving in this non-cognitive way these elementary sense-qualities which Russell thinks of as being known by us. As I write on this paper, for example,

I am responding to felt, white sense-qualities which act as stimuli to my writing; but I am not aware of them as qualities in a knowing sense. I simply have them. I simply respond to them qua stimuli. But if I reflect on what has been happening as I write this, then I do become aware of the stimulus, but no longer qua stimulus, for I am no longer responding. Now the stimulus is bracketed; we should perhaps put the word in quotes. For it is now like mentioning a word as opposed to using it.

Philosophers like Russell, who claim that cognition is involved even in this most elementary kind of perception, are guilty of importing their attitude, as engaged in reflective analysis, back into the original experience. In reflecting on the stimulus and our response to it, we of course know it. But this was not the way in which it was originally perceived.

What Dewey is suggesting with regard to the proper way to discover what our experience is like at this level of most elementary perception can perhaps be clarified by considering an account which is similar in some respects, viz., that of Sartre in Transcendence of the Ego. In this essay Sartre is concerned with the question of what status the ego or I has in our experience, and he claims that it is not present at all in certain kinds of experience which we have, viz., what he calls "unreflected consciousness" of the world. "When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is no I. There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken, etc.," but no consciousness of the ego or I to which this streetcar might be presumed to be appearing. It is the act of reflection upon that original, non-reflective experience of the streetcar which gives rise to the

I or ego, Sartre says. But there is also a mode of access to the original experience as it was lived. This, Sartre says, is possible because of a "non-reflective memory" which is left of it in our consciousness. This kind of "non-reflective apprehension" shows us what experience was actually like, whereas "reflection modifies the spontaneous consciousness."[9]

Similarly, Dewey is arguing that the kind of reflective analysis upon our experience which philosophers like Russell engage in projects into the original experience an element that was not there at all, viz., cognition. To recover experience as it was originally lived, therefore, it is not enough just to look at it; one must look at it in the right way. In the case of the paper on which I am writing, this involves not looking at how the paper appears to me now as I am engaged in reflecting on it in relation to a problem into the solution of which it enters as a datum, but rather to look at this "non-reflective memory" of the original perception which persists after the experience itself has ended.

A second reason why Dewey denies that feeling is cognitive is that it is (and this is true even for Russell) the presence of qualities standing alone and in relation to nothing else; not even in relation to themselves. But cognition is always a relational kind of consciousness. One cannot stand in a knowledge-relation to qualities which are not themselves related to other qualities or to eventualities which they suggest. If nothing else, knowledge involves relating this or these blue qualia to the word "blue." But not even that is involved in this most elementary kind of perception. Qualities simply are, totally without relations. To be, as Russell says he is in the passage quoted above, "immediately conscious"

of the color, shape, etc. of the table, without relating them even to the word "color," "shape," etc. is not to know, but simply to have.[10]

Finally, Dewey argues that the view that even the most primitive kind of perception is cognition or knowledge leads to idealism.[11] If we assume, with Russell and so many other philosophers, that the most primitive kind of presented material is in any sense cognized, we are caught in the Cartesian trap of an encapsulated self which cannot ever find a ground for believing in the existence of other things than itself. Descartes, it will be remembered, held that all presentations of qualities are cognitions, objects of thought. And, having assumed this, he had upon his hands, and bequeathed to those of subsequent thinkers, the monumental task of justifying our common-sense belief that we are aware of a world that lies outside of, and is independent of, our own minds.

Dewey thinks that one can never succeed in showing the possibility of a cognition of the external world (the problem of what is to him an unnecessary discipline called "epistemology"--unnecessary because, as we shall see, it is founded on a false assumption) if he starts with the assumption that all presented material, all qualities which in any sense "appear" to us, are cognized or known. In an interesting analogy which he uses in a very difficult essay called "Naive vs. Presentative Realism," in Essays in Experimental Logic,[12] Dewey says that the philosopher who argues for realism (that we are aware of an independently existing world), but who begins with the assumption that each of our perceptions or sensations is "an intrinsic case of knowledge or of presentation to a mind or knower . . . lets the nose of the idealist camel into

the tent. He has then no great cause for surprise when the camel comes in and devours the tent."[13]

What Dewey means, I believe, is this. If we assume that, for example, the railroad tracks as convergent and the railroad tracks as parallel (or the pencil as one and the pencil as doubled) are objects of thought occurring inside a mind or, in some sense, to a knower, then the problem of deciding which cognition or opinion is correct is incapable of solution. For we have nothing to turn to to test one or another of them save another cognition. But how do we know that this latest cognition or opinion has anything to do with reality?

But all of this is unnecessary, Dewey says, because our most primitive kind of presented material is not cognitive at all. It is a real event in nature. The color-, sound-, shape-, etc.-qualities which constitute my experience at its most primitive level (viz., feeling) are outside mind and cognition to start with. They are not opinions about or putative cognitions "of" nature, which we then have to prove "correspond to" nature. They are part of nature.

There is, then, a kind of overlapping of the world of nature and the world of perception in the event called feeling--i.e., the bare presentation of uninterpreted qualities. In the essay, "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge" in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy,[14] Dewey puts it this way:

> To be a smell (or anything else) is one thing, to be known as smell, another; to be a "feeling" one thing, to be known as a "feeling," another. The first is thinghood; existence indubitable, direct. . . . The second is reflected being, things indicating and calling for other things--something offering the possibility of truth and hence of falsity.

And in the reply to Russell's criticisms in the Schilpp volume, Dewey answers Russell's remarks about Dewey's view of things an sich or in themselves as follows: Things in our directly had experience (feeling) are events, are things-in-themselves. And these things, far from being unknowable, are the material which, when a situation becomes problematic, "produce precisely that which is to be known by being inquired into."[15]

Now to talk about what we directly experience or feel as being things in themselves may seem to commit Dewey to a kind of idealism with feeling-experiences as those to which idea-experiences must conform--both of these types of experience nevertheless being experience and therefore "ideal." But such a criticism would fail to take account of Dewey's view that at the level of feeling, event and experience are one. Felt qualities, as I have been trying to argue above, are not occurrences "in a mind," but are real events in nature.

This overlapping of experience and nature in feeling helps to explain Dewey's contention in the "Introduction" to Experience and Nature that experience is both "in" nature and "of" nature.[16] And it is, in Dewey's view, the only way that we can avoid the impossible task of epistemology --to show that the mind can have knowledge of, or access to, reality. For we do not begin, in inquiry, with "ideas" in our minds; we begin with events which are real presented material.

The epistemological problem arose, Dewey believes,[17] because it was assumed that what is "'given' in a primary, original way" is mental in nature. Consequently, the facts about

> genuine primary experience, in which natural [non-mental] things are the determining factors of all change, were regarded either as

> not-given dubious things that could be reached only by endowing the only certain thing, the mental, with some miraculous power, or else were denied all existence save as complexes of mental states, of impressions, sensations, feelings.

Not to recognize, then, this continuity of experience in general and perception in particular with natural events, not to see that in feeling perception and event overlap and experience is both in and of nature, has led to the dualism according to which the "universe is split into two separate and disconnected realms of existence."[18] To assume that these two realms, "one psychical and the other physical, . . . in spite of their total disjunction specifically and minutely correspond to each other . . . presents the acme of incredibility."[19]

Such a dualism postulates a miracle to account for knowledge, viz., the "miracle of a mind that gets outside itself to lay its ghostly hands upon the things of an external world."[20] There is a kind of "Deus ex Machina, whose mechanism is preserved a secret" which is assumed by the "transcendental epistemologist" to account for the way in which "mental states get objective reference."[21]

Both idealists and presentative realists start with the assumption that all appearances, all presentations are presentations to a consciousness or a knower. They assume, that is, that we begin with appearances which may or may not have anything to do with the world as it is in itself. The idealist concludes that we can have no knowledge of the world in itself, that indeed we cannot possibly have any evidence of the existence of such a world, since all our evidence is necessarily of ideas in our own minds. The presentative realist concludes that through the ideas in our minds we can somehow, miraculously, of course, in Dewey's view, come

to have knowledge of the world in itself. Dewey calls his own view a kind of naive realism, since for him, as we have seen, what is directly presented is itself real, not ideal at all, although it is necessary to make certain distinctions among these real things.[22]

For Dewey, the epistemological question--i.e., the question whether presented qualities have this applicability or correspondence to the real world--arises only because of the false assumption that all appearances or presentations are cognized. If we recognize that there are feelings, and that these are not cognitions but real occurrences or events, then the epistemological problem never arises. We are <u>in the world</u> to begin with.

The realization that appearances or presentations are real occurrences also solves the problem of the relativity of sense-perception--i.e., the problem of how one object can appear in many different ways to many different observers, and to different points of view of any one observer. For since these presentations are perfectly natural and real events occurring in natural things called organisms, they admit of the same explanation as the relativity of appearances upon the film in a camera, for example. Nobody is surprised at the differences in the appearances of an object from the different points of view of the same camera, because this is just the way a natural object effects changes in another object under varying conditions. But the convergence of the presentations or appearances of the thing in us "follows from the physical properties of light and a lens,"[23] just as it does in the case of a camera. And it is subject to the same perfectly naturalistic explanation.

We seem to see convergent railroad tracks and the camera registers

converging tracks on its film. And the physical explanation, in terms of the behavior of light rays, applies in the case of the eye just as it does in that of the camera. The problem of relativity arises only if we assume that the various appearances of the railroad tracks, etc., are not real events, but appearances to a mind or a knower. If we assume instead, as the empirically observed facts suggest to us anyway, that the presentations are all real events in nature, resulting from the interaction of an organism and its environment, then all the presentations are real and the only question is which appearance is most fruitful for our purposes. Is it more fruitful, for example, to regard the tracks as parallel or as convergent? And if one's interest is in traveling along them in a train, for example, the assumption of their being parallel is the better one. But this does not imply that the presentation of the tracks as convergent is "mental"; it simply implies that the assumption of them as convergent, on the basis of the perfectly real and natural event of convergent-track-presentation, is not the more useful assumption.

The analysis given here of Dewey's view of what he calls feeling is based on his work up to and including Experience and Nature, which was published in 1925. From Essays in Experimental Logic to Experience and Nature he seems to have taken the view I have presented above. But in an article published in 1930, called "Qualitative Thought" (reprinted in Experience, Nature, and Freedom, edited by Bernstein, Liberal Arts Press), and in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, published in 1935, Dewey's view has changed significantly.

In Experience and Nature and earlier works, as we have seen, Dewey

held that feeling is the almost totally non-cognitive presence of uninterpreted, meaningless qualities. Any interpretation such qualities may later receive is a later addition, occurring after they cease to be merely felt. They are dumb, character-less, unlocated, and submerged. But in Logic and in "Qualitative Thought," Dewey uses the term "feeling" to refer to a mode of awareness in which one grasps, or at least has a hunch, as to the meaning of a situation. If a person suffers an insult and becomes angry, there is a quality of, let us say, obnoxiousness that pervades every movement of the person who has insulted him, and every person, thing, and occurrence in the situation is pervaded with a certain "tone, color, and quality" which this insult has produced. Or, let us suppose, to take another example of this pervasive quality which colors a situation and makes it what it is, that one comes back to his apartment, finds the door thrown open, drawers pulled out, clothes and books lying around in total disarray, and certain things missing. He then comes to perceive the situation as pervaded by a quality of having-been-robbed. This quality colors the total world of things experienced. Everything is seen in the light of this pervasive quality. Objects out of place, etc., are all viewed from the point of view of this pervasive hunch--having-been-robbed.

Now such a pervasive quality, Dewey says in "Qualitative Thought," is felt. This kind of awareness is like that referred to by the word intuition, as that word is sometimes used in popular usage. For it refers to a

> single qualitativeness underlying all the details of explicit reasoning. It may be relatively dumb and inarticulate and yet penetrating; unexpressed in definite ideas which form reasons

> and justifications and yet profoundly right. . . . Reflection and rational elaboration spring from and make explicit a prior intuition [or feeling]. . . . Thinking and theorizing about physical matters set out from an intuition, and reflection about affairs of life and mind consist in an ideational and conceptual transformation of what begins as an intuition. Intuition, in short, signifies the realization of a pervasive quality such that it regulates the determination of relevant distinctions or of whatever, whether in the way of terms or relations, becomes the accepted object of thought.[24]

These feelings or hunches or intuition of pervasive qualities, Dewey says, "have a cognitive import." Even such a seemingly innocuous remark as "'Good!' may mark a deep apprehension of the quality of a piece of acting on the stage, of a deed performed, or of a picture in its wealth of content."[25]

So it is on the basis of a previously <u>felt</u> situation that one is able to make the specific and explicit acts of perception which, Dewey thinks, are the only kinds of perception which philosophers have generally recognized. Most philosophers, that is, think of perception as being basically awareness of specific, isolated objects. Dewey, on the contrary, thinks there must first be the total qualitative situation, which is not perceived or thought, but felt or "intuited," on the basis of which these specific, explicit perceptions can be made. But if feeling can grasp a quality like having-been-robbed or of a perfect acting rendition of the part of, let us say, some crabbed old man, feeling is now being seen as capable of grasping the <u>meaning</u> of a state of affairs, an accomplishment explicitly denied to it in the earlier works referred to above.

The view that reflection (and therefore, of course, perception as awareness of signification, this arising only after reflection) occurs

always against a background of things and objects of the practical, common-sense world--this view can be found even in the earlier works.[26] The context of the perception of the apartment as having been broken into and robbed, for example, is not a set of brute, uninterpreted qualities, but a whole set of common-sense objects standing in a relation to each other. Thought and perception cannot occur simply on the basis of felt qualities which are totally devoid of meaning. It is necessary that there be already some kind of meaning in the situation on the basis of which to understand the situation as being one of having been robbed, or as fine acting, or as whatever. The "stream of existence" or of brute, character-less qualities "is no sooner regarded than its total incapacity to officiate as material condition and cue of thought appears."[27]

So, in these earlier works as well Dewey thinks of inquiry as occurring in a context of already meaningful objects and situations, funded products of much previous inquiry. But in these works Dewey tended to think of the awareness of the background involved in inquiry as a perception of the sense of a set of qualities. He even uses an example in Experience and Nature which closely resembles his examples in the essay, "Qualitative Thought":

> When we are baffled by perplexing conditions, and finally hit upon a clew, and everything falls into place, the whole thing suddenly, as we say, "makes sense." . . . The meaning of the whole situation as apprehended is sense. The idiomatic usage of the word sense [whereby a whole situation makes sense, becomes organized by a certain significance] is much nearer the empirical facts than is the ordinary restriction of the word in psychological literature to a single recognized quality, like sweet or red.[28]

But it is understandable that Dewey should later have come to regard awareness of sense as a kind of feeling. For they do both share the

characteristics of being immediate and of forming the background for the mediated perception that occurs in explicit inquiry. In at least one passage in Experience and Nature he seems to think of them as being interchangeable. "The larger system of meaning suffuses, interpenetrates, colors what is now and here uppermost; it gives them sense, feeling, as distinct from signification."[29] Nevertheless, it seems to me it would have made his view much clearer if he had always kept these two notions distinct.

I believe the later works, exemplified by the essay, "Qualitative Thought," do point to a difference in emphasis anyway in Dewey's view of perception. In these later works, that is, Dewey emphasizes that perception as a cognitive, reflective occurrence always takes place against a background in which a less explicitly reflective kind of thought has been going on. I could not have perceived as a result of inquiry that the sounds I had grasped the sense of as being sounds, coming from outside, being obnoxious, etc.--I could not have perceived them as being produced by a saw cutting down a tree if there had not already been a total qualitative situation with a pervasive sense.

Dewey also uses, in the later works referred to, the term "tertiary quality" for what he sometimes calls sense. But clearly the awareness of such a pervasive quality as having-been-robbed or superb-acting-performance, although it does have immediacy and pre-reflective status in some instances, is an awareness of a meaning rather than of the brutely given existence which a color or a shape has. And it cannot, therefore, be said, it seems to me, to be felt, at least in the earlier sense in

which Dewey used that term.

What seems to me responsible for this change in use of terminology from sense to feeling is a failure on Dewey's part to distinguish two kinds of perception we have, both of which may be said to be awarenesses of pervasive qualities. The first of these he discusses in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.[30] Here he says there is a difference between specific qualities like red, hard, and sweet, and a quality which, following Santayana, he calls a tertiary quality. Some examples he gives of tertiary qualities are distressing, perplexing, cheerful, disconsolate. Let us take the quality of cheerful. Imagine the way in which one perceives the bright cheerfulness of a perfectly clear day as an example of this kind of all-pervasive quality. Every thing and event does indeed seem to be affected by this quality of bright cheerfulness, just as on dull, gloomy days everything seems affected by the quality of dull gloominess.

Now this bright cheerfulness is not a quality that is contained in any one moment of the day or any one of the things that one encounters. It is a quality which comes to "permeate and color all the objects and events that are involved" in the experience. The people one meets and even physical objects become infected with the quality. "A tertiary quality qualifies all the constituents to which it applies in a thoroughgoing fashion."[31]

Now, it seems to me that this kind of a quality is indeed felt. For it arises spontaneously and pre-reflectively. We do not infer this bright cheerfulness as belonging to a day. It just happens. Of course, to use the term "cheerful" is to make an inference, to interpret the

situation. But prior to reflection, one is just confronted with a brilliant, sunny, cheerful day. But such a quality has to be distinguished from another sort of pervasive quality which Dewey, in these later writings, seems to regard as occurring in the same way. Thus, in both Logic and "Qualitative Thought" he says that sometimes we apprehend the significance or character of a situation in a kind of "intuitive," "hunch"-like fashion, and such an apprehension is also a case of feeling a pervasive quality. One might, for example, come to apprehend, after a few moments with a person, that he is a very bitter, spiteful person. And this quality would be felt as permeating the whole of one's experience of that person. But clearly, to experience a person as being bitter or spiteful, like experiencing one's apartment as having been robbed, is an inferential kind of experience. It is getting the sense of a situation and thereby lifting it out of the immediacy of the present with a view to what has been and can be expected with respect to it. Granted, there may be such interpretation and inquiry that is not explicitly so. Nevertheless, one is here grasping the meaning of a situation, not just feeling it as one feels a day's cheerfulness.

As I indicated above, feeling can be the mere having of qualities as a kind of "surplusage"[32] which is neither interpreted nor reacted to, and it can also be the having of qualities (without any explicit attendant interpretation) together with a habitual, unreflected response to these qualities. If a backwoodsman is on his way back to town to sell the furs he has trapped during the week, he will have various kinds of perception along the way. He will probably feel certain qualities which he will

neither react to nor interpret. His gaze will doubtless wander, for example, over many trees, etc., along the way, things which are on the fringe of his perceptual field and which he will not even respond to, much less interpret. But he will respond to some clusters of qualities. When, for example, he comes to a point where the path he has been on ends and he must make his way through virgin forest in order to get to the next path, he will respond to certain clusters of tree-qualities and other qualities which he has learned (having taken this route countless times before) as indications as to how to proceed. But he will not have to stop and reflect about these qualities. He has been through all that several times in the past and his reactions are now automatic. He probably does not even think about it at all, anymore than we think about the clutch and the stick-shift before going from first to second gear.

Now the feeling of these qualities and the immediate reaction to them Dewey does sometimes call perception. Indeed, it is his view that this kind of non-cognitive response to qualities is the most common kind of perception in which we engage in our lives. My perception of the pen with which I am now writing is of this sort. It is not the object of a "cognitive regard," or the "theme of an intellectual gesture."[33] It is a set of qualities to which, as a result of habit, I respond without reflection.

