

THE VIOLENCE IN LEARNING

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ABSTRACT. This paper argues that learning is inherently violent. It examines the way in which Heidegger uses – and refrains from using – the concept in his account of Dasein. Heidegger explicitly discussed “learning” in 1951 and he used of the word in several contexts. Although he confines his use of “learning” to the ontic side of the ontic-ontological divide, there are aspects of what he says that open the door to an ontological analogue of the ontic learning. In this discussion it emerges that what precludes “learning” behaving as does “willing”, “waiting” and “thanking”, is something that derives from the relatedness of Dasein. The paper finally examines violence within the disclosure of truth. The approach to the investigation is experimental and is to some extent modeled on Heidegger’s own later enquires.

Keywords: violence, learning, thinking, truth, Heidegger, curriculum, school management

1. Introduction

Schools use the correspondence theory of truth all the time. Its use is probably the most characteristic feature of Western schools. It defines them. Students and teachers spend their time seeking right answers. Rightness is inherent in the formal and informal curriculum, teaching, classroom and school management, and all issues of student and teacher conduct. The examinations system, student progression, and the students’ subsequent employment, all depend entirely on the correspondence theory of truth.

The correspondence theory of truth dominates school learning. Every student uses the correspondence theory each day as they seek

to learn. Student success, both day-by-day and ultimately, entails correspondence. Students are pushed by the motivation system enacted by their nation and its schools to demonstrate their competence through correspondence. Even such objectives as “creativity” and “religious conviction” render as percentage results or judgements made against criteria.

The broad context of the present paper is an assault on the hegemony of correspondence in schools. The immediate target is the concept of learning, which is at the heart of school practice and the dialog about schools. The thinking recorded here is facilitated primarily by Heidegger. This paper is in three substantive parts. It begins with a discussion of Heidegger’s use of the word “learning” and relates this to his thoughts on teaching. Some analysis of the words he selects to describe learning follows. The second part, which seeks “learning” in formal ontology, examines the way that Heidegger seeks to explicate that which is beyond language and puzzles why the technique is not applied to “learning”. The penultimate section muses about “the violence in learning” in relation to school learning.

2. Learning from Teaching Practice

“Learning” is not one of those words that Heidegger uses intensely. Frequently he lets the word be – meaning, that his customary use of the word is unsurprising to us, he makes no analysis of it, and uses it without any connotations of ontology. He uses the word “learning” as a part of his vocabulary regarding ontic studies. Some examples of his use of the word are:

... for us to learn to conceive ... (Heidegger, 1962, p. 40).

... rhetoric is conceived as the kind of thing we learn in school ...” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 178).

...when we learn not to take problems too lightly ... (Heidegger, 1962, p. 425).

...without any prospect of learning something ... (Heidegger, 1962, p. 229).

Can anything be learned from this about ... (Heidegger, 1966, p. 66).

...if indeed learning is to arise in the course of these lectures ... (Heidegger, 1968, p. 16).

We will choose the most secure way to learn what is said and thought in the words of Parmenides. We will follow the text (Heidegger, 1992, p. 3).

... you will learn to experience... (Heidegger, 1992, p. 4).

...to translate a Greek word we must in the first place learn that foreign tongue (Heidegger, 1992, p. 13).

... attained by someone only through studying and learning.... Doctors and the practice of medicine do not grow the way trees do (Heidegger, 1998b, p. 196).

... motorcycle, we would remain standing before it and make a speech about it with the intention of learning in this way how to ride it (Heidegger, 1992, p. 15).

The mathematical as ... the teachable as such, that is what can be learned in a preeminent sense; ... learning (Heidegger, 2010, p. 25).

... with the reception or communication and what is known and cognized as such, truths as such, for precisely that is learning and teaching (Heidegger, 2010, p. 26).

This means learning to grasp that this great inception of our Dasein has been cast out over and past us as what we have to catch up with ... (Heidegger, 2010, p. 71).

That his Dasein (roughly, human being) “learns” is apparently not problematic for Heidegger. As indicated above, he uses the word in a common, conventional way that is a clue to his usage being ontic. It may be seen in these examples that ‘learning’ is associated with change or progression and thus with time: “... in the first place ...”, “... experience ...”, “... in the course of ...”, “... learned from ...”, and “... learn to ...”. In some of the quotations, “learn” could be replaced by “acquire” or “attain” and thus it relates to a specific thing. It is the thing that one might possess or hold, such as a truth or know-how. We might say it is the Heideggerian analogue of acquiring specific knowledge or particular skills. This is supported by his discussion about medical skills and knowledge not being integral to Dasein – as quoted above, the practice of medicine does not grow the way that trees grow.

The “customary usage” described above, is reinforced in one lecture where Heidegger does specifically address the concept of learning. In his winter 1951 account of thinking (the first lectures he is permitted to deliver after the Second World War), as a way into a discussion, Heidegger reflects on the concept of learning

specifically: What is learning? Man learns when he disposes everything he does so that it answers to whatever essentials are addressed to him at any given moment. We learn to think by giving our mind to what there is to think about. (Heidegger, 1968, p. 4)

The words at issue are “disposes”, “everything”, “answers”, “essentials”, and “addressed to him”. The second quoted sentence is more specific than the first. It focuses on the mental which is to be interpreted as an example or aspect of “everything”. The whole statement presents two challenges, first, to seek in his statement any possibility of an ontological notion of learning, and second to develop the ontic account of learning which is that account required for a regional ontology. The second challenge is not addressed in the present paper.

