Abstract
Popper is well known for rejecting a logic of discovery, but he is only justified in rejecting the same type of logic of discovery that is denied by consequentialism. His own account of hypothesis generation, based on a natural selection analogy, involves an error-eliminative logic of discovery and the differences he admits between biological and conceptual evolution suggest an error-corrective logic of discovery. These types of logics of discovery are based on principles of plausibility that are used in the generation as opposed to the preliminary evaluation of hypotheses. The normative relevance of these principles is grounded in the distinction between strategic and definitory rules.
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Notes
This term is due to Monk (1977).
“The Logic of Scientific Discovery” is a misleading translation of “Logik der Forschung.” A more accurate translation would be “The General Rules of Scientific Research.” However, Popper uses the term ‘discovery’ to refer to the whole of scientific inquiry—both the generation and evaluation of hypotheses—while the traditional use of ‘discovery’ by philosophers of science refers only to the process of generating hypotheses.
Hoyningen-Huene (1987) delineates six ways in which this distinction can be interpreted, none of which involves the rejection of a logic of discovery.
Ayer (1946, pp. 85–86) distinguishes between logical and psychological content. With this distinction, it can be granted that a purely formal logic of discovery does not generate anything novel in the purely logical sense, but that the uncovering of content not previously noticed is still psychologically novel.
The change to a new problem situation could turn the generative process into one of serendipity and not a logic of discovery, but before a satisfactory solution to a problem is found, scientists do not as a rule change the problem on which they are working.
Bradie (1986) labels these the evolutionary epistemology of mechanisms (EEM) and the evolutionary epistemology of theories (EET).
Rescher’s position differs from the others because he rejects the natural selection analogy on the level of theories but accepts it on the level of methods. That is, he rejects thesis Darwinism but defends methodological Darwinism.
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Shah, M. The Logics of Discovery in Popper’s Evolutionary Epistemology. J Gen Philos Sci 39, 303–319 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-008-9070-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-008-9070-0