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MAKING THE AUDIENCE: EKPHRASIS AND RHETORICAL STRATEGY IN DEMOSTHENES 18 AND 191

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2015

Andreas Serafim*
Affiliation:
University College London

Extract

In this paper, I intend to explore three examples of ekphrasis – narrative scene painting – in Demosthenes 18 and 19: the first is Demosthenes' depiction of the announcement in Athens of the capture of Elatea by Philip (18.169–73), while the second and third are descriptions of Aeschines' (allegedly) failed theatrical performances (18.262 and 19.337–8). Scholars have paid insufficient attention to these descriptive accounts: there have been a few limited discussions of 18.169 in commentaries but, otherwise, the use and purpose of these accounts as part of Demosthenes' rhetorical strategy have not been widely appreciated. This article aims to show that ekphrasis, when skilfully deployed as in Demosthenes 18 and 19, is a powerful weapon in the speaker's arsenal that merits thorough investigation. By instructing the audience as to what and how to think, imagine and remember, orators seek to engage the audience, elicit their verbal or non-verbal reaction in the law court, create a certain disposition in them towards the litigants, stir up and manipulate their emotions, and thus affect their verdict.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 2015 

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Footnotes

1

This is a revised and expanded version of a paper given at two conferences: ‘Theatre of Justice: aspects of performance in Greco-Roman oratory and rhetoric’, University College London, April 2012 and the Classical Association Annual Conference, University of Reading, April 2013. I am deeply indebted, as ever, to my Ph.D. supervisor, Chris Carey, for reading and commenting on multiple drafts. I also owe special thanks to Ian Worthington, Adele Scafuro, Brenda Griffith-Williams and the audiences of the two conferences, especially Roger Brock, Christos Kremmydas, Eftychia Bathrellou, Matthew Kears and Laura Viidebaum for their valuable comments. Finally, I also thank Andrew Morrison and CQ's anonymous reader for suggesting further improvements to the structure and content of this article.

References

2 See, for example, Wankel, H., Demosthenes Rede für Ktesiphon über den Kranz (Heidelberg, 1976)Google Scholar, 848; Usher, S., Demosthenes: On the Crown. Greek Orators 5 (Warminster, 1993), 230–1Google Scholar; Yunis, H., Demosthenes: On the Crown (Cambridge, 2001), 204–5Google Scholar.

3 See Slater, W.J., ‘The epiphany of Demosthenes’, Phoenix 42 (1988), 126–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 129, who argues that the presentation of tranquillity in Athens before the announcement of the messenger is a device that Demosthenes uses in order to dramatize the change of the moment and then underscore his role as saviour of Athens. As Slater notes, according to the lacunose information left to us, the Athenians ‘were waiting for news for some time, and it was not really likely that business had been going on totally as usual’.

4 See pp. 105–6 below. Harris also casts doubts on the veracity of Demosthenes' claim in 19.337–8 that his adversary gave up his theatrical career because of the hostility theatrical audiences showed to him. Harris, E.M., Aeschines and Athenian Politics (New York and Oxford, 1995)Google Scholar, 31.

5 Bompaire, J., Lucien écrivain: imitation et création (Paris, 1958)Google Scholar, 707: ‘mais le sens le plus intéressant est celui qui fait de l’ ecphrasis d'œuvre d'art, sculpture, tableau, édifice, l'ecphrasis par excellence'. See also Bertrand, E., Un critique d'art dans l'antiquité (Paris, 1881), 4954Google Scholar; Spitzer, L., Essays on English and American Literature (New York, 1984)Google Scholar, 89; Hefferman, J.A.W., Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery (Chicago and London, 1993)Google Scholar, 3; Elsner, J., ‘Introduction: the genres of ekphrasis’, Ramus: Critical Studies in Greek and Roman Literature 31 (2002), 118CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 1–3; Bartsch, S. and Elsner, J., ‘Introduction: eight ways of looking at an ekphrasis’, CPh 102 (2007)Google Scholar, i–vi, at i. For critical discussions of these modern definitions of ekphrasis: Goldhill, S., ‘What is ekphrasis for?’, CPh 102 (2007), 119Google Scholar, at 1–3; Webb, R., Ekphrasis, Imagination, and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice (Surrey, 2009), 2838Google Scholar.

