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Moral Psychology of the Confucian Heart-Mind and Interpretations of Ceyinzhixin

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Abstract

Many comparative philosophers discuss ceyinzhixin 惻隱之心 (the Confucian heart-mind of pity and compassion) and its moral psychological nature to understand the Confucian heart-mind and the unique Confucian approach to other-concerning love. This essay examines and analyzes different interpretations of ceyinzhixin. First, it surveys and compares the four interpretations (ceyinzhixin as empathic concern, as concern-based construal, as modular moral emotion, and as Humean moral sentiment) in recent publications of comparative Chinese philosophy, and analyzes their moral psychological viewpoints. Second, three major approaches (the essentialist, the foundationalist, and the integrative approaches) to ceyinzhixin and their differences are analyzed. Third, the moral psychological complexity of ceyinzhixin and the advantage of the integrative approach are discussed. The integrative approach, in comparison to other approaches, explains both the complexity and the unity of ceyinzhixin better and develops an inclusive and comprehensive interpretation of ceyinzhixin and the unique moral psychological nature of the Confucian heart-mind in its empathic other-concerning love.

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Seok, B. Moral Psychology of the Confucian Heart-Mind and Interpretations of Ceyinzhixin. Dao 21, 37–59 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-021-09814-8

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