As a step towards both the challenges, the word “dispose” needs attention. At issue is, first, what makes “disposing” possible, and second, how this “disposing” is actually deployed by Dasein. This last issue is assumed to embrace the circumstances and “context” of disposing. “Dispose” is a distinctly better word for Heidegger’s notion of learning than “deploy” or “direct ones effort towards”, or “use”. There are connotations in “dispose” that encourage us to towards helpful patterns of thought regarding the being of Dasein. When a human being expires, it disposes of carbon dioxide that has been produced by the Krebs’ cycle in mitochondria. This removal of particular molecules leaves the tissues in a state that allows further biochemical reactions that are necessary to life. Households dispose of their acquired rubbish and if they did not do this their living conditions would deteriorate. It may be seen that in disposal it is that which remains that is of prime importance (ongoing biochemistry, sanitary living). This structure suggests we ask: What remains when we deploy our resources to “answer essentials”? As Heidegger well understood truth remains, and this refers to both correspondence, *adaequatio*, and the truth of disclosure, *alētheia* (Heidegger, 1962, p. 257; Heidegger, 2002, p. 6; Heidegger, 2007, p. 280).

Disposing also involves re-location. Expiration is spectacularly a re-location of a gas. Likewise, rubbish spectacularly accumulates in landfills and away from households. What is the re-location entailed in Heideggerian learning? The answer that rushes forward is “truths”. However, it is not the truths that are sought, but those other truths that hide those that are to appear. Dasein has to relocate truths that cover over the “essentials”. There are several aspects to this:

1. The word “sought” here must be considered delicately. The teacher may seek to have the student possess specific truths in correspondence formulations. From teacher’s point-of-view there is seeking in several senses that might relate to the ontic concepts of pedagogy such as motivation and effort. However, from the students point-of-view regarding the presence of what is learnt – the unitary truths – there is no seeking. They are not actively sought in themselves.

2. Learning is about a progressive clearance of things. Some things require more clearance than others. (Notice that here there is potentially an interpretation of the lit clearing that supplements the horizontal interpretation of Heidegger’s clearing.)

3. The things to be re-located are respectable in themselves, in other words they are truths. They are not to be despised or undervalued by us the ontic interpreters of the situation. Is such undervaluing apparent, for example, when a science teacher does not address a student’s myths and superstitions an appropriate manner? That which is removed holds its own dignity and integrity by virtue as its standing as truth.

4. A Socratic dialog, in that original sense of leading the student to see the contradictions and false trails, might be a sensible way to advance learning. It is the removal of covering truths. Each time something is asked by the teacher the student takes something away from what they held in the foreground. This applies to both truth as correspondence and truth as disclosure, *adaequatio* and *alētheia*.

5. It explicates one aspect of Heidegger’s statement that teaching must allow learning to happen. Teaching is separated from the event of learning.

The re-location aspect of “dispose” is present in “deploy”. When troops deploy they move and occupy a place. This deployment aspect of “dispose” is in an obsolete use of the word (Meaning I.1.d.for “dispose, v.” in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, 1989). When an army deploys it moves everything. Likewise with the movement of the covering truths, they all must go. In this may be seen Heidegger’s “everything”.

Later in the present paper, Heidegger’s use of the word “logistics” is considered in relation to thinking. This is also a word conditioned for today’s reader by having a common use in the

military and positivist management theory. Again, there is an obsolete use of “dispose” that emphasises the authoritative character of disposing (Meaning I.3. for “dispose, v.” in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, 1989). This becomes relevant in relation to Heidegger’s notion of learning where his notion might be contrasted with that which suggests *inter alia* that the mind is a calculator.

In the already cited work, *What is Called Thinking*, he presents his ideas about teaching and learning. His leading points are conventional ideas today and include for learning:

1. That learning to think should be construed as similar to learning any handicraft.
2. Any attempt to learn begins with an acknowledgement that there is something the learner does not know.
3. Even if we are gifted at thinking we still have to learn it as a skill.
4. Close listening is important. Which means finding in words those meanings and adumbrations that are subtle, forgotten, or hidden. This is of course one of Heidegger’s own consummate skills and disciplines.
5. It is desirable that student avoids “one-track” thinking which is the kind of thinking analogous to being on a railway track and which occurs with the failure of 5 above (Heidegger, 1968, pp. 24–27).

Regarding teaching, he says:

1. Teaching is more difficult than learning.
2. This is because the teacher is less sure of his ground than the student.
3. The teacher must at times motivate the student (by becoming “noisy”).
4. It is also, most importantly, because the teacher’s task is “to let learn” (p. 15).
5. Nobody any longer wants to be a teacher.
6. This is because teaching is “downgraded”, for example through an emphasis on business.
7. Being an esteemed teacher is entirely different from being a famous professor (Heidegger, 1968, pp. 14–15).

These points about student learning and teaching indicate that Heidegger’s working context was similar to that of modern teachers (Some relevant historical material is in Riley, 2009). Had it been

possible to set aside the events of the Second World War, he would have spoken about his work – the students and the institutions – as many teachers speak today (Achour et al., 2008).

