Abstract
Popper’s methodological individualism faces some problems. It is not clear if we should interpret it as Weberian or along the lines of rational choice theory. As contrasted with what was done in Ian C. Jarvie’s admirable The Revolution in Anthropology (Jarvie, The Revolution in Anthropology. Routledge, London, 1964), the theory was not addressed to concrete problem situations in social theory and does not fit well with Popper’s early ideas about methodological rules or his later ideas about metaphysical research programs. Further, its defenders–including Jarvie–interpret it in ways that give it little content, or which, I think mistakenly, take its thrust to be moral. In reinterpreting this nonetheless important idea, I think that we should take our lead from Jarvie in The Revolution in Anthropology.
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My concern here is with the more individualistic side of Weber’s approach, as found in his explicitly methodological writings (which may be contrasted with aspects of his approach to politics, which were at times more Marxian in their character); see on the latter Beetham (1974).
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I have no objection to Koertge’s approach to Popper’s views—her discussion ranges far beyond methodological individualism. My point, rather, is that when Popper introduced “methodological individualism,” it did not fit the ideas about “methodological rules” that he held at the time, while his ideas about “metaphysical research programs” were only articulated later and which also don’t fit his treatment of methodological individualism. Popper had long held that some metaphysical ideas played an important role in the development of science. But his ideas about “metaphysical research programs” were developed first in his lectures in 1949 and set most fully in his Unended Quest (Popper 1976) and the Postscript.
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See Watkins to Danto, 11 January 1962; L.S.E. Archive J. W. N. Watkins, Box 14, Folder 136.
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Compare the tradition, in some Western societies, of throwing salt over one’s left shoulder if it is accidentally spilled on the table or the custom, in England, of wearing paper hats from Christmas crackers, during Christmas dinner. Such practices have historical origins; but these are typically not known to those who behave in this manner.
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An interesting case is the development of the burning of (fake) paper money for the sake of the dead, in popular Chinese religious traditions, into the burning of paper versions of televisions, cars, and even Viagra. It seems that the burning of paper money may have had its origins in an indulgence-like belief that it could assist people in avoiding penalties in hell, prior to their reincarnation. The extension of this seems to be a matter of analogy, built on a misunderstanding of the original rationale for burning the paper money and to a picture of hell that makes no sense, although one might suspect that the content of TV programs in hell might be very much like the lower range of channels on satellite TV.
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Acknowledgment
I would like to thank Francesco Di Iorio for his comments on an earlier version of this paper and Raphael Sassower for many useful suggestions. I am only sorry that considerations of space precluded my responding to all the interesting problems which Di Iorio posed.
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Shearmur, J. (2019). Ian C. Jarvie, Critical Rationalism and Methodological Individualism. In: Sassower, R., Laor, N. (eds) The Impact of Critical Rationalism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90826-7_12
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