Dewey discusses this kind of perception at various places in his writings.[34] In Essays in Experimental Logic he describes it as a kind of experience in which the objects of our awareness are objects not of knowledge or observation, but of

> esteem or aversion, of decision, of use, of suffering, of endeavor and revolt. When, in a subsequent reflective experience, we look back and find these things and qualities (quales would be a better word or values, if the latter word were not so open to misconstruction), we are only too prone to suppose that they were then what they are now-- . . . known objects.[35]

But in Essays in Experimental Logic Dewey says that it is perhaps an exaggeration to say that all of these primarily non-inquiring, non-cognitive experiences are totally devoid of intellectual components.[36] It is more likely that they contain at least some intellectual elements. And this he explicates as "a certain taking of some things as representative of other things."[37] Otherwise there would not seem to be any difference between human experience and that of "an oyster or a growing bean vine."[38]

But elsewhere Dewey seems to deny that any intellectual or cognitive element is involved in our ordinary, non-cognitive perception. Thus, he says in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry[39] that "either an immediate overt response occurs, like using the typewriter or picking up the book (in which cases the situation is not a cognitional one), or . . . the object directly noted is part of an act of inquiry." To say that "an immediate overt response occurs" seems to me clearly to make of non-cognitive perception a purely non-cognitive kind of experience, with no elements at all in which some things are taken as representative of others.

In the essay, "The Logic of Judgments of Practice," the last essay in Essays in Experimental Logic, Dewey expands on what he called in the "Introduction" experience of objects in a non-cognitive way, whereby they are objects of esteem, aversion, enjoyment, and so on. Here he

says that such experiences are "direct experiences of good and bad," a kind of experience he calls sometimes "prizing." Such experiences of "finding a thing good apart from reflective judgment" involve "simply treating the thing in a certain way, hanging on to it, dwelling upon it, welcoming it and acting to perpetuate its presence, taking delight in it. It is a way of behaving toward it, a mode of organic action," together with the feelings which also form part of the organic reaction to it.[40]

This description would also apply to objects which are simply used in an unreflective way, like the pen I am writing with, although, of course, such an object is not found good or bad in the way this pipe I am smoking is. It is nevertheless perceived in this behavioral way, as an object not of cognitive regard or observation, but of organic reaction.

It seems to me that in his great concern to draw a distinction between objects which enter into contexts of inquiry and those which are perceived non-cognitively, Dewey drew the distinction much too rigidly. For there seem to be many experiences in which, although our main interest is not in getting knowledge or warranted assertibility, we are nevertheless engaged in some intellectual activity, i.e., taking some things to be representative of others. And, indeed, this may even figure rather extensively in our experience. If one is, for example, involved in an ordinary conversation with a friend ("the enjoyment of social converse among friends"),[41] he is using and listening to language. And language here is necessarily being used as representative of other things. For one is not, like the animals, merely responding to the sounds being made by his friends; rather he is understanding them.

So, although certainly some perception is indeed of an almost, if not exclusively, non-cognitive sort, a mere response to qualities, other perception, even when not part of a primarily cognitive, inquiring sort of experience, is nevertheless intellectual in nature. My perception of the sidewalk I am walking on when I am walking along the street is indeed, as it usually occurs, merely overt response to merely felt qualities. But my perception of the meaning of the words that a friend utters in describing, say, a scene he witnessed, is of an intellectual or cognitive nature.

Dewey was, I believe, led to this under-intellectualization of ordinary experience in reaction against the view of those philosophers who had made all experience a cognitive activity. We have already seen above that he believed such a view leads inevitably to idealism. This is so because it results in the view that nature is fundamentally bifurcated between a known experience and an unknowable reality in itself. And, in his zeal to avoid this conclusion, Dewey overlooked the fact that intellectual activity is really very widespread even in our ordinary experience.

NOTES

1. Although Dewey does sometimes so refer to it. See, for example, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 256.

2. Italics mine.

3. John Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1965 [first published, 1910], pp. 78-79 and p. 84.

4. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 167.

5. See below, p. 98 f.

6. Italics mine.

7. Bertrand Russell, Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1912), p. 47. Italics mine.

8. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 6.

9. Jean-Paul Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego (New York: Noonday Press, 1957), pp. 47-50.

10. For Dewey's discussion of the relational character involved in all cognition, see especially "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge" in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy. My view, Dewey there says, calls attention to the "distance between being and knowing: and the recognition of an element of mediation . . . in all knowledge." (p. 80)

11. See especially Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 255.

12. Ibid., p. 255.

13. Ibid., p. 255.

14. Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 81.

15. Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey, Vol. I: The Library of Living Philosophers (second edition; La Salle, Ill: Open Court Publishing Co., 1951), p. 548.

16. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 4a.

17. Ibid., p. 16.

18. Ibid., p. 267.

19. Ibid., pp. 267-68.

20. Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 81, footnote 2.

21. Ibid., p. 105.

22. For this distinction between some of the real things, viz., felt qualities, which are "veridical," and those not so, see below, p. 71. For the whole discussion of presentative realism, naive realism, and idealism, see the essay, "Naive vs. Presentative Realism," in Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 250-263.

23. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 250.

24. Richard J. Bernstein, ed., John Dewey on Experience, Nature and Freedom: Representative Selections, The Library of Liberal Arts, No. 41 (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1960 [the essay, Qualitative Thought," first published in 1930]), p. 184.

25. Ibid., p. 184.

26. In Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 128, for example.

27. Ibid., p. 126.

28. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 261.

29. Ibid., p. 306.

30. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, pp. 69-70.

31. Ibid., p. 69.

32. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 394.

33. Ibid., p. 4.

34. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 150; Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 3-4; Experience and Nature, p. 310.

35. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 4.

36. Ibid., p. 394, footnote 1.

37. Ibid., p. 4.

38. Ibid., p. 3.

39. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 143.

40. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 353-54. Italics in last sentence are mine.

41. Ibid., p. 2.

CHAPTER III

PERCEPTION AS AWARENESS OF SIGNIFICATION AND AS PRESENCE OF SENSE

I have already referred a number of times in the previous two chapters both to perception of signification and to perception of sense, since it is impossible to discuss feeling without making at least some reference to the kinds of perception which it is not. I shall now take up perception of sense and of signification in more detail and systematically.

In general, what both of these types of perception involve which feeling does not possess is <u>meaning</u>. Feeling is itself involved in both of these. It is what <u>has</u> a meaning. Sense and signification are the "qualities of feeling [having] become significant of objective differences in external things and of episodes past and to come."[1] But feeling is usually not even called perception by Dewey because of the fact that it lacks meaning. The specific way in which feeling has meaning determines whether one is perceiving signification or sense. If the meaning is possessed immediately and directly by a quality or a set of qualities, in really much the same kind of immediate and uninquiring, uninferred, non-cognitive way in which feeling itself occurs, then it is perceived as awareness of sense. But if the meaning is a product of conscious inquiring, cognitive inference, then it is perceived as awareness of signification.

Since perception as awareness of signification and as presence of sense are distinguished from feeling by the presence of meaning, we must now get clear precisely what Dewey means by meaning. Dewey thinks of meaning as originating in the communication situation between human beings. What is peculiar to the human communication situation is that it is "participative." A human being "puts himself at the standpoint of a situation in which two parties share."[2] If a person A is pointing out a flower to a person B with the intention of having B bring him the flower,

> the characteristic thing about B's understanding of A's movement and sounds is that he responds to the thing from the standpoint of A. He perceives the thing as it may function in A's experience, instead of just ego-centrically. Similarly, A in making the request conceives the thing not only in its direct relationship to himself, but as a thing capable of being grasped and handled by B. He sees the thing as it may function in B's experience. Such is the essence and import of communication, signs and meaning. Something is literally made common in at least two different centres of behavior. To understand is to anticipate together, it is to make a cross-reference which, when acted upon, brings about a partaking in a common, inclusive undertaking.[3]

Animals, according to Dewey, do not possess communication, language, or meaning, because they do not engage in this participative experience in which two or more organisms share in an undertaking. For animals are "ego-centric." They engage in what Dewey calls "signaling activity."[4] This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for communication and meaning. What it involves, Dewey says, quoting Max Meyer, is a reflex activity, like that of the peacock in spreading its tail, "'the lighting of a fire-fly, the squeezing out of a black liquid from the ink bladder of a cuttle-fish.'"[5] These activities stimulate on some occasions, "by some preformed mechanism,"[6] a response that may be sexually or protectively useful to the agent or to the species. But it is not a signal

that the hen or the peacock or the cuttle-fish performs from the point of view of the other. Indeed, it often performs what functions on occasion as signaling acts even in the absence of the other animals. It is in this sense that Dewey calls the signaling acts of animals "ego-centric."

"The heart of language," then, for Dewey, is this participative activity in which there occurs "the establishment of cooperation in an activity in which there are partners." Language is not the "expression" of some antecedently existing state of affairs or state of mind to which it attempts to correspond. It is rather this cooperative activity, through the use of signs, of two or more persons whereby they work toward some consummatory experience. "A proposes the consummatory possession of the flower through the medium or means of B's action; B proposes to cooperate --or act adversely--in the fulfillment of A's proposal." Language, then, involves the signaling activity of A by means of motions and sounds, and "the movements of B, which are signs to A of B's cooperation or refusal."[7]

Understanding what another person means is not a matter of "grasping" an antecedent state of affairs that he proposed to make his language correspond to, but the occurrence of an activity in which A and B are working harmoniously together, an enterprise in which "the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership." Correspondingly, "to fail to understand is to fail to come into agreement in action; to misunderstand is to set up action at cross purposes."[8] Dewey's view of understanding and misunderstanding here is similar to that of Wittgenstein in Logical Investigations. To grasp the meaning of a sentence is to do or to be able to do the appropriate thing. Understanding is not then an act of

a disembodied or passive intellect reaching out to an antecedent, pre-existing state of affairs. This is the epistemological or spectator theory against which Dewey animadverts so often. No, to understand is to do, or to be prepared to do, something; it is therefore future-oriented rather than past-directed.

Meaning, we are now in a position to see, is, as that which is understood, a property belonging to the signs used both by, for example, A and B, whereby they expect certain things to happen upon the performance of certain actions. The meaning of the pointing gesture is the activity that A is calling for, viz., taking the flower to him, and the sort of expected consummation of A's intent in performing the activity. But not only do people's movements and sounds come to take on meaning, but so do things themselves. "The thing pointed to by A to B gains meaning. It ceases to be just what it is at the moment, and is responded to in its potentiality, as a means to remoter consequences."[9] Having served in an activity of being taken from one place to another, as a means to the realization of the intent that A meant, the flower now comes to take on the meaning of portability. At first and "primarily," Dewey says, it has its meaning as part of the cooperative activity which A and then B envisage and achieve, but then, "secondarily," it comes to have the meaning of portability on its own, as something that can figure in many activities of transport from one place to another. As a result, it is lifted out of its brute existence, which it has as a set of qualities merely felt or perhaps perceived in a very primitive way as just a thing of some sort, and it comes to have a meaning, to be responded to, that

is, not just as a brute set of qualities, but as something having potentialities; responded to, then, with an eye to the future, to what can be done with it, rather than that dumb absorption in the present and the particular which characterizes feeling.

Meanings, Dewey says, are "rules for using and interpreting things; interpretation being always an imputation of potentiality for some consequence."[10] The meaning that a quality or a set of qualities takes on when they are perceived in the modes of signification or of sense, then, "is a method of action, a way of using things."[11] And this use of things is originally "as a means to a shared consummation," although, as we have seen, things such as roses can come to take on meanings of, say, portability which do not necessarily have to do with a shared consummation, but presumably to some consummation one envisages for oneself. Nevertheless, meaning, in Dewey's view, clearly originates in a social context.

If one perceives something as being portable, this meaning which he infers as belonging to it (signification), or which is now inherent in it because of funded habitudes (sense), has to do with what one can do with it. To perceive portability as a characteristic or meaning of a television set is to expect that it can be easily, or relatively easily, moved about; it is to expect that certain actions one might take would result in certain consequences.

Dewey thinks the traditional account of the way in which meanings arise is absurd. This theory holds, in a characteristically unempirical, a priori manner, that "general ideas or meanings arise by the comparison of a number of particulars, eventuating in the recognition of something

common to them all."[12] Dewey holds, in a view that seems to me much closer to the facts, that we take the meaning to the things and see if they fit it, rather than to see it in the facts. We see a feature in a thing not because it happens to have it and its having it impresses itself upon us. This latter is the contemplative theory of knowledge again. We are spectators reading off the characteristics of reality just for the sake of knowing what they are. Roses are portable, and that fact just comes across to our minds which are busy inspecting reality and picking out its characteristics--*for its own sake*. *In fact*, Dewey believes, we have something we have to do, viz., in the case under consideration, to take something over to A, who wants it. And this project, this proposed course of action, is what leads us to notice that the rose is portable. Except as it relates to something we have to do, a rose lies hidden in nature, born to blush unseen and waste its portability on the garden air.

Furthermore, when the meaning, portability, which has been discovered as belonging to a rose, is generalized to other things, it is not because we see something common between the rose and something else, say, a dollar bill discovered lying on the street. Rather is the meaning "carried spontaneously as far as it will plausibly go."[13] We have discovered a new meaning and we apply it to all kinds of new things. We look for portability in everything, or many things anyway, that we come across, often to many more than those to which it legitimately applies. "A newly acquired meaning is forced upon everything that does not obviously resist its application, as a child uses a new word whenever he gets a chance or as he plays with a new toy. Meanings are self-moving to new cases."[14]

Of course, if we are not irrational, we will have to discipline our application by observation and experiment. But the observations are tests for an application of meaning that precedes them and is spontaneous. We do not first see the feature and then apply the meaning to the new thing, which we previously found to belong to the rose. We apply the meaning first and then see if it really belongs.

Dewey's analysis of meaning applies also to the term "idea," which he often uses interchangeably with the term "meaning."[15] Thus he says that "ideas are anticipated consequences (forecasts) of what will happen when certain operations are executed under and with respect to observed conditions."[16]

But to return to the subject of meaning, the meanings which objects come to have and which constitute them as what they are (sense) or what they imply (signification), are objective. They are not properties of "ghostly psychic existences."[17] They are part of reality. By saying which Dewey does not mean to imply that all meanings are equally valid. Some are more legitimately meanings than others. For example, "the ceremonial sprinkling of water" does not portend the imminence of rain as it is thought to by certain primitive cultures.[18] But that meaning, as suggested or indicated by the ceremony in question, is nevertheless an objective, real occurrence, not an "idea" in the "minds" of the people who believe in it. Of course, for Dewey, it, like everything else that is real, is not a self-enclosed, independently existing reality. It is a product of the interaction or transaction[19] of the organism and its environment. But if the fact of its relativity made it subjective, it

would make everything subjective. There would be no meaning of rain, as imminently suggested by the ceremony in question, if there were not human beings and their customs and expectations. But this is true of all reality: it is all a product of things in relation to other things.[20]

The only distinction, then, among the meanings contained in or implied by a set of qualities is that some are actually borne out by subsequent experience and experiment and some are not. Imminence of rain is as much a meaning of the sprinkling ceremony as fire is a meaning of smoke. But to act on the assumption of the imminence of rain in the sprinkling ceremony will probably not result in as great a frequency of subsequent rain-experiences as acting on the assumption of fire on the basis of the suggestion of it by smoke will result in subsequent fire-experiences.

Dewey distinguishes carefully between those meanings which work and those which do not. A meaning may not have

> the particular objectivity which is imputed to it, as whistling does not actually portend wind, nor the ceremony of water indicate rain. . . . It requires the discipline of ordered and deliberate experimentation to teach us that some meanings, delightful or horrendous as they are, are meanings communally developed in the process of communal festivity and control, and do not represent the polities, and ways and means of nature apart from social arts. Scientific meanings were superadded to esthetic and affectional meanings when objects instead of being defined in terms of their consequences in social interactions and discussion were defined in terms of their consequences with respect to one another. This discrimination permitted esthetic and affective objects to be freed from magical imputations, which were due to attributing to them <u>in rerum natura</u> the consequences they had in the transmitted culture of the group.[21]

Meaning is also universal.[22] For it is a method or a "way of using things,"[23] and methods are universal. It is a general way of dealing

with all situations of a general sort. A method of checking fingerprints, for example, is a general way of dealing with general features common to marks left on guns, furniture, etc. Even the notion of a fingerprint itself is a general meaning telling what one may expect if one performs certain operations on this mark left on the gun. Detectives who come into a room where a crime has been committed and discover a fingerprint are first apprehending in the mode of feeling a certain set of qualities and then are reading those qualities as indicative of certain operations that can be performed, comparing the mark here to a set of marks on file in the crime laboratory, and consequences that may be expected, e.g., correlation with some known criminal whose identity and whereabouts can then perhaps be determined. And these operations and consequences, the meaning of the marks that make them fingerprints and not, say, part of the design of the chair, are general, applicable to any number of qualitative situations.

Let us try to get clearer now about this distinction between the two ways in which felt qualities can take on meaning, viz., as having signification and as having sense. So far, I have talked rather generally and sketchily about the two kinds of meaning as being either inherent in the qualities and immediately and directly experienced (sense), and as being implied by them, consciously inferred as a future eventuality that acting on them in a certain way will lead to (signification).

Let us look at these now more closely.

Perception as awareness of signification occurs when a set of qualities or a thing (a thing being a set of qualities with a sense already

inherent in it from previous inquiries) is consciously taken as a sign or index of something else.[24] Consider the following example: I am driving in Mexico and have gotten off the road I was supposed to take to get to Guanajuato. So I consult my Mexican road map. I look at the lines on the map until I find the one I am on now, viz., Route 25. I follow the red line representing Route 25 until it comes back to the highway I was supposed to be on, viz., Route 95. Now the perception of the red line with 25 on it as indicating that, if I go back 25 kilometers and turn right on Route 95, I will be on the road to Guanajuato again--this perception is an example of perception as awareness of signification. It is perception of signification in that it is an inferential awareness of qualities or a thing as a sign of something else that needs to be done to get to a consummatory experience I wish to have, viz., arriving in the familiar town of Guanajuato. Signification, then, denotes an inferred operation to be performed subsequent to the perception and a consummatory experience which one expects will result from performing that operation. The meaning of the red line is then a set of future operations and their consequences. This meaning is <u>extrinsic</u> to the line itself.

When I looked at the map, I perceived its red lines as meaning highways, and it was on the basis of this perception of them as highways that I was able to infer what I had to do to get back on the road I wanted to be on. But this perception of the lines as meaning highways was not a perception which had to be inferred. It was an immediately and directly noted meaning of the lines that they represented highways. That the lines represented highways was therefore perceived as the <u>sense</u> of the

lines. This kind of meaning is intrinsic to the line itself.

This distinction between signification and sense is illustrated in innumerable experiences which we have. Take the card that comes in the mail informing one that a car he has ordered has arrived. The card is perceived as meaning (in the sense of signification) that one may now go to the dealership and pick up his car. What is meant by the card, then, is a future operation that one must perform if he is to have a consummatory experience which he wishes to have, viz., the possession and enjoyment of the car. But the perception of the word "car" as it appeared on the card was not itself perceived in the same way. The meaning of the word "car" was perceived directly and immediately, on the basis of much familiarity with the word. And this immediate grasping of the sense of the words and sentences on the card served as the evidence or data on the basis of which it was possible to make the inferential kind of perception of signification which enabled one to know what to do to get the consummatory kind of experience which he wished to have.

Perception of signification, then, occurs in response to a problematic situation, like that of being lost, and it is of something or some qualities which indicate a course of action which will solve that problem. Since one is in a problematic situation, it is clear that one does not perceive immediately and directly what course of action one should take. One has to stop and reflect. If one had not been in a problematic situation, there would have been no consciousness at all, according to Dewey, but just immediate response to familiar stimuli. For this reason, Dewey's view seems to be that neither perception of sense nor perception

of signification occur except in those cases in which one has a problem to deal with. When a problem does occur, consciousness arises as a device for dealing with the problem. Prior to that time, one has felt qualities and perhaps responded to them, but one has not been conscious of meanings.

Consider the following example as an illustration of the way in which perception of sense and of signification arise out of a previously entirely non-cognitive kind of experience when that situation becomes problematic. I am driving my car along the Kennedy Expressway here in Chicago, a route I have taken many times before in order to get to my apartment building. Since the route itself is entirely familiar, and driving in general is very familiar to me, and there are no unusual traffic jams or detours today, I am really driving along in a more or less unconscious way. I am, of course, <u>having</u> or feeling qualities, some of which I am responding to in accordance with habits I have developed, like my turn-off at the Montrose Street exit; others of which are mere "surplusage"--qualities which are had but neither noted nor responded to, like the banal nonsense coming from my radio, to which I have long since stopped paying any attention whatsoever. This is the kind of experience in which, as Professor Browning puts it, we are merely "coasting along on our present equipment of habit and instincts (if there are any) uninterrupted by any challenging novelty."[26]

But then suddenly my car begins to lose speed, and I am wrenched from my dogmatic slumber in non-cognitive coasting into an anguish of thought and reflection. For, I note with terror, cars are bearing down upon me from behind. What to do? The situation has become problematic,

and mind, which was slumbering, suddenly is called on to rescue me from disaster.

