Plato's Causal Logic and the Third Man Argument

  • Sharvy R
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Abstract

(1) anything that fs does so because it participates in the f itself. (2) it is impossible that: a form phi fs because phi participates in phi. (3) the f itself fs. These are inconsistent all right, but (1) is not a doctrine of the theory of forms, and (2) is neither reasonable nor held by plato! but the tma does not involve any of these three. Rather, the tma is aimed at (4) anything that fs does so (a) because it participates in the f itself and (b) because the f itself fs. And the tma uses only simple inference rules of the logic of 'because'–no suppressed premises. I also discuss causal regress arguments generally.

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APA

Sharvy, R. (1986). Plato’s Causal Logic and the Third Man Argument. Noûs, 20(4), 507. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214982

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