Something more (than the points above concerning the nature of truths and their disclosure) needs to be said about the teacher's task being "to let learn". It suggests teachers might do best if they resign forthwith and stay well clear of students. "To let learn" apparently contradicts his statement that teachers must become "noisy" at times. This confusion is about the motivation of students and unpacks if some distinctions are made. The lecturer or classroom teacher is involved in many tasks with the students. There may be the need to maintain order in the classroom, issue books, and set out the prescription, for example. However, when the focus is directly, specifically, and purely on that to be learnt (some would say the "course content", in a sense that embraces both skills and knowledge) then the student is on their own. Harking back to what was said above about the uncovering of truths by the removal of truths – this is something that only the learner as Dasein can achieve. We learn alone. Today the implications of this are relevant in discussions about e-learning pedagogy (for an example in science education, see Shaw, 2004; Shaw, 2005; Shaw, 2007; Shaw and Love, 2007).

To return to the present line of thinking – which is to indicate how his views may relate to the learning of Dasein – it is helpful to focus on the "essentials" to which he refers: "Depending on the kind of essentials, depending on the realm from which they address us, the answer and with it the kind of learning differs. ..." (Heidegger, 1968, p. 14). This solidifies several things that come from his "definition" of learning (cited above, Heidegger, 1968, p. 4) and the critical words it contains:

1. There are alternative "essentials". Although these are not discussed by Heidegger in the passage being considered, his acknowledging of "essentials" harks back to Husserl regarding how different types and sub-types of entities might be secured.
2. The alternative essentials address us from different realms. The present paper does not consider regional ontology, but this is a direct reference to regional ontology.

3. The word “address” could probably be replaced with the word “question”. If this is so, it returns us to a substantial body of Heideggerian theory around method in both philosophy and science.
4. The answers in their essentials are determined by the corresponding essentials of the questions. These answers are entailed in the questions asked initially. Accordingly, there may be “kinds of learning”.
5. It is the nature of the objects that determines the kind of learning. These “objects” are variously glossed as “entities”, “existents”, and “truths”. The preferred word in the present paper would be “truths” because this indicates the discreteness and accords with Heidegger’s emphasis later in his work.

Obliquely, Heidegger provides further information on learning. There is apparently a distinction that may serve to dissociate learning and the truths of regional ontology on the one hand and academic learning on the other hand. He writes against “learnedness”. Heidegger wrote to Jaspers upon his appointment in 1928 to Husserl’s chair at the University of Freiburg: “Freiburg for me will once more be a test of whether anything of philosophy is left there or whether it has all turned to learnedness” (Safranski, 1998, p. 189). Learnedness is a potential outcome of learning and relates to both what is learnt and how the learning is held by the learner. It might seem that the distinction between “philosophy” (as a genuine regional ontology) and “learnedness” could be argued back to the “how” of learning. The use of such an argument would be rendered if it was possible to relate it to unitary truths. For example, we might think that there is a truth that is factual, (say) from the ontic realm of science (the Earth will cease to exist in some billion year’s time). If the philosopher and the learned person – both as Dasein – are in some relationship with this unitary truth, is the situation intrinsically different in each case? One of the initial problems with apparently unitary truths is their mysterious lodgement (existence together, entailment of each other) with ostensibly different Dasein. The truths we tend to think of as unitary because of their specificity and “objectivity”, are somehow “repeated” in many Dasein. The challenge is to say how Heidegger’s model of truth can accommodate the independence of truths and their dependence upon Dasein which appear to us as discrete examples of Dasein-ness. This challenge is, of course, an old discussion. In the 1980s, Badiou

(2006) produced insights into the unitary character of truths, building directly on the work of Heidegger, in his *Being and Event*. Incidentally, by 1933, when Rector Heidegger “had long since lost touch with reality” he was arguing for truth in the absolute singular and ultimately for “indoctrination” (Ott, 1993, p. 156 and 225).

3. Seeking ‘Learning’ in Relatedness

‘Learning’ is not blatantly apparent in foundational ontology. Accordingly, the questions arise, why not and how does learning narrate to relatedness which is definitive of Dasein? To approach these questions a method used by Heidegger is applied, yet we should not be too optimistic about Heidegger’s methods. As Peters sweeps: “Heidegger’s strategy for getting beyond ‘man’ will not do the trick...” (Peters, 2007, p. 3). Ignoring Peter’s pessimism, this paper here seeks to draw upon one of the techniques that Heidegger uses to explicate one idea (learning) within this mysterious thing – the Being of beings. In doing this, the paper provides yet another interpretation of Heidegger, as opposed to a commentary.

Even greater than Peter’s pessimism is Heidegger’s frustration when he is locked into this same enterprise. Many reflective people understand the central problem of ontology as our arriving at an understanding about the foundational nature and origin of human beings. Many realise that science cannot deliver all that we apparently require. The frustration Heidegger felt is evident in his persistence. It is of course not desirable to simplify what drove Heidegger. The “dreaming boy” that Jaspers described as the post-war Heidegger, holds some similarities to the “Young Heidegger, who poetized his way though his neurosis” (Kisiel, 2002, p. 182). The present paper inherits these deliberations and seeks to locate a method in them. It asks why that method is not by Heidegger applied to “learning.”