When he says that a situation is problematic, Dewey means that it is indeterminate with respect to its outcome. "'There is something the matter,'" and when we look more closely at the situation, we find that this something "is found to spring from the fact that there is something lacking, wanting, in the existing situation as it stands, an absence which produces conflict in the elements that do exist."[27] And this conflict consists in the fact that the situation "tends to evoke discordant responses,"[28] as contrasted with the immediate and sure responses evoked when "things are going completely smoothly."[29]

What is lacking in the situation on the expressway is the power of acceleration. My car is losing speed. And, as a result, I do not know what to do. A series of conflicting courses of action occur to me: let my car come to a stop and make a break for the shoulder; attempt to glide to the shoulder; fumble around with the ignition switch to try to get the car started again, etc. In addition to considering various possible suggestions as to how to rectify the situation, I begin to look around and examine the facts of the situation. For the proper course of action will be the one that is appropriate to the facts of the case.

Now the way in which I perceive the facts of the case, when those facts are such familiar things as cars bearing down upon me from behind, the shoulder a couple of lanes over to my right, my accelerator pedal flat on the floor, etc., is called by Dewey <u>apprehension</u>. This is the word he uses in <u>Logic</u> for grasping the sense of qualities and things.[30]

These meanings are grasped immediately and directly in the sense that they are grasped simultaneously with the qualities themselves, in the same moment of awareness. There is not, that is, first the perception of the qualities of the cars approaching, and then the inference to their meaning as cars-approaching-portending-danger. To say that they are apprehended directly and immediately is precisely to say that no inference from qualities felt in one moment to a meaning apprehended in a subsequent moment is involved. Due to previous experience and the funding of its results, I am able to grasp certain key facts about the situation immediately in the form of apprehension. All of these sensed or apprehended facts of the case are then perceived in the other sense of meaning, as having the signification of: If I get over to the shoulder on what remains of my rapidly waning power, I will be safe. One is not cognitively aware of the objects of his apprehension. He is cognitively aware of the signification of, or what can be done with, what he apprehends or gets the sense of. If one had to be "observantly" and consciously aware of everything that is relevant to the solution of a problematic situation, one would not be able to act fast and efficiently enough to get it solved.

The "potential consequences" of a thing like a car or a plant, when they are repeated in our experience many times and when they are relevant to our aims and needs, come to "mark" the thing as the sort of thing that it is. They come to form the essence or defining characteristics of that thing. This essential meaning which qualities come to have comes to be apprehended or recognized after much dealing with a thing of some sort. The essence is, however, not the essential make-up of the thing as it is

in itself. It is the characteristics of a thing that are most important to us in the living of our lives. A thing like a car has innumerable consequences upon other things and upon us, but we ignore those that do not relate vitally to our interests. The nature of the things of our world is thus intimately tied up with our interests. We forge "objects" out of the infinitely rich and inexhaustibly complex world of natural events. These objects are "potential consequences" of a thing as it relates to other things. Since, however, in doing so we abstract from many other characteristics of a thing, it is perhaps better to say that we create rather than discover the objects and world of our experience.[31]

Dewey's analysis of essence and object is suggestive, it seems to me, of what constitutes one of the main differences between peoples of different ages in history. Since the interests and aims of people in different ages are different, it would follow that they would not even perceive certain facts about the world that might figure very importantly in the experience of others. So that an ancient Athenian and a modern New Yorker, for example, would differ not only in their behavior, but in the world of their perception as well. If they could (per impossible) come to be in the same place at the same time, there would really be two places, not one, since they would perceive (i.e., forge out of the given qualitative situation) totally different objects.

Dewey recognizes another way in which perception of sense occurs. He calls this sometimes contemplation[32] and sometimes appreciation.[33] Such a perception of sense occurs when one is no longer struggling to get a difficulty solved, but can rest in the appreciation or "savoring"

of something. In the previous example, upon reaching my little refuge, the shoulder, I might well rest for a time in an appreciation or savoring of it. And, at this point, the shoulder is not a thing entering into a reflective context, but one that one relishes as having saved one's life. It is appreciated for a meaning that has now come to be inherent in it.[34]

The difference between perception of sense which is appreciation and perception of sense which is apprehension seems to lie in its position vis-a-vis the inquiring situation. When one grasps the sense of a thing in the course of inquiry and as a part of the inquiry process, he is perceiving in the mode of apprehension. His perception at such times is really a shorthand version of a cognitive perception, i.e., perception as awareness of signification. But if his perception of sense comes at the close of inquiry as an appreciation of a satisfactory termination of the reflective process, then it is perception in the mode of appreciation. The shoulder perceived while I was coming gradually to a stop in the middle of the Kennedy Expressway was apprehended as something relevant to the possible solution of my urgent problem; but the shoulder as perceived when I realized I had escaped disaster was perceived in the mode of appreciation.

Perception of sense in the sense of apprehension dominates the discussion of sense in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Here sense is regarded in an entirely practical or utilitarian way. It is that system of meanings which gives a people the

> power to discriminate the factors that are relevant and important in significance in given situations; it is power of discernment; in a proverbial phrase, ability to tell a hawk from a hernshaw, chalk from

> cheese, and to bring the discriminations made to bear upon what is to be done and what is to be abstained from, in the "ordinary affairs of life."[35]

There are two kinds of such meanings which constitute what is here called the "common sense" of a culture, and

> they are both of them connected with the conduct of life in relation to an existing environment: one of them in judging the significance of things and events with reference to what should be done; the other, in the ideas that are used to direct and justify activities and judgments.[36]

But elsewhere Dewey focuses on the kind of perception of sense which he calls appreciation. In Essays in Experimental Logic, for example, he says that

> such terms as "meaning," "significance," "value," have a double sense. Sometimes they mean a function: the office of one thing representing another, or pointing to it as implied; the operation, in short, of serving as sign. In the word "symbol" this meaning is practically exhaustive. But the terms also sometimes mean an inherent quality, a quality intrinsically characterizing the thing experienced and making it worth while. The word "sense," as in the phrase "sense of a thing," (and non-sense) is devoted to this use as definitely as are the words "sign" and "symbol" to the other. In such a pair as "import" and "importance," the first tends to select the reference to another thing while the second names an intrinsic content. In reflection, the extrinsic reference is always primary. . . . In the situation which follows upon reflection, meanings are intrinsic;[37] they have no instrumental or subservient office, because they have no office at all. They are as much qualities of the objects in the situation as are red and black, hard and soft, square and round. And every reflective experience adds new shades of such intrinsic qualifications. In other words, while reflective knowing is instrumental to gaining control in a troubled situation (and thus has a practical or utilitarian force), it is also instrumental to the enrichment of the significance of subsequent experiences.[38]

And then Dewey concludes, in refutation of the criticism of those philosophers who mistakenly regarded his view of experience as mere business, with no place for enjoyment, appreciation, or restful contemplation:

> "And it may well be that this by-product, this gift of the gods, is

incomparably more valuable for living a life than is the primary and intended result of control, essential as is that control to having a life to live."[39]

Let me summarize now Dewey's view of perception in the following outline:

A. Perception as Feeling (without presence of meaning).

1. Mere feeling or having of qualities.

2. Having qualities, and responding in accordance with habits previously developed, to those qualities.

B. Perception of Meaning.

1. Cognitive, reflective perception of meaning: perception of signification.

C. Perception of Sense.

1. Apprehension.

2. Appreciation or contemplation.

It seems to me that this distinction between perception of signification and perception as apprehension, on the one hand, and perception as appreciation on the other can be better understood by seeing it in the light of the two modes of relation in which Dewey thinks we stand to the world. He calls these consummatory and preparatory.[40] A consummatory experience is one in which we enjoy or suffer directly an activity or an object, and the activity or object so enjoyed or suffered is immediate, final, and absorbing. We are absorbed in our activity or the object of our attention rather than dealing with it as a means to some end which we are concerned to bring about. For this reason, Dewey calls it a final

rather than a preparatory kind of experience. He uses as an example of an object so regarded the flag as perceived by a person in a moment of patriotic fervor.[41] The flag here, in such an experience, is not a sign or indication of something else, some activity that one anticipates in the way that, in my previous example about the road map, the line one sees on the map represents another and separate thing, viz., a road and an action to be taken. Rather, Dewey says, is the flag something like a totem in that it embodies certain things (in the case of the totem a whole social organization). Such symbols are "condensed substitutes of actual things and events, which embody actual things with more direct and enhanced import than do the things themselves with their distractions, impositions, and irrelevancies."[42]

Now the way in which the whole social organization is contained in the totem, and the meaning of the flag in the flag as experienced by the patriot in a moment of patriotic fervor, is the way in which the sense of a thing or a set of qualities is perceived in appreciation. In both cases the meaning is inherent in the thing, and the experience is one of absorption in something final and self-contained.

A preparatory kind of experience is one in which, rather than being absorbed in an object or activity and its intrinsic meaning, we regard things as possible means to a future eventuality. If one has lost his way and it is growing late, he has no time to look at flags patriotically, or to have any other such consummatory experience; he has to look around for signs of the way home. He therefore regards things as means to the solution of his problem, being lost and needing to get home. He looks

for road signs, people he might ask for directions, and so on, in order to get some indication of the proper course of action, the best means for the solution of his difficulties.

The way in which these signs are experienced is the way in which we perceive both in the sense of apprehension and in the sense of awareness of signification. It is perception which is a preparatory kind of experience--an experience in which one is looking forward to the occurrence of future events rather than resting in the consummatory enjoyment or "suffering" of a present one.

Now these two kinds of experience--viz., the consummatory and the preparatory--are not just two kinds of experience that occur independently of each other in our experience. They are really closely tied up with each other. For signification, Dewey says, "denotes the possibility of a later fulfilling sense of things in immediate appropriations and enjoyments."[43] So involved in the very notion of signification (and we may add, I believe, apprehension) is its capacity to lead us to a consummatory experience of "sense-ful" awareness of things.[44] Furthermore, the <u>appreciation</u> of the sense of a thing is enhanced by the preparatory activities that have led up to it. This is true both in the sense that, for example, one appreciates a thing more if he has had to struggle to get it, and in the sense that it takes on a new and richer meaning as a result of that very preparatory activity. Take the flag that was planted atop Iwo Jima as an example. It is appreciated more because of the agony, bloodshed, and death that went into putting it there, but it also <u>means</u>, contains immanently in it, that very fierce fighting and dying that occurred in

order that it might fly there. Thus Dewey says, as we have seen above, that the objects of perception gradually acquire a richness and depth of meaning (which is appreciated) which may well be more valuable than the resolution of a difficulty which inquiry and preparatory activity (and their attendant apprehensions and perceptions of signification) originally arose to effect.

Let me emphasize the point that not all perception of sense has this consummatory character of absorption in the contemplation of an object which we saw to be the case with the patriot and his flag. There is also an immediate grasping of the sense of a thing which is not of this appreciative or aesthetic character, but is nevertheless the apprehension of a meaning that is contained in the object or the qualities. My awareness, for example, of an American flag, in a non-patriotic moment, is such a perception of the sense of a thing. If someone sets me the problem of picking out the French flag from a group of flags, I will, in the course of coming across the French flag, notice that a particular one is the American flag, and therefore not the one I am looking for. This perception of a particular flag as the American flag will be a direct and immediate one of its sense; I do not have to reflect or explicitly to apply criteria in order to identify it as the American flag. It is therefore perceived in the mode of apprehension.

But the perception of the French flag, which is one I am not familiar with, will require reflection and inquiry. I might have to consult a manual or ask some questions, and then apply the results of these investigations to the selection of the appropriate flag. In such a case, then,

perception would be in the mode of signification rather than of sense. For it is perceiving by inference, rather than immediately or directly (rather than, then, non-reflectively, non-cognitively), and its meaning is therefore extrinsic to it, not immanent to or inherent in it.

Because of previous experience with objects, Dewey says, we come to recognize some of them

> on sight. I see or note directly that <u>this</u> is a typewriter, <u>that</u> is a book, the other thing is a radiator, etc. This kind of direct "knowledge" I shall call apprehension; it is seizing or grasping, intellectually, without questioning. But it is a product mediated through certain organic mechanisms of retention and habit, and it presupposes prior experiences and mediated conclusions drawn from them.[45]

Apprehension is part of the preparatory kind of experience which is inquiry. The other kind of immediate grasping of meaning occurs after preparatory experience has been completed. It is the enjoyment of the satisfactory termination of such experience. This, as we have seen, Dewey calls appreciation or contemplation. Like apprehension, appreciation or contemplation involves perceiving something which is "funded" with meaning given to it by previous transactions with it. It therefore presupposes previous inquiries and their consequent acts of knowing, but it is not itself an act of knowledge or cognition. In contemplation, Dewey says, "knowing has stepped out of the picture; the vision is esthetic. This may be better than knowing; but its being better is no reason for mixing different things and attributing to knowledge characters belonging to an esthetic object."[46]

The question one might well ask at this point is whether Dewey could really have maintained that appreciating or contemplating a thing can be

said to be perception of it. One might argue, that is, that something has to be perceived before it can be appreciated or contemplated, and that appreciation is a subsequent and different act. Such perception need not be sense-perception, of course. On can appreciate or contemplate an object of sense-perception, as he does when he appreciates a painting or a fine building which is contemporaneously affecting his sense-organs. But he can also appreciate an object perceived by way of recall, for example, savoring the memory of a fine old church seen in Mexico. Or he can appreciate an object perceived by way of imagination, as an architect might savor the object of an imagined perception which he plans to build. But is there not first the perception of the object of sense-perception, memory-perception, and imagination-perception, and then, as another sort of act, the aesthetic enjoyment or appreciation of it? Appreciation, then, would seem not to be another kind of perception of sense, but rather a further act, following upon a previous perception of sense, whether sense-perception, imagination-perception, memory-perception, or some other kind of perception.

The issue comes, then, to this: Do we first perceive the object, let us say Root's famous Monadnock building here in Chicago, and then, in a separate act or group of acts, which are non-perceptual in character, appreciate it? Or is the appreciation itself a perceptual act?

Now it seems to me that to hold that appreciation is a separate act from perception is to take a view like that of the emotivists that all we actually perceive in a work of art or a person or situation that is valuable are purely factual characteristics. All that we actually perceive

in the Monadnock are its shape, color, the thickness of its walls, its undulating bay windows, its simple, unadorned walls, etc. And then, when we say it is graceful and that it is a wonderful balance of austerity and lightness, we are just reacting to it with an entirely subjective response. These evaluative characteristics are not parts of what is perceived. They are in us, not out there. Value is subjective; fact alone is objective.

Such a view of appreciation is explicitly denied by Dewey, however. The grace, charm, balance, and austerity of the Monadnock are not in us; they are in the Monadnock. Thus he says that such qualities "are as much qualities of the objects in the situation as are red and black, hard and soft, square and round."[47] But to say that they are in the situation seems to me to imply that we find them there, in some kind of perceptual act that we engage in.

Certainly it is true that such qualities as are appreciated are not in the object as we perceive it initially. They are there as the product of a study or investigation. Austerity as the meaning of the unadorned walls and some of the windows, which are prison-like in their recessed positions, is not obvious; it probably must first be grasped in the mode of signification as a separately meant significance of the building's more obvious characteristics, as something that is extrinsic to the qualities themselves. All art-appreciation would seem to involve a period of analysis whereby we survey the obvious facts of the object; then the meaning of those facts comes to us; and finally, in the act of appreciation, as the kind of perception "which follows upon reflection," these meanings come to be intrinsic to the thing itself.

The view, then, that perception cannot ever have (and that Dewey cannot mean that it has) as its object anything like an aesthetic object, with its value-characteristics, seems to me to rest on the assumption that perception is always of facts. But Dewey, I think rightly, thinks the world of our perceptual experience has value-characteristics as much a part of it as colors, textures, and shapes.

There is another reason why one might be inclined to regard appreciation as some kind of a non-perceptual or post-perceptual act. This is an inclination on the part of some philosophers to limit perception to such simple and mundane things as trees, rugs, chairs, etc., and these as they enter into one's ordinary, run-of-the-mill affairs. But in fact, for Dewey, perception is the grasping of <u>any</u> meaning either implied by or contained in a set of qualities or an object. Perception can therefore be the apprehension not merely of the fact that this is a chair, but of an immensely rich and complex meaning. It can be something as complicated as a general's grasping of the entire strategy of his opposing general from the configuration of the enemy's troops as symbolically spread out on a table in front of him.

Now I do not mean to claim that Dewey regards the <u>whole</u> experience of appreciation or contemplation as being either perceptual or limited to one particular kind of perception. Especially when one is involved in the kind of appreciation in which he "savors a thing fully--as Arnold Bennett's heroines are wont to do,"[48] would it seem that more than mere sense-perception is involved. Dewey would probably want to say that such an experience goes beyond just sense-perception and involves one's own

emotional response. And it might also involve some proprioceptive perception of the meaning of one's own internal feelings. Also it might involve some purely conceptual elements--"having meanings and rolling them over as sweet morsels under the tongue,"[49] he says in Experience and Nature. And it might also involve memory-perceptions and imagination-perceptions.

Nevertheless, I think he does mean to say that at least part of the "enhanced and intensified experience of an object"[50] is some kind of perception. And this not in that some kind of perception provides the material on the basis of which one performs subsequent appreciative acts, but rather that there is a kind of perception which is itself appreciation. For the object of perception itself, and not just one's subjective response, is enriched and enhanced by the funding of one's previous experiences with it.

Most of our experience is not exclusively either of the consummatory or of the preparatory type. We are not usually involved purely in contemplative or appreciative savoring of an object or an activity, or involved in a purely laboring, working kind of experience in which the meaning of everything perceived lies beyond it in a future eventuality which our activity is projected toward achieving. Instead, most experience is of a dual sort, involving both consummatory and preparatory elements. Indeed, at times Dewey seems to believe that there is never an experience which is purely the one or the other.

> All experienced objects have a double status. They are individualized, consummatory, whether in the way of enjoyment or of suffering. They are also involved in a continuity of interactions and

> changes, and hence are causes and potential means of later experiences. Because of this dual capacity, they become problematic. Immediately and directly they are just what they are; but as transitions to and possibilities of later experiences they are uncertain. There is a divided response; part of the organic activity is directed to them for what they immediately are, and part to them as transitive means of other experienced objects. We react to them both as finalities and in preparatory ways, and the two reactions do not harmonize.[51]

The answer to the question of whether experience is always of this dual nature would seem to depend on how thickly or thinly we slice experience. Certainly there are occasions when we are completely absorbed in contemplation. One might just savor the Parthenon, for example, or a landscape, without any kind of inquiry or preparatory activity in general going on. But such an experience doubtless soon gives way to some kind of preparatory activity, either inquiry into such a question as why they built it here on this hill, and as they did build it, or where one shall have his dinner tonight, or from what perspective he can get the best photograph of it.

So the total experience of viewing the Parthenon one fine Greek afternoon will include both perception of sense in the mode of appreciation, a part of consummatory experience, and perception of signification, a part of preparatory experience. But within the total experience there are surely stretches that are purely the one or the other.

Dewey characteristically relates his metaphysics of experience to value-considerations. He sees here in this division between consummatory and preparatory experience the source of one of the basic conflicts of life. It is the conflict one sees running throughout Thomas Mann's writings, for example, between the desire for work and the longing for just

stopping and enjoying things. "Each of us, "Dewey says, "can recall many occasions when he has been perplexed by disagreement between things directly present and their potential value as signs and means; when he has been torn between absorption in what is now enjoyed and the need of altering it so as to prepare for something likely to come."[52]

"The woods are lovely, dark, and deep; but I have promises to keep, and miles to go before I sleep, miles to go before I sleep."[53]

In Art as Experience Dewey deplores the separation between consummatory and preparatory activities that characterizes so much of modern life. The aesthetic has been divorced from ordinary human experience and relegated to the museum, instead of being intimately tied in with one's everyday experience, as Dewey conceives it was originally. And people's work has become humdrum labor, unaccompanied by a satisfaction of having completed something well. We now divide our lives into work and play, and fail to achieve genuine satisfaction even in the latter. For the finest kind of experience, the aesthetic, which can occur in any endeavor, whether intellectual, practical, or strictly artistic, is an experience that lies between, on the one hand, "the humdrum" with its "submission to convention in practice and intellectual procedure," its "rigid abstinence, coerced submission"; and, on the other hand, "dissipation, incoherence, and aimless indulgence."[54] And these two really seem to characterize the life of modern man, a humdrum performance of his job, which he does mechanically and semi-consciously, and aimless, unconscious dissipation which he calls enjoyment.