6 Webb (n. 5), 1.

7 Trans. Webb (n. 5), 197. See also Ps.-Hermog. Prog. 22; Apth. Prog. 36.

8 Trans. Webb (n. 5), 202–3.

9 At this point, it is worth noting that the potency of language to bring images before the eyes is also described in Arist. Rh. 1411b24–5, 35 where it is noted that metaphor can bring its subject πρὸ ὀμμάτων. Although Aristotle does not expand the discussion, nevertheless, even this brief reference indicates that the power of language ‘to place X before the eyes’, which was discussed systematically later, was recognized in fourth- and fifth-century Athens.

10 Trans. Webb (n. 5), 8.

11 The nearest modern equivalent would be Deixis am Phantasma, a notion used for the first time by Karl Bühler. Despite the convergences in meaning, use and application between ekphrasis and Deixis am Phantasma, there are some divergences: ekphrasis refers to any account that brings the described matter before one's eyes, whereas a prerequisite for Deixis am Phantasma, at least as generally understood, is normally the use of specific deictic wording, such as the use of demonstrative words and expressions. See Bühler, K., Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 1990), 141–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vamvouri-Ruffy, M., ‘Visualization and “Deixis am Phantasma” in Aeschylus' Persae’, QUCC 78 (2004), 1128Google Scholar, at 13; Felson, N., ‘Introduction: the poetics of deixis in Alcman, Pindar, and other lyric’, Arethusa 37 (2004), 253–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 254.

12 Webb, R., ‘Imagination and the arousal of the emotions in Greco-Roman rhetoric’, in Braund, S. Morton and Gill, C. (edd.), The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature (Cambridge, 1997), 112–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 120.

13 Webb (n. 5), 51–2 n. 51.

14 For example, phantasia, as used by post-classical rhetoric, arises from Stoic philosophy with a broad sense: it is ‘not merely an act of imagination, but a way of looking at the world’. Bartsch and Elsner (n. 5), 90.

15 The only crystal-clear information we have on the quality of ekphrasis is about the virtues of ekphrasis, clarity (σαφήνεια) and vividness (ἐνάργεια), with which the art of bringing the described object, person or place before the eyes is achieved. See Theon, Prog. 118.7; Ps.-Hermog. Prog. 23.

16 Translation of passages from Dem. 18 is taken from Vince, C.A. and Vince, J.H., Demosthenes: De Corona and De Falsa Legatione (Cambridge, MA and London, 1953)Google Scholar except when otherwise indicated. The translation of §169 is slightly adjusted.

17 The question of the theatrical competence of the ancient Athenian theatrical audiences inevitably emerges at this point. Aristotle (Poet. 1451b23–6) is sceptical about the ability of the majority of spectators to recall even the most well-known material. For a critical discussion, see Revermann, M., ‘The competence of theatre audiences in fifth and fourth century Athens’, JHS 126 (2006), 99124CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Yet despite the doubts about the theatrical competence of the audiences, it can still be argued that the invited effect (whether or not it was achieved) of theatrical patterns, language register, quotations or pictorial narrative descriptions is to draw on the experience of the audience as theatregoers in order to connect what happens in the law court with theatre.

18 Trans. Welles, C. Bradford, Diodorus of Sicily (Cambridge, MA and London, 1963), 72–5Google Scholar.

19 See Eur. Andr. 1070, Supp. 638, Phoen. 1075, Rhes. 268, Bacch. 658, Tro. 258; Soph. Trach.180. In the majority of the plays mentioned below in n. 20 (except for Electra and Philoctetes), the character who brings the news is called ἄγγελος.

20 Trans. Morwood, J., Euripides: Hecuba, The Trojan Women, Andromache (Oxford, 2000)Google Scholar, 106. The same pattern, ἥκω followed by a participle, is also used in several other plays; see Eur. Supp. 634: ἥκω πόλλ᾽ ἔχων λέγειν, Or. 854: ἥκω φέρων + λόγους; Soph. El. 666, Phil. 1267; Aesch. Sept. 40. This list of examples is based on a quick search through the online TLG database. It should be noted at this point that this formula – the verb ἥκω followed by a participle – is used only rarely in oratorical speeches (see Aeschin. 1.122; Dem. 19.223, 45.1, 59.13; Lys. 33.3) and not for describing the action of bringing news.

21 See West, M.L., Euripides: Orestes (Warminster, 1987)Google Scholar, 14; Dickin, M., A Vehicle for Performance: Acting the Messenger in Greek Tragedy (Lanham, MD, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Plymouth, 2009), 68Google Scholar.