Heidegger states that leaning is a “way” but not a “means” by which unconcealedness happens. The context for this is Lecture II in *What is Called Thinking?* where he uses Hölderlin’s line “Who has most deeply thought, loves what is most alive” (Heidegger, 1968, p. 20) to establish that “inclination reposes in thinking” (pp. 20–21) and to argue that this line tells us we can only fathom when we think. Such thinking – that required – is not the thinking of logic that has largely dominated the Western tradition which culminates (he

specifies in “America and elsewhere”) in “logistics” (Heidegger, 1975, pp. 60–61; The same expression “logistics, psychology, and sociology” he uses in reference to the now manifest disintegration of philosophy at the end of the tradition which is marked by Hegel, see Heidegger, 1998a, p. 323). “Logistics” appears here in the old sense of pertaining to reasoning or calculation. This situation (“fateful submission” he says, p. 22) is derived from “far away” and is still properly approached by considering the Greek distinction between poesy and technology. This situation – precisely the withdrawing of poesy – provides for us genuine food for thought. Although this withdrawing began in the Western intellectual tradition over 2,000 years ago, what is in its being and its grounding Being, is close at hand, and we must learn to hear and intuit what is still there. It is this situation and continued presence that he claims is most thought-provoking for those who practice thinking: Whether, by way of this learning though never by means of it, we shall attain relatedness to what is most thought-provoking, is something altogether out of the hands of those who practice the craft of thinking (Heidegger, 1968, p. 25).

Consequently, learning as it is pursued in schools (in other words, ontic learning, that learning requiring correspondence, *adaequatio*) may be advantageous in the creation of circumstances that facilitate, or hold open, the possibility of, “relatedness”. However, he indicates relatedness in itself can never be directly learnt by learning. Relatedness is not something one can “learn” in Heidegger’s use of that word. This is because the required associations are not to be established by our learning the relationships of correspondence. The “relationships” of relatedness are integral to Dasein and already entailing of the world. Apparently this “world” can appear to us in a manner that leads us to intuit to some aspect of Dasein. For example, this method shows in the consideration Heidegger gives to Hölderlin’s line: “It is the land of your birth, the soil of your homeland, What you seek, it is near, already comes to meet you” (Heidegger, 2000a, p. 27).

There are several associated ideas in Hölderlin that are relevant to the present enquiry and they are considered by Heidegger. In summary, there is a seeking, a searching, that requires a finding. There is also the idea that the looking is in the present but that the answer was present in the past (actually distant past, although you would not know it from the two quotations above). There is,

additionally, the notion about method that relates to Hölderlin's style in poetry (how he says what he says) which is to state in simple words a description of some physical situation that is reasonably comprehensive, and without being explicitly, directly, or specifically told the reader comes to realise that this is an account of something more profound. This depends on a moment of insight and answers to the name of truth, *alētheia*. For example, a description of a river from its source becomes the history of the people who live in that vicinity. Painters use the same technique, a pair of old work boots speaks to us of working people, honest toil, injustice, death, and social strata. The strength of such a method is that it does bring forward, disclose, things that might not be disclosed in quite the same way (as quite the same thing), whilst the difficulty is that we cannot be certain what anyone takes from the situation. This latter point applies to what is written intending the technique; perhaps particularly (meaning in special regards, or drawing upon special features such as those of language) in examples about his enduring topic, being.

Heidegger is not concerned with any perceived need for communality regarding insight. This is about Dasein, and particularly how Dasein might arrive at an understanding of its ownmost and of its ownmost as being. Facticity is involved comprehensively and this is integral to Dasein and without a necessary recourse to any categories of ontic deliberation.

With "by way of this learning though never by means of it" he opens the door to a consideration of "learning" in formal ontology. The door opens because both "way" and "unconcealedness" describe Dasein on both sides of the ontological divide. In other places he also opens this door. For example it is convenient to use "learning" in relation to the possible advance of humankind to a totally new sphere of insight and being, a new generation of Dasein, a generation that can think into things that are at present precluded. Some Kantian philosophy emphasises the limits of human reason, and Heidegger asks if those limits cannot be altered. This alteration is not to be thought as an extension, but rather as a radical new beginning: "... For the learning of his [humankind's] own poetic vocation is something which is coming, which also allows the homelike to be something which is coming" (Heidegger, 2000a, p. 123).

As Heidegger says, building on and quoting Hölderlin, the what-has-been comes back to the one who thinks it from the opposite

direction. In nature, in the paddock, the wind “goes” (his quotation marks) away from the poet, but “re-thinking-of (*An-denken*)” does not admit objects or directions in the manner of the wind. This analogy may be applied to, and extended within, the pre-cognitive realms of understanding. In other words, it may be thought without any form of subject-object categorising. It is apparent that the strategy Heidegger uses to explain this situation is to begin with an expression we will naturally interpret ontically and with a fullness of associations and with a context, and then to remove from that understanding certain, selected critical elements. The last move he makes is to ask us to now think what is left behind.

There are several places where Heidegger adopts this distinctive strategy in his determined efforts to explain to us aspects of the foundation of Being. After considering the strategy he uses in some examples, the question is posed: can it be applied to “learning”? More specifically, the strategy often draws attention to a transitive verb that applies in an ontic deliberation and then removes from that verb its object. The question Heidegger poses is: what are we left with? Whatever it is, we are allegedly taken closer to an apprehension of Being. The strategy certainly problematises the words that he renders to this treatment, whether it reveals anything about Being is another matter. Perhaps the most immediate question we have is why he selects some words for this treatment, and not others. Be that as it may, there is something humanly appealing in his examples – it is possible to discern that there is a waiting that is not a waiting for something, and to wonder about such waiting. That said, such thought requires a particular frame of mind, a kind of openness, towards the gaining of insight from poetry and the use of words in a manner that does not proceed from definition-to-definition (meaning, by correspondence). This is, in Heidegger’s account of *Dasein*, in each example related to both the horizons involved and mood.