The aesthetic experience, in which one is most alive, vital, and

perceptive,[55] has both preparatory and consummatory elements in it, integrally joined and affecting each other. The anticipated consummation carries over into the preparations themselves and gives them a consummatory element, and the preparations are carried over into the consummation and become part of its meaning in the act of appreciative perception. It is a labor of love and an enjoyment that contains in it a richness and diversity made possible by that very labor which preceded it.

Dewey pokes fun at the philosophical account of enjoyment and pleasure. It is, like the philosophical account of perception, curiously remote from enjoyment as it is actually experienced.

> Even philosophers who have conceived that pleasure is the sole motive of man and the attainment of happiness his sole aim, have given a curiously sober, drab account of the working of pleasure and the search for happiness. Consider the utilitarians, how they toiled, spun and wove, but who never saw man arrayed in joy as the lilies of the field.[56]

This inattention to the way in which the joy of consummation can carry over to the preparation of the beautiful object or the consummatory experience in general led Plato to a disparagement of practice and labor. And Aristotle defines pleasure as the <u>completion</u> of an act. Dewey is here pointing to the fact that, as men are "arrayed in joy" out in the field, instead of as seen in the philosopher's study, they are, at best, joyous in labor as well as in completion of labor. Thus Dewey says that

> at the outset the hunt was enjoyed in the feast, or in the calm moments of shaping spears, bows and arrows. Only later was the content of these experiences carried over into hunting itself, so that even its dangers might be savored. Labor, through its structure and order, lends play its pattern and plot [otherwise it would be the unrefined, unsophisticated "enjoyment" of dissipation]; play then returns the loan with interest to work, in giving it a sense of beginning, sequence and climax.[57]

Thus we see that the kind of perception of sense which Dewey calls "appreciation" occurs not only at the completion of an act of inquiry. Rather is it the case that appreciation occurs even before the consummation is reached. In Art as Experience[58] Dewey expresses this point in this way: "This consummation, moreover, does not wait in consciousness for the whole undertaking to be finished. It is anticipated throughout and is recurrently savored with special intensity."

Dewey is talking here about those experiences which have aesthetic quality. Such quality can belong to all kinds of experience, not just "distinctively esthetic" ones.[59] It consists in a relationship among the parts of the experience which Dewey calls "linkage," a relationship such that the various parts look forward to their successors and backward to their antecedents rather than simply succeeding one another. In listening appreciatively to music, for example, one does not hear one sound or even a group of sounds and then forget it. Rather does one keep previous sounds in mind and anticipate (especially on later hearings) future ones. And in constructing a proof in symbolic logic, to take a non-aesthetic experience which nevertheless has aesthetic quality, one must, in the midst of his proof, be aware of prior steps and be looking ahead toward subsequent ones and, of course, ultimately to the final one, the one after which he can write, Q. E. D.

Dewey's view seems to me suggestive, as his views usually are, but nevertheless questionable. I agree, that is, that, as he claims, the finest experiences we have are those "integral" ones in which aesthetic quality or linkage is present. But I do not agree with him that the act

of appreciation, when it occurs in such an experience, always consists in an anticipation of the consummation of the experience as a whole. One can appreciate, for example, a particular passage in the course of a musical work not because it is perceived in any way as contributing to a final consummation or resolution, but just in itself. It is appreciated as being just the lovely group of sounds that it is. Of course, all of these must be experienced together as one integral group, but they can form an object of appreciation independent of the consummation of the work as a whole.

If one is engaged in a practical kind of undertaking, like that of fixing a flat, then perhaps each step is savored as being anticipatory of the consummation, viz., having a tire at full pressure that one can drive on again. But distinctively aesthetic experiences, although they are perhaps ideally directed towards objects which have a kind of all-pervasive unity which the ultimate consummatory experience will appreciate--these experiences seem nevertheless to have components that are appreciated and yet involve no reference at all to that ultimate consummatory insight.

Dewey's analysis, in Art as Experience, of aesthetic perception or appreciation raises some questions about the previously formulated scheme, according to which I have been trying to interpret his theory of perception. It will be recalled that I described appreciation there as a kind of sense-perception of sense in which one experienced, let us say, the reaching of the shoulder of the expressway as being the satisfactory resolution of a problematic situation. But here, in the distinctively

aesthetic kind of experience, we have not been sense-perceiving, since Dewey limits his use of the term "sense-perception" to practical contexts in which overt action is relevant. In "dramatic or literary or playful" contexts, however, no such overt action is ever called for or relevant. So it would seem that the kind of perception that goes on in distinctively aesthetic experiences is a non-cognitive kind of perception of a meaning which is not relevant to action now or ever. (Perception of a meaning which entails the relevance of action in the future he calls "conceptual perception.") Rather is it a meaning on which we act only in a playful or imaginative way.

There is a further difficulty with Dewey's theory of aesthetic perception which we need to consider now. This is the problem of whether aesthetic perception is cognitive or non-cognitive. It is undeniable, I believe, and Dewey admits this,[60] that thinking goes on in art. (And I believe he would say that it goes on in the experience of the appreciator as well as in that of the artist.) For the painter, for example, certainly

> must constantly undergo the effect of his every brush stroke or he will not be aware of what he is doing or where his work is going. Moreover, he has to see each particular connection of doing and undergoing in relation to the whole that he desires to produce. To apprehend such relations is to think, and is one of the most exacting modes of thought.[61]

But if thinking goes on in art, then it would seem that the aesthetic experience is a cognitive and not a non-cognitive one. It would seem, that is, that in distinctively aesthetic experience the artist as well as the responsive viewer or listener is actually involved in something like a problematic situation. Dewey seems, therefore, to be

committed to the view that aesthetic perception is a cognitive kind of perception, a view that is contrary to the view of aesthetic perception he holds in Experience and Nature, for example.

Let me suggest, however, the following interpretation of Dewey's view which will, I believe, rescue him from this seeming contradiction in his view. I think what he means might be that the artist and the appreciator, when they are thinking, e.g., tracing out relationships between component parts of a painting or a musical composition, are not appreciating. They are not, that is, having an aesthetic experience at all at such times. Rather they are having an experience like that of the person involved in any other problematic situation; they are responding to a difficulty with hypotheses or ideas (e.g., "suppose I paint this a slightly darker shade of red"), and they are then testing these ideas with experiments. Then, after the perception of the successful resolution of the problem, do they have the aesthetic experience, which, like my appreciative perception after reaching the shoulder of the expressway, is indeed a non-cognitive savoring of a completed performance. So the thinking that the artist and the appreciator engage in, although it is a necessary condition of at least some aesthetic experiences, is not a part of the aesthetic experience.

Let me return now to a discussion of the three general kinds of perception which Dewey recognizes, viz., feeling, perception of signification, and presence of sense. The three constitute a kind of evolution as well as a temporal development. For not only is signification a later stage temporally than feeling, and sense than signification, but each of

these is an improvement over its immediate predecessor. Signification marks the birth of mind in human experience, with the practical resourcefulness that only mind can provide to a living creature; but sense, in addition to providing immense practical value in the form of apprehension, is, even more importantly in Dewey's view, the source, through appreciation, of the enjoyment of the richness and diversity of our experience and of the world. This, as we have already seen, Dewey regards as a "gift of the gods" perhaps even "more valuable for living than is the intended result of control, essential as is that control to having a life to live."[62]

But the development can be seen in another sense as a kind of Hegelian dialectic. Feeling in its immediacy and indeterminateness is the thesis. Signification is the antithesis. It introduces determination and the possibility of control. Sense then synthesizes the two, preserving the best of each--the immediacy and directness of feeling, and the determination, structure, and practical utility of signification.

It is important to distinguish between the experience we have of an object as it occurs in a totally non-cognitive context and the experience we have of it when we are engaged in some sort of inquiry. If one is walking down the street with no problems whatsoever on his mind, simply engaged in an experience which Professor Browning calls <u>coasting</u>, can he be said to be perceiving either in the sense of awareness of signification or of awareness of sense? I believe Dewey's view is that he perceives in neither sense of the term perception. For Dewey, we perceive in these two ways only when we are either involved in inquiry, or just after inquiry has been completed and we are savoring or contemplating

its results. So in the case in question, viz., that of non-cognitively coasting along the street, we do not perceive the sidewalk or the passing cars, even in the sense of being aware of the sense of the sidewalk. We simply respond to the sidewalk-stimuli, or simply have the passing-car and other qualitative stimuli.

In the essay, "Qualitative Thought," Dewey discusses this matter in connection with the experience of water:

> When water is an adequate stimulus to action or when its reactions oppress and overwhelm us, it remains outside the scope of knowledge. When, however, the bare presence of the thing (say, as optical stimulus) ceases to operate directly as stimulus to response and begins to operate in connection with a forecast of the consequences it will effect when responded to, it begins to acquire meaning--to be known, to be an object. It is noted as something which is wet, fluid, satisfies thirst, allays uneasiness, etc. . . . As long as the visual stimulus operates as a stimulus on its own account, there is no apprehension, no noting, of color or light at all. To much the greater portion of sensory stimuli we react in precisely this wholly non-cognitive way. In the attitude of suspended response in which the consequences are anticipated, the direct stimulus becomes a sign or index of something else--and thus matter of noting or apprehension or acquaintance.[63]

For Dewey, then, as I have said above, even perception as presence of sense occurs only in cognitive contexts, in connection with some inquiry we are engaged in. If my car breaks down on the expressway, I perceive the sense of the qualities which constitute the cars behind me, by way of trying to size up the situation and find a way out of it. But, unless I am in at least some degree engaged in inquiry, or have just finished doing so, I grasp no meaning whatsoever. I feel a total qualitative situation and I respond to it, or, as he says above, I am overwhelmed by it, or, as the discussion of "surplusage" in Essays in Experimental Logic indicates,[64] I simply have it, without either responding to it,

being overwhelmed by it, or, least of all, interpreting it.

I spoke above about the immediate grasping of the sense of the qualities constituting my typewriter, lamp, books, and so on, which Dewey calls apprehension. But such apprehension and its grasping of sense does not occur apart from some current inquiry. And the kind of grasping of the meaning of qualities and things which is involved in contemplation does not occur apart from some inquiry of which it is the completion. At other times, the typewriter-qualities may be responded to, or merely had, but not perceived even as awareness of sense.

In the passage in Logic in which Dewey discusses the kind of awareness of sense which he here calls apprehension, he says about it that it is a kind of awareness in which

> after considerable experience . . . we come to recognize objects on sight. I see or note directly that this is a typewriter, that is a book, the other thing is a radiator, etc. This kind of direct "knowledge" I shall call apprehension. It is seizing or grasping, intellectually, without questioning. . . . But the important point for the purpose of the present topic is that either an immediate overt response occurs, like using the typewriter or picking up the book (in which case the situation is not a cognitional one), or that the object noted is part of an act of inquiry directed toward knowledge or warranted assertion.[65]

Now this claim that our perception in a non-cognitive situation is entirely of uninterpreted qualities, uninterpreted either as qualities of a certain nature or as objects, perhaps seems implausible. Surely, one is inclined to object, there is more involved in even a coasting experience than the mere feeling of a qualitative situation. It would seem that in our ordinary, waking, but not primarily cognitive experience we are aware of objects. If I am walking down the street, not exercised by any problem, but just coasting, do I not perceive more than mere "submerged"

and "obsessive" qualities? Do I not experience, even though not observantly or concentratedly, cars, people, stores, cats, shadows on the street, signs on windows, and so on? And do these not appear to me not just when I am being a little curious about the way things are looking today, say, on the first warm, bright day in quite a while (which is really a kind of inquiry in which I set myself a problem), but even when I am not inquiring <u>at all</u>? Even when I am coasting along, with no problem occupying my attention, just lying on the beach staring at the sea and soaking up the sun, for example, and even on the fringe or horizon of my perceptual field when I <u>am</u> reflecting, there seems to be a perception of objects. Now, as I write this, I am engaged in a reflective, inquiring kind of experience. On the horizon of my perceptual field, meantime, there are the sounds and shapes and colors of people sitting at the counter of the restaurant where I am. Am I not aware of these people and the counter and the stools on which they are sitting, not merely as clusters of uninterpreted qualities, but as qualities with the meaning (in the form of sense) of human beings, stools, counter, conversation, laughter, and so on--meanings funded and made automatic by previous inquiries?

It is terribly difficult to perform the phenomenological or "empirical, denotative" experiment required to answer these questions. To do so requires looking at an experience which was non-reflective and non-cognitive from a reflective and cognitive point of view. And doing this seems inevitably to turn that original experience into a reflective experience, so that the field of perception does indeed become one of

objects rather than one of clusters of uninterpreted qualities. Nevertheless, armed against such a danger, it seems to me that one can recapture the pre-reflective experience as it was lived. As I reflected on this problem, for example, I was looking in the direction of the draperies of the restaurant in which I was sitting. I had or felt the qualities of these draperies, but not as red or of a certain shape or texture; in fact, not as anything at all. They were just bare, dumb qualities. The kind of reflection I am involved in, when directed at a prior experience, does indeed turn the content of that experience into objects. Prior to such reflection, the content, the that-which-is-experienced, is, I believe, a set of qualities submerged in the general qualitative situation.

One may, however, respond to these uninterpreted qualities. I may wince and grimace because of the bitterly cold wind blowing in my face without even bothering to identify it as wind or bitterly cold. And, while coasting down the street, I feel the qualities of the sidewalk under my feet and, kinesthetically, my own movements, and I respond to these visual and kinesthetic cues in such a way as to constitute walking. But these cues are responded to not as objects or meaningful cues, but as unnoted, dumb qualities.

I do, however, take exception to Dewey's assertion that far the greater part of our experience is of this sort. I believe, as I indicated above (p. 59), that we are engaged in some sort of simple inquiry about the qualities that we are experiencing much more often than Dewey seems to recognize. It seems to me, therefore, that Dewey underintellectualizes experience. In the experience which he mentions in the

"Introduction" to Essays in Experimental Logic, for example, in which we are "paying attention to a young woman" and not inquiring about whether, let us say, she would make a good wife, I believe we might nevertheless be taking note of features of the young lady in connection with some sort of a question which has come up in our minds. I cannot imagine a stretch of experience much longer than perhaps five minutes in which we do not encounter some question or other, and therefore perceive the meaning of qualities. So, although I agree with Dewey that what is on the edge or horizon of our perceptual field is not itself perceived with meaning, it seems to me that intelligence and inquiry come into our experience and our perception much more frequently and extensively than Dewey seems to allow for, at least in such later works as Logic: The Theory of Inquiry and "Qualitative Thought."[66]

Dewey recognizes a kind of experience, which he also calls "feeling," and which is a kind of perception which lies in between the purely non-cognitive perception to which he usually applies the term "feeling" and the perception of objects which occurs in perception of signification and of sense. The use of the term I am referring to occurs in the very interesting essay, "Qualitative Thought," and also in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.[67] A consideration of the use of the term "feeling" in these works will not only bring to our attention another kind of experience or perception which Dewey recognizes in these later works, but also provide further clarification of Dewey's view of how the cognitive kinds of perception relate to the non-cognitive background out of which they develop, i.e., feeling.

What Dewey says in these works is that in at least some of the cases of our feeling of a qualitative situation, that situation, though "relatively dumb and inarticulate,"[68] nevertheless involves a realization of something bordering on significance. This realization is not explicit, but it is a "hunch"[69] which provides the basis for the explicit perceptions that occur later to reflection. Dewey uses as an example of what he means the background of the perception of a lump of sugar or perhaps some honey as that which one can use to sweeten something, one's coffee perhaps.[70] What happens in such a case is that one has a problem of finding something to sweeten his coffee. He is in a problematic situation. The situation would not be problematic if the source of a sweetener for his coffee were ready at hand in its usual place. There would then be simply the habitual response to the felt sugar-bowl qualities over in their usual place on the breakfast table. But in the instance in question something is awry, and this out-of-joint quality of the situation causes it to become problematic. Let us suppose the sugar bowl is empty, and one must therefore find an alternative way of sweetening his coffee. So he looks around and espies a jar of honey. The jar of honey is then perceived as that which will substitute as a sweetener for his coffee. The sense of it as a jar of honey is perceived in the mode of apprehension; its usability for sweetening this cup of coffee in the mode of signification. But before it is so perceived there is a prior feeling of the whole situation. This whole felt situation Dewey, following James, describes as a "big, buzzing, blooming confusion."[71] But it is not merely this, for it

> buzzes to some effect; it blooms toward some fruitage. That is, the quality, although dumb, has as a part of its complex quality a movement or transition in some direction. It can, therefore, be intellectually symbolized and converted into an object of thought. This is done by a statement of limits and of direction of transition between them. "That" and "sweet" define the limits of the moving quality. . . . Putting the nature of the two limits briefly and without any attempt to justify the statement here, the subject represents the pervasive quality as means or condition and the predicate represents it as outcome or end.[72]

There is, then, in this felt but uncognized situation a complex quality which constitutes the potentiality for an explicit perception of the honey as that which will sweeten one's coffee. Before one has this explicit perception, one has an implicit "hunch" or "intuition" of the whole situation as allowing for the possibility of using honey as a sweetener. But such a hunch, such "thinking," is done purely in connection with the qualities themselves, without the employment of any symbols or meaning.

Dewey says in an interesting footnote[73] that even animals might be said to engage in this kind of pre-reflective hunching. This, he speculates, could account for

> what the Gestalt psychologists call "insight." That total quality operates with animals and sometimes secures, as with monkeys, results like those which we obtain by reflective analysis cannot, it seems to me, be doubted. But that this operation of quality in effecting results then goes into symbolization and analysis is quite another matter.

What is given to perception, then, is precisely this qualitative situation. If, because of a problem I have, and upon reflection, I single out from the total situation some cluster of qualities (e.g., the jar of honey), this is an act of taking and making something out of the given qualitative situation. The object, a jar of honey, is not given, either to the child or to the seasoned perceiver setting out to drink a cup of

coffee. Each of us goes through, with each act of reflective perception, a repetition of the history of our orientation process, the history of discovery-creation of the objects that constitute our world. It is not a matter of having to go through the same reflective inquiry vis-a-vis every object. Some can be directly apprehended as having the meaning (their essence) that they have. These are, of course, those that are perceived in the mode of sense. But the perception of a possible new relationship between these objects (e.g., using honey to sweeten one's coffee) does require new reflection--and that perception is therefore in the mode of signification.

There is something involved, then, in the development of a world of objects out of the pervasive qualitative situation which is analogous to the repetition by ontogeny of phylogeny. For, as Dewey says, the total qualitative situation with its submerged, dumb, blooming, and buzzing qualities is "not only the state of a baby's experience but the first stage and background of all thinking [and we can add perception] on any subject."[74] So just as the individual, in its embryonic development, reproduces the whole development of his race, so does perception, in each of its emergences out of mere feeling, reproduce the history of its development from the inchoate confusion of the child's experience.

We see, then, that, in Dewey's view, perception is not of isolated, independently and antecedently existing objects that <u>present</u> themselves as such to us. Nor, as we shall see in the next chapter, is it by an isolated, independently and antecedently existing self that they are perceived. Both the object and the self are distinctions introduced

into the given, existing thing which is the total qualitative situation,[75] and are justified in that introduction not by virtue of their supposed revelation of antecedent reality, but by virtue of their utility in accomplishing our desired results.