22 Rehm, R., Greek Tragic Theatre (London and New York, 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 61.

23 See de Jong, I.J.F., Narrative in Drama: The Art of the Euripidean Messenger-Speech (Leiden and New York, 1991), 118–19Google Scholar; see also Dickin (n. 21), 1–3.

24 See de Jong (n. 23), 130.

25 See de Jong (n. 23), 147–8. There are several instances of silence before the catastrophe in tragic messengers' speeches. See Eur. HF 930, where there is a moment of silence before Heracles' madness; Bacch. 1084–5, where there is another example of silence before the Maenads attack Pentheus. On silence, tone and sound in tragedy: de Jong (n. 23), 144–8.

26 (n. 2), 847.

27 Denniston, J.D., Greek Prose Style (Oxford, 1952), 2834Google Scholar.

28 For example, ἕσπερος: Hom. Od.1.403, 18.306; νύξ: Soph. El. 91, 198, 1684, 1752 (for some of the few occurrences of this abstract noun as subject indicating time in oratorical speeches, see Andoc. 1.43, 48); Hom. Il. 5.310, 659, 8.488, 9.474, 11.356, 13.580, etc.; Aesch. Pers. 378, 384; σκότος: Eur. Hipp. 192, 1444, HF 1216, Phoen. 1453; Hom. Il. 4.461, 503, 526, 5.47, 6.11, 13.575, 672, 14.519, 15.578, 16.316, 325, 607, 20.393, 471, 21.181 (two rather rare uses of that noun as abstract subject in oratorical speeches are in Dem. 57.9, 13); ἡμέρα: Aesch. Pers. 386 (for two rather infrequent uses of this abstract subject [Dem.] 59.99: ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο; Din. 1.107); ἦμαρ: Soph. El. 199; Ἠώς: Hom. Il. 1.477, 6.175, 8.1, 9.707, 23.109, 24.695, 788, Od. 2.1, 3.404, 3.491, 4.194, 4.306, 431, 576, 5.228, 8.1, 9.152, 170, 307, 437, 560, etc. This not at all exhaustive list of examples is based on a quick search through the online TLG database.

29 As mentioned above (see pp. 99–100), Diodorus describes the same historical event. There are some significant convergences in the content of his account and that given by Demosthenes, since, as McQueen notes, Diodorus' narrative description is based on Demosthenes' one. McQueen, E.I., Diodorus Siculus: The Reign of Philip II. The Greek and Macedonian Narrative from Book XVI (Bristol, 1995)Google Scholar, 156. There are also, however, some notable divergences in both the content and the way of presenting the events. Diodorus, for example, telescopes events, while Demosthenes spins out the moment with circumstantial detail. For more information on the differences between Diodorus' description and that of Demosthenes, McQueen, ibid., 156.

30 Yunis (n. 2), 204.

31 Trans. Wooten, C.W., Hermogenes: On Types of Style (Chapel Hill and London, 1987)Google Scholar, 69.

32 Smyth, H.W., Greek Grammar, revised by G.M. Messing (Cambridge, 1959 2)Google Scholar, 419, §1872a3.

33 LSJ s.v. μεταξύ.

34 Smyth (n. 32), 425, §1898.

35 Goldhill (n. 5), 6.

36 Trans. Usher (n. 2), 109. On this passage as an example of Demosthenes' masterly self-portrayal: Yunis, H., Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens (Ithaca and London, 1996), 269–75Google Scholar.

37 Yunis (n. 2), 207.

38 See Eur. Hec. 37, 110; Ar. Ach. 567, Eq. 458, 836. Secondary sources: Wankel (n. 2), 863–4; Slater (n. 3), 126–8. For a comprehensive discussion of the convention of the deus ex machina: Rehm (n. 22), 68–73.

39 See also Goodwin, W.W., Demosthenes: On the Crown (Cambridge, 1904)Google Scholar, 109; Yunis (n. 2), 207.

40 Yunis (n. 2), 207.

41 Translation is slightly modified; the underlined clause (‘getting more … lives’) is taken by Usher (n. 2), 143. The translation of Usher underscores Demosthenes' subtle irony and his implicit attempt to ridicule the military record of his opponent.

