Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Strong Global Supervenience is Valuable

  • ORIGINAL ARTICLE
  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

It is generally assumed that everything that can be said about dependence with the notion of strong global supervenience can also be said with the notion of strong supervenience. It is argued here, however, that strong global supervenience has a metaphysically distinctive role to play. It is shown that when the relevant sets include relations, strong global supervenience and strong supervenience are distinct. It is then concluded that there are claims about dependence of relations that can be made with the global notion of strong supervenience but not with the “local” (individual) one.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Here is Kim’s (1987) definition: A-properties strongly supervene on B-properties if and only if for any possible worlds w 1 and w 2 and any objects x in w 1 and y in w 2, if x in w 1 is B-indiscernible from y in w 2, then x in w 1 is A-indiscernible from y in w 2.

  2. Global supervenience was first introduced by Horgan (1982) as a relation between the B-properties and A-properties of the entire objects in any possible world.

  3. The weak version says that if there is a B-isomorphism, there is an A-isomorphism. Shagrir (2002) and Bennett (2004) define intermediate global supervenience which is arguably what Kim had in mind when defining global supervenience.

  4. A maximal B-property is (roughly) a complete world perspective of an object x in terms of B-properties; see Stalnaker (1996) and Sider (1999).

  5. Bennett (2004) also demonstrates that if the A-properties are intrinsic there is no need to enlarge the B-base: she proves that SGS and SIS of A on B are equivalent whenever the A-properties are intrinsic.

  6. Kim (1993) examines several ways to account for relations, but he is satisfied with none of them. He finally (p. 164) settles on the notion of isomorphism over sets of individuals, which is really yet another version of global supervenience. Indeed, I think that the way to make Kim’s suggestions adequate is in terms of SGS.

  7. See Bennett and McLaughlin (2005) Sect. 5.3.

  8. See Kim (1993) who argues for this point when discussing relations.

  9. Hoffmann and Newen (2007) argue that a B-base that includes all the intrinsic and extrinsic properties (and relations) is too weak, as it does not distinguish between the relevant and irrelevant B-properties. I discuss this argument elsewhere (Shagrir, forthcoming).

References

Download references

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Ted Sider and two anonymous referees. This research was supported by The Israel Science Foundation, grant 725/08.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Program of Cognitive Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus, 91905, Jerusalem, Israel

    Oron Shagrir

Authors
  1. Oron Shagrir
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Oron Shagrir.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Shagrir, O. Strong Global Supervenience is Valuable. Erkenn 71, 417–423 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9187-5

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9187-5

Keywords

Search

Navigation