This perception of qualities and objects therefore occurs within a "field." They are singled out of a total qualitative situation. And they refer back to it; it is the subject-matter to which they refer. The "this" and the "sweet" are "correlative determinations of . . . an undetermined and dominant complex quality."[76]

One part of Dewey's theory of perception which seems to me most revealing and innovative is his view of the spatial-temporal spread-outness of the qualitative situation as well as of the refined objects of perception of sense and signification. This is a characteristic of Dewey's view that I referred to in the Introduction to this dissertation when I quoted a passage from Experience and Nature in which Dewey ridicules the typical philosophical account of, say, Othello's perception of the handkerchief as consisting "of a color under certain conditions of light and shapes seen under certain angular conditions of vision. But the actual experience was charged with history and prophecy; full of love, jealously, villainy, fulfilling past human relationships and moving fatally to tragic destiny."[77]

Dewey discusses the spatial and temporal spread-outness of the felt qualitative situation in Logic as well. Here he actually refers to the pre-reflective experience of the qualitative situation itself as perception, and uses the term observation for what I have been calling, in

accordance with his usage elsewhere, perception of sense and signification. (This deviation in terminology and even, as we have seen in the case of feeling, in doctrine, is one of the exasperating characteristics of Dewey's thought.) He speaks of this perception as being non-cognitive, and of being of "objects" which are not, however, objects of knowledge or observation, but of an environment as a "scene of actions performed and of consequences undergone in processes of interaction; only secondarily do parts and aspects of it become objects of knowledge. Its constituents are first of all objects of use and enjoyment-suffering."[78]

Now we could conceivably interpret this kind of perception as perception of sense, for he does say it is of "objects." However, on p. 143 of the same work, Logic, he speaks of apprehension in the same way in which he speaks of perception of sense in Experience and Nature, and there (in Logic, that is) talks of apprehension as occurring only in cognitive situations as part, then, of what he here[79] calls the observational process. Otherwise, he says, we do not have apprehension or explicit cognition, but "immediate overt response," for example, to a felt typewriter or book.[80]

This kind of non-cognitive perception of the typewriter and the book may seem to constitute a fourth kind of perception, but insofar as it is a response to a felt quality or cluster of qualities and does not involve the presence of symbolization and meaning, I believe it belongs in the category of feeling. He may here regard it, however, as having the kind of implicit and potential meaningfulness, by virtue of a pervasive quality, that he recognizes in the essay, "Qualitative Thought." It seems also to be the same kind of experience that he talks of in the "Introduction" of

Essays in Experimental Logic as the socio-affectional experience of the world.

But to return to the point that initiated these observations: Dewey says of this kind of perception that it is of an "environment" which "forms an extensive temporal-spatial field. . . . [For] the maintenance of life is a continuous affair."[81] To respond appropriately to the environment involves an adaptation "to future conditions or death will speedily ensue."[82] But it also involves continuing to respond to a past event, for, as he says in the early essay, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," the occurrence of a stimulus is not itself sufficient to trigger running, for example, as an attempt to escape danger. The original "sound experience must persist as a value in the running to keep it up, to control it."[83] So the continuation of life and the possibility of persisting in an integrated action such as playing a composition on a musical instrument or virtually any other kind of an action involves a response to qualities that are past, present, and future, both here in this place and in some other place.

And those qualities which reflective analysis focuses on within the total qualitative situation, and forges into objects, are also temporally and spatially spread out. For an object is not just a set of qualities now present to a percipient organism. An object is so "by virtue of the consequences of which the existent qualities, be they few or many are signs, and of which they are the conditions provided operations institute certain interactions not then and there occurring."[84] So what one is aware of when one perceives, for example, the jar of honey is what will

happen, viz., sweetened coffee even in the absence of sugar today if the action of stirring some of the honey in the coffee is undertaken. The object therefore involves in its very nature <u>future</u> actions and their consequences.

Dewey here singles out the <u>future</u> of qualities and our actions in response to them as being implicated in the nature of objects. But elsewhere, as we have seen, he refers to the past of the object as an essential part of what we perceive. Desdemona's handkerchief is what it is as perceived by Othello not just because of what it means in the future, but also because of what it has been in the past. As perceived by him, as Dewey says, it is charged with prophecy <u>and history</u>.[85]

This recognition of the spatio-temporal spread-outness of the objects of our perceptual experience, and its fundamentally dynamic character,[86] seems to me perhaps the most significant contribution Dewey has made to our understanding of perception. By its "dynamic" character I mean the fact that perception of sense and signification, and perhaps also feeling in certain of its modes, have an essential reference to future action in response to a problematic situation which consciousness has arisen to attempt to solve. What is especially lacking in most philosophers' accounts of perception is this recognition of why perception occurs, this putting of perception in the context of experience as a whole.

What characterizes the account which most philosophers give of perception is the assumption that we are spectators of the world in our perception of it, looking out upon it in a kind of detached contemplation.[87] A physical object, from such a view, has two characteristics, both of

which Dewey denies it has: (a) it is essentially irrelevant to us and our projects and needs, and (b) it is a self-enclosed, encapsulated substance. One finds, then, in most contemporary theories of perception a yanking of perception out of its actual practical context and an analysis of it in terms of a pure contemplative knowing. We are told that our experience of the world and of ourselves is a matter of the inspection of a complete and finished world by a purely detached intellect whose only interest is to note the way things are. We may, of course, go on to use these detached observations in the solutions of our problems, but they themselves are not essentially related to those problems. For Dewey, on the contrary, one observes only in regard to one's problems. There is not even a moment of disinterested inspection in perception.

Dewey insists, then, that even the purest intellectual inquiry is never so completely detached as these perception-commentators would have us believe perception is. Even the scientist examining his carefully refined data is examining them with regard to their significance vis-a-vis a theory that he hopes to prove or to disprove.

An example of such a theory of perception (a theory which regards perception as the disinterested inspection by a spectator of the world around him) is that of H. H. Price. The H. H. Price of the almost classic work, Perception, thinks of perception as being something like "intuition" in that the perceptual object appears directly or immediately to the perceiver. We immediately and directly apprehend the house, Price contends, as having the front surface we sense, and as being "a house, with four outside walls and many inside ones: all this and nothing less

is what I take to exist. And not only so: what I take to exist is often not just a house but a particular house, with such and such a particular sort of back . . . and such and such a set of rooms, thus and thus situated."[88] And all of this, Price adds, is intuitive-like in that it

> is not an activity. It is not a "doing" (though of course it may and usually does accompany "doings" of a practical kind). There is in it no element of fussiness, no wondering or questioning. One does not have to take trouble over it--it is a blessed relief from the labor of discursive thought. The only effort required (and of course it may be very great) is that of getting ourselves into the right bodily or mental state, as when we buy a pair of spectacles, or climb a mountain to see what is on the other side . . . , but once we have got into the right state of body or mind there is no more to do. The Thing (<u>be</u> it real or unreal) just comes, along with the sense-datum: it just dawns upon us of itself. We look and there it is.[89]

There is no clearer and more detailed statement of the spectator theory of perception. The house, the canyon, the mountain, and the pair of spectacles lie there complete and self-enclosed, just what they are, waiting for us contemplative observers to read off their inherent qualities. And that act is passive reception, in which no doing or activity whatsoever is involved.

For Dewey, on the contrary, <u>even</u> when we have got our bodies and our eyes in position to look at the spectacles, the perception is an <u>act</u> of <u>taking</u> note of qualities vis-a-vis projects or ends-in-view we have. We do not just passively receive the Thing. We note its shape with respect to whether it will be appropriate for the size of our faces. We note the degree of darkness of the lenses with respect to whether they will sufficiently remove the glare from objects. We note the hinges of the stems as they attach to the body with respect to whether they are sufficiently strong to hold with much use.

Perception, in short, is indeed a doing. It is not a mere receiving of a finished Thing. It is taking data and regarding them from the perspective of purposes which we have which have made us look at the object in the first place. If we did not have any purpose or end-in-view for which the perception of the object, e.g., the spectacles, was relevant, we would merely receive uninterpreted qualities dumbly, in the mode of feeling. We would not apprehend an object; we would simply have qualities.

A perceived object is something that can be used, and it is perceived precisely in relation to that use to which it can be put. There is therefore, one must regret to suggest to Price, no end to the wondering, questioning, and fussing which characterizes perception as well as "discursive thought" short of no consciousness at all. If this does not seem reasonable to the reader, let him ask himself just what sorts of things he perceives, and whether that perception is not always the noting of a characteristic of the thing, say, the size of a pair of spectacles, with regard to some end-in-view he has.[90]

NOTES

1. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 258.

2. Ibid., p. 178.

3. Ibid., pp. 178-79.

4. Ibid., p. 177. Dewey takes this expression from a book by Max Meyer called The Psychology of the Other One (1922), a book Dewey praises as "a statement of behavioristic psychology that has hardly received the attention it intrinsically deserves."

5. Quotation from Max Meyer, The Psychology of the Other One, in Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 176.

6. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 177.

7. Ibid., pp. 179-80.

8. Ibid., p. 179.

9. Ibid., p. 180.

10. Ibid., p. 187.

11. Ibid., p. 188.

12. Ibid., p. 188.

13. Ibid., p. 188.

14. Ibid., p. 188.

15. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 109: "Observation of facts and suggested meanings or ideas arise and develop in correspondence with each other." (Italics mine.)

16. Ibid., p. 109.

17. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 189.

18. Ibid., p. 189.

19. As Dewey came to call it in Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949).

20. For more on this, Dewey's "objective relativism," see the discussion of Dewey's thought in Arthur Lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dualism (second edition; La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1960 [first published, 1930]), Chapter 3, and below, pp. 137-38.

21. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 189.

22. Ibid., p. 187.

23. Ibid., p. 187.

24. Ibid., p. 261.

25. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 143.

26. Professor Robert W. Browning in a letter to the author.

27. John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 33.

28. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 106.

29. Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 33.

30. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 143. In Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch, and Co., 1934), and sometimes in Experience and Nature, he uses the term "recognition" for this kind of perception. See pp. 52-53 of Art as Experience and p. 182 of Experience and Nature.

31. Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 182-83. The term "create" and the term "discover," as I am using them here, are not taken from Dewey's own discussion, but are my own suggestions based on my interpretation of his discussion.

32. Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 256.

33. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 351-52; Experience and Nature, p. 376.

34. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 16-18.

35. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 61.

36. Ibid, p. 62.

37. Italics mine. Note that it is the point in inquiry at which it is grasped that determines whether perception of sense is apprehension or appreciation.

38. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 16-18.

39. Ibid., p. 18.

40. Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 81 ff.

41. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

42. Ibid., p. 83.

43. Ibid., p. 271.

44. I am indebted to Professor Browning for the term "sense-ful."

45. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 143.

46. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 331.

47. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 17.

48. Ibid., p. 353.

49. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 331.

50. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 352.

51. John Dewey, Quest for Certainty (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, Capricorn Books, 1960 [first published, 1929]), p. 238.

52. Ibid., p. 236.

53. Robert Frost, "Stopping By Woods on a Snowy Evening."

54. Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 40.

55. Ibid., p. 19.

56. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 78.

57. Ibid., p. 81.

58. Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 55.

59. An experience is "distinctively esthetic" in which the main interest or purpose that initiates or controls it is to have that experience rather than to solve a practical or intellectual difficulty (Art as Experience, p. 55).

60. Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 45.

61. Ibid., p. 45.

62. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 18.

63. Bernstein, ed., John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom, p. 54. Italics mine.

64. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 394.

65. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 143.

66. For the earlier view, however, see Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 394, footnote 1.

67. Bernstein, ed., John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom, pp. 176-98; Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, pp. 68-70.

68. Bernstein, ed., John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom, p. 184.

69. Ibid., p. 183.

70. I am taking the liberty of amplifying his example somewhat. Dewey himself does not talk of the object as being perceived, but rather as the object of an act of judgment; but the perception of signification, as we have seen, is the product of reflective thought or inquiry as well.

71. Bernstein, ed., John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom, p. 190.

72. Ibid., p. 190.

73. Ibid., p. 196.

74. Ibid., p. 190.

75. When Dewey distinguished between object, which is a product of thought and inquiry, and event, the actual existent, he means by the latter the qualitative situation itself. See Schilpp, ed., Philosophy of John Dewey, p. 548, and Bernstein, ed., John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom, p. 189.

76. Bernstein, ed., John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom, p. 188.

77. Dewey, Experience and Nature (first edition), p. 56.

78. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 150.

79. Ibid., p. 150.

80. Ibid., p. 143.

81. Ibid., p. 150.

82. Ibid., p. 150.

83. John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," Psychological Review, III (July, 1896), p. 363.

84. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 130.

85. Dewey, Experience and Nature (first edition), p. 56.

86. See John Smith, The Spirit of American Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 119: There is in Dewey's philosophy "a fundamental tendency" to "translate the static into the dynamic and replace substance or entities with functions."

87. See Dewey, Art as Experience, pp. 52-53: "We are given to supposing" that perception "merely takes in what is there in finished form, instead of realizing that this taking in involves activities that are comparable to those of the creator."

88. H. H. Price, Perception (London: Methuen and Co., 1950), pp. 151-52.

89. Ibid., pp. 152-53.

90. See Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 392, for Dewey's development of this point.

CHAPTER IV

PERCEPTION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

As I indicated early in this dissertation, one of the most interesting and significant aspects of Dewey's theory of perception is its import for certain difficult problems about the nature of mind. I would like now to discuss Dewey's theory from this point of view by considering how his theory of perception allows for his view of "mind" and its relation to the "body," and by offering a defense of that view.

It will be noticed that I put the terms "mind" and "body" in quotation marks in the preceding paragraph. I did so because, as we shall see below, Dewey does not regard mind and body as independently existing entities which are named by the two terms respectively. Dewey does not think of the world as consisting originally and fundamentally of minds and bodies. Rather are these concepts that we employ, within a specific context, to accomplish certain purposes.

Dewey's view, which I shall be trying to defend, is that mind and body are notions that have originated out of a more fundamental reality that underlies them. They are therefore not antecedently existing realities, which are somehow mysteriously related to each other. They are categories employed to facilitate dealing with certain difficulties that arise in the world that antecedes them, which is a world that is neither mental nor physical. His view is therefore very similar to James's as presented in "Does Consciousness Exist?"[1]

Dewey prefers to avoid using the term "mind" to describe the subjective side of experience. His aversion to doing so is based on its suggestions of transcendental status. He himself, in describing the way in which the distinction between the subjective and objective comes about within the underlying reality, prefers to use the term "organism" or "self" for the subjective side. In what follows, therefore, it may sometimes seem that I am offering Dewey's theory of the problem of the relation of organism and environment rather than that of mind and body. In fact, however, what Dewey says in general about the way the categories of subjective and objective, or organism and environment, originate, and about what they mean, he thinks applies to the mind-body categories as well--except that for him the subjective side of experience is the organism, not the mind, and the objective side is the world, not the body.

In general, however, this subjective-objective distinction, whether one interprets it as referring to a mind-body or to an organism-environment distinction, is a functional, not an absolute one. Philosophers have mistakenly assumed that objects and qualities forged out of the underlying reality and referred to the subjective side really and absolutely belong there, and they have posited a mental realm to hold them. The mental, or subjective, is, in Dewey's view, simply a category to separate off from the environment qualities and objects which for other purposes one may wish to include in it.[2]

In this chapter, then, I shall attempt to show how Dewey's theory of perception enables him to develop a philosophy of mind which, I believe, solves the problems which have plagued philosophical thought on this

subject at least since Descartes.

We have already seen how Dewey's view of that kind of perception called "feeling" allows for a solution of one of the basic problems in philosophy of mind (as well as epistemology). The problem I refer to is that of how thought can presume to have any connection with the real world. How can we know that a group of thoughts or ideas which we have in our minds has any resemblance to the world that is outside our minds, or, indeed, that there is any world outside our minds? May we not, as Descartes supposed possible, be deceived by an evil demon, be dreaming, hallucinated, etc.? Why suppose, on the basis of an inner conviction, that our thoughts conform to die Sachen selbst?

Dewey answers by saying that this skeptical position is indeed inevitable if we grant the premise that our experience is exclusively a matter of thoughts or ideas in an isolated mind. If experience is always cognition occurring in a mind, then there is no way of knowing whether it has any resemblance to the way things are. But if at least some of our experience is not only experience but also reality, then the connection of experience with reality is assured.

Feeling is precisely that mode of experience in which thought and reality intersect. Feeling is not the thought of something; it is the something. To feel or have a foul odor is not to think of or cognize that odor; it is for that odor to be.

This view is closely related to Dewey's view that man is continuous with nature, not a transcendental interloper therein. If we were disembodied, transcendental souls somehow contemplating a world outside us,

as the tradition has assumed (even when not realizing it does so assume),[3] then the "problem of knowledge" would be insoluble. There would be no conceivable way of testing one claim of the mind over another one. Such a theory, as Dewey puts it, lets the idealist camel in the real tent, which he then devours.

The theory of a disembodied, transcendental mind, Dewey says, is not derived from an examination of experience. It is rather the imposition of a

> conception once universally entertained regarding the subject or bearer or center of experience. The description of experience has been forced into conformity with this prior conception; it has been primarily a deduction from it, actual empirical facts being poured into the moulds of the deductions. The characteristic feature of this prior notion is the assumption that experience centers in, or gathers about, or proceeds from a center or subject which is outside the course of natural existence, and set over against it--it being of no importance, for present purposes, whether this antithetical subject is termed soul, or spirit, or mind, or ego, or consciousness, or just knower or knowing subject.[4]

Dewey suspects that this conception of experience is derived from certain religious grounds:

> There are plausible grounds for thinking that the currency of the idea in question [the transcendental self or knower] lies in the form which men's religious preoccupations took for many centuries. These were deliberately and systematically other-worldly. They centered about a Fall which was not an event in nature, but an aboriginal catastrophe that corrupted Nature; about a redemption made possible by supernatural means; about a life in another world--essentially, not merely spatially, other. The supreme drama of destiny took place in a soul or spirit which, under the circumstances, could not be conceived other than as non-natural--extra-natural, if not, strictly speaking, supernatural. When Descartes and others broke away from medieval interests, they retained as commonplaces its intellectual apparatus: Such as, knowledge is exercised by a power that is extranatural and set over against the world to be known.[5]

This argument is of a type one often finds in Dewey. He attempts

to refute an alternative view by showing what its origin is and then pointing out either that the philosophical motives for that origin are no longer relevant, are no longer even held by the philosopher who holds the position which derives from that origin; or that there are good reasons for doubting the validity of the views constituting that origin. In this case the position in question is that of a transcendental knower or mind. The origin is a theological conception of man as a creature fallen from pure, spiritual status by combination with an alien and sinful body and physical world. This view of man's origin is not even held by most of the philosophers who nevertheless do hold to the doctrine of the transcendental self. It is therefore a vestige, an anachronism.

In other contexts, as I have indicated, the assumption is not one the philosopher in question would necessarily disavow, but is one nevertheless not explicitly acknowledged by him. And, having spelled it out, Dewey then seeks to refute it. An example of this approach can be found in his attack on the emotivist theory in ethics. This view maintains that value statements cannot be cognitive or propositional because they are simply expressions of emotion, like such expressions as "Ouch!" But this theory, Dewey argues,[6] rests on the assumption that the world is perfectly and exhaustively characterized by the scientific account of it, an account which is value-free. Dewey attacks this view by arguing that the scientific view does not exhaustively characterize the world, but is, like any other characterization, a perspective or device useful for the purposes for which it is designed, viz., a certain kind of control. For other purposes, the secondary and tertiary (including evaluative) qualities

which the scientific view evacuates from the world have to be brought back in. Dewey uses the expression "selective emphasis"[7] to characterize the abstraction of certain qualities in primary experience as being most useful for certain purposes. But to insist that qualities so selected are the exclusively real is the source of the worst errors that occur in philosophy.

Now this type of argument is objected to by many philosophers as committing the genetic fallacy. Such persons argue, that is, that the question of the validity or invalidity of a philosophical position is independent of the motives or historical origin of the position; that it is simply irrelevant why a philosopher holds the view he does. What counts is his argument itself.

Dewey does not, so far as I know, speak to this objection. My own thinking on this matter is that the "genetic" argument which is so common in his work is not really a case of the genetic fallacy at all, but that it, together with other considerations, constitutes a legitimate and often very plausible form of argument. What Dewey is doing in such cases is pointing to a hidden assumption which he believes lies in back of a philosopher's--or even an age's--thinking, and which accounts for what he thinks to be a misreading of the facts. Thus in the case of the "traditional" view of immediate or direct experience, Dewey feels that these philosophers have been led into disastrous errors by virtue of their assumption that all experience, all perception, is cognitive. Now the demonstration of the existence of that assumption, together with an examination of experience from the "empirical, denotative" point of view,

do constitute a good argument.