42 Pickard-Cambridge notes that the Athenians ‘kept themselves refreshed throughout the performances with wine and dried fruits and confectionery, which might also be used to pelt actors whom they do not like’: Pickard–Cambridge, A., The Dramatic Festivals of Athens (Oxford, 1968 2)Google Scholar, 272. See also Arnott, P.D., Public and Performance in the Greek Theatre (London and New York, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 6.

43 Secondary bibliography: Pickard-Cambridge, A., Dithyramb, Tragedy, and Comedy (Oxford, 1962), 134–6Google Scholar; Yunis (n. 2), 257.

44 For a detailed discussion of the figure of the fruiterer: Goodwin (n. 39), 162; Wankel (n. 2), 1154.

45 Yunis (n. 2), 257 suggests a less persuasive analysis of this sentence. For him, the simile ὥσπερ ὀπωρώνης ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων χωρίων is an indication that ‘Aeschines took the opportunity to steal fruit from the fields like a thieving small fruit-seller’ and the next clause πλείω λαμβάνων … ἠγωνίζεσθε that ‘Aeschines’ performances were so bad that he earned less from them than from his fruit-thieving'. If we accept Yunis' approach, however, then the last clause (ἦν γὰρ ἄσπονδος … ὡς δειλοὺς σκώπτεις) does not make good sense. The use of the particle γάρ at the beginning, which indicates that this clause clarifies what precedes it, makes clear that Aeschines acquires the fruits and other agrarian produce as a consequence of the audience's hostility, i.e. that he was pelted.

46 Goodwin (n. 39), 162; LSJ s.v. ἀγών.

47 Goodwin (n. 39), 162–3.

48 Halliwell, S., ‘The uses of laughter in Greek culture’, CQ 41 (1991), 279–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 283.

49 Mockery by ones' enemies was a powerful fear in Greek culture attested in prose and verse texts, such as Eur. Med. 1049–50; Lys. 3.9. See Halliwell, S., Greek Laughter (Cambridge, 2008), 1938CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50 On this ‘relation-building’ potential of laughter: Carey, C., ‘Structure and strategy in Lysias XXIV’, G&R 37 (1990), 4451Google Scholar, at 49; Hall, E., The Theatrical Cast of Athens: Interactions between Ancient Greek Drama and Society (Oxford, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 388.

51 In this case, laughter is also used to dispel Aeschines' strong argument about Demosthenes' lack of military achievements that cannot otherwise be refuted. To quote Aristotle (Rh. 1419b7), ‘as for jests, since they may sometimes be useful in debates, the advice of Gorgias was good – to confound the opponents’ earnest with jest and their jest with earnest'.

52 Translation of 19.337–8 is from Douglas MacDowell, M., Demosthenes: On the False Embassy. Oration 19 (Oxford, 2000)Google Scholar, 335.

53 MacDowell (n. 52), 352. The verb recurs only in later works, such as Dion. Hal. Dem. 53; Lucian, Dial. D. 13.2; Philo 2.280, 520.

54 Smyth (n. 32), 473–4, §§2120–2.

55 On the manner Athenian audiences proclaim their preferences and put pressure on the judges, see primary sources: Thuc. 4.28.1–4; Arist. Rh. 2.1400a9–11; Pl. Leg. 659a, 700c–701b, 876b1–6, Resp. 492b5–c1; Hyp. 1.20; Dem. 18.52; Ar. Vesp. 912. Secondary sources: Pickard-Cambridge (n. 42), 275; Bers, V., ‘Dikastic thorubos’, in Cartledge, P.A. and Harvey, F.D. (edd.), Crux: Essays presented to G.E.M. de ste Croix on his 75th Birthday (Devon, 1985), 115Google Scholar; Hall (n. 50), 363–6; Roselli, D.K., Theater of the People: Spectators and Society in Ancient Athens (Austin, 2011), 4851Google Scholar; Thomas, R., ‘And you, the Demos, made an uproar: performance, mass audiences, and text in the Athenian democracy’, in Lardinois, A.P.M.H., Blok, J.H. and van der Poel, M.G.M. (edd.), Sacred Words: Orality, Literacy, and Religion, vol. 8: Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World (Leiden and Boston, 2011), 161–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 171–85.

56 Θόρυβος is any vocal expression (for example, the shouts of praise or blame) directed from the judges (dicastic θόρυβος) or the bystanders (coronal θόρυβος) to the speaker. Bers (n. 55), 1–15; see also Thomas (n. 55), 171–85.