There are two points to make about his strategy in general. Firstly, it would be a mistake to think that the moves he makes are to be assessed with regard to the correct management of transitive verbs, sentences, or concepts. In this work, Heidegger does not proceed from sentence-to-sentence or even from concept-to-concept. Instead, he paints in words a potential picture, and allows space for something akin to a Gestalt moment. The horizon within which all these “deliberations” reside is that of thinking within formal

ontology and the use of transitive verbs as displayed in rules of correspondence is distinctly ontic.

Secondly, induction is also implicated in such deliberations. It is important to be circumspect about a term like “induction” because “induction” itself derives from a particular ontic science, specifically and foundationally the science of logic. Heidegger came to these deliberations via an extensive examination of Brentano and Lotze and their insights into the difficulties of the discipline of logic. In 1925, Heidegger wrote “Logic is the only science that, strictly speaking treats of truth” and Dahlstrom begins his book on Heidegger’s notion of truth at this apt starting place (Dahlstrom, 2001, p. 1). The thinking that has just been sketched, with Hölderlin as the example, is at first acquaintance “inductive”. And, the approach being taken in the present investigation is also inductive. A general proposition is sought for Heidegger’s use of specific words, and then that proposition is to be applied to “learning”. This approach derives from the context in which any author (as Dasein) must work. Yet, with Heidegger, we must not in an ontological enquiry admit any such thing as a general proposition (law). Instead, we have a pattern. In the deliberations here, we do no more than notice the pattern and should refrain from attaching to it a label derived from ontic enquiry.

Before considering the strategy in relation to learning (which Heidegger apparently does not do), the strategy is considered with the some Heideggerian examples. The examples are all associated with his analysis of the ontological, of the things that are equiprimordial and entailed in the ontological essence of Dasein. Here it is the strategy that is inherent in the manipulation of words that is at issue, and why that strategy seems oddly inappropriate when applied to “learning”. Some positive examples include: waiting (without waiting for anything), thanking (that does not have to thank for something), willing, releasing (releasement), apprehending, having (as derived from Husserl’s notion of intentionality), and sheltering.

The example of Heidegger’s use of “having” has as specific origin. According to Kisiel it appeared first in his Marburg winter semester lectures in 1925–26 (published as *Logik: Die frage nach der Wahrheit, Logic: the Question of Truth*) and built upon Husserl’s “principle of all principles” (Dahlstrom, 2001, p. 9; Kisiel, 2002, p. 182). Husserl’s principle, intentionality, is that our mental awareness

is always directed at, or carries with it, an object. With Heidegger, the relationship between the intuition and the object of the intuition is described with the words “having” or “apprehending” (Kisiel, 2002, p. 182).

In *Logic: the Question of Truth*, Heidegger challenges the notion of truth when it is entailed in the logical prejudice and comes to blame Lotze for:

more than anyone else ... cementing the logical prejudice in the minds of a generation, at the outset of the twentieth century (Dahlstrom, 2001, pp. 9–10).
... intentionality designates a relation or, more precisely, a way of relating or behaving (*Verhalten*) in which what is intended and the way it is intended are necessarily and originally united. In Heidegger’s further elaboration of this phenomenon as a ‘relating that means something’ (*bedeutendes Verhalten*) or ‘being-in-the-world,’ it becomes a ‘primary’ understanding in the sense of ‘simply having something’ (*schlichtes Haben von etwas*) (Dahlstrom, 2001, p. 101).

Dahlstrom uses the words “further elaboration” to describe Heidegger’s step ahead. However, it is a large step – more than an “elaboration” of Husserl, because it entails two new ideas and the rejection of the leading idea in Husserl’s intentionality. The new ideas are:

1. The removal of intuition and object and their replacement with one “necessarily and originally united” entity which Heidegger comes to call truth or more atomically “truths”, and which in *Being and Time* are integrally Dasein.
2. The widening of the grounding of the world (both in itself and in its examples that are unitary truths) that is primordially distinctly holistic, but which subsequently articulates (becomes broken into categories, better termed horizontal structures, and also broken into released truths within those horizons).

This situation produces compartment. Being-in-the-world is not sitting in the world as a stone sits in the world, but it entails going about one’s business as Dasein comports. Importantly, it is non-thematic, and does not of itself necessarily entail anything mental. Husserl’s intentionality is atomic, mental, and discussed in examples

drawn from the realms of science. Heidegger's equivalent of intentionality is prior to Husserl's, undifferentiated, not mental (non-thematic), and described in examples (comportments) that are universal to Dasein and necessary before Husserl's forms of truth can comport.

