Abstract
Jonathan Lear in Radical Hope tackles the idea of cultural devastation, in the specific case of the Crow Indians. What do we mean by “annihilation” of a culture? The moral point of view that he imagines as he reconstructs the eve and aftermath of this annihilation is not second personal, of obligation, but first personal, in the collective and singular, as told by the Crows, with Lear as “analyst.” Radical Hope is a study of representative character of a people—of virtue, courage, resilience, and hope in the face of cultural collapse. The leading questions are shaped by ancient Greek ethics, but with a twist: On the brink of cultural death, what counts for us as good living and what is the nature of the virtues or excellences that constitute it? How might a leader, a phronimos, exemplify it? This puts it too narrowly. The questions, also, are Wittgensteinian: How does a nation go on, when the concepts and way of life it has lived by for centuries are no more? What does it mean to go on? What does it mean to stop when the marks of going on are no longer?
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
As cited in http://www.pbs.org/weta/thewest/resources/archives/two/cherokee.htm. See Goodin (1985) p. 40 for mention of the two legal cases in this paragraph.
There is a body of empirical studies suggesting that we mentally represent in an unconscious and hard-wired way (as a part of a deep “moral grammar”) a significant moral difference between directly harming an innocent in a way that uses them as a mere means and causing them harm as a foreseen side effect; for discussion, see John Mikhail’s (2007) philosophical computational model of double effect dilemmas. Other empirical moral philosophers have argued that even if we generally think it is morally alright to cause harm as a side effect when the overall benefits are great enough, in cases where that harming is “up close and personal,” we are less likely to think it morally permissible; see Greene (2007).
Some dialogue with critics of historical moral psychology might be fruitful here, especially on the issue of constancy of character, central to Lear’s project. I have in mind the work of John Doris and Gil Harmon who point to social psychology experiments by Darley and Batson (among others) that suggest doing what is right is more a matter of the serendipity of situation than character. See Doris (2002), Harmon (2003). Also, see Darley and Batson (1973).
Fagles (1999).
On Anger, 1.9, in Cooper and Procopé (1995).
Chagnon (1988). At the time of the study, Yanomamö numbered 15,000 and divided into about 200 politically independent subgroups.
Relevant here is the work of Volkan (2006).
Indeed, I have been told from several sources that the head of West Point paid a visit directly to the producer of the program to insist that “24” was misleading cadets about proper interrogation techniques and corrupting core values that the Academy teaches.
For an excellent discussion of new models for the use of force, see Pfaff (2005). For one account of events at Haditha, see Newsweek, “Probing Bloodbath,” June 12, 2006.
References
Blumenfeld, L. (2002). Revenge. New York: Washington Square Press.
Chagnon, N. (1988). Life histories, blood revenge, and warfare in a tribal population. Science, 239, 985–992.
Cooper, J. M., & Procopé, J. F. (Eds.). (1995). On Anger, 1.9, using the translation in Moral and political essays. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Darley, J., & Batson, C. D. (1973). From Jerusalem to Jericho: A study of situational and dispositional variables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27.
Doris, J. (2002). Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fagles, R. (Ed.). (1999). The Iliad, Homer (pp. 22.398–405; 24.64–65). New York: Penguin.
Goodin, R. (1985). Protecting the vulnerable. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Greene, J. (2007). The secret joke of Kant’s soul. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology, Vol. 3: The neuroscience of morality: Emotion, disease, and development, Cambridge: MA, MIT Press.
Harmon, G. (2003). Moral philosophy meets social psychology: Virtue ethics and the fundamental attribution error. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Vol. 99, pp. 315–331), July 2003.
Mikhail, J. (2007). Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence and the future. TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences, 30, 10.
Miller, W. I. (2006). Eye for an eye. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pfaff, T. (2005). The ethics of complex contingencies. In D. Snider & L. Matthews (Eds.), The future of the army profession (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw Hill.
Volkan, V. (2006). Killing in the name of identity. Charlottesville: Pitchstone Publishing.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Sherman, N. The fate of a warrior culture. Philos Stud 144, 71–80 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9368-8
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9368-8