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Knowledge and assumptions

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Notes

  1. Contrary to Harman (1976, p. 47).

  2. An example of a weak closure principle is one that holds not of knowledge but of what you either know or assume. Weak closure principles are compatible with the picture we present here, though we neither endorse nor reject them here.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA

    Brett Sherman

  2. Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

    Gilbert Harman

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  1. Brett Sherman
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  2. Gilbert Harman
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Correspondence to Brett Sherman.

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We have used material from Harman and Sherman (2004).

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Sherman, B., Harman, G. Knowledge and assumptions. Philos Stud 156, 131–140 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9797-z

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