In *Being and Time* (1962, pp. 259–262) Heidegger shows that the derivation of truth in the sense of “*adaequatio*” is derived from the primordial sense of truth as disclosedness-discoveredness. He deplores the way in which the derivative *adaequatio* was taken as the primordial. This, he says, has been the attitude of the scientists, where the abstract, decontextualized world of the structures generated through the derivative representational devices of language and mathematical equations were taken as the source of the underlying, equipmental, lived world (for example of tables, chairs, and buildings). Succinctly: “The *Being-true (truth)* of the assertion must be understood as *Being-uncovering*” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 261). This account of truth is then related to intentionality, in the words of Dahlstrom:

Intentionality [as understood by Heidegger] is to be investigated precisely with respect to what is thereby a priori in the original sense, namely, its manner of being or, more precisely, the sense of the manner of being. Just as the truth is originally experienced but not grasped in a categorical intuition, so the sense of being discloses itself unthematically in the intentionality of being-in-the-world. ‘With this discovery of intentionality, the way for a radical, ontological research is given for the first time in the entire history of philosophy’. (Dahlstrom, 2001, p. 102, who translates Heidegger GA 17, p. 260)

This account of an insight by Heidegger is necessary to support a simple observation: The having of truth follows from the holding open. The truth is originally experienced but not grasped (to use Dahlstrom's words). All of this occurs without any Dasein having to work or force the situation. It is Dasein's way of being. In a word, it is a “passive” process or situation.

Heidegger also uses the notion of “willing” in a way similar to that displayed for “having”. In the *Conversation*, it is the Scientist who summarises:

Am I right if I state the relation of the one sense of non-willing to the other as follows? You want a non-willing in the sense of a renouncing of willing, so that through this we may release, or at least prepare to release, ourselves to the sought-for essence of a thinking that is not a willing (“Conversation on a Country Path,” in Heidegger, 1966, pp. 59–60).

Re-leasement does not belong to the domain of the will. It lies beyond the distinction between activity and passivity and is hidden (p. 61). With this Heidegger separates the domain of the object from the notion of the re-leasement, and leaves us in that domain that is ahead of any particular re-leasement. What is the nature of this “re-leasement”? It is to be seen when traced etymologically to the word “lax”. The word “release has a Latin source as “relax” which in turn can suggest to us “lax” (Entries for “release” and “relax” in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, 1989). The notion that is essential within this releasement is “passivity”. This is a releasement that accords with opportunity and circumstance. It is the opposite of “forced”, “violent” or even “managed” releasement.

Incidentally, the use of “domain” for the first time on page 61 in the *Conversation* associates his discussion of releasement with regional ontology and ontic enquiries. On page 64 and 65 this is developed to entail an horizon, and the notion of sheltering and securing what presents to, or within, an openness. Problematised in very few words are the issues that Husserl dwelt upon in relation to objects within horizons.

There is the example of “waiting”. When one waits, one waits for something or someone. Can Dasein just wait, without the presence of a waited for something or someone? Heidegger calls such waiting “releasement towards things” and there is the notion that thinking is waiting:

Waiting, all right; but never awaiting, for awaiting already links itself with re-presenting and what is re-presented. Waiting, however, lets go of that; or rather I should say that waiting lets re-presenting entirely alone. It really has no object.... In waiting we leave open what we are waiting for. ... A word does not and never can represent anything; but signifies something.

Further, there is the example of thanking in relation to fundamental ontology. Again, this is related to thinking as thanking: "... that thanking which does not have to thank for something, but only thanks for being allowed to thank" ["Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking," *Discourse on Thinking*, 59, 67, 68–69, 85 (1945)]

This same line of argument appears elsewhere in his works. For example in this quotation, the foundational form or kind of thinking is brought forward and contrasted with ontic deliberation in the most broad way using the expression "realm of language". The use of the word "realm" has the effect of reminding us that the model is spatial, geographic:

Thinking is poetizing, and indeed more than one kind of poetizing, more than poetry and song. ... Thinking is primordial poetry, prior to all poesy, but also prior to the poetics of art, since art shapes its work within the realm of language. All poetizing, in this broader sense, and also in the narrower sense of the poetic, is in its ground a thinking ("The Anaximander Fragment", written in 1946, in Heidegger, 1975, p. 19).

To advance the discussion, the question may be posed: why not "learning"? One possible answer is about the seen by contrasting learning with those words he does use with their objects removed – having, waiting, and thanking. As mentioned, it is possible to imagine waiting, without waiting for any event or object. Having existence is a form of having and there is a debate out the extent to which existence is a substance or a property, and accordingly there is the possibility to what "is" that is not substance or property.

However, one apparently consistent and immediate characteristic of the group is that they do not require a mental aspect. The exception possibly is the notion of "thanking". Creatures that are not Dasein, have and wait. This may be seen in an earthworm. In the case of Dasein, this being with objects, and then, potentially, applying Heidegger's strategy, being without objects. "Thanking" is closer to an activity of mind than the others, but even "thanking" may be construed in a manner that is free from a cognitive component. It may be seen in the comportment of animals that cling to life. It may be possible to construe the instinct to remain alive and to preserve the self into a form of "thanking".

“Learning”, in contradistinction, stands without the same form of possibility. It cannot be associated with Dasein, or indeed with animals that are not Dasein, without some object. There is no “learning to be”. There is just being. Skills may be acquired, learnt, without mental involvement in Descartes’s sense of mind-body. However, the skill always has a reference that is an object. You cannot have a totally abstract, non-referred skill. Every skill must have an effect that is palpable and recognisable. In short, it must relate to something that we might say is real.

