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The recursive nature of ownership intuitions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2023

Anat Shechter Open the ORCID record for Anat Shechter [Opens in a new window] ,
Michael Gilead  and
Yoella Bereby-Meyer Open the ORCID record for Yoella Bereby-Meyer [Opens in a new window]
Anat Shechter
Affiliation:
School of Psychological Sciences, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel anathos@post.bgu.ac.il michaelgilead@gmail.com
Michael Gilead
Affiliation:
School of Psychological Sciences, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel anathos@post.bgu.ac.il michaelgilead@gmail.com
Yoella Bereby-Meyer
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel yoellabm@gmail.com
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Abstract

The proposed model overlooks the self-referential and self-perpetuating nature of ownership intuitions. Human knowledge is primarily formed through social interaction within power dynamics. Accordingly, we suggest that legitimate ownership of one object can influence perceptions of legitimate ownership of another object. Ultimately, we argue that ownership intuitions are not independent but embedded in a self-referential system that perpetuates inequality.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e349
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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