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Bursting Bealer's Bubble: How the Starting Points Argument Begs the Question of Foundationalism Against Quine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Michael J. Shaffer  and
Jason A. Warnick
Michael J. Shaffer
Affiliation:
The University of North Carolina at Wilmington, Wilmington, NC28403, USA
Jason A. Warnick
Affiliation:
The University of North Carolina at Wilmington, Wilmington, NC28403, USA
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Extract

In his 1993 article George Bealer offers three separate arguments that are directed against the internal coherence of empiricism, specifically Quine's version of empiricism. In doing so, Bealer identifies three fundamental principles of Quine's empiricism. First, the principle of empiricism states that:

(i) A person's experiences and/or observations comprise the person's prima facie evidence.

Second, the principle of holism states that:

(ii) A theory is justified (acceptable, more reasonable than its competitors, legitimate, warranted) for a person if and only if it is, or belongs to, the simplest comprehensive theory that explains all, or most, of the person's prima facie evidence.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , March 2004 , pp. 87 - 105
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2004

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