4. The Violence in Learning

Our focus must now become *alētheia*, or truth as disclosure; however *alētheia* is here approached in an unusual way. The present paper to this point has largely attended to that which is revealed – construed as the unitary truths which include (roughly speaking) those that teachers seek to have their students learn. These truths are those rendered by correspondence in the tedious, pervasive underside of school learning. These truths, like all Heideggerian truths, are neither desirable nor un-desirable in themselves. They are constitutional of Dasein. Now the paper must attend to that which is removed and the procedure of “uncovering”. These things removed are also truths, but they apparently acquire a “pejorative” status in that they are not-present. There is a residual sense in which it may be said they are undesirable, an adumbrated pejorative sense. They are to be re-moved, re-located, and perhaps for a period, discarded.

For all that, those relocated are truths with the status that the being of truths entails. To recall the earlier analogy, neither carbon dioxide nor rubbish is false because it is unwanted and discarded. Recall that for Heidegger the truths in this discussion are neither true nor false, except in one particular sense of having truth or falsity as a “property”. Of course “property” is the wrong word because it is magnificently the word of an ontic science. Truth and falsity have an association with the truth only when truth is within a particular theoretical frame. Truth and falsity always serve to maintain belongingness so far as Dasein’s ownmost is concerned.

It is not correct to say that the truths proceed into oblivion or nothingness, even though there is no law of conservation of matter in ontology. Nor is there a law of contradiction in ontology as there is in logic. “Re-location” is a helpful word for it fits well with

Heidegger's "uncovering" and with the phenomena we seek to explicate. It works well with the analogy seen in forgetting and remembering. Forgetting may lead to remembering. When Dasein forgets, the forgotten object remains with Dasein but not within foremost consciousness. When Dasein remembers, Dasein relocates the object and identifies it as that sought which is a constitution of itself in a complex that involves truth. Schooling provides many examples. For example, whilst the Pacific Island student learns the mantra of science and says the living world is composed of plants and animals, the classification of their culture (plant, animals, insects, and man) will continue to exist as an equally convincing configuration of truths and can emerge under stressful conditions such as examinations.

Dasein does not destroy those truths that re-locate to allow others to shine. All truths hold their presence integral to Dasein. For that reason, they are available to be re-located a second, and a third, and subsequent times. Each Dasein is re-ordering, re-configuring, its ownmost landscape of truths all the time. In this model, the ontological equivalent of one "property" is important to each and every truth. Namely, they are always "known" in categories. These categories themselves are something that Dasein "establishes" and "disestablishes". This discussion here uses the ontic equivalent words of the ontological framework being described. These truths are not "known" mentally. Nor are the categories like those that Aristotle and others developed into the school subjects that we have today. Ontological "categories" are further considered below.

The account of truths – now with its focus on those particularly "desired" for students by teachers – is a model of the human way of being. It is from within this model that the notion of violence appears. As developed here, following Heidegger, integrally there is truth and Dasein. However, over two centuries ago, and without the specific references to truth, one academic wrote about the structural situation being described and used the word "violence" in a manner that is effectively modelled with the notion of unitary truths. Around 1715, the Scots mathematician Gregory had an insight into Dasein. He had in his first book on astronomy set out the views of astronomers on "the realm of Phenomena" (Book I of Gregory, 1726). With this he sought to explain solar dynamics and particularly diurnal motion. Then he continued "but Methods must be explained", and this was the task of his second book.

There are some who may interpret his second book as a plea for empiricism and model building in science. Indeed, he does say that to explain the words of astronomers he must describe the use of “Spheres, Globes, and other Instruments” (p. 200) and accordingly there is indeed an aspect of this in what he wrote. Others may see a concern for the common people and the need to relate science to them. Indeed, Proposition I of Section I is a detailed account of how space looks to the everyday, ordinary observer on Earth (Book II of Gregory, 1726, p. 201). Others still may see a concern for science itself and its need for popular appeal. Regardless of Gregory’s purpose, attention is drawn to his account of how the mind functions. Although apparently he does not refer to unitary truths, his account is consistent with the ideas about them. His statement below refers to “our” reason and “our” senses, thus it holds science integrally as thine ownmost. The statement comes about by his consideration of two groups with what we might say are different mind-sets: “the common People” and “Astronomers”. However, the two groups are forgotten when the one individual person or single group appears as “our” and the tussle is about something more profound because it is more foundational: “We must ... not make our Reason and Philosophy perpetually offer violence to our Sight and other Senses” (Book II of Gregory, 1726, p. 200).

“Violence” here is pejorative and entails an unwanted intensity. It rightly conjures images of conflict with alternatives. In such a tussle there is an object tussled over. There is the pulling of the one to be an object of “Reason and Philosophy” or the other way to be an object of “Sight and other Senses”. “Violence” is the appropriate word even today for the concept that Gregory seeks within a model that entails unitary truths akin to those of Heidegger.

Equally important to the object involved in what is above, is the necessary entailment of two distinct horizons or spheres – that of “Reason and Philosophy” and that of “Sight and other Senses”. Thus, Gregory constitutes a model that is about the functioning of the mind and involves what we naturally see as “categories” but which are better cast as areas or volumes within a model. Probably knowingly, Gregory establishes as issues the nature of boundaries and the nature of truths within boundaries.

The notion of violence within learning was implicit in the deliberations of the 18th Century philosopher-scientists. Gregory is an example. He was involved in wide discussions on these topics

with the Royal Society and other academics. The notion of violence in learning became more explicit in the 20th Century in Heidegger's companion volume to *Being and Time*. Precisely, it was the companion volume to the seventh edition (1953) where Heidegger refers his readers to the now published version of his 1935 summer semester lecture course (Translator's introduction to Heidegger, 2000b, p. vii).