The difference between Dewey's method and the genetic fallacy is that Dewey points to a hidden assumption in a philosopher's thinking, whereas those who commit the genetic fallacy point to an ulterior motive of a philosopher. It is indeed irrelevant to a philosopher's argument for, let us say, the existence of God, that he would lose his job if he did not believe in God. But it is not irrelevant that he believes and assumes in his argument that every event has a cause. The latter is a doctrine that may be logically involved in his argument, even when it is not acknowledged to be so involved. The former is not logically involved. It obviously does not play any role whatsoever in the argument for God's existence that one would lose his job if he did not believe in and defend the existence of God. But that every event must have a cause does or could conceivably play a role in the logical justification of God's existence.

If, then, one can show (a) that the facts about experience contradict a philosopher's view, and (b) that the philosopher makes some assumption which makes an acknowledgement of the empirical facts inconvenient, then one has a very good argument against that philosopher, an argument stronger by virtue of b than by virtue of a alone. Moreover, if one can add another kind of consideration, which we may call (c), that the consequences which the position leads to are unacceptable, that, for example, they make a distinction between valid and invalid thought and perception impossible, then one has a very good case indeed.

And this is Dewey's technique. One of the consequences of the view

that there is a mind or knower which is somehow non-natural (i.e., the Cartesian view) is that it commits the philosopher either to idealism or the impossibility of distinguishing true from false judgment. This is an argument of type c. A consideration of type b is that which points to a theological framework long since abandoned by many of its inheritors as presupposed by Cartesian dualism. What remains to be discussed are considerations of type a--what the "empirical, denotative method" reveals to us to be really the case with regard to our experience in relation to such things as minds and bodies. If it can be shown that the phenomenological or empirical-denotative data do not agree with the dual-substance hypothesis, then the reference to a theological framework becomes much more plausible than it would be alone, for it offers an explanation of why philosophers have failed to see the facts as they are.

In the section of this chapter that follows, then, I shall try to give Dewey's own account of the empirical, denotative facts about how "mind" and "body" are related to each other in our experience. Then I shall offer a defense of Dewey's view of what the facts are against objections that have been or, in my view, could well be raised against it. This will, then, constitute a fourth kind of justification, which I shall call d, for Dewey's view. Finally, after presenting these arguments, I shall return to a consideration of part c of Dewey's own argument, viz., the consequences of alternative views.

Dewey discusses this question of the relation, in our experience, of self and object, or of mind and body, in connection with the discussion

of the ontological status of qualities. The most common (the "traditional") way of regarding the qualities which we perceive or experience is to think of them as belonging to or inhering in either mind or self, on the one hand, or object or thing, on the other. Thus we commonly and "traditionally" think of such secondary qualities as colors and odors as belonging either to mind or body. Just which they belong to is, of course, still in question. But we are convinced that the color of the rug actually inheres either in that antecedently existing rug, or in one's antecedently existing mind, produced there by something that does antecedently exist in the rug. The correct view will be the one that best describes the antecedently existing state of affairs. Is the color, before I interact with the rug, part of the rug? Or are the secondary qualities like colors, not to mention tertiary ones like cheerful or dull, not in rugs in themselves, but rather produced in our antecedently existing minds and "ejected" from them into the external world in our interaction with the antecedently existing thing we come to call a rug?

Against this view Dewey contends that the qualities, say, of green and even of cheerful, do not exist antecedently to the act of perception of signification or perception of sense either in the world or in the self. "With language" and hence meaning, Dewey says, qualities

> are discriminated and identified. They are then objectified; they are immediate traits of things. This "objectification" is not a miraculous ejection from the organism or soul into external things, nor an illusory attribution of psychical entities to physical things. The qualities never were "in" the organism; they always were qualities of interaction in which both extra-organic things and organisms partake. When named, they enable identification and discrimination of things to take place as means in a further course of inclusive interaction. Hence they are as much qualities of things engaged as

> of the organism. For purposes of control they may be referred specifically to either the thing or to the organism or to a specified structure of the organism. Thus color which turns out not to be a reliable sign of external events becomes a sign of, say, a defect in visual apparatus.[8]

What exists prior to the institution, through language and meaning, of objective things, is a felt total qualitative situation. This situation is neither self nor other; neither mental nor physical. There is no self or subject or ego given over here, and object given over there. What is given is a total situation including numerous qualities together but submerged in a general unity. And, although this total qualitative situation is what is given, it is misleading to say that it is "given," because this word

> suggests something to which it is given, mind or thought or consciousness or whatever, as well as something that gives. In truth "given" in this connection signifies only that the quality immediately exists, or is brutely there. In this capacity, it forms that to which all objects of thought refer, although as we have noticed, it is never part of the manifest subject matter of thought. In itself, it is the big, buzzing, blooming confusion of which James wrote. This expresses not only the state of a baby's experience but the first stage and background of all thinking on any subject.[9]

This last point is, it seems to me, especially important. It entails that in much of our ordinary experience our world is not divided up into objects out there and self over here. There is instead just a cluster or congeries of qualities, qualities of all types--primary, secondary, and tertiary--and all existing together in the way that feeling in general perceives them, viz., without classification or interpretation of any sort. When engaged, that is, in any primarily non-cognitive activity, such as shining my shoes, I do not experience my shoes as physical objects or things, and myself as a mind or consciousness, to which the shoes are

given. There is the sound of the music from my hi-fi, experienced not as sound or as music, but as uninterpreted qualities; the sounds of the airplane passing overhead; sounds of children playing in the street; the foul odor of the Chicago air coming in my open window; trucks roaring on the Kennedy Expressway; colors and shapes of objects around me--all perceived merely by feeling and therefore without significance or meaning. Then let one of these sounds get peculiarly offensive and upsetting, and it will become a subject for inquiry. Non-cognitive action (coasting) gives way to reflection, and some of the sounds and shapes begin to be organized into objects. Before there was no division between self and other, trucks and airplanes, bathroom faucet and rain falling outside. Now a disequilibrium in my experience necessitates classification as a means to eliminate, let us say, an offensive ringing quality. What is the source of the sound? What does the sound <u>mean</u>? Does it mean: an alarm clock in the next room has gone off? a telephone in another apartment is ringing? or perhaps that something is wrong with my inner ear? Initially, again, the sound was neither bodily nor mental, alarm clock or distant whistle. It was just a submerged, uninterpreted quality. When, however, the felt quality became painful and obnoxious, though not of course <u>as</u> painful and obnoxious, then attention and observation became necessary. And the need to exercise control, specifically to eliminate this obnoxious quality, led to employment of the extremely useful categories of myself and other.

Thus come into play the categories in question, i.e., mind-body, self-other, etc. But these categories are not names of entities that

existed antecedently to the inquiry to eliminate the sound. They are devices for control of the future. If I want to eliminate the sound, what course of action would it be better to employ--an action on the thing, that set of qualities now identified as an alarm clock, or on the body, that set of qualities now given the interpretation of myself?

In Experience and Nature Dewey puts the point with regard to the utility of the self-other categories in this way:

> It is obvious that a total, unanalyzed world does not lend itself to control; that, on the contrary, it is equivalent to the subjection of man to whatever occurs, as if to fate. Until some acts and their consequences are discriminatingly referred to the human organism and other energies and effects are referred to other bodies, there is no leverage, no purchase, with which to regulate the course of experience. The abstraction of certain qualities of things as due to human acts and states is the pou sto of ability in control.[10]

But the resultant subjective-objective distinction became hypostatized into a description of the original and fundamental structure of reality. Instead of philosophers' keeping their attention upon the "origin of the 'subjective' out of primary experience" for use as a

> function of discriminating what is usable in the management of experienced objects . . . , the results of psychological inquiry were conceived to form a separate and isolated mental world in and of itself, self-sufficient and self-enclosed. Since the psychological movement necessarily coincided with that which set up physical objects as correspondingly complete and self-enclosed, there resulted the dualism of mind and matter, of a physical and a psychical world, which from the day of Descartes to the present dominates the formulation of philosophical problems.[11]

The world is not in itself, noumenally, organized into self and other. It is not even, noumenally, organized into organism and environment, a division Dewey sometimes seems to recognize as basic and noumenal. Thus in Logic he indicates that even this distinction between organism

and environment is an instrumental one, arising to deal with a problem and justified in terms of its success or failure in resolving it and not in terms of some supposed "correspondence" with objective, noumenal reality.

All of these terms--self, other; mind, body; organism, environment--are like the "simples" and "elements" that figure in the thinking of physicists. They are really functional, not absolute in nature. They are, that is, devices for effecting a control within experience. To regard them as having independent existential standing, Dewey says, "is one more case of hypostatization of an instrument."[13] "There is nothing in nature that belongs absolutely and exclusively to anything else; belonging is always a matter of reference and distributive assignment, justified in any particular case as far as it works out well."[14]

To help clarify Dewey's point with regard to the functional character of the self-other and organism-environment classifications, let us look at another example, viz., that of the proverbial bent stick. The question arises: Where is the bent stick--in the water, or in the perceiver or subject? For Dewey, it depends on one's purposes. If one is rowing and is concerned to reach out and seize his oar, the bentness of the oar is illusory and hence "in one's mind." The real oar is straight. And the reason is that to regard it in that way facilitates the resolution of one's problematic situation, in this case, retrieving the oar that has slipped out of one's hand. But consider the case of an artist whose aim is to depict in a painting the situation of the fisherman in his boat. For him the real oar is the bent one, not the straight one. For so regarding it is the best way of accomplishing his purposes.

Which car is the really real one, the one that is out there independent of us and absolutely? There is no such car. "Nothing in nature . . . belongs absolutely and exclusively to anything else." Both bentness and straightness are effects of a transactional relationship between organism and environment. Both are therefore equally relational characteristics.[15] The only question is this: Which way of regarding the situation deals best with my specific problematic situation?

The character of the given, or that which exists prior to thought and reflection and interpretation, may be further clarified if we consider such qualities as sounds and smells. These are qualities which have never really gotten the difinite and convenient kind of classification which most of our tactile and visual qualities have gotten. As I look out over my room now, I find that, as a result of previous dealings with such qualitative situations, I classify most of the visual qualities in my perceptual field as objective or external. But when it comes to sounds and smells, I am not nearly so certain what to do. For the most part, I seem not to lift sounds and smells out of their given, pre-reflective submergence in the qualitative situation itself. The whirring sound of my air conditioner, for example, I have been experiencing, not as part of the air conditioner, nor as part of me, but as given and submerged even when other qualities are lifted up and objectified into things. In describing it, of course, I have described it as being the sound of the air conditioner, and I might therefore mistakenly infer that it is as part of the seen object, the air conditioner, that I have always experienced it. And I might even, further, infer that that is its real

status, viz., as part of the thing, the air conditioner.

Such an inference would be an example of the assumption which Dewey calls the superior reality of causes.[16] If one wanted to control the sound-qualities, one would want to make changes in the air conditioner, not in one's ear. On the assumption, then, that where the cause is, the more real is, we come to believe that the real is objective or physical. And since, for purposes of control, it is primarily those primary qualities, like mass and force (which are really relational in character) that are useful, there is a tendency to posit them as the only genuinely and independently real ones, and to relegate the others to the realm of the purely mental.[17]

But in fact, the real, in the sense of what exists prior to reflection, what lies outside of thought, is the qualitative situation which is felt. But we are not cognitively attentive to the qualitative situation and we therefore do not often take note of it. We take note rather of the finished products of reflective analysis, because it is of them that it is useful to take account. And we mistakenly infer from this that they are the original furniture of our experience and of reality.

What Dewey means here can perhaps be clarified by referring to a passage from James's Psychology which Dewey quotes in his article, "The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of James."[18]

> Take the example of an altogether unprecedented experience, such as a new taste in the throat. Is it a subjective quality of feeling, or an objective quality felt? You do not even ask the question at this point. It is simply that taste. But a doctor hears you describe it, and says: "Ha! now you know what heartburn is," then it becomes a quality already existent extra mentum tuam ["objectified"] which you in turn have come upon and learned.

> The first spaces, times, things, qualities, experienced by the child probably appear, like the first heartburn, in this absolute way, as simple beings, neither in nor out of thought.

Dewey, in discussing this passage, adds that

> There is nothing intrinsically sensory about red, hot, pain. They are so named because experience has shown the importance of the organic apparatus by which they are mediated. That color is visual and sound auditory is an item of knowledge gained through the study of the conditions of the occurrence of the quality; it is no part of the quality.[19]

Now this presence of a felt situation in which qualities are just beings and not only are not physical or mental, but are not even auditory, tactual, visual, or whatever--this total felt situation is the background of all thought. It is what our experience is when we are not cognitively classifying and interpreting these qualities vis-a-vis some problem we have. For, as I indicated above, for Dewey, James's characterization of the experience of the child applies also to all our experience when it is not explicitly reflective.

But if the ultimately real, the things in themselves, are the qualities of our directly had experience (as he puts it in his reply to Russell in the Schilpp volume),[20] then is not Dewey himself an idealist? Is it not the case that the distinction between self and other, mind and body, and so on, is instituted by virtue of certain facts characterizing the interrelations of the felt qualities within the subjective andideal sphere of our experience?

This is a kind of interpretation of Dewey which it is easy to fall into, I believe, but it is a misinterpretation because it neglects Dewey's identification of the raw qualities of direct, primal experience with nature or reality. Or, as I put it earlier, in the chapter on feeling,

the fact that in feeling experience and nature intersect or coincide. The qualities which feeling has, or which are denoted by the term "feeling," are natural events, not events in a mind or in a self or even in an organism. They are the products, Dewey thinks, of natural transactions. "As manifestations of interactions of a naturally existent organism and existent environing conditions all experienced materials stand on exactly the same level."[21] And these natural interactions or transactions had been going on long before man came on the scene and began to get involved in them.

But a further question arises: Even if there are natural transactions which give rise to feelings, how are we to know what nature is really like? Have we not got the old epistemological problem all over again? We have various felt qualities which are the products of natural transactions of some sort. But which of these qualities most accurately represents the way things are? Or is it just impossible to say? Are we, that is, not necessarily limited to our own point of view?

Dewey answers this question in two ways:

1. That description of the way things are is best which works, which gets us the kind of results which we need to solve our problems. And this working is not a working of the belief in the proposition in question in effecting certain salutary consequences in our experience, but the working of the proposition itself. He thus rejects the Jamesian conception of "pragmatic" justification as consisting in a change which the mere holding of a belief creates in our lives. There must instead be "objective" changes effected by the testing of the hypothesis itself

before it can be said to be a true or veridical one. One could not demonstrate the innocence of Lieutenant Calley, for example, on the ground that belief in his innocence would be better for one's own life, or for American society in general. If he is innocent, certain facts and their relations to laws will have to be discovered, and this is so irrespective of how well belief in his innocence might work to improve our lives. For Dewey, then, a belief can be beneficial and false, or harmful and true.[22]

2. But in Experience and Nature Dewey discusses another criterion for determining what account of the natural transactions which constitute reality is the most accurate. "It is reasonable to believe," he says, "that the most adequate definition of the basic traits of natural existence can be had only when its properties are most fully displayed--a condition which is met in the degree of the scope and intimacy of interactions realized." So, although for purposes of control, it is better to regard nature in some of its "lesser, more external fields of interaction," which are the ones which the sciences describe, the kinds of qualities which are found in the more extensive and involved interactions which come into play in human experience are "more adequate indications of the nature of nature than are" those which figure in the sciences.[23] Such a view implies that not only are the secondary and tertiary qualities, and therefore the value-characteristics, of our experience equally true of nature as those which figure in the physical sciences, but that they are even truer of it than those of the physical sciences.

Parodi, in his essay in the Schilpp volume, "Knowledge and Action in Dewey's Philosophy,"[24] raises two very interesting questions about

Dewey's view. I would like to discuss these now, both because they and Dewey's answers clarify Dewey's view of "mind" and "body," and because they raise what seem to me the most serious difficulties for Dewey's view.

Parodi's first objection questions the feasibility of putting the phenomena the physicist describes and experienced qualities like red on the same level.

> For it is from the outside that we experience both the vibrations which constitute for the physicists say, the color red, and the modifications of the nerves which transmit them (i.e., the impressions) to the brain; and we would, if we could follow its course farther, undoubtedly find in the brain itself a new series of phenomena of a mechanical or chemical nature . . . ; but nowhere, certainly, should we meet, from this point of view, the color red as something felt, as the sensation or perception properly so called. It seems indeed that, in order to apprehend something like that, it is necessary to change one's point of view and to place oneself into the very center of the consciousness of the subject who perceives.[25]

Parodi is then suggesting here a dualistic theory of mind and body, according to which some "outside" phenomena exist in the sphere of body, and other interior or private ones exist in the sphere of mind. He is making the familiar point that--supposedly, at least--a physiologist could probe a man's brain from now until the end of time and never discover what the man was thinking of. If he were thinking, for example, of the color <u>red</u>, the physiologist would never be able to know that fact unless he were informed by the man himself.

Dewey answers that the quality <u>red</u> is not an event in consciousness or mind, but an event in the world. Parodi, he says, takes

> a quality, say <u>red</u>, to be . . . a "sensation" in and of itself. My view is more realistically naive. The <u>quality</u> occurs exactly, in principle, as any natural event, say a thundershower. There is no passage from the physical to the mental, from an external world to

> something felt or of the nature of a psychical consciousness, but from objects with one set of qualities to objects with other qualities. When, however, a quality is termed a "sensation," or is explicitly taken in connection with an act of perceiving, something additive has happened. It is now placed in a specially selected connection, that to the organism or self. Pending the outcome of an inquiry not yet completed, one may not know whether a quality, say red, belongs to <u>this</u> or <u>that</u> object in the environment, nor indeed whether it may not be the product of intra-organic processes as in the case of "seeing stars" after a blow on the head. In other words, the occurrence of qualities upon my view is a purely natural event. . . . [Even] the final reference of qualities to intra-organic events is itself a reference to one kind of object <u>in</u> the natural world.[26]

Parodi's view, then, simply assumes that the red quality is in the mind, and the vibrations and nerve system are in the natural world. Dewey insists, however, and I think rightly, that the red is not initially experienced as internal or as external. It is just a <u>being</u>, a quality had as part of a total felt[27] situation. Only later, in response to a problematic situation, do we locate it as being in the organism, or in the world. It does not exist antecedently to inquiry in either place.

But now, one can reply, in defense of Parodi, that surely the red is not as good a candidate for inclusion in the natural world as are, say, the vibrations. For the red is dependent on a <u>relationship</u> between the vibrations and the organism. It is not a part of the apple, for example, intrinsically, but relationally.

Dewey's reply here, I believe, would be that if nothing is part of the natural world that does not exist there absolutely, then there is nothing at all in the natural world. Because all things, including the entities that physics describes, have their character by virtue of relations in which they stand to other things. Modern physics, Dewey says in <u>Quest for Certainty</u>, requires us to abandon the view that the world

consists of "unchangeable substances having properties fixed in isolation and unaffected by interactions. . . . For not only are no such objects found to exist, but the very nature of experimental method, namely, definition by operations that are interactions, implies that such things are not capable of being known."

