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De se belief and rational choice

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Abstract

The Sleeping Beauty puzzle has dramatized the divisive question of how de se beliefs should be integrated into formal theories of rational belief change. In this paper, I look ahead to a related question: how should de se beliefs be integrated into formal theories of rational choice? I argue that standard decision theoretic frameworks fail in special cases of de se uncertainty, like Sleeping Beauty. The nature of the failure reveals that sometimes rational choices are determined independently of one’s credences in the kinds of ‘narrow’ de se propositions that Sleepy Beauty has set in relief. Consequently, in addition to pinpointing a failure of standard decision theoretic frameworks, this result casts doubt on a large class of strategies for determining principles for the rationally updating de se beliefs in cases like Sleeping Beauty, and also calls into question the importance of making such a determination at all.

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  1. University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

    James R. Shaw

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  1. James R. Shaw
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Correspondence to James R. Shaw.

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Shaw, J.R. De se belief and rational choice. Synthese 190, 491–508 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0044-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0044-0

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