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Note on the Scope of Truth-functional Logic

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Abstract

A plausible and popular rule governing the scope of truth-functional logic is shown to be indequate. The argument appeals to the existence of truth-functional paraphrases which are logically independent of their natural language counterparts. A more adequate rule is proposed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ, 86011, USA

    David Sherry

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  1. David Sherry
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Sherry, D. Note on the Scope of Truth-functional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28, 327–328 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004367312707

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004367312707

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