To clarify what he means by the relational character of scientific entities, Dewey refers to Eddington's statement that "'the whole of our physical knowledge is based on measures,' and . . . whenever we state the properties of a body in terms of physical quantities, we are imparting the responses of various metrical indicators to its presence, and nothing more."[29] He then offers as an example of such a statement of a body's properties Eddington's analysis of "what happens when an elephant slides downhill. . . . The mass of the elephant is the reading of a pointer on a weighing scale; the slope of the hill, the reading of a plumb line against the divisions of a protractor; bulk, a series of readings on the scale of a pair of calipers;" and so on.[30]

Another example of the relativity of what dualists characteristically call primary qualities (and thus suppose to be inherent and absolute) is that of the length and shape of a body. For, to the theory of relativity, the same body

> has many different lengths, in the direction of its rectilinear unaccelerated motion, depending upon the state of relative motion of the reference-body with respect to which its motion is defined; it has therefore many different shapes; and these effects, the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contractions, are often described by physicists, not as illusory ways in which the body merely "appears" to different observers, but as physical properties of the body, any one of them as "real" as any other. Thus a character which a material thing has only in a special context, only in its relation to another

> individual thing, it has none the less objectively and physically. This suggested that a character which exists only in relation to an individual sentient organism, or to an act of perception, may be in like manner, objective and even "physical."[31]

But now, to come to Parodi's second objection, even if it be granted that qualities like red are natural events, there is a further difficulty: How is it that a natural event, like the color red, can take on _significance_? How is it that the color red can mean: _I must now stop my car!_

"We are told," Parodi says

> that sensations and perceptions, which are, until that moment, simple natural facts [Dewey's dumb, uninterpreted, felt qualities], become objects of knowledge when they serve as signs and announce or suggest other facts which are not yet present in the experience of the senses, but, if they were in the beginning only natural facts (which means, undoubtedly, that they were not yet data of consciousness), how could they enter as terms into these conscious relationships or thoughts which constitute our inferences and which permit us to foresee and to estimate consequences? Would they not suddenly have to change their nature in the most mysterious manner?[32]

The problem Parodi's objection points to, it seems to me, is that of how a _natural_ event can contain within itself a reference to the future and to the past. How can the red quality "contain" the meaning _I-must-stop-or-I-will-be-run-into-by-another-car_? It would seem that a natural event can simply _be_ what it is, what Sartre would call _en soi_. For it to be what it is not, as something it signifies, seems surely to require the operation of another kind of existence than natural existence, unless magic or "mystery" is at work in the universe. And that other kind of existence (Sartre calls it _pour soi_) is consciousness or mind--the capacity to transcend the encapsulated being of the present moment and to project into the future and the past.

Dewey, of course, agrees that consciousness begins precisely with this liberation from the present. As I have pointed out, Dewey distinguishes between the "brutely serial fashion" in which animals experience the world, and the presence of past and future which characterizes man's experience. In the animal,[33] Dewey says,

> the smell, S, is replaced (and displaced) by a felt movement, K, and this is replaced by the gratification, G. Viewed from without, for itself, it is now S, now G, and so on to the end of the chapter. Nowhere is there looking before and after; memory and anticipation are not born. Such an experience neither is, in whole or in part, a knowledge, nor does it exercise a cognitive function.[34]

Now, as I believe Parodi agrees, Dewey describes experience with great insight. But the question Parodi asks is whether Dewey does not uncover some facts about our experience which testify eloquently to the inadequacy of his own naturalistic starting-point. Dewey's commitment to the empirical-denotative method would seem to have led him to conclusions inconsistent with the fundamental assumptions with which he began.

Actually, this objection was made much earlier by Lovejoy in an article called "Pastness and Transcendence."[35] Here Lovejoy calls into question Dewey's contention that "e.g., a past fire can be now 'known' or become 'present-as-absent,' if, as his theory holds, nothing is now given in experience but the effect of the fire, viz., the smoke."[36]

Lovejoy here and in his essay, "The Anomaly of Knowledge,"[37] is asking Dewey, and naturalists in general, just how it is that an organism can effect the relation between a present, actual thing and a future, possible one. How does it lift itself out of time and actuality to bring this about? Is this not indeed a sign of a transcendental, non-natural mind at work?

Dewey's own answer to this objection is contained in the essay, "Realism Without Monism or Dualism-II."[38] It is, in my opinion, an embarrassingly poor effort to answer Lovejoy's criticisms. Rather than to discuss it in detail, therefore, let me offer the following as a defense of Dewey's view against both Lovejoy's and Parodi's very trenchant criticisms.

When I become aware of fire as a present-as-absent meaning of smoke (or of any other meanings that qualities and objects have), I am not transcending the present into the future. Such an operation of transcendence would indeed be possible only by a transcendental or psychical kind of thing. What is happening is rather that I am using a general principle I know, viz., that smoke always follows fire, and upon seeing smoke now I am inferring that the general rule will hold again and that, as before so many times, the smoke will be seen to have come about in conjunction with fire. I am not transcending into the future or the past, but am making an inference in the present. The present-as-future fire (which I expect to see) suggested by the smoke is therefore not apprehended directly, but is inferred from the general principle, "If there is smoke, there is (or anyway was) fire," and the singular proposition, "There is now smoke." The inference is, "There is (or was) fire." In making this inference, I no more go to the future than I go to the apartment above mine when I infer that the sounds I hear up there are footsteps. Does such an inference require that I transcend from the apartment I am in to the one up above, not of course physically, but psychically? What I am contending is that it does not, that what one

is doing in making such inferences is making use of a general principle that sounds of that sort are created by a person walking on his floor.

But another objection, one which was made by Blanshard,[39] can be raised at this point: If we are not now directly projecting into the future in anticipating fire from smoke, but are rather making an inference from a principle or rule, what exactly is the status of this rule? Is it not a supra-temporal kind of thing? Are we not, therefore, in understanding such a principle, necessarily making a leap out of the present into the future and into the past? For a general principle like this by its very nature holds for all times. So that what we have avoided by reference to the principle, viz., transcendence into the future, now seems to be contained in the principle itself.

Here I think one can answer that a general principle is not a description of past and future events, but what is now sometimes called a "disposition" to act in certain ways under certain conditions. To say that one believes that smoke means fire is, then, not to say that one is now surveying all of time and noting that throughout its expanse a certain law or general principle holds true. It is rather to say that one is inclined, if he should encounter smoke, to expect fire. A general principle is a disposition to expect certain things, or to do certain things, if certain conditions are fulfilled.

We have already seen that this is Dewey's view of meaning on p. 68 of this dissertation. There I indicated that for Dewey the meaning of a quality or thing is a rule for interpreting or using that thing in some practical context. To say, then, that a thing is portable is to be

prepared or disposed to perform appropriately under certain circumstances. But such dispositions do not involve making direct (or even indirect, through mental contents, as Lovejoy maintains) contact with past and future times, but just to act or to be in a state of readiness to act.

But now I think we must add that for Dewey the meaning is also a property of the object. To say that clouds mean rain or that smoke means fire is not to say merely that something subjective called readiness to expect rain and to seek shelter occurs in me when I see clouds. For the clouds themselves come to have this meaning as a quality belonging to them, not of course intrinsically, but because of their interaction with me. Just as Desdemona's handkerchief was itself "charged with history and prophecy," and this was in the handkerchief as a pervasive quality of it, so are many of the meanings that things are perceived as having just such pervasive qualities that belong to them[40]--always, of course, because of their interactions with us and our expectations.

It is this qualification of Dewey's view of meaning that rescues him from physicalism and Watsonian-type behaviorism, I believe. The Watsonian behaviorist might agree that meanings are expectations and dispositions, but he would not agree that these dispositions are correlated with "emergent" properties or qualities in the objects themselves. Othello interprets Desdemona's handkerchief as indicating that she has betrayed him. This meaning of the handkerchief consists in part in a set of expectations and dispositions to behave on Othello's part. But it also consists, and in a way that is inseparable from those expectations and dispositions, in a certain quality of the handkerchief itself

whereby it is objectively charged with history and prophecy. This is what Dewey means when he says that the expected consequences of the use of a thing become "commuted into . . . bare things" themselves. "When an event has meaning, its potential consequences become its integral and funded feature. When the potential consequences are important and repeated, they form the very nature and essence of the thing, its defining, identifying, and distinguishing form."[41]

There are many other problems with Dewey's naturalistic account of consciousness or cognition. To consider all of them in the kind of detail they require would call, however, for another dissertation, and one even longer than this one. But there is one which I would like to consider before leaving this subject. That is the problem of how knowledge of the past is possible for an organism. Dewey, in discussing this problem, characteristically says very illuminating things about the various ways in which we have knowledge of the past,[42] but fails, I believe, to deal with the metaphysical problems involved, the kinds of problems pointed to by Lovejoy and Parodi, that is. Such problems have to do with the question of whether certain facts about existence do not necessitate the recognition of an entirely different mode of being to account for them. It is the kind of question that Paul Weiss is concerned with in his book, Modes of Being.

Let me adumbrate an answer to this question of how we have knowledge of the past in a way that I think is consistent with Dewey's philosophy, and which accounts for such knowledge on his own naturalistic grounds.

We are not, as I believe Dewey would agree, directly acquainted with

the past in memory, any more than we are directly acquainted with the future in anticipation. Our knowledge of the past is an inference from present data and perceptual and conceptual objects funded from past inquiries.[43] I know that I went to Northwestern University as an undergraduate, for example, because of the present evidence of having done so, and the fact that the assumption of having done so is the best account of that evidence. Of course, I do not generally go through this kind of proof with regard to my recollections or beliefs about the past, but this is because such reconstructions of my past experience, without resorting to tests, "is so repeatedly confirmed by the course of ensuing events that we come to depend upon them without applying special tests. Only in cases of crucial doubt do we resort to the latter."[44]

But now the metaphysical question remains: How can I even understand that I had a past, or will have a future, for that matter, unless I am in some sense now directly acquainted with my past and my future.[45] Even, that is, if one granted that in knowing about my past I am testing a hypothesis about what happened on the basis of what evidence exists for that hypothesis today, how am I able to make sense of the fact that that hypothesis refers to the past unless I have direct acquaintance at least with Past-ness? If my awareness is limited to the present, what sense does it make to talk about my past? Or, for that matter, how can I even make sense of the notion of the present, if I do not have some direct acquaintance with the past?

Let me now try to answer this objection to what I would take to be Dewey's view. Dewey would hold, as I have said, that memory is not direct

acquaintance with the past. And I believe his view can be defended against views like those taken by Professor William Earle in the chapter, "Memory," in his book, The Autobiographical Consciousness.

First of all, how is it that we are able even to conceive of the past if we are not directly acquainted with it? The answer I would suggest to this question is that we are indeed acquainted directly with the past. For our awareness is not limited to the present, but to the specious present. And the specious present contains in it future, past, and present time modes. Thus do I have the material out of which to construct my knowledge of the past and my anticipations of the future. For I am, in the specious present in which I now live and of which I am aware, aware of what the past and the future are, although not of the contents of them.

Any awareness at all, it would seem, no matter how thinly it be sliced, necessarily contains at least a past mode and perhaps a future mode as well. You cannot step into the present even once. For the "present" is really a relative term. No moment is absolutely present. It is only more or less present than some other moment, both of which, however, contain in themselves past and perhaps future modes.

It might seem that the assertion that we are aware of a specious present that includes present, past, and future time modes commits me to the view that I am trying to refute, viz., that memory is direct acquaintance with the past. I do not believe this is the case, however, because in the specious present I am not remembering the past mode that is immediately present to me now. Memory is precisely the recapturing of a moment in one's experience that has slipped out of the specious present. It would

surely be preposterous to say that I "remember" the beginning of the note when the middle, beginning, and anticipated but not given completion of that note are all now part of my specious present.

Now to come to the second part of my defense of memory as indirect acquaintance with the past. What we do when we remember, I believe, is either of two things, neither of which involves direct acquaintance with the past:

I. We are able to perform some action. This is the kind of memory which consists in being able to do something appropriately. If I say, for example, that I remember where I put my car, my remembering consists in my being able to find my car. Like understanding as interpreted by Wittgenstein, then, to remember is to be able to do something. And the way we know that we remember is not by means of a direct acquaintance with our pasts, but by attempting to perform the action which the assertion that we remember predicts we will be able to do.

II. The other kind of memory is what I believe Dewey might call a "memory-perception." An example of this is my memory of having seen Martin Luther King some years ago at a church in Menasha, Wisconsin. Now this kind of memory does not consist in being able to perform some task appropriately, but in having a perception, i.e., a set of qualities or objects with a certain meaning. And I believe this kind of memory can also be seen neither to consist in nor require a direct acquaintance with the past, but rather an inference that proceeds along the

following lines:

A. First of all, a perception which is taken to be a memory-perception is either a new one which I must decide by a fresh act of inquiry to be memory and not some other kind of perception, or it is a perception which a previous act of inquiry has funded with the sense of being a memory-perception and not some other kind of perception. Now it is these memory-perceptions in the mode of sense that mislead some philosophers into thinking that memory is <u>direct</u> acquaintance with the past. For they fail to realize the fact that there has been a previous establishment of such memories, or at the very least a previous establishment of a certain kind of experience as being a reliable sign that a perception is memory. (See below, 2b, for further development of this latter criterion.)

B. But if previous inquiry has not funded a particular perception with the sense of being a memory-perception, then a new act of inquiry has to be engaged in. And this inquiry involves the following stages:

1. The perception is first determined not to be a sense-perception. This fact is known by inference from either or some or all of the following:

a. I cannot <u>act</u> on the perception now. My perception of Martin Luther King, for example, does not permit of my walking over and shaking hands with him, or

the like.

b. The facts about the perception, what sort of thing I am doing in it, when it occurs, and/or where it is are incompatible with what I know on other grounds to be the case about the present.

c. The perception is relatively undetailed and sketchy as contrasted with what we know to be the case with the present, i.e., the objects of sense-perception. It cannot, that is, be examined further and further and thus spelled out in the kind of inexhaustible detail that sense-perceptions admit of.

2. The perception is then determined not to be a fantasy-perception or an imagination-perception. And this occurs, again, not by means of direct acquaintance with the past, but by either or some or all of the following:

a. The perception is independently verifiable as being of an event that actually occurred by means of present, i.e., sense-perceptual, evidence. Such things as entries in journals, or photographs that were taken at the time, or testimony from someone else who was there are examples of this kind of evidence.

b. The perception is a familiar-seeming non-contemporary perception, and is coherent with other familiar-seeming or independently-verified non-contemporary perceptions. By "familiar," I mean the felt conviction

that this has happened to me before. This kind of familiarity has itself been confirmed as being a more or less reliable sign of veridical memory-perception by previous association of it with subsequent independent inquiry-verifications.

If a lot of such familiar and non-contemporary perceptions are found to cohere with one another, and to cohere also with some other memory-perceptions which have been independently verified, then one has a very good case for a memory-perception, rather than an imagination-perception.

c. The perception is one with regard to which I am able to fill in a number of details, the before and after of it, for example. And these details occur to me involuntarily, rather than having to be constructed by me. I can say, for example, what led up to and followed seeing King, but not what led up to and followed an imagined meeting with President Nixon over his policy in Vietnam.

In my discussion above of the general sorts of considerations which Dewey offers in behalf of this view of "mind" and its relation to "body," I referred to three such considerations. These were: (a) the results of the application of the empirical, denotative method, i.e., the observation of the facts as we experience them; (b) the assumptions, whether hidden or

avowed, of the philosopher who takes an alternative view; and (c) the unacceptable consequences of the alternative view or views. I then added some considerations, d, in defense of his view against actual and possible objections. I would like now to return to the third kind of consideration, c, and indicate some of the other consequences Dewey believes follow from alternative theories of mind and body.

In Dewey's view, one of the most serious consequences of the view that mind and body, or self and the world, are distinct existentially, at least as that view is generally held,[46] is the evacuation of "secondary" and "tertiary" qualities from the "real" world and the relegation of them to the world of the "mind." By "secondary qualities" Dewey refers to the colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and so on of the world of our ordinary experience, qualities viewed by many mind-body dualists as not actually part of the furniture of the independently existing universe, but products of the action of primary qualities (those described by physics) upon our minds. By "tertiary qualities" Dewey refers to such qualities as the fineness of a work of art, the irritability or surliness of a bad waitress, the stoical look and ways of an American Indian.

All of these qualities, which are, after all, the ones that make the world interesting and important to us, are regarded by such philosophers as not really inherent in reality. They are the products of reality's operation on us. Whitehead puts this point as follows in Science and the Modern World:

> The mind in apprehending experiences sensations which, properly speaking, are qualities of the mind alone. These sensations are projected by the mind so as to clothe appropriate bodies in external

> nature. Thus the bodies are perceived as with qualities that do not belong to them, qualities which in fact are purely the offspring of the mind. Thus nature gets credit which in truth should be reserved for ourselves: the rose for its scent: the nightingale for his song: and the sun for his radiance. . . . Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colorless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly.[47]

Dewey's view avoids this outrageous denuding of reality of all that is interesting and valuable in it by recognizing that science simply selects from the real that which is capable of providing control. It does not describe the exclusively real, but the more easily controllable. For its purposes it picks out certain aspects of the given, real situation of experience. But the other qualities are also there, as part of the real world, and for certain purposes are even more important parts of it than those which the scientist discloses.

There are, in Dewey's view, more of those hidden assumptions involved in the thought of those philosophers and scientists who want to exclude secondary and tertiary qualities from the "real" world. One of these is the assumption, referred to above, of the "superior reality of causes." Since we can control the scents and colors of our experience by controlling light waves and sound waves, and they are therefore the causes of the colors and sounds, it is assumed that the waves are the real things, and the colors and sounds we experience merely mental. But, in fact, effects are as much a part of reality (indeed, as we saw above, p. 135 perhaps more a part of it) as causes, even though some of them do not seem to give us handles for control as much as do the relational characteristics that the sciences describe.

Another assumption in back of the theory that secondary and tertiary

qualities are merely mental is that the real is what knowledge or cognition discloses about reality. This is the assumption that the "real is the rational and the rational is the real." In fact, knowledge in general and science in particular give us only one point of view on reality: they pick out relationships in order to facilitate control. This relational character of the world is indeed a part of it, but the secondary and tertiary qualities disclosed in feeling are also, and perhaps even more profoundly, a part of it.

Finally, the theory according to which mind and body are separate and radically distinct entities leads to the problem of how they can possibly act upon each other. This difficulty of how a purely spiritual thing can act upon a purely bodily thing, and vice versa, was so acutely felt by the philosophers who nevertheless accepted Descartes' starting-point that they devised, without the slightest bit of empirical evidence, such fantastic hypotheses to account for it as Spinoza's mind-body parallelism and Malebranche's occasionalism. And it is certainly understandable that they should have devised such extraordinary hypotheses. For it is nothing short of <u>magical</u> to suppose that a pure thought, say the thought--<u>It would be nice to have another cup of coffee</u>--could "produce" the movement of one's body in the direction of the coffee pot. To suppose that the relation between mind and body is interactional is like supposing that one could will an ashtray to rise up off his coffee table, onto his floor, and down the hall. The possibility of a causal connection between mind and body, as conceived by the dualists, is equally unintelligible and magical.

Dewey's theory remains in touch with the empirical data while at the same time avoiding any such extraordinary difficulties and proposed solutions as those mentioned above.

In discussing Dewey's arguments for his theory of "mind" and "body," I have referred to that group of arguments, c, which consider the consequences of alternative positions only in connection with Cartesianism, or mind-body dualism. There are, of course, other theories of the nature of mind and its relation to body which need to be considered before one can make any claim to the plausibility of Dewey's view. One such view is the Identity Theory. This is a view which did not exist during Dewey's lifetime, at least in the form in which we think of it today. A consideration of it will therefore provide the kind of test for Dewey's view which he believed analytic realism provided for the views of Essays in Experimental Logic, which were originally directed against the kind of idealism contained in the philosophy of Lotze. As Dewey says in the "Introduction" to Essays in Experimental Logic, which was written in 1916, thirteen years after the essays themselves:

> It is one thing to develop a hypothesis in view of a particular situation; it is another to test its worth in view of procedures and results having a radically different motivation and direction. . . . A consideration of how some of its [analytic realism's] main tenets compare with the conclusions outlined above will, however, throw some light upon the meaning and worth of the latter [i.e., Dewey's own theory].[48]

The following consideration of the Identity Theory on the relation between mind and body should serve therefore to throw some light on the meaning and test the worth of Dewey's own view. It is a kind of use of

the scientific method in philosophy which characterized Dewey's own work: A hypothesis which originated to deal with one or more observed "phenomena" is then tested on new "phenomena" which subsequently come to light.

The Identity Theory, as it is developed by Place, Feigl, and Smart,[49] is an attempt to offer an account of mental events which does not commit the philosopher to the existence of a non-material kind of reality. One might maintain, as indeed many philosophers have and still do maintain, that the proper account of such things as understanding, intending, having after-images, and so on, is that which describes them as non-material or non-physical events. There are at least two varieties of such a view. According to the first, such events occur in the non-material minds of the persons having them. According to the other, they are events which, although perhaps not occurring in a mind, and although always attendant upon certain physiological occurrences, are nevertheless irreducible to such occurrences. The latter view is usually called epiphenomenalism.