Heidegger's translators specifically warn of the difficulties around the "ordinary German" word for violence, *Gewalt*. Fried and Polt specify two separate meanings for the same word in their translation:

1. Violence in the sense of arbitrary and willful (*sic*) force, and
2. Violence as employed by the legitimate force employed by the institutions of the State (Heidegger, 2000b, pp. xii–xiii).

They note that *Gewalt* is related to *Walten* (hold sway) and *das Walten* (the sway) which in turn, via the Greek word *phusis*, relates violence to being itself (Heidegger, 2000b, p. xiii). Ostensibly, the use of the word "sway" is to be interpreted as representing a "powerful upsurge in the presence of beings", and the reader is urged to pay "special attention" to this (xiii). ... Heidegger seems to want to underline the radically transformative work of *Gewalt-tat* and the *Gewalt-tätiger* – the act of violence and the doer of violence ...” (Heidegger, 2000b, p. xiii).

The phrase "radical transformative work" echoes Gregory. His Astronomer may view the planet Venus scientifically on Tuesday, but on Wednesday respond to the same object with "twinkle, twinkle, little star". How does this thunderous phrase – radical transformative work – come to require underling in *Introduction to Metaphysics*? It emerges from a discussion that begins with lines 332 to 375 from Sophocles' choral ode *Antigone*. The ode itself in these lines is an account of the joys of the eco-friendly lifestyle. It does not obviously refer to violence. Heidegger makes a characteristic move when he asks us to consider what must be presupposed and present before such an ode can exist. He thereby interrogates the ontological foundations for Sophocles' thought.

According the translators of *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger's translation from the Greek is unusual (footnotes, pages 156 and 157). One word at issue is "uncanny". It is in *Antigone*, and, *Antigone* also provides an apt example. This word correlates to what

occurs when the poet leaves home and consequently abides with truths that were not present at home: In the happening of uncanniness, beings as a whole open themselves up. This opening up is the happening of unconcealment. This is nothing other than the happening of uncanniness. (Heidegger, 2000b, p. 178)

To this must be applied the standard Heideggerian technique of explaining in the ontic and meaning in the ontological. As he explicitly said earlier “But we do not mean the uncanny in the sense of an impression made on our emotional states” (Heidegger, 2000b, p. 161).

“Violence” enters this model of Dasein, our way of being, with meaning from both of the Fried and Polt senses. The truths that become constituent of the poet do so without the poet’s action or volition. Dasein does not ask for homesickness, nor can Dasein avoid it. Truths become with us. There is in this the arbitrary and the wilful and there is the legitimate that derives from constitution.

The essential process is the uncovering process. The truths that are present and dominating at home are moved, re-located to reveal other truths that were not “expected”. (“Expected” is too mental.) Ontological uncanniness emerges in the both the movement of the upper layer and the discovery of the lower layer. If learning is about the acquisition of truths then learning entails violence in the sense of involuntary movement and in the sense of uncomfortable outcome.

It is possible to relate this to school learning; that is, to relate it to how Dasein comes to be integrally with particular ontic truths. The line of thought above, which starts with Gregory, launches a discussion of regional ontology. However, we may also look in the other direction, in the direction of the singular Dasein and the notion of truth therein. Heidegger tackles this directly when he says he will show three things:

1. Apprehension is not a mere process, but a de-cision.
2. Apprehension stands in an inner essential community with logos...
3. Logos grounds the essence of language. As such, logos is a struggle and it is the grounding ground of historical human Dasein... (Heidegger, 2000b, p. 179)

The mainstay of schooling is also language and logos in Aristotle’s sense of argument from reason. To enter the sphere of schooling as language and logos, it is necessary for Dasein to leave the everyday. Entering the realm of language and logos is to leave that which

Gregory saw as the way of the ordinary People, to leave the way of the senses. It is to enter a further way of being which we grandly associate with abstract thought. However, thinking and judging are more than that with which we commonly associate them. Logos involves more than “a struggle”: “But such essential deciding, when it is carried out and when it resists the constantly pressing ensnarement in the everyday and the customary, has to use violence” (Heidegger, 2000b, p. 179).

5. Final Comment

This paper, though many related discussions, suggests that violence in Heidegger’s ontological sense is at the heart of schooling. At issue are two formulations of truth, correspondence (*adaequatio*), and disclosure (*alētheia*). There are several occasions when the strategy of thought has been to pose the questions about the ground or foundation that allows distinctions to be drawn, a formulation of the hermeneutic circle. It is not a claim of the present paper that anything original has been discovered. Instead, aspects of the work of others, particularly Heidegger, but also some translators, have been brought together to contribute to a conclusion.

Something needs to be said about the approach taken to enquiry, the discussions, in the present paper. The form of the recorded enquiry holds some similarity to the form of Heidegger’s later investigations. It muses on words and circumstances, and then pronounces to test lines of thought and build relationships between ideas. There is a high dependence on analogy and a constant awareness of the need to enquire into the grounding of what is at issue. The result is that the enquiry becomes as series of shorter bursts of iterative activity as opposed to as sustained line of argument. A developed model is to be found in Heidegger’s work *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (Heidegger, 1999).

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