There are, then, according to either of these views (the ones the Identity Theory opposes, that is), certain facts about our conscious life which can be accounted for only by recognizing the existence of an irreducibly mental part of us or irreducibly mental phenomena occurring in us.

This conclusion the Identity Theory attempts to refute. For it is the operating assumption of the theory that there are no things in the world that are non-material, that, ultimately, everything that exists comes within the materialistic scope of science. Now some of those mental phenomena which some philosophers have held to be <u>irreducibly</u> mental have, according to the Identity Theory, already been adequately shown to

submit to a behavioristic analysis.[50] So-called "mental" events such as understanding and intending, we now see, are not really episodes occurring as irreducibly mental events in the private, spiritual world of the one who understands or intends, but are rather dispositions to behave in a certain way. And this, according to Place, is so because this is what "understanding" means. To say, that is, that "George understands" is precisely to say that George is disposed to act in a certain way, that, given certain circumstances (tests and the like), George will perform the appropriate action. And all of this is to be understood as a set of facts about George's behavior, and therefore as entirely within the scope of a materialistic metaphysics.

Now the Identity theorist maintains that such accounts suffice to refute the mentalistic interpretation for many of the notions for which it is claimed. It suffices, for example, to show that there are no irreducibly mental acts of understanding, meaning, remembering, wanting, intending, etc. All of these can be regarded as what Ryle calls "dispositional" notions, i.e., proclivities on the part of people to behave in certain ways under certain circumstances.

There are, however, some events in the conscious life of human beings which the Identity Theory holds will not submit to such an analysis. The having of an after-image is an example of such an event. This, those who hold the theory insist, is surely an episode occurring now, not a disposition to behave in a certain way. If I say, "I am now having a yellowish-orange after-image," I am not describing something that is going to occur if something else occurs. Rather am I describing or reporting an event

or process that is going on inside me at the very instant of the utterance of the sentence.

But this obviously creates difficulties for a materialist. For I have said that I am having a yellowish-orange image. But there is nothing yellowish-orange in the world around me, or, if there is, it is not it that I am seeing, but another yellowish-orange thing, one inside me. But there is nothing yellowish-orange in my brain. Everything there is grey-matter.

Where, then, is this yellowish-orange phenomenon that I am now "looking" at? Apparently it is not physical at all, but an irreducibly mental phenomenon. Indeed, it is as a "place for wild data" that one dualist, Lovejoy, thinks it is necessary to assume that there is a mind.

The answer that Place and Smart make to this objection is that it commits what Place calls the Phenomenological Fallacy. This consists in regarding such an event as the having of an after-image as the existence of "the literal properties of objects and events on a peculiar sort of internal cinema or television screen, usually referred to in the modern psychological literature as the 'phenomenal field.'" The assumption of such philosophers is, that is, that having an after-image of the moon is seeing a miniature moon on a kind of internal television or cinema screen. To have an after-image is therefore to have a replica of the thing actually experienced before one's consciousness, possessing the same yellowish-orange property that the thing itself possessed when one looked upon it.

This view would, the Identity theorists agree, commit one to the view that there is a part of us, or there are events in us, that are irreducibly

mental in nature. But the view is mistaken. For when one has, for example, an after-image of the moon, one does not have a little replica of the moon before him, but rather does he have "the sort of experience which we normally have when, and which we have learned to describe as, looking at" the moon.[51]

This, I take it, means that we are now in a subjective state like the subjective state we were in when the moon was actually present. And this subjective state, we can quite consistently maintain, is simply a brain-state, for it has none of these phenomenal, replica-like characteristics which had seemed to some philosophers to preclude its being called a state of the brain.

Smart, in "Sensations and Brain Processes," gives a similar reply to what he considers the strongest objection to the Identity Theory. This is the one he attributes to Max Black, according to which it cannot make any sense to say that two things are identical (e.g., the Morning and the Evening Stars) unless they have properties by virtue of which they can be distinguished. "Suppose we identify the Morning Star with the Evening Star. Then there must be some properties which logically imply that of being the Morning Star, and quite distinct properties which entail that of being the Evening Star."[52] Hence there must be some properties which characterize the sensation and entail its being the sensation it is, and some properties which characterize the brain-process and entail its being the brain-process it is.

But now the properties that characterize sensations are phenomenal qualities such as yellow, green, etc. But these are not the sorts of

things that will fit into the materialistic metaphysics. For, as Smart points out,[53] they are either "objective emergent properties of physical objects, or else . . . [powers] to produce yellow sense-data, where 'yellow,' in this second instantiation of the word, refers to a purely phenomenal or introspectible quality." To answer Black's objection, Smart has therefore to show that his view commits him neither to the existence of phenomenal properties in the perceiver nor in the perceived. I want to come back later to his attempt to eliminate the latter alternative, that is, the existence of phenomenal qualities in the world. Suffice it to say now that he regards a phenomenal property, such as a color, as a power in an object to produce a discriminatory response in the perceiver, not as a quality actually lying upon the surface of the object. There are, then, no secondary qualities in the world; there are simply powers of objects to evoke responses from us.

But to return to Black's objection. If Black's argument is correct about identifying things originally thought to be diverse, like the Morning Star and the Evening Star, then there must be some qualities that constitute being a yellowish-orange after-image and others that constitute being a brain-state. But this would, of course, commit Smart to the assertion of the existence of phenomenal properties--a view that is anathema to him. His answer to this is that what happens when one has a yellowish-orange after-image is not, as we saw that Place also maintains in connection with his discussion of the Phenomenological Fallacy, that, e.g., a replica of the moon, a little moon, now lies on a kind of internal phenomenal field possessing the properties of being yellowish-orange, round,

etc. Rather is it the case that something is going on in one which is like what is going on when one is really seeing the moon. And this something is, Smart points out, topic-neutral. That is to say, one is not committing oneself, when one has an after-image or hears a tune going through his head, as to whether the something going on is a brain-process, a process in the "mind," a free-floating datum, or anything else--any more than a person who reports that someone is here to see Mr. X is committing himself, by this mode of expression, as to what precisely the someone is, whether doctor, lawyer, bum, or what. The point is that one simply does not know where or what the status of what is going on in him is; one simply knows that it is the sort of thing that goes on when he is really seeing the moon.

So that the answer to Black's objection is that the person who has an after-image does not have any phenomenal properties before his consciousness at all. He is aware of something, but he does not know what it is he is aware of. Hence it is quite possible to identify this thing he is aware of, the precise character of which he simply does not know, with a brain-state. And we do this in the way we identify someone with a doctor.

Now this, Smart admits, commits him to saying that a person identifies a state he is now in with a state he has been in before, even though he does not know the properties on the basis of which he is making the comparison. That is, since he knows nothing of brain-states, he cannot know that the present state reminds him of the past one by virtue of, for example, similar configurations of neurons in them.

Another way of stating this objection and rebuttal, according to Smart, is the following: The objection is that a person unacquainted with brain physiology knows perfectly well what a sensation is, but has no idea at all what a cerebral process is. Hence cerebral processes and sensations cannot be identical. Smart's answer is that such a person simply does not commit himself one way or the other with regard to the nature and status of his sensations, any more than the person who sees someone in the room commits himself to the activities or character of this person.

In the Introduction to this dissertation I referred to the inexhaustible richness of Dewey's philosophy with respect to its suggestive insights into the nature of our experience. Here in the Identity Theory we have exactly the opposite kind of philosophy. It is the type of philosophy which some phenomenologists call dialectical, in that it begins with certain assumptions and proceeds to deduce its answers to specific questions from these basic assumptions, and then to answer objections and offer arguments in its defense. But it is a kind of philosophizing which never really interests itself particularly in discovering what experience is like. What is experience like, as the Identity theorist sees it? It is an affair of discriminatory responses, sans qualitative perception, of a non-qualitative, materialistic world--of course. Why? Because materialism is true. I must say, I have learned very little about experience from reading the Identity theorists. I have been occasionally impressed with their cleverness, but I have never found any of the originality and

sensitivity to experience which one discovers so abundantly in Dewey.

Perhaps even worse than that fact, however, is the fact that the whole theory rests on an assumption that not only does not reveal anything new about experience, but actually distorts it. I am referring to the view that when we have certain kinds of "mental experiences," such as after-images, we are not actually seeing a replica, with phenomenal qualities, of the thing of which we are having the after-image. This view certainly flies in the face of experience as we actually have it. It certainly seems as though we sometimes, at least, do have after-images which are of phenomenal qualities. When one looks at an object such as the sun, or a fire, and then has an after-image, one is surely regarding an actual replica of the sun or the fire, with phenomenal, qualitative properties. And if one is asked, for example, to imagine the color red, it seems as though, sometimes anyway, one entertains a replica of a colored patch, or even envisages a particular colored object. And in dreaming, one seems, sometimes anyway, actually to be entertaining the phenomenal qualities of the persons and places being dreamed of.

The Identity Theory really has no phenomenological or empirical-denotative ground whatever. It is simply an ad hoc move to rescue a theory, viz., materialism. The only reason these philosophers have for believing this theory is, as Smart puts it in Philosophy and Scientific Realism,[54] that science with its "materialistic metaphysics" has accounted for so much that it is unlikely that it cannot account for sensations as well. Otherwise, we are left with so-called "nomological danglers," i.e., secondary and, perish the thought, tertiary qualities.

Let me now return to a point discussed briefly above, viz., the view of the Identity theorist that secondary (and, we may add, mutatis mutandi, tertiary qualities) do not exist anywhere at all. There are, that is, according to the Identity Theory, no qualitative yellows, greens, reds, odors, sounds, etc. There are simply light waves, sound waves, etc., and our behavioral responses to these. We have been told that secondary qualities do not exist in us when we have after-images, etc., but that rather when we have such experiences we are having experiences like the experience of actually seeing the thing of which we are now having the after-image, the perception of the yellowish-orange moon, for example. But now we realize that what that original perception itself was of was a purely materialistic moon, a moon devoid entirely of qualitative yellow-orangeness. In fact, there are no color qualities out there in the world at all.

What, then, are colors? What is the color red if it is not a quality experienced as lying on the surface of an object? To explain what he thinks a color is, Smart uses the notion of a "normal percipient."[55]

> "This is red" means something roughly like "A normal percipient would not easily pick this out of a clump of geranium petals though he would pick it out of a clump of lettuce leaves." . . . I therefore elucidate colors as powers, in Locke's sense, to evoke certain sorts of discriminatory responses in human beings. They are also, of course, powers to cause sensations in human beings (an account still nearer Locke's). But these sensations, I am [illegible] are identifiable with brain processes.[56]

So colors and odors and tastes and all of the important and interesting characteristics of the world are not qualities, but discriminatory responses resulting from the operation of light-rays, etc., on the percipient organism. This is, of course, what one would expect the materialistic hypothesis to lead to. But it is so outrageously untrue

to experience as it actually occurs and as must be accepted by one following the empirical-denotative method that it is difficult to believe that anyone actually holds it.

The Identity Theory seems to me to get into further difficulties when one considers other "mental" experiences. Like after-images, itches and pains are, for the Identity Theory, not to be understood as dispositions to behave in certain ways, but rather as episodes or occurrences in the individual having them. Now let us consider a pain, say, a toothache. The Identity theorist would presumably agree that the toothache creates similar problems as the after-image. For it does not seem as though we can adequately analyze the toothache as being simply a brain-process any more than we can adequately analyze an after-image as being simply a brain-process. There are, after all, no pains occurring in one's nervous system, but rather electro-chemical impulses. We saw that in the case of the brain-process that is the after-image it was necessary in his analysis to make a reference to something else, viz., the actual perception of the moon, as something the present brain-process resembles. So it seems here the proper analysis of the toothache will require such a reference. But what experience is the experience of the toothache supposed to resemble? A toothache is not a reproduction of some other experience which has the actual external world directly as its object. And yet, it too seems not to be analyzable simply into a brain-process.

Smart's own account of pains such as toothaches is that they are experiences like the experience one has when, for example, one sticks a pin in his finger, or the like externally caused experience. But there

is clearly a great difference between a toothache and an experience like that of having an after-image. For the latter is, by its very nature, a copy[57] of a previous perceptual experience, and is immediately known by the person to be so. That is, it makes some sense to say of an after-image that it is an experience in which one is in a state like a state he was in previously when he was actually perceiving something. But it is really very far-fetched to say that the experience of a toothache is in any sense a copy of, or involves essentially a reference back to, a pin-prick experience.

Smart's view here is that, just as there can be no colors inside me when I am having an after-image if the self is entirely material, so there can be no pains or itches in me. So we must somehow account for these experiences in the way we accounted for the after-image. Pains and itches, as they are experienced or lived, are equally the sort of thing that cannot be going on in a body, since events in the nervous system, which is where we would have to suppose them to be occurring, are limited to electro-chemical events. But there is no external object to which to reduce the pain in the way one might be able to reduce the after-image to a previous perception.

Furthermore, even if we admitted that a toothache could somehow be interpreted as a brain-state similar to the state one is in when one is being pricked with a pin, what account are we to give of the pain that is experienced when one is so pricked? Is it a discriminatory response to pins as opposed to pillows? Surely this pain that I have when I am being pricked with a pin is a qualitative event irreducible to discriminatory

responses and brain-states.

Finally, to deny that a person who has a toothache is really experiencing a qualitative ache at the very time when he has the toothache is just as absurd as denying that there are experienced qualitative colors and odors in the world. When I have a toothache, there is a thing called an ache going on, and it is not reducible to an electro-chemical impulse. And, for that matter, when one has the pin-prick, one's experience of that pain is not a brain-state or a discriminatory response either. It is a new sort of thing, a felt quality, which, as Dewey points out, emerges from the more complex kinds of interaction that animal organisms are capable of.

The Identity Theory, then, like Cartesian dualism, fails to offer a satisfactory account of the facts about our experience. For it comes to the highly untenable conclusion that there are no secondary qualities in the world. And, as I have suggested, it would deny even more vehemently, we may be sure, that there are tertiary qualities in the world. In doing so, it fails utterly to "find a place for value" in the world.

Dewey's theory, therefore, seems to me to be the most plausible for the four kinds of reasons previously referred to: (a) It is a theory which is true to, or a proper description of, the facts as revealed by careful application of the empirical-denotative method. (b) The alternative views make assumptions which render an acknowledgement of the empirical facts inconvenient. (c) The consequences of the alternative views are unacceptable, either because they conflict with the data of

empirical observation, or because they make it impossible to account for operations such as knowing and valuing. Finally, (d) the objections to Dewey's own view can be answered along the lines I have suggested above.

In this defense of Dewey's theory of mind, I have often gotten involved in the discussion of topics not strictly related to perception. Nevertheless, as I hope I have shown, Dewey's theory of mind or self derives from and is made possible by his view of perception. Perception is initially, both in the history of the organism and in the history of each experience, feeling. What feeling is of is a total qualitative situation which is a real product of the interaction of natural events. But it is neither bodily nor mental, neither objective nor subjective. Within its field some objects are forged out by perception of signification and perception of sense, in connection with a problematic situation and the inquiry that is prompted by it. These objects are, as a consequence of inquiry, referred to the objective or world side, or the subjective or organism side of experience. But these categories do not describe the condition that holds prior to inquiry. They are provisional and pragmatic characterizations made within a mind-less, body-less qualitative situation which antecedes them, and to which experience will return when their problem is solved and their utility terminated.

NOTES

1. William James, "Does Consciousness Exist?" Essays in Radical Empiricism and A Pluralistic Universe (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1958), Vol. I, pp. 1-38.

2. See below, pp. 28 ff., for development of this notion.

3. See p. 37 of Bernstein, ed., John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom.

4. Ibid., p. 40.

5. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

6. Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 2.

7. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 25: "Selective emphasis . . . is the heart-beat of mental life. To object to the operation is to discard all thinking. But in ordinary matters and in scientific inquiries, we always retain the sense that the material chosen is selected for a purpose; there is no idea of denying what is left out, for what is omitted is merely that which is not relevant to the particular problem or purpose in hand.

8. Ibid., pp. 258-59. Italics mine.

9. Bernstein, ed., John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom, p. 190. Italics mine. Sigmund Freud, in Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1961 [first published in German, 1931]), p. 15, takes a similar view of the character of a young child's experience. He describes it as a kind of "oceanic feeling" in which all objects and qualities are experienced on the same level, with no distinction between what is mine and what is other.

10. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 13.

11. Ibid., p. 15.

12. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, pp. 33-34.

13. Ibid., p. 152.

14. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 134.

15. See below, pp. 137-39, for further development of this point.

16. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 109 and p. 252.

17. Note that here we are making the kind of consideration which belongs to part b of Dewey's argument--i.e., consideration of hidden assumptions.

18. Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXVII, No. 22 (October 24, 1940), p. 595. Quotation from James is from Principles of Psychology, Vol. I (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1950), p. 272.

19. Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXVII, No. 22, p. 595.

20. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey, pp. 546-68.

21. Ibid., p. 541.

22. See the essay, "What Pragmatism Means by Practical," in Essays in Experimental Logic for Dewey's development of this point.

23. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 263.

24. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey, pp. 229-242. Dewey praises Parodi several times in the course of his "Reply" for Parodi's excellent grasp of his thought, an honor not similarly accorded to Murphy.

25. Ibid., p. 240.

26. Ibid., pp. 597-99.

27. Using that term now in the special sense in which Dewey uses it and as defined in the chapter on feeling above, not in the sense in which Parodi talks about qualities as being felt.

28. Dewey, Quest for Certainty, p. 129.

29. Ibid., pp. 129-30.

30. Ibid., p. 130.

31. Lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dualism, p. 101.

32. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey, p. 240.

33. Dewey came to change his view about the experience of animals. See the essay, "Qualitative Thought," in Bernstein, ed., John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom.

34. Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, pp. 78-79 and p. 84.

35. Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXI, No. 22 (October 24, 1924), pp. 601-11.

36. Ibid., p. 610.

37. Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).

38. Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIX, No. 13 (June 22, 1922), pp. 351-61.

39. Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939), pp. 380-81.

40. Especially, of course, meanings which are perceived as the sense of qualities or objects. Note that a novel situation, as well as familiar ones, can become perceived in the mode of sense. Thus Dewey says (Experience and Nature, p. 261) that when "we are baffled by perplexing conditions, and finally hit upon a clew, and everything falls into place, the whole thing suddenly, as we say, 'makes sense.'"

41. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 182.

42. See especially Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, pp. 223 ff.

43. See above, pp.25-27, for development of the notions of perceptual and conceptual objects.

44. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 227.

45. For a well-argued development of this kind of objection, see the chapter, "Memory," in Professor William Earle's book, The Autobiographical Consciousness (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), pp. 142-74.

46. Dating clearly from Descartes, Locke, and Newton--and evidently present in the thoughts of some Greek atomists and of some of their Greek and Roman Epicurean borrowers.

47. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), pp. 79-80.

48. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 26.

49. U. T. Place, "Is Consciousness a Brain Process," in Vere Chappell, ed., The Philosophy of Mind (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962); H. Feigl, "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical,'" in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958); J. J. C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," in Chappell, ed., The Philosophy of Mind; J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).

50. Place refers to Gilbert Ryle's Concept of Mind and Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations as having demonstrated this dispositional character of some "mental" events.

51. Place in Chappell, ed., Philosophy of Mind, p. 108.

52. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," in Chappell, ed., Philosophy of Mind, p. 166.

53. Ibid., p. 166.

54. Smart, Philosophy of Scientific Realism, p. 68.

55. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," in Chappell, ed., Philosophy of Mind, p. 166.

56. Ibid., pp. 166-67.

57. Strictly speaking, an after-image should not be said to be a "copy" of an original phenomenon, e.g., a yellowish-orange moon. For the after-image is the complement of the original. It would therefore be a bluish-violet, not a yellowish-orange image. This fact would seem to create even further difficulties for the Identity Theory. For we see now that an after-image is not a subjective state like that which one was originally in, and, furthermore, that it involves those very phenomenal properties which the Identity theorist has been trying to get rid of.

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